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Intelligence
in the Twenty-First Century
Lt.-Gen.
Leonid V. Shebarshin
ABSTRACT
The author concludes
that the world will most probably remain rife with conflict
even in the twenty first century and that the traditional
role of intelligence will not only continue but
will increase in importance. He characterizes the international
situation as being "more of the same historically";
that is, the existence of several different centers of
power and mutual conflicts based solely on national interests.
In order to protect and promote one's national interests,
sovereign states will, on one hand, require its own military
forces, and, on the other, its own intelligence service.
In the future, the goals and priorities of intelligence
services will be subservient to the interests of state
policies, and the collection and analysis of information
obtained by "special means" in support of national
foreign policy will apply universally to all world intelligence
services. The most important changes will take place in
the technical aspects of intelligence. However, in spite
of fears expressed about an "Orwellian" solution,
which could in the future be at the disposal of intelligence
services as a result of technological advances, the author
believes human sources, humint, will remain the
main intelligence tool. As far as "rules of the game"
are concerned, they will also remain the same, though
sporadic attempts will be made to devise some internationally
acceptable framework for intelligence activities.
Introduction
The
essence, the raison d'etre of intelligence is the
acquisition of information, which is consciously concealed
from interested outsiders either by state institutions
or by other social groups like political parties or financial
bodies, etc. There is no country which does not have its
secrets and would not take steps to protect them. Evidently,
there is no country in the world whose secrets would not
be of any interest to some of its international partners.
One can safely presume that intelligence is as old as
human society. It is mentioned in the Old Testament. The
subject of intelligence, or to put it in a cruder way,
of espionage, was elaborated on a very high professional
level by a Chinese thinker in the fifth century BC.
Thus,
intelligence is an ancient phenomenon, the eternal feature
of all past and present civilizations. (And, should I
add, as honorable as any other institution.)
The volumes of information, which every country considers
to be vital to its interests, are mind-boggling not only
in totalitarian states but in the societies which are
habitually called open. Russia has opened the archives
of the USSR. (Something similar, by the way, was done
the first time by the Bolsheviks in 1918.) Recently, as
we have heard, the CIA started to open a portion of its
archives: millions upon millions of confidential and top
secret papers (nothing of actual importance, I regret
to observe.) One can be quite sure that the other, undisclosable
part of the archive is no less impressive in terms of
bulk.
But
why should one try to penetrate into other people's secrets?
A US Secretary of State in the 1920s, when presented with
decoded foreign correspondence, remarked: "Gentlemen
do not read other people's letters!"
Unlike
its citizens, the state cannot afford to be a gentleman.
Responsible political leaders cannot be lured into complacency
by a cloudless international situation (if such a situation
is imaginable in principle!). History never rests and
interstate relations may undergo extremely quick changes.
One can recollect the rapid transition from "eternal
and fraternal friendship" to a bitter confrontation
between the Soviet Union and China at the end of the 1950s,
or the sudden collapse of Iranian-American relations in
1979, when an American client regime was replaced by bitter
foes of the USA. The mission of intelligence is to foresee
changes in such situations, to detect potential threats
to the national interest at the earliest stages.
Intelligence
is not a product of war, conflict, or confrontation. It
is a normal, though peculiar, tool of the sovereign state.
The paradoxical nature of the situation is quite evident.
The activity of any intelligence service inevitably implies
the violation of the laws of target countries. An Israeli
agent, one Mr Pollard, is serving a life term in an American
prison. An American agent, Mr Baranov, is serving six
years in a Russian jail. In 1994 the French authorities
expelled four American diplomats on charges of espionage.
There have been problems concerning Russian activities
in the United States.
In
brief, every country, be it Russia, France, Italy or Bangladesh,
conducts intelligence activities abroad while perfectly
aware that it thus violates or may violate foreign laws.
Such is the reality, which to some extent does not answer
strict moral criteria. The world we live in is far from
perfect, and only in poetic dreams can one visualize a
time when all nations will fuse into a happy family and
there will be no need for espionage. (Again, even in happy
families sometimes there is a need for little spying.)
The
Future
This
is, in a word, the present state of affairs. And what
is going to be the role of intelligence agencies in the
twenty-first century?
The
future is concealed from us by an impenetrable curtain,
and it would be a folly to presume that man or the human
mind are capable of tearing down this curtain and predicting
with confidence developments for any meaningful historical
period.
At
the most, we can attempt to chart a possible scenario
of the future, always keeping in mind the possibility
of new, now unthinkable, circumstances coming into play.
This happened, for instance, with the invention of nuclear
weapons or with the disintegration of the USSR.
At
the moment, one can conjure up several versions of world
developments at the beginning of the new century.
It
is a general desire to see the strengthening of positive
tendencies which have been shaped during the second half
of the present century: the growing role of the UN; the
gradual fusing of regional organizations into a harmonious
universal system; lowering the level of military might
and elimination of the most dangerous weapons of mass
destruction; solution of conflicts in a peaceful and equitable
manner.
This
scenario seems to be an illusion without roots in the
past, without foundation in the present, and without hope
in the future. Let us better leave it to science fiction
writers and political demagogues. Intelligence must always
be prepared to face harsh realities.
There
is another, equally distant possibility. The world has
a single center of might, a sole super-power that is capable
of imposing its will on all of humanity. The role of such
a super-power might be played solely by the United States
of America, whose leading position is persistently, and
one must concede, quite justifiably, stressed by the administration
and is accepted by the international community. History,
however, never stops and there is nothing immutable and
eternal. Maintaining the leading global role might become
an unbearable burden even for the USA. Occasional flashes
of isolationist moods in the domestic politics of the
USA are not accidental, they testify to the existence
of certain premonitions within the American establishment.
One may believe that the doctrine of the leading US role
will undergo some changes and may acquire a more modest
character under pressure from domestic factors and formidable
outside resistance.
Thus,
the natural order of things to which we have been accustomed
for decades and centuries is likely to prevail: there
will be several independent but interconnected centers
of power which will continue to exist in a state of relative
equilibrium, partnership and rivalry - something similar
to the world depicted by George Orwell but maybe without
his imaginative extremes.
The
twentieth century dashed the hopes of past thinkers. It
brought neither peace nor well being to humanity. People
are apt to hope for the better but at all times they have
to be prepared for the worse. Unfortunately, the coming
century, like its predecessor, may betray our optimistic
expectations.
Look
at the Balkans, Latin America, Africa, the Near East,
look at the former USSR. The conclusion of our century
happened to be more troubled and more sanguine than the
end of the nineteenth century.
It
seems that local conflicts of different intensity will
continue to poison the life of humanity for foreseeable
future. Moreover, they may grow in bitterness and scale.
One
can predict the inevitable growth of rivalry for the control
of limited natural resources, the spread of this rivalry
over new territories, where Russia occupies a special
place, and the sea-floor. It is possible that in the next
century new sources of energy will be developed, but will
that mean the slackening of competition for energy? This
is not supported by historical experience. When oil came
to be the main source of energy, struggles for the control
of oil-fields produced many a bloody conflict. One can
also observe that the development of atomic energy hardly
improved the general international picture.
We
witness rapid and large-scale deterioration of the environment
which is aggravated by considerable population growth.
This presents a real threat to mankind, and it is in this
sphere that collisions of national and regional interests
are inevitable. Naturally, the strong will solve their
problems at the expense of the weak. Even now environmentally
unsafe industries are shifted towards less-developed countries.
They are becoming a world garbage dump for hazardous industrial
waste.
No
doubt, the problems of natural resources and the environment
will continue to be tackled by the joint efforts of the
international community. But, alas, in reality they will
be solved by economic, political, and even military compulsion.
As a result one can expect the growth of tension between
the rich giants and the rest of the world, a phenomena
which quite recently was called the fight against neocolonialism.
What is labeled now as Islamic fundamentalism is just
an offshoot of these phenomena.
Unfortunately,
there is no reason to expect that the twenty first century
will witness a decrease in ethnic conflicts. Rather they
will become more brutal not only due to their intrinsic
character, but as a result of global rivalry for the resources
and the environment. Ethnic minorities will be manipulated
by outsiders.
It
would be a thankless job to enumerate all of the factors
which may affect future developments. My task is very
modest: just to show that the world of ours will hardly
become a quiet and comfortable place to live in. (Possibly
no proof is needed at all.) The state of affairs will
be determined not so much by the harmony of national interests
as by their clashes.
This
fact leads to at least two pessimistic conclusions:
- sovereign states will need national armed forces;
- sovereign states will need special intelligence services.
The
Perspective of Intelligence
Being
the tool of the policy of their states, the intelligence
services, naturally, influence the decision-making process
but do not determine its outcome. The situation can hardly
change in the future. Objectives and priorities of the
services will be subordinated to the interests of national
policy.
Only
effective intelligence can provide timely warnings of
threats to national security, detect opportunities for
the promotion of national interests, and use them in a
specific intelligence manner.
This
is, roughly, the essence of any intelligence doctrine
at the end of the twentieth century. One can safely bet
that the essence, if not the wording, will remain the
same in the next century. Acquisition and analysis of
information which can be reached only by specific means
and support of national foreign policy will, in my opinion,
remain universal values for the services of all countries.
And, of course, within this very broad framework every
service will act in its own particular manner in accordance
with national laws and traditions.
In
recent years the problem of cooperation or the interaction
of different services became the subject of lively, open
and confidential discussions. In general, such cooperation
is rightly considered to be important in counteracting
common threats, namely, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials, terrorism, narcotraffic.
Quite often, the idea of this cooperation is presented
as something entirely novel, something that became possible
only with the end of the "Cold War". An outsider
may get the impression that this very cooperation will
be the mainstream of intelligence activities in the future.
This
view runs counter to the facts of life. The cooperation
of intelligence services is possible only in those fields
where the interests of their respective states coincide,
which happens rarely enough and practically never in full
measure. Even the mentioned sinister triad - nuclear weapons,
terrorism and drugs - is far from being the matter of
primary concern for every country. Thus, one may speak
only about cooperation between some services in some matters.
Even with the best and closest relations between the services,
their cooperation extends, as a rule, to the exchange
of information, joint analysis and estimate of certain
situations, sometimes to operational support, i.e. it
is limited to areas removed from the heart of every service
- its sources. The inherent secrecy of the intelligence
work puts natural limits to the closest cooperation. Those
who disregard this principle may pay dearly for it.
Certain
apprehensions exist that the real sovereignty of smaller
and weaker countries will continue to be impinged upon.
In this case it could not be ruled out that their intelligence
potential will be exploited by stronger partners under
the guise of cooperation.
So,
it is difficult to foresee any dramatic changes in the
function of intelligence or a substantial move for the
better in our conflict-ridden world. Possibly, some miracle
will take place though the historical experience of, at
least, two millennia teaches that to count on positive
miracles would be somewhat risky.
There
are grounds to presume that the most significant changes
may take place on the technical side of intelligence.
The progress of science, regretfully, cannot be stopped,
and practically each scientific achievement is turned
to intelligence and military uses. The progress may not
be limited to the quantitative side alone: better satellite
spies, better super-computers for breaking ciphers, higher
sensitivity of listening, watching, recording devices,
new means of surveillance, etc. The cost of technical
gadgets will inevitably increase, the processing of the
information obtained by technical means will demand an
increasing number of analysts, and correspondingly, the
cost of the product will go up. The limits here will be
set, as ever, by the financial considerations and the
common sense of state leaders. Naturally, the development
of the technological capabilities of intelligence will
call for corresponding defensive means of counterintelligence,
which never lags far behind.
But
a qualitative breakthrough in intelligence work may take
place exactly in the technological field. It concerns
the possibility of remote control of the human mind. The
practical experience of a number of years makes me very
skeptical as far as sensations are concerned. There were
many charlatans and honest but misguided enthusiasts who
tried to muddle our collective brain with bizarre inventions.
Nevertheless, the pessimistic view of scientific progress
makes me believe that we may face something entirely novel
in the field of remote mind control. The party, which
achieves this, will gain a great, though transitory, superiority
over its opponents, partners, and allies. There can be
no doubt that intelligence in the future will resort to
the increasing use of modern technologies. Nevertheless,
its main and most effective tool will remain the man,
"asset", "source", and "agentura".
It is the man, "humint," who allows to separate
truth from lie, to detect decoys and misinformation, to
give true bearings to analysts. ("Humint" is
relatively cheaper than technical and analytical effort,
though in individual cases it may look quite expensive.)
This
assertion is borne out, in particular, by contemporary
Russian experience. Our society became entirely open to
the world and still the intelligence services of our international
partners are conducting "humint" activities
on an unprecedented scale all over the former Soviet Union.
"Humint" does not solve only the problems of
today, it lays the foundation for future work, allows
the service to be prepared for changes of the circumstances.
One
can safely presume that the significance of "humint"
will not be reduced by the march of technical progress.
Moreover, it may increase, especially in the field of
"covert operations" or, in old KGB parlance,
"active measures," in other words, influencing
the solution of this or that problem by specific intelligence
means. Intelligence services have been actively, though
silently, participating in all major and minor international
conflicts. They did not always succeed, which meant bloodshed
and material expense. Their potential was not fully utilized.
Evidently, the role of intelligence in future collisions
will increase and that will mean a greater demand for
"humint."
And,
finally, a question arises whether there can be significant
changes in the unwritten rules of the game. The present
rules are defined by the goals set before services by
political leadership and by the price which the leadership
is prepared to pay for a failure, the price in terms of
prestige, money, lives, etc. The principle will hardly
change so long as intelligence lives and works, though
occasional attempts to evolve some internationally accepted
framework for its activities cannot be ruled out.
The
more the world changes the more it remains the same. Come
to think of it, it is an optimistic view of history.
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andrić's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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