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The
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Or the Unacceptable Lightness of "Historicism"
Davor
Marijan
War Museum, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
Abstract
The author in this
study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account
of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because
the current level of research does not enable this. The
only way to understand this conflict is through facts,
not prejudices. However, such prejudices are particularly
acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors. They base their
claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable
in its destruction. Relying on mainly unpublished and
uncited documents from the three constitutive nations
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually challenges
basic and generally accepted claims. The author offers
alternative responses to certain claims and draws attention
to the complexity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which has been mainly viewed in terms of black or white.
The author does, however, suggest that in considering
the character of the war it is necessary to examine first
the war in Croatia and the inter-relationship between
the two. The main focus is on 1992 and the Muslim and
Croat differences that developed into open conflict at
the beginning of 1993. The role of the international community
in the war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina
are also discussed.
At the end of the 20th century in Europe and the eclipse
of Communism from the world political scene, it is not
easy to trace the indelible marks left behind after the
collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued. Within
fifty years Yugoslavia ceased to exist for a second time,
this time it appears to be permanent or at least for an
indefinite period. The first of these wars, the war in
Slovenia, in contrast to the war in Croatia, and even
more so the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a serious
maneuver and not a conflict between nations and ideologies.
The intensity and brutality of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
caught the world's attention, a war taking place in civilized
Europe.
During
the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina there
were attempts to interpret its nature, which vulgarized
the conflict in terms of black and white, good and evil
akin to bad literature or B-grade films. For example,
Mustafa Imamović, professor at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo,
stated: "The aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina
was organized and planned in detail and implemented in
the spring of 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro (so-called
Yugoslavia), with the active support of Bosnian and Herzegovinian
Chetniks. At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993,
as an aggressor Croatia joined in, with the support of
the Ustashi elements within the Croatian Defense Council
(HVO)."1
Imamovićs statement captures the key element in Muslim-Bosniac
publications on the subject of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
between 1992 and 1995. This key element is in many ways
questionable. The significance of this interpretation,
especially in its most "sensitive" aspects,
of the Muslim-Croat conflict is the claim that the entire
war is understood from the perspective of the second half
of 1993.
he
war from 1991/92 to 1995 in many ways appeared to be the
continuation of nothing more than the darkness of World
War II, its conclusion determining the history of the
socialist (republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During
the Second World War each constitutive nation found itself
divided along two opposing sides, while the Bosniac-Muslims
found themselves divided into three, or four sides as
it has recently been asserted. The similarities to the
Second World War are visible also in the way in which
the conflict has been interpreted. In much the same way
as 1941 was viewed as the "defining" year in
which everything began and nothing good was occurred before
it, except for the "painful" experiences of
the victor. Now 1991 and 1992 are taken as starting points.
The period before 1991 was "difficult and unjust"
for all three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Clearly this interpretation is unfounded.
During
World War II the Serbs were separated into the Chetniks
and the Partizans. Their participation grew constantly
in the Partizans as the war closed, and in the Bosnia
and Herzegovina Partizan contingent they constituted a
majority. The Muslims spent the war mainly in the formations
of the homeguard/domobrani and the Ustashi forces of the
Independent State of Croatia (NDH). They also participated
in the local police forces under the auspices of the military
formations of the NDH, although today there is an attempt
to give them an "independent" character.2
The participation of the Muslims in the Partizans of Josip
Broz Tito was slightly lower, but it began to grow by
the end of 1942. However, there were only a few units
with Muslim majority participation, to that we can accept
the Partizan terminology to describe them as equivalent
"divisions" or infantry brigades, so that for
the sake of precision we can use the language of the regular
army.3 A
small number of Muslims found themselves in the ranks
of Serbian nationalist Chetniks, which is a paradox because
they mostly victimized Muslims during the war.
The
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the least numerous
nation during the entire war remained loyal to radical
Croatianhood, while their participation in the Partizans
was only symbolic, even when the latter mobilized on a
large scale near the end of the war.4
During the war Bosnian Croats only constituted a majority
within a single "brigade," that is an infantry
unit. Akin to the Muslim unit, this unit also carried
a national name, which was not the case for the partizan
forces in which Bosnian Serbs were a majority.
After
the Second World War, Serbs and Muslims who distinguished
themselves in the war were given the responsibility for
maintaining brotherhood and unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this context, their role and orientation during the
war between 1941-1945 was gradually "forgotten."
In contrast, the Croats were subjected to systematic repressive
measures after the war because of the side they took.5
The war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
during 1993 demonstrated the full extent of this forgetfulness.
In light of the fact that the history of socialistic Yugoslavia
is only becoming a problem for historiography, an analysis
of inter-national relations and the degree of "equality"
of the constitutive nations can be seen in the population
census. The census reveals that the percentage of Croats
after the Second World War constantly decreased, falling
from 25 percent to 17.5 percent. This fact speaks volumes
about the incongruity between the stated and reality.6
This analysis also includes the cultural position, economic
representation amongst other factors of Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. This is all necessary background to understand
the drama of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this
should be the subject of other historical studies.
The
recent decades of socialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are significant because of the articulation of a national
"sentiment" of Muslims, which unfortunately
has often been given vulgar interpretations in the social
sciences. However, the advocates of this notion are a
small "elite" segment of the population holding
out to be intellectuals. It seems that the foundation
stone of this process can be found in the Encyclopedia
Yugoslavia in the following formulation: "It seems
that the powerful tribe Bosna settled in central Bosnia
after the migrations, then a part of Roman province Dalmatia."7
Although this passage provoked a small scandal within
academic circles when it appeared, it remained a part
of the encyclopedia and is today considered the basis
of the pre-history of the Muslims. This was one of the
most foresighted moves in this region. We now can
read in The History of Bosniacs that "in the
literature there are views that the Slavs that settled
in the area of central or original Bosnia brought that
name with them, like other ancient Slavic tribes, namely
the Croats and Serbs. Therefore, from the Slavic pre-homeland,
somewhere from Karpata, the Bosna tribe lived or a tribe
older bearing the name Bosna."8
Even though such assertions are amusing to experts in
the field of medieval Bosnian history, they are published
in large numbers in popular books which have acquired
the status of "capital intellectual works,"9
comparable to the reputation of Vjekoslav Klaić's The
History of Croats shared by Croats.
Translated
into the idiom of this issue, to justify the assertion
that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country exclusively for
Muslims-Bosniacs it was necessary to find their "presence"
in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the early Middle Ages.
On this basis, a chronological projection was formulated
for Bosnia (early Middle Ages)-the Bogomils (Middle Ages)-Muslims
(Ottoman epoch)-Bosniacs (from Austria-Hungry until today).
The chronology served to grapple with historical sources
already demonstrating them as Croats or Serbs, as the
only South Slavic tribes that arrived in this area with
a degree of proto-state organization and awareness of
themselves that differentiated them from others.10
This is how medieval Bosnia became an important foundation
stone in the hastened creation of a Muslim-Bosniac historical
mosaic. The time period relating to this problem in the
last fifteen year speaks clearly about the nature of the
motives involved.11
Until recently, this issue was in principle of no concern
for Bosniac-Muslims, whose scientific interest in the
history of Bosnia and Herzegovina was limited to the 15th
century, when the Ottomans arrived in this area and the
end of medieval Bosnia. Indeed, during socialistic Yugoslavia,
this period of history was mainly of interest to Serbian
historians on both sides of the Drina river. Their work
was the extended hand of state interests in order
to demonstrate the similarities between Serbia and Bosnia.12
Croatian studies of the medieval period after 1945 were
directed towards religious and cultural issues, which
reflected political changes after the Second World War
in which it was undesirable to focus on the political
issue of mediaeval Bosnia. The rare study of this issue,
whether within a branch of historiography or not, was
exclusively along the lines of AVNOJ Yugoslavia, that
is, clearly along the borders of the republics.13
The
Eclipse of the "Idols"
The
victory of nationalist parties in the first multiparty
elections clearly demonstrates that the Communist, internationalist
Yugoslavism was a surrogate that failed to permanently
blunt nationalism, or more precisely chauvinism, which
remained dormant until its first opportunity to resurface.
The Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) brought together
a majority of the largest section of the population on
the basis of preserving 'Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate
political community, irrespective of whether it would
or in which manner be incorporated in some broader state-legal
framework' and the widest possible Islamization of 'all
aspects of life, aimed at creating a completely Islamic
society.'14
The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the party of Bosnian
Serbs that bore the same name and initials as the party
of Croatian Serbs in Croatia, harbored more ambitious
desires ideologically and numerically in relation to the
other two nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Serb
parties were part of a broader Serbian movement whose
center was in Belgrade. Its objective can be described
by the famous expression 'all Serbs in one state,' which
demonstrates the dismissal of existing republican borders
and the establishment of ethnic borders. The party of
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ) carried the same name as its counterpart party
in Croatia. It was expected to be a response to the idea
of unified Serbdom. In contrast to the largest segment
of the party leadership in the first phase of its organization,
prewar phase of its existence its supporters clearly looked
towards Zagreb and the Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tuđman.
The HDZ advocated a decentralized form of power in
Yugoslavia through the transformation of the country into
a confederation, the continuation of internal republican
borders, and in the event that the confederation failed,
the only option was the withdrawal out of Yugoslavia,
as well as the equality of the three constitutive nations.15
The parties individually sought to organize power upon
the model of trilateral separation, which analysis's at
the time pointed out that such a model was unnatural and
incompatible with democratic standards, and therefore,
dysfunctional.16
As a result, it was clear that the nationalist parties
after they appeared on the historical scene demonstrated
that their perspectives on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina
were incompatible. This should have been of no surprise
because this has been the problem in past and remains
the problem today.
War
before "war"
The
war in Croatia between 1991 and 1992 affected Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same way that it affects
Croatians. The attack on Croatia was understood as an
attack on Croats as a whole, and the Serbs as the attackers
were identified without distinction throughout Yugoslavia.
Many Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina volunteered to
fight in the war. This was also the case with Bosnian
Serbs, but in much larger numbers. They saw themselves
as the rest of the Serbs did, as the defenders of Yugoslavia.
The role of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
war on the Serbian side was mainly in the form of the
officer corps of the Yugoslav Army, new recruits beginning
their military service in the army and reservists mobilized
by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). On the Croatian side,
there were volunteers in the Croatian National Guard of
the Republic of Croatia (ZNG RH). However, it seems that
in both cases they did not constitute a significant percentage,17
particularly compared to the role of Bosnia and Herzegovina
as a staging ground for the JNA's attack on Croatia. The
Bosnian Krajina and eastern Herzegovina were the bases
for attacks on western Slavonia and southern Croatia from
the Neretva river to Prevlaka. The Commander of the Territorial
Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina (TO BH) even gave soldiers
from Bosnia and Herzegovina a supplement to their wages
without the knowledge or approval of the Presidency of
the SRBH ... from the budget of the Republican Headquarters
of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.18
At this point, the republican sovereignty of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was such that it raises the legitimate question
whether in fact it existed at all.
As
stated previously, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not in a
position to protect its local population, and to large
extent became the staging area for attacks against the
Republic of Croatia. In addition to using the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA also attacked Croats
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as witnessed by the destruction
of Croatian settlements in eastern Herzegovina. The destruction
of the village of Ravno became the symbol of suffering
of these settlements.19
Here we have the primary problem or issue, the issue for
Croatia whether Bosnia and Herzegovina was the aggressor?
Bosnia and Herzegovina became the operational area for
JNA attacks against Croatia, which was made up of members
from the local population that blindly accepted Belgrade
as the unquestionable political center. Apart from the
bordering areas inhabited by Croats (Posavina and western
Herzegovina with Livno and Tomislavgrad), the rest of
Bosnia and Herzegovina's border and deep hinterland became
a war zone with at least two operational directions. The
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina played an unfavorable
role for Croatia in extraordinary operational basis that
the JNA failed to exploit for their own strategic objectives.
This fact is very often not taken into account. The three
constitutive nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina held different
positions regarding the war in Croatia. Croats and Serbs
participated, while the Muslims tried to remain on the
side lines in accordance with Alija Izetbegović's famous
statement that 'this is not our war.'20
If
we understand Bosnia and Herzegovina as a territory that
functioned in accordance with its current territory since
the period between 1878 and 1918, and from 1945 to 1991,
then we can conclude that Bosnia and Herzegovina survived
on the basis of its special status. It is significant
that this status, which was the guarantee of its survival
(indivisibility), came from outside the borders of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
Bosnia and Herzegovina fell within the authority of a
joint ministry. In socialistic Yugoslavia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina was placed between Croatian and Serbian national
questions, which led to the emergence of the Muslim question
near the end of Yugoslavia's existence.21
At the end of the 80s the guaranteed "equality"
that held Bosnia and Herzegovina at bay began to wade,
ceasing to exist by late autumn 1991.
Precursors
of Dissolution
The
war in 1992 had its political roots in the second half
of 1991. In political terms, the Bosnian Serbs on October
24, 1991 founded the Serbian People's Assembly of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.22
On the basis of the plebiscite of a Serb nation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina held on October 9-10, 1991, the Serbian
Autonomous Region in Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed
on October 21, 1991.23
The next step was to pass the Decision on efforts towards
the establishment of the Srpska Republika of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on December 21, 1991, which was in fact founded
on January 9, 1992.24
This initiated the process of reorganizing and destroying
the central authority of republican institutions in one
section of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In addition to the Bosnian Serbs, Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina also saw the need for the reorganization within
the republic, which was being reduced on a daily basis.
Meeting in Grude on November 12, 1991, the presidents
of the crisis headquarters of the Herzegovinian and Travnik
regional communities concluded that that the Croatian
nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina must finally pass a decisive,
active policy on realizing the centuries dream of a joint
Croatian state. While this conclusion demonstrates
the strategy adopted by Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
towards the establishment of a sovereign Croatia in
her ethnic and historical (currently possible) borders,25
six days later they rejected the decisions with the Decision
on the establishment of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna.
This resolution specified that the Community ... will
respect the democratically elected government of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as the state independence
of Bosnia and Herzegovina exists in relation to former
Yugoslavia or any other Yugoslavia.26
The
Decision on the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina
passed by the republican assembly on October 15, 1991
stipulates, inter alia, that Bosnia and Herzegovina ...
will develop as a civic republic, sovereign and indivisible
state. In the conflict between Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina will remain neutral, but it can only remain
within a Yugoslav community if Serbia and Croatia also
remain.27
This resolution reflects the position of the Bosnian Muslims.
For the other two nations, this position was an anachronism.
Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina was Yugoslavia in small. The Bosnian Muslims
were neither enemies nor allies of the Croats or Serbs.
This relationship continued until April 1992 with the
turning of a new page in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On
the Threshold of War
The
period immediately before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was characterized by preparations by the parties for war.
The intensity of these preparations was not the same for
all the parties because their respective points of departures
were different. The dominant SDS as the Serbian party
received its weapons from the Serbianized JNA. The Croats
through the HDZ also received weapons, but in significantly
lower quantities than the Serbs. However, the Croats received
enough to completely erase any sense of inferiority after
the JNA disarmed the Republican Territorial Defense forces.
The Muslims were in a much more unfavorable position,
in part because they found themselves stuck between political
leaders and nations, even though they made plans for this
very early on. The Muslim Patriotic League was created
on May 2, 1991, which could then only be treated as a
party based paramilitary group. On June 10, 1991 in the
Sarajevo Police Offices (Dom) at a meeting of the leading
Bosnian officials from Yugoslavia, under the auspices
of the SDA, the Council for National Defense of the Muslim
Nation was established and the Patriotic League remained
its military component.28
The political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina resembled
the political situation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from
the era of Dragiša Cvetković and Vladko Maček, when the
political representatives29
of the Serbs and Croats sought to resolve their most important
problems while the Muslims were placed to 'one side'.
The
shared element in the 'race towards arms' was its ethnic
principle. Each party armed themselves individually. During
a military council of the Muslim Patriotic League in the
village of Mehurić near Travnik held on February 7/8,
1992, it was decided that the League had at its disposal
between 60 and 70 thousand armed members. By the end of
February, the Directive on the defense of the sovereignty
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted. The directive
specified that the Patriotic League consider that the
SDS along with the Yugoslav army and the extremist wing
of the HDZ are the destructive factors in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The directive charged the Patriotic League
with the responsibility to protect the Muslim nation,
preserve the integrity and wholeness of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and to secure the further common life of all the nations
and nationalities on the state territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Article 3 of the directive called upon the
people of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia to join our just
struggle and immediately begin the struggle to undermine
the power of the enemy and weaken their offensive capacity
on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same
time, it is necessary to establish contacts, cooperation
and coordination in joint platform with the Croatian nation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the common enemy.30
Compared to the beginning of the month when the decision
referred to the "extremist wing of the HDZ,"
this was large step forward.
The
War
After
the relaxation of military activity in Croatia at the
beginning of 1992, it was feasible to consider that the
conditions for separating the front lines could be separated
along republican, that is state borders. However, this
was not possible primarily because the war in Croatia
had not ended, but only a cease-fire was in place. The
secession of parts of Croatia inhabited by Serbs were
not incorporated into the legal system of the Republic
of Croatia. As a result, the state borders in parts of
Lika, Banovine and Kordun could not become state borders.
The
withdrawal of the JNA to Bosnia and Herzegovina began
in the summer of 1991, and the withdrawal of the 14th
and 30th Corps from Slovenia and the 10th and 13th Corps
from Croatia officially should have continued. Two groups
can be identified in the withdrawal of the JNA. While
one group withdrew from areas in which it had no physical
contact (14th and 30th Corps), a part went over the border
into Bosnia and Herzegovina and continued with its military
activities against Croatia.
The
process of opening the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began
after the relaxation of the conflict in Croatia. Even
at this point the strategy of the Serbian JNA was clear
that it wanted to solve the two problems separately and
to avoid two fronts along separate lines. They examined
their experiences in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in
time, and considered that a difficult situation is forthcoming
for members of the army and that they have to begin with
an evacuation on more secure grounds.31
The
early phase of the war is illustrated by the assessment
of the Command of 2nd VO, which states that: After
the recognition of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina
by the European Community, the United States and other
states, this republic was exposed to war with unforeseen
tragic consequences. The escalation of the international
armed conflict on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
resulted in general mayhem, chaos, fear and panic by people
in various towns and villages. The situation is totally
unclear, conflictual and in the final analysis completely
unpredictable. Various armed groups and armed civilians
control certain counties, cities and settlements. Murders
and mass killings are becoming frequent occurrences, extensive
destruction, imprisonment and maltreatment, suffering
and theft and crimes of all sorts are occurring. On the
entire area not a single political-state institution is
functioning, apart from the JNA. Life it totally paralyzed.
Hunger, social deprivation and all the other scourges
of war are apparent.32
Nothing could be added to this assessment except that
the cause of this human drama was the Serbianized JNA.
As
expected, parts of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina became
the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, which gave them
an incomparable advantage in the war.33
At the end of May, existing forces and materiel and technical
resources of the JNA were transformed into the Army of
the Srpska Republika of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They retained
similar operational structures in the previous zones of
responsibility and their names were changed during the
month of May and the beginning of June in accordance with
their new terminology.34
Although they had overwhelming superiority in MTSes (materiel
and technical resources, MTS), the Bosnian Serbs encountered
problems in human resources and with parts of its officer
corps. They especially encountered problems with the latter
when General Ratko Mladić in September 1992 complained
that from 4206 soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the Army of the Srpska Republika, only 900 joined, which
was half the required soldiers for the needs of the Bosnian
Serb army.35
Between
Objectives and Success
From
Serbian ethnic areas in which the MTS and the JNA withdrew
to from Slovenia and Croatia between 1991 and 1992, the
war for mapping out Serbian ethnic space began. The quickest
successes were made in eastern Bosnia in areas with Muslim
majorities. In southwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina, apart
from the successes in Kupres, the JNA suffered a double
failure in Croatian areas around Livno. Suffering these
losses, the JNA tried to take Sarajevo and the Neretva
basin. At the end of March, difficult and long battles
for the Bosnian Posavina began. In the area of the Bosanska
krajina where there was no military resistance, the practice
of ethnic cleansing and the establishment of concentration
camps began, which spread to other parts of the Srpska
Republika of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It
seems that in the first phase of the war the JNA, or rather
from May 21, 1992 the Army of the Srpska Republika of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempted to quickly take as much
territory as possible by mobile infantry without utilizing
lines accessible by tank. On areas that the land-mechanized
infantry were unable to dominate, whether because of the
terrain or organized resistance, their success was greatly
reduced. After this, it required a great deal of effort
and manpower and MTSes to be successful, as demonstrated
in Bosanska Posavina and Jajce.
In
an address on the results and the status of the armed
forces, the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Srpska
Republika estimated that they had achieved ... significant
results which could be described as follows:
- The
Army of the Srpska Republika successfully took control
of the front held by the JNA in former Bosnia and Herzegovina
and defended the Serbian nation.
- Responded
to efforts by destructive forces of Yugoslavia to destroy
and eliminate the Serbian nation in the former Bosnia
and Herzegovina or to reduce them to second-class citizens.
- Prevented
the occupation of territory belonging to the Srpska
Republika, and stopped Ustashe units advancing along
the wide front on the River Drina.
- Repelled
many offensive efforts by the Croatian-Muslim coalition,
assisted by the regular forces of Croatia and other
Western European and Islamic countries in an attempt
to deblockade Sarajevo through Herzegovina and to cut
off the corridor.
- Operation
"Corridor" destroyed Ustashi units in Posavina
and Semberia and the operation opened a territorial
link with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
rest of the Srpska Republika ....
- Due
to the heroic resistance and high level of consciousness
of the Serbian nation, as well as the determination
of the political and military leadership of the Srpska
Republika to continue the struggle to defend Serbianhood
and the creation of our state on the land of our forefathers,
we have achieved a situation in which for the first
time since the arrival of our forefathers in these areas
we have realize our goals to remain on our own and create
a democratic community in which all the standards of
civilization and the rights of individuals and citizens
are respected.36
In
response to the Serbs, in the first phase of the war the
Croats and Muslims sought to consolidate their defense
positions. In this context, the significance of Croatian
successes has greater strategic relevance than those of
the JNA for the following basic reasons.37
The Croat successes were important for both threatened
nations because they connected them to Croatia as logistics
and support base. The military activities of the Croatian
army, or more accurately the Croatian National Guard (ZNG),
along the northern and southern borders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in cooperation with the HVO, directly benefited
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the hinterland.
It assisted the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina because
the military activities disrupted lines held by the Bosnian
Serb army and they enabled logistics and humanitarian
supplies to get through. In this respect, this important
aspect seems to be forgotten not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but also in Croatia.
The
fall of Bosanska Posavina carries the "pall"
of a political agreement since the autumn of 1992, a betrayal
which is based on the claim that despite a propitious
position, Franjo Tudjman through parallel command channels,
ignoring the General Headquarters of the Croatian Army,
ordered the withdrawal of the Croatian Army and the HVO
from parts of Bosanska Posavina. This enabled Serbian
forces from the direction of Banja Luka and Bijeljina
to merge and establish a corridor as the vital communication
link between Serbia and parts of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina under Serbian para-authority.38
However, without a detailed analysis it is undesirable
to draw any far-reaching conclusions. We are of the opinion
that Posavina was too demanding for the Croatian Army
and HVO. The command structure was a questionable element,
as was the tactic of deploying a large number of armed
troops that had difficulty in reaching a level of unity
in the spiritual sense. Within the HVO, which at the time
resembled more a police force, there were significant
problems of disinterest amongst soldiers in acting outside
their own areas, especially after they were lost in battle.
The Army of the Srpska Republika mainly used armored and
mechanized troops inherited from the former JNA, whose
value was in heavy firepower and good maneuverability.
These troops were not identified in time by Croatian army
intelligence, which was a significant mistake because
they included 16 mtbr. and 1 okbr which were of the highest
quality troops of the 1st Krajiški Corps.39
This was particularly important for the armored brigades
because of areas assessable by tank, but it seems that
the overwhelming success of the Army of the Srpska Republika
was achieved by armored and artillery, so that the opponent
could not strike back.40
In the discussions of the battle for Posavina there are
only partial analyses that elide over the fact that battles
along the southern front where also taking place and that
parts of the operative armed forces were dispersed along
the areas under the control of rebel Croatian Serbs. In
addition, the Croatian Army underwent great changes with
the reduction of ten infantry brigades.41
Operation
Vrbas 92, which involved a strengthened 30th Krajiški
division of the Army of the Srpska Republika,42
after months of battle, took Jajce, developed in part
parallel with the battle for Posavina. The operation demonstrated
unambiguously the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs were
dependent on armory and tanks and that it was limited
in its successes when it relied on infantry troops. Naturally,
the conflict between the HVO and the Muslims also affected
the battle. However, the suggestion that a joint Croatian-Bosniac
defense coalition collapsed in large part because of political
intrigues within the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reflects
more the position(s) of the author(s) than a true analysis
of the facts.43
With
the fall of Jajce and Bosanska Posavina, HVO's war with
the Army of the Srpska Republika literally came to a close.
The defense of Livno, parts of the Vrbas valley and parts
of Central Bosnia, especially the successes in the Neretva
valley, crowned by operation Dawn of June,44
meant that the HVO came to a stalemate with the Serbs.
After this there were only battles for positioning, erupting
occasionally around Usora and parts of the Posavina battle-lines.
Several meetings between the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs
and Croats outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not lead
to any concrete steps forward.45
To summarize events in 1991 on the side of the Croats,
the Head of the Main Headquarters of HVO concluded that
the forces of HVO, in addition to the problems and
difficulties under its control, successfully held 70 percent
of the free territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that
the creation of its armed forces on the area of the Croatian
Community of Herceg-Bosna, the Croatian nation defended
... itself and the largest part of the Muslims.46
The
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the least reason to
be satisfied. At the end of 1992 it had the worst relationship
between their size and the territory under its control.47
Efforts
by representatives of the international community to end
the war resulted in the well known Vance-Owen plan at
the beginning of 1993. This plan transformed Bosnia and
Herzegovina into ten provinces. The basis of the plan
was the situation on the ground. It seems that the Croats
and Serbs were satisfied with the territory under their
control. Areas in Central Bosnia that was under the control
of mixed units Operative Zone HVO Central Bosnia and the
3rd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the
delimitation into provinces, this problem was to be resolved.
The HVO in the early days of January 1993, believing that
the war was over, undertook measures to fulfill its obligations
arising from the Geneva Conference. The HVO also requested
plans of minefields and assessments of necessary manpower
to control the extant front-lines.48
The National Assembly of the Srpska Republika passed on
December 17, 1992 a Declaration on the end of the war
that, inter alia, concluded that the ethnic-religious
war in former Bosnia and Herzegovina has ended and that
the Serbian nation has defended its independence and sovereign
state-the Srpska Republika.49
Under
these circumstances it can be asserted without reservation
that the Croats were satisfied with their situation in
the spring (more accurately the winter, author's note)
of 1993 and the Croats had no reason to open a conflict
with the Bosniacs.50
The conflict that erupted in mid-January 1993 is rarely
a good basis to hide the true causes of the conflict,
two irreconcilable political concepts about the future
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
War
within "War"
The
Muslim-Croat conflict that continued throughout 1993 had
its causes in the early days of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The SJB (Office for Public Security) in Bugojno
delivered ammunition only to Muslim members of the special
police forces, along with instructions that they hide
their stash from Croatian members of the force. In Gornji
Vakuf relations between Croats and Muslims were tense.
Although these two sentences may be apt descriptions of
the situation by the end of 1992 and the beginning of
1993, they were written on April 1, 1992 in the regular
daily report by the "impartial" Command of the
30th Partizan Division of the JNA, which immediately before
the conflict erupted had the Kupres plateau zone of responsibility,
the river Vrbas to the broader area of Janja.51
The
suspicious relations noted by the military intelligence
of the 30th Partizan Division was a regular pattern in
the areas in which there was a rough balance between two
or more nations, that is in areas where the size of one
nation was not large enough to dominate over another.
In such areas one nation was not able to dominate convincingly
on another. In this sense, we can assert that in principle
two types of national composition existed in principle
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, areas with a balance and areas
that were ethnically clear in which one "constitutive"
nation had an obvious majority. The conflicts that erupted
in 1992 turned into open war in such areas, more specifically
Central Bosnia.52
The only exception to this "principle" was the
conflict in Sarajevo in the settlement of Stup, where
the small Croatian oasis in an area populated mainly by
Muslims.
It
seems that in the Uskoplje area, around Gornji Vakuf,
the first incidents between the HVO and the Territorial
Defense occurred at the end of April. They reoccurred
on June 20 and 21, 1992.53
At the beginning of May, a conflict erupted in Busovača,54
which reoccurred the following month.55
In Novi Travnik on the afternoon of June 19, 1992 a conflict
between units of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defense
and units from the HVO and the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS).56
Inter-ethnic tensions increased also in Konjic,57
which led to conflicts by the end of August in Kiseljak.
However, in the first phase of the Muslim-Croat tensions
August 17, 1992 has a special significance. On this day,
units of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina
attacked the Croatian village of Stup in Sarajevo. This
incident differed from previous incidents on a local level
because of its impact on Croats in Sarajevo and raises
the important question about the origin of such an action.58
The
chronology of the conflict between HVO and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina that is known widely in the public
begins with events in Prozor. It was preceded by tensions
that lasted throughout October between the HVO and the
Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Central
Bosnia, but primarily in Travnik. Tensions were lifted
by Sarajevo Television after it broadcast a special "Documentary"
on alleged massacres of Territorial Defense soldiers in
the village of Lješač, while in fact the pictures were
actually of members of the HVO from Travnik. The massacre
occurred on May 15, 1992 in Vlašić, committed against
HVO members by Chetnik forces. Following this there was
gunfire and armed attacks against members of HVO officer
corps from Central Bosnia and their colleagues in the
village of Rastovci, in the county of Novi Travnik. In
the village of Karaula members of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina fired at the car of the HVO Commander of Jajce.59
A conflict of words between HVO and the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina over a petrol pump in Novi Travnik leads
to the murder of the Commander of the Travnik Brigade
along the Travnik-Vitez route. The local commander of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had declared that it
was 'either the Petrol station or war.'60
The HVO accused members of the 7th Muslim Brigade for
the murder.61
The
deterioration of security in the Central Bosnia Operative
Zone frequently spread from Gornji Vakuf to the edges
of areas along the Operative Zone North-western Herzegovina.62
The HVO General Headquarters on October 21, 1992 reported
that in Gornji Vakuf and Prozor the situation is tense
and that at any moment a conflict could break out ...
in relation to the new situation in parts of the operative
zone all measures will be undertaken to preserve security
to prevent any conflict between HVO and OS of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially in Gornji Vakuf and Prozor.63
The
conflict occurred in fact on October 23, 1992 and ended
with the total defeat of the local forces of the Army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The claim that HVO prepared
a surprise attack against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in Prozor is very "courageous," and it is based
purely on prejudice.64
At a meeting between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
held on November 6, 1992 in Jablanica, representatives
of the latter accepted the HVO request to replace its
commander of the County Defense Headquarters in Prozor.65
This is a fact that is not insignificant in analyzing
the conflict.66
The
other main problem in relations between HVO and the Army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the existence of two parallel
political and military structures in the central areas
of Bosnia and north-western Herzegovina. They are a reflection
of deeply held distrust and divergent perspectives on
the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The relevant issue
for historians is to answer the question of what where
the efforts of SDA and HDZ to resolve this problem?
This
problem is well illustrated in statement by a member of
the war presidency of the County Assembly (SO) of Novi
Travnik: The fundamental problem in Novi Travnik is
the existence of two authorities, the HVO and ours, as
well as the regular one. This has led to collisions and
conflict. And they will reoccur in the future. They do
not allow the President of the Government to enter the
County without his identification being controlled. It
is better to separate. We will fight again. There were
various proposals that the Muslims and Croats form their
own governments. We have tried to give each nation an
equal number of members in the government.67
The
issue of parallel authorities was a crucial problem for
Croatian-Muslim relations in Central Bosnia, an area where
the conflict escalated. Examining the causes of the conflict
in Prozor, the Commander of the Operative Zone North-western
Herzegovina correctly concluded that the only preventive
measure to avoid such conflicts was to end the existence
of two command structures, two armies, and two logistics,
etc.68
A similar view was expressed by the Commander of the 17th
Krajiška Brigade of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
assessing that one of the problems in the failure to defend
Jajce was the problem that a single town was defended
by two command structures.69
However, the most widely known attempt to resolve the
problem of parallel authority was the order by the Minister
of Defense of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on
January 15, 1993. This order was interpreted in a recent
book about this issue in following terms: "The Minister
of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina Božo Rajić (HDZ)
ordered that in the operative zone in areas covered by
provinces 3, 8 and 10 (Posavina, Herzegovina with Livno-Duvno
areas, parts of central Bosnia with Travnik and Lašva)
units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina submit to
the Main Headquarters, which was rejected by the former."70
A similar interpretation can be found in the Hrvatski
leksikon.71
For the sake of historical truth, we have to state that
such an interpretation cannot be supported. The order
under examination consists of 9 points, but only point
2 is discussed. In point 1, the order stipulates that
"all units of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO),
which find themselves in the areas under provinces 1,
5 and 9, which are defined as Muslim provinces under the
Geneva agreement fall under the command of the Main Headquarters
of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.72
While the editors of the Hrvatski leksikon could be excused
because of superficial and lack of understanding of the
problem, this could not be said of the compiler of the
chronology for the collection of essay The War in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995 because in one
of the essays there is, although rare, an accurate interpretation
of the order.73
From
the military perspective the order was uncontroversial.
It was an unsuccessful attempt to define the zone of responsibility
and authority after both sides had a clearer picture of
its position in time, space and most importantly, objectives.
However, it seems that this is precisely the reason that
it was rejected by one side and why the politicians responded
as they did with a focus on the military component.
The
third major issue in Muslim-Croat relations was provoked
by the third party, the Serbs with their occupation efforts
and practice of ethnic cleansing. The shear mass of refugees
and displaced persons from areas under the control of
the Army of the Srpska Republika into Muslim-Croat areas.
A part went to Croatia and further abroad, while males
competent for military service remained. In this way,
the ethnic structure was changed, especially in the mixed
areas in Central Bosnia that lead to a new balance of
power between Croats and Muslims. A majority of refugees
came from rural areas into urban settings, bringing with
them a different approach and way of life. Cities in ethnically
mixed areas had an experience with multi-ethnicity, which
was not in principle the case in the villages.74
The changes to the ethnic structure strengthened the position
of the Muslims. The HVO was aware of this, and the HVO
in Gornji Vakuf adopted a characteristically undefined
political position about the future, stated in one of
its reports from mid-June 1992 that after a second conflict
with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina within two months,
that in our area there are approximately 12,000 refugees
from D. Vakuf (all of Muslim nationality) with a large
number in military service, so that the further that they
arm themselves, they represent a danger to our county
and the neighboring counties (Bugojno, Novi Travnik, Travnik).
We conclude that we their primary enemies, and only then
the Chetniks.75
After local Muslim-Croat conflicts, one of the first Croatian
demands was for the withdrawal of foreigners from county
areas.76
A
Lack of Tact
One
of the most interesting issues of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the problem of cooperation between HVO
and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the struggle
against the JNA, or rather, the Army of the Srpska Republika.
In the main part, the greatest degree of cooperation began
after the Washington Agreements of March 18, 1994.
The
most interesting and intriguing period before that was
1992. In the first months of the war both sides were concerned
with establishing their armed forces. Croatia literally
tried to create something out of nothing by relying minimally
on the former republican structure of territorial defense,
while the Mulsim-Bosniac inherited elements of the Territorial
Defense with a strengthening of the officer corps with
those that left the JNA. The main problem in relations
between HVO and the Territorial Defense, or rather the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was exactly the officer
corps, which included elements who had fought in the war
in Croatia against the Croatian nation.77
Within HVO, part of the officer corps also had experience
in the war in Croatia, naturally on the other side. Both
sides, unsurprisingly, were suspicious towards each other.
After
the signing of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation
between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republic of Croatia in Zagreb on July 21, 1992, conditions
for cooperation between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were created.78
It was not until autumn of 1992 that an effort towards
cooperation was made. The factor that stood in the way
was differing views on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A demonstrative example is the unsuccessful meeting between
civil and military representatives of Gornji-Vrbas and
Lašva region held on August 15, 1992 in Travnik. An agreement
wasn't reached because of mutual Croat-Muslim recrimination
about Muslim unitarism and the role of Croatian responsibility
for the situation in the region. In his conclusion in
a report of the meeting, the representative of the County
Headquarters of HVO Gorni Vakuf stipulated that the President
of the Assembly of the Travnik County stated that where
Serbs and Muslims lived, Muslims suffered, where Croats
and Serbs lived, Croats suffered, and where Croats and
Muslims live, both are alive and well, but without an
agreement.79
The
nature of this cooperation seems to be described aptly
in a report of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia about
impressions from the first meetings between the highest
official representatives of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and HVO in Sarajevo. The head of the Main Headquarters
of HVO complained that the Presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
not contacted as yet the Main Headquarters of the HVO.
Petkovic brings forth the fact that the Main Headquarters
was not contacted by telephone, or that any thing else
was done. On the other side, the Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and organs of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
contacted the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) from Ljubuški,
which has 180 soldiers, which is the equivalent of a company.
As he stated, you are sending your people to Ljubuški
to contact Blaz Kraljević without my knowledge and in
my zone of responsibility. In the future we will arrest
anyone entering our zone of responsibility without my
knowledge. You have invited Kraljević and Primorac, and
they have attended meetings in Sarajevo, but you didn't
invite anyone from HVO. If you want to continue working
on a joint defense you have to respect our results and
us. When and how the politicians agree to a joint command,
the HVO will respect that.80
The Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina met on November 1, 1992 in Zagreb to discuss
cooperation. The meeting resulted in a joint command,
headed by Colonel Jaganjac and General Praljak. Time demonstrated
that this was not acceptable, mainly within the ranks
of the Bosniac-Muslim side.81
In
discussing efforts to promote Croat-Muslim cooperation,
there seems to be the false and baseless impression that
only the HOS stood for cooperation as a mixed armed group
made up of Croats and Muslims. In this respect, it viewed
that the murder of the Commander of HOS Blaž Kraljević
on August 2, 1992 was the advocate of a Croat-Bosniac
alliance.82
This view "converts" the media's problematical
HOS from the war in Croatia as a group into a group whose
dissolution is greatly regretted. The Serbian perspective
on this problem is illustrated well by the assessment
of the command of the 30th Partizan Division at the beginning
of 1992, in which he concludes that the HOS ... is considered
as the most extremists part of the Croatian forces, even
Tuđman has distanced himself from them, but they are still
sent to the front lines.83
However, the HOS did not act as a united formation on
the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Section
of the State Security Service in Zenica at the end of
June 1992 estimated that HOS is the extended hand of HVO
in the area of Novi Travnik. In the June 19 conflict,
HOS took part on the side of HVO.84
The
Guilty and Prejudices
In
analyzing the contemporary historical process is an extremely
difficult task. If that process, such as the "story
of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is not complete, then
it is even more difficult. Contemporary historiography
in many respects is specialized in relation to the study
of earlier periods. Due to technological advances, generally
high levels of literacy and the emergence of new media,
the contemporary period there are ample documents with
an abundance of facts and information. On the one hand,
this enables unprecedented access to local and apparently
less important historical levels. On the other hand, the
sheer number of facts carries with it the constant danger
of selective analysis, focusing on only the minimum number
of selected arguments to "firmly" prove a desired
image. So there is a legitimate question whether it is
at desirable to wait for "historical distance"
of 30 to 50 years after which the archives are opened,
and when the "story" from the perspective of
the participants, journalists and publicists refined prejudices
are mercilessly unwrapped and turned into a "witch
hunt."
All
that is necessary is to look at Croatian or Muslim-Bosniac
press to see what the problem is. In mid-March of 2000,
we find in the widely circulated Globus weekly an article
about the formation and the command structure of HVO and
read, inter alia, that Mate Boban's decision on establishing
the Croatian Arms in Bosnia and Herzegovina was made ...
as early as 1991, and that in June 1991 an improvised
Main Headquarters was established. The journalist erred
for one year that the General Headquarters of HVO General
M. Petković under international pressure was replaced
in the second half of 1993 by General Slobodan Praljak.
In fact, General Praljak was named the commander of HVO,
while General Petković further remained the Head of the
Main Headquarters. That General Praljak after the destruction
of the Old Bridge in Mostar did not initiate an investigation,
which is inaccurate because he could no longer initiate
such an investigation because he was no longer the Commander
of HVO. That General Praljak as the Commander of HVO was
replaced by General Stanko Matić, which is not accurate
because that former General Major of the JNA was the assistant
head of the Main Headquarters of HVO at the time that
General Praljak departed. That the command "confusion"
within HVO mistook Janko Bobetko, Four Star General of
the Croatian Army as the Commander of the Southern Command.
It is sufficient to look at All My Battles that
General Bobetko at the end of 1993, the relevant time
under discussion, was the head of the Main Headquarters
of the Croatian Army for almost a year.85
This
example is mentioned because it relates to the most transparent
element of a military organization. Moreover, the organization
can be reconstructed on the basis of civilian and military
newspapers, which are available to the widest possible
audience in institutions such as the National University
Library in Zagreb.
The
majority of publications referred to in this analysis
fall within the category of cultivated Muslim-Bosniac
publicity that does not reflect the formal qualifications
of the author. So, in the case of Brigadier General Hasan
Efendia, former JNA officer and the first Commander of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, his book Who Defended
Bosnia? is far more authoritative than that of the professional
historian Dr. Smail Čekić's Aggression against Bosnia
and the Genocide against Bosniacs 1991-1993.86
The
publication The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
1991-1995 is the last to appear on the topic of war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from the authoritative
article by the historian M. A. Hoare, attention should
be given to the chronology of the war. Although we have
mentioned some of the questionable aspects of this chronology,
it is worthwhile to examine another flaw.
We
can read that on December 18, 1992 the HVO assumed authority
on all the areas under its control: it dissolved the
lawful county assembly, replaced the mayors and members
of the local administration who were against confrontation
with the Bosniacs, disarmed the remaining Bosniac soldiers
(except in Posavina). The HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are largely homogenized and powerful political
opponents.87
Although we were unable to verify the first claim,88
the second one is a total fabrication. Multiethnic forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina really only existed in the HVO,
primarily because in the operative zones of South-eastern
Herzegovina and Bosanska Posavina.89
To the ultimatum of the 1st Brigade of HVO, the Command
of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina responded in mid-April 1993, inter alia, with
the following words: We remind you that you are well
aware that a large number of soldiers from the Muslim
ranks are within your armed forces, and they are Muslims
and belong to this nation, so it would be undesirable
to damage the existing organization and formation of your
units.90
After June 30, 1993 betrayal of a group of Muslims soldiers
in HVO, the Northern camp military base collapsed and
the 2nd Brigade of HVO was dissolved. This incident accelerated
the process of disarmament of distrusted soldiers,91
which was completed only by the end of 1993, except for
the area of Orašje.
It
seems that the intention of the compiler of the chronology
was to show that a confrontation between HVO and the Army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unavoidable from the beginning
of 1993. The period between April 1992 and January 1993
was the relevant period to study the political and military
tensions between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
or more accurately, HDZ and SDA. During this period the
Republic of Croatia made repeated, but unsuccessful efforts
to move these relations from a dead letter.92
At
the end we should focus on some aspects of the war for
the period between January 1993 and the end of 1995. Some
of the issues that need to be addressed before a "serious"
assessment can be made are, inter alia, the following:
There
are three constitutive nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The question is how to confront the fact that one of the
nations from the very beginning of the war had an undisclosed
intention to destroy the state? The next question relates
to the fact that this was also sought by two of three
nations, and not necessarily always the same two.93
If
three constitutive nations are at war with each other,
does this mean that it is appropriate to describe the
conflict as a civil war? The next difficulty is to describe
the involvement of neighboring countries. The Republic
of Croatia has been described as an aggressor because
it assisted HVO with logistics and manpower. At certain
points of the war, Croatia assisted logistically the Army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and permitted the organization
of its army on Croatian territory.94
The 1st Volunteers Regiment "King Tomislav"
actually became formally part of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, that is, the Territorial Defense.95
From the perspective of the Bosnian Serbs, this was an
act of aggression. From the perspective of HVO, Croatia
could be criticized. Croatia could also be criticized
because the largest number of "holy warriors"
in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived through Croatia. With
a good dose of irony about the question of Croatia's aggression
against Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could it be suggested
that Croatia was the aggressor because rebel Croatian
Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina assisted the
Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1992 in battles for the
Bosanska Posavina. The HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina have the same attitude toward the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ).
What
is the role of the international community? What is the
significance of the infamous UN Security Council Resolution
713 on the embargo on the supply of arms and military
supplies to all the republics of the SFRY?96
Does this resolution have any moral responsibility and
represent the direct assistance of the better armed side,
the Army of the Srpska Republika? Does this mean that
the world (the Great Powers) from the perspective of HVO
and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina took part in the
war along side the Army of the Srpska Republika against
the other two constitutive nations?97
Did not the international community by accepting the reality,
that is, the reality on the ground, place the foundation
stone of partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina firmly in
the ground?98
Amongst these issues belong also the unanswered questions
about the visit of the late President of the French Republic
and the UN "safe havens."99
Was
there a war against or in Bosnia and Herzegovina?100
If we accept the proposition that the war was against
Bosnia and Herzegovina, does this not mean that one nation
is more "foundational" that the other two? Does
this mean that the aggression was committed from outside
the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina? This means that
the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SRJ) are treated equally responsible. Under this interpretation,
it is forgotten that the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina had a common war zone around Bihaa, so
that the position of Croatia is significantly different
to that of the SRJ towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.101
And where is the (dis)honorable role of the United Nations
Security Council and the international community, whose
shadow passed like a nightmare over the ruble of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia?
We
are of the view that the war was both against and
in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was sanctioned by the international
community. The Army of the Srpska Republika in trying
to occupy as much territory as possible committed ethnic
cleansing and egregious crimes. The armed forces of the
other two constitutive nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina
committed noticeably less war crimes. However, it is demonstrative
that HVO is treated on the same level as the Army of the
Srpska Republika, while the role of the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is whitewashed. However, facts do not
support this scenario. The HVO and the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina have shared elements: they both have a
war against the other two constitutive nations; an attack
on the territorial integrity of the state; assistance
from abroad; ethnic cleansing; destruction of property
of the enemy; concentration camps and war crimes. Is the
"generally-accepted advantage" of the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina over the HVO only in a name?
NOTES
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andrić's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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