View
on the Current Situation in Kosovo
Tome
Batkovski
ABSTRACT
The newly established
situation in Kosovo, after the conclusion of NATO air
strikes against Yugoslavia, has not resolved the open
issues but, instead, introduced new questions in regard
to internal, regional and European positions of Kosovo
and Yugoslavia, questions which will in the long term
be a burden on the security situation in the explosive
"Balkan powder keg". The first priority in Kosovo
is a speedy and effective implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1244, which will present a serious
test for the international community. Results here will
affect success in various moves for reconciliation in
a variety of conflicts. On the Kosovo political scene,
the main struggle in Albanian political bodies will be
between representatives of former UCK-Tachists, which
are characterized as extremists, and the moderate forces
of the DSK, led by Ibrahim Rugova. In peacetime conditions,
the moderate forces are slowly and effectively making
political gains, and are more familiar with international
community positions on multiethnic and multireligious
entities as opposed to autonomy. In the area of security,
serious threats might emerge from the former commanders
in the paramilitary UCK formations, who are dissatisfied
with their positions in the newly established transition
government and civil administration.
The
end of the NATO military campaign against the former Yugoslavia
during the Kosovo crisis, and the deployment of KFOR forces
into the Kosovo territory subsequent to the withdrawal
of Yugoslav military and police forces signify a definite
beginning of the democratic resolution of the problems
in this part of the Balkans. However, these developments
present many questions in regard to Kosovo, Yugoslavia,
the region, and Europe as a whole, which will present
a burden on the long-term security in the explosive "Balkan
powder keg". Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, adopted by
the UN Security Council on June 10, 1999, represents the
basis for and, at the same time, the most appropriate
way of reaching a just and proper solution to the Kosovo
crisis.
Therefore,
having in mind the political, military administrative,
and socio-pathological elements in Kosovo, let us address
the essential provisions of this document in order to
reach relevant conclusions about the security mosaic in
this troubled region.
Security
Council Resolution 1244
Resolution
1244 on Kosovo, adopted by the Security Council, takes
as a starting point the following premises: "preserving
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and of other states in the region, under
the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2: reaffirming the request
for substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo
in the real sense of the word: confirmation that the situation
in the region continues to present a threat to international
peace and security, and presents 21 points (decisions,
requests, obligatory directions) in which it is:
-
requested that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately
put a verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo
and commence and complete verifiable phased withdrawal
from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary
forces according to a quick schedule (point 3);
-
confirmed that after the withdrawal, the agreed number
of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will
be allowed to return to Kosovo in order to perform the
functions in accordance with Annex 2 (point 4);
-
decides that civilian and security presence be deployed
in Kosovo, under UN auspices and welcomes the acceptance
of this presence by FRY (point 5);
-
requests the Secretary-General, in agreement with the
Security Council, to appoint a special representative
who will control the application of international civilian
presence (point 6);
-
authorizes member states and relevant international
organizations to establish presence of international
security forces in Kosovo, as stated in point 4 of Annex
2 (point 7);
-
confirms the necessity to deploy effective international
civilian and security forces in Kosovo and requests
the parties to fully cooperate in their deployment (point
8);
-
decides that the responsibilities of the international
security presence deployed and operating in Kosovo shall
include: deterrence of renewed hostilities; demilitarization
of KLA and other armed groups of Kosovo Albanians; establishment
of a safe environment for the refugees and displaced
persons to return safely and so that transitional administration
may be established and humanitarian aid may be provided;
carrying out duties for the necessary monitoring of
the borders; ensuring protection and freedom of movement
for itself, the international civilian presence and
other international organizations; ensuring public security
and peace until international civilian presence undertakes
the responsibility for this task (point 9);
-
authorizes the Secretary General to establish international
civil presence in Kosovo in order to ensure interim
administration for Kosovo according to which people
in Kosovo may enjoy significant autonomy within Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (point 10);
-
main responsibilities of the civil presence will include
promotion of the establishment, until final resolution,
of significant autonomy and self-government in Kosovo,
fully taking into account annex 2 and the Rambouillet
Agreement; enabling of a political process intended
to determine the future Kosovo status, taking into account
the Rambouillet Agreement; ensuring safe and free return
of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes
in Kosovo (point 11);
-
requests KLA and other armed groups of Kosovo Albanians
to immediately stop all offensive activities and to
respect the terms for demilitarization stated by the
chief of international security presence in consultation
with the special representative of the Secretary General
(point 15);
-
requests all states in the region to fully cooperate
in the application of all aspects in this resolution
(point 18);
-
decides that the civil and security presence be established
first for a period of 12 months and to further continue
unless otherwise decided by the Security Council (point
19);
The
adoption of this document represents a serious and heavy
burden on the UN representing the international community,
as well as a significant responsibility in respect to
the necessity of its quick and qualitative implementation.
On the other hand, it may be said that this is a test
for the UN, which will determine its future success and
international rating in the 21st century; that is, whether
the proper direction and means for finding a solution
to the Kosovo crisis (and similar crises in the future
in Europe and other continents) have been taken, and,
if taken, whether the UN has efficient means and forces
available for its realization.
Albanian
Nationalism
One
of the most significant issues which should be taken into
consideration when beginning an analysis and assessment
of the Kosovo crisis is the "constants" of Albanian
nationalism, which this author presents and elaborates
upon in his book "Albanian Nationalists' Game In
Macedonia", published in Skopje, 1994. The book addresses
the subjects of territorial, ethnic, and ideological homogeneity,
anti-Slavs, resistance to any type of Yugoslav state,
the involvement of third forces which take advantage of
the idea of Greater Albania to further personal goals,
and the involvement of the state of Albania as the center
and promoter of the idea of Greater Albania.
-
territorial homogeneity - the objective set for
the creation of "Greater Albania", which would
extend to the territories of present Albania, Macedonia
(Kumanovo, Skopje, Titov Veles, Prilep, Bitola, Resen,
Ohrid, Struga, Kicevo, Debar, Gostivar, and Tetovo),
Serbia (Kosovo and Metohia, Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje,
Novi Pazar, and Tutin) and Montenegro (Ulcinj, Bar,
Titograd, Rozaj, Plav, and Gusinje) as well as the Cemeria
area in Greece. Actually, it is the issue of spacial
national integration that strongly activates Albanian
nationalism, with reliance on Albania. Since the realization
of this formula endangers neighboring nations and states,
it inevitably leads to conflicts with them. Thereby,
a brief look at the territories encompassed in the projection
of "Greater Albania" indicates that the most
endangered area is Macedonia, because the aspirations
include more than a half of its present territory;
-
ethnic homogeneity implies collection of all
Albanians into a "Greater Albania" and is
one of the main components of the maxim "one state-one
nation-one language". The retroactivity of this
constant is seen on many levels. First, this tendency
leads inevitably to the isolation of the Albanian nation
and interrupts the many established links in all areas
with neighboring nations and states; that is, with the
members of other nations in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro,
which in the long-term is detrimental to the development
of the Albanian nation itself; second, the implementation
of this tendency leads to efforts to achieve an enormous
birthrate within the Albanian nation on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, to various measures, most often
brutal, intended to decrease the numbers of other nations
considered not to belong to the "historically pure
Albanian territories", which represents a step
toward fascism; third, the strong emotional bond with
the members of one's own nation, which is implied by
this constant, necessarily leads to hatred between nations,
clashes, and tragic consequences in the long-run.
-
idealogical homogeneity - the basic criterion
in determining who is a true Albanian, based on orientation
toward the idea for "Greater Albania". This
idea must be primary, regardless of any closer ideological-political
determinations of the individual Albanian. As a matter
of fact, this is the point which differentiates the
"Albanian patriot" from the anti-patriot,
the "corrupt person", "traitor",
"spy", etc. (these labels are taken from the
terminology of Albanian nationalists). Thus, a strong
psychological pressure is exercised on all members of
the Albanian nation; that is on the Albanian national
minority, to accept the tendency toward national homogenization.
-
anti-Slavism - Macedonians, Serbs, and Montenegrins
(Albanian nationalists use the term "Slavs"
for these groups) are considered nations lacking the
historical right to the territories to which they have
aspired in attempts to create "Greater Albania".
This historical right has been afforded only to Albanians
as the "native population" upon the territories
mentioned.
-
involvement of third powers in efforts to realize the
idea of "Greater Albania" - actually,
this involves utilizing Albanian nationalists to realize
the expansionist plans of other states in the Balkans.
Thereby, Albanian nationalists become a mere tool in
the hands of certain powers attempting to realize their
vital interests, depending on the projected spheres
of interest.
-
the involvement of Albania as a center and promoter
of Albanian nationalism - utilizing legal, semi-legal
and illegal methods, and playing off the various ideological-political
factions (peasants, youth, bourgeoisie, republican,
royalist, fascist, bureaucratic, dogmatic), Albania
has been participating in provoking, instigating, organizing
and stirring up Albanian nationalism among the Albanian
national minority in Yugoslavia, and among Albanians
who for various reasons either permanently or temporarily
reside in third countries. In the first years after
Ahmet Zogu came to power (1924) and between 1945-1948
(until the adoption of the Informburo Resolution) there
was a relative decrease of this activity of Albania.
Here it must be said that the leading (ruling) structures
in Albania have used Albanian nationalism as a means
to realize their class-social interests; that is, to
remain in power - with national homogenization and the
increase of national control, it was easier to distract
attention from existing social disparities with which
Albanian people were manipulated.
The
issue of the constants of Albanian nationalism is of particular
significance for the security prognosis, in respect to
the development of possible modalities, both conceptually
and in concrete terms.
In
this context, it is worth noting Sinan Hasani's conclusion
in his book "Kosovo - Truth and Misconception":
Albanian nationalists have the same relationship toward
the "Prizren League 1878-81", when the map of
"Ethnic Albania" was drawn up, as Islamic fundamentalists
have towards the Koran.
Five
political subsystems in Kosovo
The
current political-security situation in Kosovo consists
provisionally of five political subsystems and five military-security
(para-security) subsystems.
Five
Political Subsystems
On
a political level, the subsystems are represented by the
Kouchner administration (UN - international presence),
the structure of the former Hashim Tachi's "interim
government", the structure of Ibrahim Rugova's LDK,
the structure of Bujar Bukoshi and his "exile government"
and the structure of the leaders of the Serb entity, Bishop
Artemije and Momcilo Trajkovic. In the Albanian political
corps, Redjep Kjosja and Veton Surroi are especially influential;
the former has closer ties to the extremist movement,
and the latter shows clear liberal characteristics and
tolerance for other ethnic groups in Kosovo, and is openly
critical of extremist elements within his own ethnic group.
In that sense, it can be said that Veton Surroi's attitude
is that Albanians in Kosovo are endangered by fascist
elements and groups within their own ranks, groups which
put into jeopardy and possibly even obstruct democratic
processes in Kosovo.
The
group emerging from the KLA ("Tachists") after
the end of the NATO air campaign, is, of course, the most
influential, and is striving to quickly seize power in
the political vacuum which exists within Kosovo territory.
Actually, establishing a parallel but de facto system
of government to Kouchner's administration (from the smallest
settlements to Pristina) should ensure their victory in
the elections anticipated in the year 2000. This group
takes all credit for the established situation in Kosovo,
and, on this basis, grants itself an exclusive right to
rule in Kosovo during the next 8-10 years. Its main characteristics
are nationalist radicalism and the goal to achieve, at
any cost, an independent Kosovo, and, eventually, an "Ethnic
Albania". This group has its roots in the emigrant
organization LPK - Popular Movement for Kosovo, and the
illegal organizations which in the former SFRY appeared
under the Stalinist ideological auspices of Enver, and
which are known mainly as GMLK - Group of Marxist-Leninists
in Kosovo. The name LPK itself was adopted sometime prior
to 1990, while previously, the name DARJ was used (Movement
for Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia) and, after 1982,
DASRJ (Movement for Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia).
In Europe, LPK has had the most influence among Albanians
in Switzerland. In regard to relations with the ruling
structures in Albania, it is close to the socialist government
of Fatos Nano, Pandeli Majko. According to recent information,
plans are being made to form a separate political party
under the leadership of Hasim Tachi, which will be called
the "Party for Democratic Progress in Kosovo".
This new party is to articulate and realize, in coordination
with the "Party of Albanian Democratic Unity"
led by Bardil Mahmuti (also from the LPK group), the objective
of gaining legal political power in Kosovo.
The
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under the leadership
of Ibrahim Rugova, is slowly but surely strengthening
its position among the Albanian political corps, which
were shaken during the NATO air campaign. The undoubted
authority of Ibrahim Rugova and the results he has accomplished
in the past nine years, especially his acceptance of tolerant
methods in the building of a future multi-ethnic structure
in Kosovo, should provide realistic chances for the LDK
to grow into a serious rival of the "Tachists."
According
to the "Washington Post", recent public opinion
polls in Kosovo have shown that, should elections be held
now, the moderate political leader, Ibrahim Rugova, would
defeat the extreme candidate, Hasim Tachi, by 4:1. This
can be attributed to the fact that, in peacetime conditions,
Albanians in Kosovo prefer LDK's moderation to the despotism
of the former KLA groups. Recent events in the Albanian
political scene in Kosovo indicate that serious tensions
are arising which may produce an internal clash, if the
"Tachists" feel their expected absolute power
is endangered.
Bujar
Bukoshi's group and his former "government in exile",
although lacking a public presence, should not be discounted.
During the past 8 years Bujar Bukoshi has gained a solid
number of supporters, both within and outside Kosovo and
has managed to raise a large financial fund (known as
the "3%"), which is a trump card he will be
using shrewdly in seeking a high political position in
Kosovo. It is uncertain whether he will act independently
or join one of the two most visible leaders at the moment,
Tachi and Rugova.
Considering
his previous conflict with Tachi (KLA-FARK relation),
it is to be expected that he would have more in common
with Rugova's political option. His future engagement
will depend to a great extent on the political scene in
Albania. Should Sali Berisha strengthen his position and
possibly come to power, it will open a much greater political
space for Bujar Bukoshi as well.
The
Serb political corps under Bishop Artemije and Momcilo
Trajkovic have actually reduced their requests to the
preservation of the few Serbs and Montenegrins that have
remained in Kosovo, that is, to sheer survival, in light
of the expulsion of their population under pressure of
Albanian extremists (threats, kidnappings, setting houses
and properties on fire, killings) and the inability of
the international military forces (KFOR) to protect them.
The extremely tense political situation in Serbia and
Yugoslavia is also a factor. The result of this is a push
for the establishment of cantons in which the Serbs and
Montenegrins would be secure. In the present situation,
especially if a speedy return of the 180,000 Serbs and
Montenegrins who have moved out is not effected, this
group will no longer have a significant impact on the
structure, processes and decision-making in Kosovo.
Five
Security Subsystems
On
a security level, there are five structures in Kosovo
which exist and deserve attention: KFOR - exponent of
the UN international community; Kosovo Protection Corps
under the patronage of the Kouchner administration; undercover
KLA members; Serb protection groups, and the organized
part of the Albanian underground (Mafia).
KFOR
forces undoubtedly represent the strongest component,
regardless of the fact that they are not capable of ensuring
the complete safety of all citizens in Kosovo, especially
of the Serb ethnic group. If in the period prior to the
NATO air campaign against former Yugoslavia, the cases
of repression against Albanians on the part of the Yugoslav
government were condemned, the burden for the numerous
cases of violence against Serbs and Montenegrins under
the KFOR mandate must be borne by the international forces,
and serious reconsideration is needed to achieve solutions
which will lead to a real democratic community (multi-ethnic
and multi-religious). Thus far, it seems clear that the
primary armed forces having KFOR components have not assessed
the situation qualitatively enough, or the possible dangers
of destabilization of the area. This applies particularly
to the region of Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Gnilanje,
and Prizren, where there are frequent and tragic incidents
directed against the Serbian population.
The
Protection Corps, which has recently begun operating under
the auspices of the Kouchner administration, should neither
be underestimated, nor should its real power be overrated.
Because it has only been in operation a short time, there
are as yet too few facts available in order to evaluate
the successfulness of its security role. However, due
to the knowledge among the Serb population that this Protection
Corps is largely composed of Albanians - former KLA members
- the Serb population considers it more of a threat than
a protection force. Consequently, there has been a move
to form Serb Protection Corps, which will protect citizens
of Serbian ethnic origin. These facts provide an additional
illustration of the fact that the process of democratic
political and social development of Kosovo will be very
difficult, as the lines of division are still very deep.
The
undercover KLA still appears to be the biggest obstacle
to the realization of a democratic Kosovo, pursuant to
UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The existence of
the KLA secret police is a public secret among Kosovo
Albanians. After the NATO air campaign, the KLA secret
police carried out searches for and execution of Albanians
and Serbs who were believed to have cooperated and were
still cooperating with the Yugoslav authorities. The members
of this structure operate in Macedonia, Albania, and Western-European
countries, in addition to Kosovo.
Under
these conditions, it is important to note that many of
the KLA members, especially the commanding staff, will
be unable to fulfill their personal objectives (primarily
material and financial) under the current conditions in
Kosovo and within the auspices of the international community.
As a result, many individuals from this structure have
become closely aligned with organized groups of the Albanian
Mafia in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, creating a strong
outside network outside opposing the official Kouchner
administration. Because the participation of individuals
of Albanian ethnic origin in the Balkan and European Mafia
is very high, it is clear that unless the legal Kouchner
administration and KFOR forces launch an aggressive attack,
this link between the undercover KLA and Albanian Mafia
will present a serious security threat, not only within
Kosovo, but also in this region of the Balkans, and including
Europe as well. The undercover KLA has access to secret
storehouses of arms, ammunition, and explosives necessary
for the realization of the projected independent Kosovo,
and because of the nationalist radicalism upon which it
is based, it will be unwilling to wait much longer. In
the event that an "independent Kosovo" is not
effected, the undercover KLA may also be expected to come
into conflict with KFOR forces and the Protection Units
of the Kouchner administration.
UN
Responsibility
The
responsibility that the UN undertook in Kosovo, which,
to a large extent, is a consequence of the NATO action
(attack) against FR Yugoslavia (for the first time in
its history) represents for the international community
one of the most difficult exams in its history. As a result,
most analysts of the Kosovo crisis feel that the UN entered
Kosovo unprepared and lacked an appropriate solution on
how to most efficiently fill the political vacuum that
had been created. It must be borne in mind that the success
or failure of the international mission in Kosovo will
depend on the level of implementation of Resolution 1244,
and the UN and the leading NATO forces will bear the burden
for failure and any tragic consequences which might occur
in the future in this part of the Balkans. One has the
impression that NATO has simply withdrawn and shifted
the entire responsibility to the UN, since, following
the military strike, without any prior decision by the
UN, NATO forces under KFOR which were posted in Kosovo
began building military bases without any prior decision
by the UN for a long-term presence, violating FR Yugoslavia
territorial integrity, and immediately shifting the responsibility,
i.e. the civilian administration, to the UN. As a result,
this organization will be shouldering the responsibility
for every further failure.
A
particularly significant aspect of the success or failure
of the international mission in Kosovo will be the realization
of the principles in Resolution 1244, such as: maintaining
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia;
return of all refugees; establishment of substantial autonomy
in Kosovo within FR Yugoslavia and securing the personal
and material safety of citizens in Kosovo. Without this,
it will be impossible to engage in democratic political
processes, build legal and financial structures and initiate
human freedoms and rights in the European sense of the
word. However, when the situation in the area stabilizes,
radical Albanian nationalist forces will most likely continue
attempts to realize "independent Kosovo", since
prior to and during the NATO military campaign against
FR Yugoslavia, they felt the Alliance to be their ally
in the realization of their goal (or at least nurtured
that illusion). It is clear that if the violent creation
of new states by national minorities becomes a practice,
there would be a conflagration throughout Europe , which
would be impossible to extinguish. Moreover, the present
situation in Kosovo may serve to revive hopes in some
Balkan and European countries for the creation of "greater
states" and the undertaking of "campaigns of
conquest", which is a film we have seen in the not
so distant past, with all the accompanying tragic consequences.
The political and security situation has been disrupted
in the Balkans and there is a danger that this peninsula
will become a "ghetto of Europe" over the long
term, as the Bulgarian sociologist and publisher Marija
Todorova has said (lecture at Columbia University, United
States, May 29, 1999, presented via the Internet on July
23, 1999). In this context, the security situation surrounding
the Republic of Macedonia (referred to as FYRM under the
UN framework) is especially complex., as extreme Albanian
nationalists still aspire to more than half of the territory
of the Republic of Macedonia, which represents a political
threat to its security and territorial integrity. Therefore,
the principle of unchangeable state borders, in this case
in the Balkans, and full respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of existing states, is the only
acceptable option. As the same time, full realization
of a democratic, pluralist political environment and respect
for human freedoms and internal rights is necessary. A
quicker and more effective implementation of Resolution
1244 in Kosovo will certainly serve to decrease tensions
from the north toward the Republic of Macedonia and will
create possibilities for democratic changes in FR Yugoslavia;
that is, Serbia (i.e. democratic changes in Slobodan Milosevic's
rigid team), and, at the same time, will contribute to
the relaxation of the overall situation in this part of
the Balkans. Moreover, the newly arisen situation in Kosovo
may again revive hopes with some Balkan and European countries
for the creation of "greater states" and undertaking
"conquest campaign" - a film already seen in
the not so distant history with a lot of tragic consequences.
In the Balkans in the current period the political and
security situation has been disturbed and there is a danger
that this peninsula be turned into a "Ghetto of Europe"
in the long run, as the Bulgarian sociologist and publisher
Marija Todorova says (lecture at the Columbia University
- USA on 29 May 1999, presented via the Internet on July
23, 1999). In this context, the security situation surrounding
the Republic of Macedonia is especially complex, which
within the UN framework still is under the reference FYRM.
Namely, in the projections of extreme Albanian nationalist
there are aspirations to more than half of the territory
of the Republic of Macedonia, which undoubtedly represents
a potential threat to its security and territorial integrity.
Therefore, the principle of unchangeable state borders,
in this case in the Balkans, fully respecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of existing states, is the only
acceptable option for it, having, at the same time, full
realization of a democratic pluralist political environment
and respect of human freedoms and rights internally. The
faster and more qualitative implementation of Resolution
1244 in Kosovo will certainly be in favor of decreasing
tensions from the north towards the Republic of Macedonia,
and will create some room for democratic changes in FR
Yugoslavia, that is Serbia (democratic change of Slobodan
Milosevic's rigid team), and, at the same time, will contribute
to the relaxation of the overall situation in this part
of the Balkans.
Instead
of a conclusion
-
The newly established situation in Kosovo, after the
end of the NATO air strikes against FR Yugoslavia, has
opened, instead of resolved, a large number of issues
affecting Kosovo, Yugoslavia, the region, and Europe,
issues which will place long-term burdens on the security
situation in the explosive "Balkan powder keg";
-
The primary emphasis in the current situation in Kosovo
is on a quick and qualitative implementation of Resolution
1244 of the UN Security Council, which represents a
serious test for the international community and will
have a very important effect internationally on the
resolution of this and similar conflicts;
-
The international community was insufficiently prepared
to effect the formation of a civilian administration,
and this resulted in organized violence on the part
of radical Albanian nationalists, especially against
the Serb population. Their massive exodus from Kosovo
is also the result of the insufficient preparation and
engagement of the numerous KFOR forces;
-
Among the Albanian political corps in Kosovo, the former
KLA representatives ("Tachists") characterized
by their extremism, and the LDK moderate forces led
by Ibrahim are the two main factions. In peacetime,
it appears that the "moderates" are slowly
but surely gaining in political strength and are much
more closely aligned to the policies of the international
community regarding a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
community in the form of basic autonomy;
-
From a security point of view, serious threats may arise
from the "undercover KLA"; that is, former
members of the commanding cadre of this paramilitary
formation, who will not assume higher positions in the
newly established transitional government of the civilian
administration, and will not be satisfied with the form
of "essential autonomy" that is required by
Resolution 1244, but will insist on the goal of an "independent
Kosovo", which may lead them to a clash with KFOR
forces;
-
In order to gain political power through the elections
which are expected to be held next year, "undercover
KLA" is assuming de facto power throughout Kosovo,
connecting itself with Albanian Mafia members from Kosovo,
Macedonia and Albania. This connection may in the long
run seriously endanger security in this part of the
Balkans, and disable the creation of legal and economic
structures within Kosovo itself.
From
the Republic of Macedonia's security aspect, the most
acceptable option is the principle of unchanged state
borders, fully respecting the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each state, and, at the same time, creating
rich democratic, pluralist political environments in each
individual state. In respect to the current situation
in Kosovo, it implies the full implementation of Resolution
1244 of the UN Security Council.
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