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How
Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared
or the Transformation of the JNA
into a Serbian Imperial Force
Admiral
Davor Domazet - Lošo
ABSTRACT
The most significant
changes in the JNA and the way they were carried out so
that it could become a Serbian imperial force are identified
and explained. The following is emphasized for its significance:
(1) reorganization of the "ideological equality"
type military; (2) the characteristics and the purpose
of the reorganization that had been put into effect before
the idea of creating "Greater Serbia" was made
public; (3) war plans and the role of military strategy
and its theoretical, organizational and trial foundation;
(4) the implementation of such strategy in the aggression
against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Within the aforementioned,
the Serbian strategic idea is explained, i.e. "...that
in a low intensity conflict, including the prevention
and elimination of extraordinary events, and counterstrikes
from distance, the enemy be decisively defeated and Yugoslavia
protected," which makes up the operational plan for
the employment of JNA.
Regarding the implementation
of the plan in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the segment that is invisible, not always recognizable,
in a word covert, but crucial for making own strategic
decisions, is explained. The covert nature of the plan
is always a good basis for debate, in which the exchange
of ideas and views is a continuos process, and the result
questionable. Therefore, it is essayed in this work to
bring to light this other, less visible side.
The
First Stage in the Transformation of the JNA (Yugoslav People's
Army) into a Serbian Imperial Force
Any
systematic analysis of the plans, preparations and role
of the JNA in the aggression against Croatia should provide
an answer not only as to how it was planned, but also
an insight into the characteristics of the military, which
became an instrument of aggressive politics.
A
number of contemporary authors have written about the
peculiarities of military organizations and professions.
In this particular case, one must delve into the "nature"
of the military and its dependence on the prevailing social
system; that is, an insight should be gained from a sociological
point of view.1
Different models of the fundamental social relationship
(domination as opposed to equality) and their variations
produce different types of military organizations, in
regard both to the political role of the military factor,
as well as their external aspect, the type of management
and the mechanisms of achieving unity - i.e. the object
of identification of the military personnel.
Theoretician
M.D. Feld has based his "typology of military organizations"
on the differences in the political environments in which
armed forces are formed and used.2
There is no doubt that the JNA belonged to the "ideological
equality - all-embracing" type organization.
What are the characteristics of that particular type and
other similar militaries?
In
a socialist (communist) structure - as is also the case
in the structures of non-socialist totalitarian societies
which are characterized by ideological equality, the party
is perceived as a synthesizer and the supreme overseer
of both the state and society. The distribution of power,
including between the military and society, is determined
by the expressions of individual affiliation to the programmatic
objectives of the ruling party. The political, fundamental
structure of ideological equality as a whole, including
the military, can indeed be seen as an all-embracing society.
The society demands of all its members a full commitment
to social transformation, and organizations and individuals
that refuse to comply are treated as potential or actual
enemies.
The
significance of individual judgement and decision-making
abilities is negated in a specific manner. An individual
insight, even if it might result in a direct benefit,
is denigrated as an inferior level of knowledge. The most
valued insight is the one which is derived from the party
program objectives. An obvious consequence of this is
that "rank is the official measure of conviction"
and that there must be a total correspondence between
the structures of the military, the party and the state.
The political role of an army founded on the principles
of ideological equality is primarily to promote the ruling
ideology.3
Hence, the army protects those who adhere to the idea
and is suspicious of, or overtly hostile toward, those
who do not.
The
image emanating from the management within such a system
comes in the form of charisma. A military official is
a "natural" leader and represents the embodiment
of conviction.4
As the embodiment of a common will, he represents an omnipotent
figure, a person who has no right to make a mistake. His
control is based upon the principle of seniority - embodied
in the personality - and the creation of balance and harmony
among his subordinates. Success and failure are the product
of repeated development of prior actions and affirmation
of the core issues and their significance as long-term
goals.
The
social model of the military is that, aside from obvious
differences in duties and responsibilities, it is an open
and equal community of all those who promote common goals.
Obviously, the equality is not and cannot be absolute
("some are more equal than others"), but there
are no nonfunctional differences in status among different
categories of members. Such an army is proclaimed to
be and perceived as the People's Army.
Members
of the military are bound to military and social goals
at the level of larger formations.5
The identification is not only with the unit, but with
commanders as well. This creates feelings of rivalry,
so it is in the best interest of an individual that the
authority of their superiors increase. Charisma assumes
a practical application, as an individual's promotion
becomes conditional upon the ability of his superiors
to ensure promotion for their subordinates, irrespective
of their actual performance.
The
distribution of power and decision-making mechanisms is
most certainly the most important aspect of the relationship
between the military and society. Regardless of the nature
of social organization, the type of political doctrine
or even the level of economic development, the modern
world agrees that this power, in principle, should be
distributed in favor of society, not only during peacetime,
but also during time of war. The differences emerge from
attempts to determine an optimum model of control.6
Socialism
(communism) is characterized by the so-called subjective
control over the structure of national defense. The armed
forces are a constitutive element of society, "the
armed people", the segment which is not allowed a
great deal of specialization and hence separation and
isolation from the community. Every citizen has an equal
duty to contribute to his own defense. At the same time,
officers do not differ in terms of their social status
and psychological profile from other society members and
they share with them all the prevailing values. Under
such circumstances, the military structure tends to spread
across society. High military officials think within political
frameworks, and high government officials, in turn, do
not hesitate to resolve military issues.7
In societies of ideological equality, which are characterized
by subjective control, the defense function is exercised
through direct means. The basis for the realization of
military unity is a combination of national interests
and the political program of the society.
Transformation
of the JNA from an "Ideological Equality-Type"
Military into a Serbian Imperial Force
Given
the fact that the JNA had all the characteristics of an
"ideological equality - type" army, its transformation
into a Serbian imperial force was a long and systematic
process which took place at the following levels: (a)
language; (b) national composition; (c) administrative
and officer corps; and (d) war doctrine.
In
a multinational community as was former Yugoslavia, the
equality of peoples was guaranteed at the formal legal
level. The armed forces were no exception to this (per
the Service in Armed Forces Act and other regulations).
A significant violation appeared in the area of the official
language, which has a strategic significance from the
ethnic point of view. The official language of the armed
forces was "Serbo-Croatian", which could be
rationalized by the need for uniformity of command and
the fact that the language was spoken and understood by
the majority of the population of former Yugoslavia. In
essence, however, this constituted a complete and systematic
"Serbianization" of all the non-Serb members
of the armed forces.
In
addition to the language, another obvious example of inequality
was the ethnic composition of the JNA officer corps. The
percentages were as follows: Serbs 63.2%, Montenegrins
6.2%, Macedonians 6.3%, Croats 12.6%, Slovenes 2.8%, Muslims
2.4%, Yugoslavs 3.6%, Albanians 0.6%, Hungarians 0.7%
and others 1.6%. The issue of ethnic structure of the
Army and Territorial Defense (TO) officer corps in a multiethnic
state, as was Yugoslavia, called for a proportional representation
of the various nationalities. It is obvious that the representation
was not only disproportional, but also that this was an
intentional act to deprive entire nationalities, particularly
the Croats, of just representation. This deprivation would
reach its peak between 1986 and 1990, i.e. after the SANU
Memorandum and the reorganization of the armed forces,
when the percentage of Serbs in the total JNA officer
corps surpassed 70%.
This
long-term, intentional deprivation was evident both at
the management and commanding levels of majors, brigadiers
and generals. There was a continuous ideological, political
and social homogenization of the officer corps as well,
which strove for pro-Yugoslav (pro-Serbian) socialization
and was carried out in a planned and subtle manner. This
socialization consisted of a long-term service away from
the person's own cultural, civilizational and national
environment, which is the only obvious explanation for
the "consistent" need for transfers and active
service far from one's home area. This resulted in the
penetration of Serbs into areas where it was felt the
national structure of the population had to be changed.
The Greater-Serbian orientation of the highest-ranking
officers was achieved not only by giving precedence to
those of Serbian (or Montenegrin) nationality, but also
in terms of their education. Military academies regularly
emphasized Serbian history and glorified the heroic achievements
of the Serbian Army. An integral part of this plan was
the principle by which the majority of conscripts served
outside their respective republics, the idea being to
create new potential Yugoslavs whose mission would be
to defend "every nook and cranny" of Yugoslavia.
At
the level of war doctrine (strategy), a Copernican revolution
took place in the 80s with the appearance of a new player
on the world scene: information. However, it seems that
as far as the JNA was concerned, military operations such
as Eagle Claw, Prairie Fire, El Dorado Canyon, Peace for
Galilee, Corporate and, finally, Desert Storm, had never
taken place. The fundamental strategic postulate continued
to be that "the peace-time army is equivalent to
the army at war."8
This viewpoint reveals the nature of the JNA and the role
it was to play in the attainment of the Greater-Serbian
goals. In addition to its ponderousness and its obsolescence
in technological, organizational and doctrinal aspects,
it was the conservatism of the JNA which exerted the most
influence on the form that the active military cadre assumed.
The process was twofold - the creation of a massive army
with an outdated organization and doctrine was largely
driven by the psychological, sociological and educational
profile of the active military cadre. Within such a military
organization, anti-intellectualism was very prominent.9
This would have a major impact on the operational capabilities,
since there existed no well-defined doctrine or training
program. This situation was further exacerbated by the
firm traditionalism of the military. A continuing strong
bond with the revolutionary accomplishments of the NOB
(National Liberation War), and the focus on ideological
and political work, were among the main reasons for the
dogmatic approach with regard to the operational doctrine
and the tactical use of formations.
Final
Stage in the Transformation of the Yugoslav People's Army
into the Serbian Imperial Force
The
early 80s saw the final stage of the transformation of
the JNA into the Greater Serbian imperial armed force.
This was shaped by two fundamental factors:
-
The reorganization of the armed forces in late 1986
and early 1987. Armies, divisions and regiments were
abolished and replaced by military regions, corps and
brigades.
- The
issuing of the Strategy of the Total National Defense
and Social Self-Protection of SFRJ, which was adopted
by the State Presidency on May 20, 1987.
Characteristics
and Purpose of the Reorganization of Armed Forces (OS) (Comprising
the Yugoslav People's Army - JNA and Territorial Defense
- TO)
Although
the reorganization of the armed forces took place during
1987, its beginnings and trial implementation took place
between the years 1981 (the Kosovo events) and 1985, when
the decision on the reorganization of the SFRJ Armed Forces
was made. During this 5-year period, the functioning of
the Corps structure, in this case the 52nd Corps formed
in 1981, was systematically tested within the territory
of Kosovo. The principal mission of this unit was area
pacification. The conclusion reached about this "laboratory
test" was that: if the pacification mission
proved successful in a territory with a 90% non-Serbian
population, then there was no reason whatsoever why it
should fail in places where circumstances were much more
favorable (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina).
This
successful test was followed by the abandonment of the
previous military structure which corresponded to the
territories of the Republics, the only exception being
Croatia, which was split between the 5th and the 7th Armies.
It should be noted that such a division of the military,
including the Territorial Defense,10
adhered to the "republic" principle (Figure
1). At the strategic and operational levels, the organization
of the JNA for the most part respected the borders of
the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. Thus, every Republic
had "its own" Army, and every Autonomous
Province had "its own" respective Corps.
The commanders of the armies, i.e. corps, were usually
nationals of the respective Republic.11
That practice had to be discontinued. Therefore, as early
as 1981 the plan was conceived, drawn up in 1985, and
subsequently implemented by reorganizing the chain of
command and establishment of OS SFRJ (the JNA and TO).
Veljko Kadijević would remark that the essence of this
resolution was that there were now three military regions
in place of six armies (Fig 2.) Their territorial division
completely ignored the "administrative12"
borders of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces (the
Territorial Defense HQs of the Republics and Autonomous
Provinces were operationally under the direct chain of
command of the regional armies' HQs instead of the "Supreme
Command"13
and regional headquarters of Territorial Defense were
under command of the JNA corps.). Since the General did
not want to delve into the details of other strategic
and operational considerations which influenced such a
decision, the following question should be asked: What
was the hidden agenda? The hidden agenda was as follows:
(1) operational development of readily available forces
according to plans of deployment under extraordinary conditions;
(2) ensuring that those officers who displayed an open
commitment to the idea of a Greater Serbia were in positions
of authority; and (3) training units in line with the
deployment strategies envisaged by the new "battle
in space" doctrine.
According
to Kadijević, those new organizational solutions, at least
to a certain extent, impaired the well-established control
by the Republics and Autonomous Provinces over "their"
respective Territorial Defense forces and, for the most
part diminished "their" already legalized influence
over the JNA. However controversial this statement may
have been, it proves the extent of the political independence
of the military establishment and the length to which
it would go to destroy the fundamental principle of the
JNA as the armed forces of all the nationalities and ethnic
minorities.14
That was the beginning of its planned transformation into
the Serbian imperial armed forces, long before the dissolution
of Yugoslavia occurred.
Since
the political agenda determined that the western border
of a "Greater Serbia" would be drawn along the
line connecting Virovitica, Karlovac and Karlobag, the
new military territories were devised in line with this
concept.
1.
VO + 3. VO + 1/3 3. VO + 2/3 VPO = a Greater Serbia (1)
This
pseudo-mathematical equation translates into a strategy
to appropriate the Danube from Croatia and two-thirds
of the Adriatic.
Strategy
of Territorial Defense (ONO) and Self-Protection (DSZ) of
SFRJ - Military and Political Foundation for the Realization
Of Greater-Serbian Political Goals
Unlike
the 1983 "armed conflict strategy"15
(which was not formally invalidated by the new strategy),
the strategy of ONO and DSZ was devised as a general military
approach to dealing with defense issues.
Its
very title, particularly the section referring to the
self-protection of the people by the people, makes clear
that it was a military and political platform which
not only elaborated all the variations by which the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of SFRJ could be "jeopardized,"
but emphasized any form of destabilization of the prevailing
social and political structure and economic system. According
to that strategy, the JNA, in its capacity as an armed
force for the protection of territorial integrity, was
transformed into a military for the protection of the
oligarchic socialist (communist) system. Very significant
in this respect was Chapter 4, entitled "extraordinary
circumstances," which analyzed the possibility
of the SFRJ's social system being destabilized and how
to prevent this from occurring. The definition of "extraordinary
circumstances" read as follows: these are such social
circumstances which arise in a smaller or larger area
(bolded by author) or in the entire territory of Yugoslavia
when an internal enemy, independently or jointly with
external enemy forces, using the contradictions of social
development, objective difficulties, subjective weaknesses
and international circumstances, increases its subversive
activities within the framework of special war or plans
to undertake extensive armed and other types of activities
by which it would directly threaten the country's independence,
its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its social
organization as established by the Constitution of SFRJ.
According
to this definition, the employment of the JNA forces could
be effectuated in two ways:
(1)
Demonstrate force and threaten its use in the foci of
hostile activities;
(2)
Direct participation of parts of the JNA in the elimination
of "extraordinary circumstances" and their
direct consequences.16
There
would subsequently be a number of discussions and "expert"
opinions regarding the extraordinary circumstances, particularly
in the JNA G.S. Bulletin. A textbook would be commissioned
for the Military Academy curriculum. General Blagoje Adžia
enumerated the tasks, the purpose of which was to prepare
the Armed Forces for any such conditions, all within the
legal framework on the use of the Armed Forces of the
SFRJ. Those tasks were "education and training,
particularly of the units engaged in the elimination of
extraordinary circumstances, according to the plans for
extraordinary circumstances."17
What
can be concluded from such a "military strategy"
which is in fact no strategy at all? First, that the military,
rather than the police, which would make much more sense,
would be called upon to intervene in any such extraordinary
situation. Second, if such an extraordinary situation
did not arise, then the strategy would have lost its meaning.
In order to render the strategy meaningful, an extraordinary
situation had to be made up, instigated, created, fuelled
and subsequently, the military had to be employed in reaction
to such a "deterministic chaos," based
upon a meticulously elaborated plan which relied on well-trained,
tested and prepared forces. Therefore, already between
1986-1987, there was a well-disposed, fully "Serbianized"
structure of commissioned officers, the action strategy
was well in place, and the military forces favorably restructured.
Those factors would have steered the already transformed
JNA toward the Greater Serbian nationalist idea even before
Miloševia entered the political scene as the direct executor
of that idea. The change of borders, even internal ones
within the federal structure, was not possible without
the use of military force. Realization of this objective
could follow only when the military was in place (military
regions) and when it had adopted a clear ideological and
political orientation (the SANU Memorandum). How did it
unfold?
War
Plans and Preparations for the Attainment of the Greater
Serbian Political Goal
A
top-secret war plan existed that envisaged two variants
of "aggression" against Yugoslavia. Those were
the East and West variants, under the code names S-1 and
S-2. After 1985 (i.e. the year when the decision on the
restructuring of the armed forces had been made) the East
variant (S-1) was no longer considered an option and the
focus was placed on the West variant. From a strategic
point of view, this implied an entirely different combat-ready
deployment of formations, and also, special attention
had to be paid to the deployment of strategic reserves
and the construction of new infrastructure facilities.
Military
strategy played a crucial role in the realization of the
"Greater Serbia" project, which contained the
following elements:
(1)
theoretical;
(2)
organizational;
(3)
trial.
Theoretical
Fundamentals
At
the beginning of the 1980s, conventional weapons became
much more lethal as a direct result of the third technological
revolution, a lethality which resulted from their substantially
greater targeting distance and accuracy. Analysts referred
to them as "intelligent weapons". In addition
to these, there were also more advanced intelligence gathering
instruments (satellites, planes, unmanned aircraft, electronic
and optical-electronic reconnaissance instruments etc.),
and computer-assisted analyses of data enabled control
in real time. This led to the concept of an integrated
and extended battlefield, where information became the
key to the solution and where combat armament was used
sparsely, to the extent required to destroy a target with
a given probability of not less than 95%. The echo effect
of any such military action was reinforced by political
and diplomatic means as well as through the media. Serbian
military circles (the JNA GS) unable or not wanting to
fathom the essence of the new phenomena of war doctrine,
developed the notion of "distance blast."
Such a "blast" was impossible to oppose, as
there was no way to overcome the distance. Such an approach
was used to draw up a war plan based upon circumstances
of total aggression by NATO forces against Yugoslavia.18
The totality was needed to provide the rationale for a
secret operational development of the restructured JNA
forces over the entire territory of Yugoslavia. However,
that was not done in order to resist the NATO forces,
but was to be used according to the well-elaborated plan
for area pacification (the Kosovo model) in order to create
a Greater Serbia. So that the restructured JNA forces
could develop operationally, a new concept "battle
in space"19
was implemented. The battle and the space, as understood
by the author, actually meant connecting the resistance
points (read Serbian enclaves) by roads controlled by
maneuver troops (read the JNA) in order to occupy a particular
territory.
Organizational
Fundamentals
The
already mentioned reorganization of the JNA was the organizational
foundation which was built, tested and adapted over a
period of five years. New infrastructure, primarily barracks
to garrison the mobile, permanently ready forces, were
required to carry out the operational development of the
newly reorganized forces. In addition to those already
in existence, new facilities were built either in suburbs
or at city entrances, in major hubs which formed the connecting
tissue between cities and Serbian "enclaves"
deep in the territory of Croatia (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The sheer number of cities involved - Osijek, Vukovar,
Vinkovci, Bjelovar, Petrinja, Karlovac, Gospia, Zadar,
Šibenik and Split - indicates clearly what was to be the
purpose of those facilities: to exert control over main
roads, to project the military power into the urban centers
and to create a funnel through which the Serb rebel force
would flow directly to the western border of a Greater
Serbia.
Trial
Fundamentals
War
Plan S-2, the western variant of radical aggression against
Yugoslavia, was systematically tested by the annual training
plan for both the command and units. The highest form
of command education, according to the JNA methodology,
was the "Command and Staff War Game" (CSWG).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff worked out the basic idea for
those maneuvers and fundamental tasks for different formations
- military regions, Navy and Air Force, and by "pure
coincidence", the name of the maneuvers was the name
of a mountain near Sarajevo, "Romanija"
- 86, 87, 88, 89, 90.
An
analysis of the Command and Staff War Game, carried out
by the Navy, will best illustrate how the JNA prepared
and trained the command and units for future aggression
against Croatia.20
The
fundamental premise was that the overall aggression in
the Adriatic Sea naval theater would be carried out by
armed forces of the USA, Italy, and the United Kingdom,
from the Italian operational base, and using the territory
of Albania, with the participation of parts of its military
(9th Corps). In the northwest (Slovenia, Croatia), Italian
forces would be seconded by German and Austrian (a neutral
state) operational groups. During the second phase, they
would be joined by Hungarian forces (a member of the Warsaw
Pact). The assault on the southeastern Yugoslavian territory
would be carried out via Macedonia by the USA and Greece,
to be joined subsequently by Bulgarian (a Warsaw Pact
member) forces.
During
the mid 1980s, such a combination of forces was impossible,
not only due to their different bloc affiliation, but
also because it would have been impossible to reconcile
their respective national goals and to create a willingness
to jointly embark on a mission to destroy a country by
military action solely in order to change its social system,
as was stated among the reasons for aggression against
Yugoslavia. In other words, it would have been an action
conducted on sheer whim. The absurdity of this strategic
assumption is best illustrated by Kadijević's remarks.
He claimed that the USA would formally hand Yugoslavia
over to the European Community, which Germany would take
advantage of in all possible spheres - political, economic
and military - in order to totally conquer the Balkans
in a direct German expansion and gain access to the Adriatic
Sea as the crucial intercontinental hub. This implied
the dissolution of Yugoslavia into small states. It also
implied that not only was there no chance of any form
of reduced Yugoslavia, but also that the creation of a
unified Serbian state embracing the entire Serbian population
from the territory of Yugoslavia would not be permitted.21
The thesis that the USA, as a major superpower, would
hand the ball over in such a sensitive area to the European
Community only to give Germany an opportunity for economic
but also for territorial expansion is extremely far-fetched.
The final outcome of this equation was allegedly to prevent
the formation of a Greater Serbia (a unified Serbian state).
To make the equation workable, an inversion was necessary:
in order to form a unified Serbian state, a pretext had
to be found in a possible threat coming from the "coalition
forces", which could not, and could never have had,
such a political goal. Their goal was to preserve,
rather than destroy, Yugoslavia.
The
fundamental military-strategic idea for the forceful appropriation
of two-thirds of the Adriatic dates back to the 1970s.22
According to the plan, the Croatian coastal area had to
be isolated as much as possible from the offshore islands.
An imaginary line beginning in Istria, continuing to Lošinj,
Molat, Dugi otok, Žirje, Drvenik, Vis, Lastovo, Koreula,
and then down to Mljet had to be marked by military infrastructure
and connected with the respective line in the hinterland
which stretched from Benkovac via Knin down to Trebinje.
It took operationally developed and well-trained forces
to connect the two. The task was to break into the Maslenica-Velebit
and Slano-Ston areas, thus isolating the central coastal
area and cutting it off from the northern part of Croatia
along the line from Karlobag to Karlovac.
How
was this provided for by the postulates of the CSWG? First,
the NATO operational forces were incorporated in the "Jadran"
Operative Group. This Operative Group was comprised of
the following: (1) complete Italian Armed Forces; (2)
two MEBs23,
two naval assault groups, two aircraft carrier groups,
101st and 82nd Airborne divisions from the United States;
and (3) one airborne assault landing brigade and a marine
expeditionary unit from the United Kingdom, and Albanian
9th Corps. Airborne support and isolation of the military
region was to be performed by the 5th ATAF, i.e. the total
NATO air-force operating on the Southern European front
(the original idea of the "Romania" CSWG).
The
forces incorporated into the "Jadran" operational
group were classified into TG (tactical group) "Trieste",
TG "Ancona", 10th Albanian Corps, Marine Landing
Unit of the United Kingdom, the US airborne forces, the
marine landing unit of the United Kingdom and four naval
battle groups. Although it was emphasized that the coalition
forces would apply the principles of air-land battle and
deep penetration in the execution of the operation order,
these principles were not applied in the simulation. The
emphasis on the classical 2-D warfare, and the especially
overemphasized role of the army, was not only due to a
5:1 ratio in favor of the sea, but to the hidden intentions
of the JNA to realize the Greater Serbian idea. The projection
of power was primarily aimed at depriving Croatia of its
water surfaces. The equation (1) was thus extended and
read:
1
+ 3 + 1/3 (5) + 2/3 (VPO) = a Greater Serbia (2)
The
implementation of the plan dating from the 70s, and its
final operationalization during the 80s, illustrated the
fact that the forceful appropriation of two-thirds of
the Adriatic was strategically the most important point,
i.e. it was the domino which had to fall first. Eastern
and a part of Central Croatia would follow, as would Bosnia,
which would "fall silently."
Summarized
Plan of "Aggressors'" (NATO) Activities
Since
Maslenica-Velebit and Slano-Ston were two key points (in
Figure 2
marked "K"), the structure and the utilization
of the "Jadran" Operational Group had to be
adapted accordingly. How was this conceived? First, on
day "D" (the beginning of the "aggression")
until D+2, sea and parachute landing operations were undertaken
on Lošinj, Molat Isles, Vis, Lastovo, Mljet and in the
region around Slano. During the second stage of the first
part of the operation, when control over all islands and
the broader region of Slano had been gained, the second
operational formation was introduced, landing was performed
in Ravni Kotari, the 10th Corps was transported by sea
into the widened bridge-head near Slano, and force penetration
inland continued toward (1) Ravni Kotari-Sinj-Livno-Kupres,
(2) Slano-Mostar-the Neretva Valley-Sarajevo.
The
Activities of the "Reds" (The JNA)
The
plan: Prevent (slow down) penetration into the Ravni Kotari
and Slano regions, and then engage the 9th Corps (Knin
Corps), parts of the 7th K (Sarajevo Corps) and the 9th
Boka Naval Region, counterattack toward Knin-Benkovac-Ravni
Kotari-Zadar, Mostar-Eaplina-Slano and Trebinje-Konavli-Dubrovnik,
liberate the area and assume the defense24.
What counterattacking and assuming the defense in these
two directions meant was illustrated by the events of
1991. If the idea of the "Jadran" Operational
Group Maneuver, as an integral part of the "Romanija"
CSWG, is compared with the actual situation in 1991, (Figure
3), any further explanation is unnecessary. It is
more than clear to the reader.
This
strategic plan (dating from 1986 on) is implemented each
year on day D (the beginning of the attack), over D+7,
D+15, D+35 to D+101, when the NATO forces break onto the
Una-Virovitica line. This "occupied" western
part of former Yugoslavia is then "liberated"
by strategic assault operations, using forces from the
rear, i.e. from Serbia.25
The well-prepared and systematic plan, which had a theoretical,
organizational and experimental basis, could not be applied
in the classical manner of a coup d'etat, due to
prevailing internal and external circumstances. The other
possibility would be an open attack on Croatia, in which
case the JNA and Serbia would have been considered aggressors,26
and the repercussions upon the two would have been much
more significant than if they were shown to be the "defenders".
The essence of the entire plan was to create an aggressor
which would transform the JNA into the defender.
Therefore,
the JNA, as a tool of Serbia's hegemonistic intentions,
did not act directly. They applied a wearing-down strategy,
a conflict of low rather than medium intensity, which
was intended to reinforce the impression that it was a
spontaneous resistance by the "unarmed Serbian people"
who were defending their lives and "centuries-old
hearths and homes", and that the JNA was present
only for their protection. Actually, the fundamental characteristic
of such a strategy was its vagueness, with the military
armed forces being used in small increments, between meetings,
sessions, agreements, negotiations and diplomatic notes.
It all appeared aimless, and still the objective was well
defined, according to a well-elaborated and tested plan:
the gradual occupation of the largest possible portion
of Croatian territory. This particular use of the military
could be appropriately referred to as a "crawling
strategy".
Strategy
is not a doctrine (science) but a way of thinking, even
if abstract, which enables the alignment and arrangement
of the sequence of events. Within the crawling strategy,
the most important goal during the first stage of the
war was to transform Croatia from a defender into an aggressor.
A trap had to be set to achieve that goal, and Croatia
was expected to fall into the trap without thinking twice.
The trap was the attack on garrisons,27
or more accurately, the attack against the JNA.28
The
Application of Strategy in Aggression Against Croatia
Between
March 12 - 15, 1991, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff",
i.e. the Greater-Serbian military establishment, asked
the Presidency of SFRJ to proclaim a state of emergency29
throughout Yugoslavia and to deploy the JNA. When this
was denied, the JNA decided on the implementation of the
contingency plan, which was the emergency plan "on
the protection of the Serbian people and assisting them
in their defense," mentioned by General Blagoje
Adžia.
The
strategy was implemented in two steps. The first step
implied the conquering of key points: Karlovac, Zadar,
Dubrovnik, Sisak, Pakrac, Osijek and Vukovar. The JNA's
task was to time the attacks on the main roads by combining
infantry and tank assaults, assisted by mortar fire, to
destroy civilian objects and infrastructure along the
entire territory of Croatia. The Navy was to implement
a naval blockade, and the Air Force an air blockade.
The
goal, the idea and the plan of the JNA departed from the
reformed role of the JNA with regard to its role as established
by the Constitution of the SFRJ. During this stage of
armed conflict (read aggression), the JNA "protected"
Serbs in Croatia from the attacks by "Croatian
armed formations," and at the same time enabled
them to organize themselves for "defense", but
in actuality for attack. The JNA was prepared for a war
against Croatia as soon as Croatia launched the "war
against the JNA." The mission was to be carried
out within the framework of "preventing conflicts
among the nations" as was put forth by the Presidency
of SFRJ in its decree. The G. S. would reinforce the JNA
formations in Croatia and around Croatia in order to implement
the set mission. A number of armored mechanized formations,
ranging from company to division, would be placed as close
as feasible to the possible venues of conflict so that
they would be able to intervene at very short notice.
An adequate number of armored mechanized brigades would
be deployed on the axis points (gravity centers) in and
around Croatia so they could be used for major interventions.
Here
we can see the strategic postulate of the operational
deployment of units which the JNA G. S. delineated, and
General Radinovia scientifically elaborated in his general's
thesis as a "battle in space."
According
to the JNA G. S. point of view, the JNA succeeded in attaining
the objectives of the first stage of the war: it "protected"
the Serbian population, it helped them and enabled them
to prepare, in military and political terms, for the events
which were to follow, and, according to Kadijević, that
is exactly what the Serbs did. Croatia failed to gain
full control over its whole territory because of the
role played by the JNA. And not only that. "Croatia
realized that this is the goal it would never attain as
long as the JNA was there."30
During
the second stage of the war, as conceived by the overall
concept on the use of the JNA forces in Croatia "for
the defense of Serbs" in Croatia, the model of "preventing
conflicts among nations" could no longer be applied.
There had to be an "open Croatian attack", which
would be obvious and which would clearly show who was
the attacker and who the defender, who was imposing the
war, and only then strike back.
The
basic idea which served for the elaboration of the use
of the JNA between 1986 and 1990 throughout Yugoslav territory
was the following: total defeat of the Croatian Army,
if the situation so permitted, but at least to
the extent which would enable the attainment of set goals.
For the JNA, those goals were to attain full collaboration
with Serbian rebels and enable the completion of the retreat
of the remainder of the JNA forces from Slovenia; in doing
that, special attention had to be paid to the fact that
the "role of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina would
be crucial for the future of the entire Serbian nation."
The new disposition of the JNA forces had to be adapted
accordingly.31
The
strategic plan of the occupation of Croatia was covertly
prepared over a number of years. It was tested over a
period of five years, and was announced in 1993 by its
implementer, General Veljko Kadijević, who, before he
actually started implementing it, disarmed Croatia by
appropriating the arms from its Territorial Defense. On
the eve of the realization and launching of the plan,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (G.S.) of the Armed Forces of
SFRJ issued the "Instruction on the use of strategic
groups" by which it would determine how they
were to execute operations.32
The
actual operationalized plan (strategic operation) read
as follows:33
strategic mission to be carried out in two stages. During
the first stage, primary use of counterattacks of tactical
significance, in several directions, until Croatia becomes
more heavily involved (attacked barracks), with reinforced
organization and preparation of Serbian rebels; during
the second stage, a coordinated strategic attack operation
to defeat the Croatian Army and complete the mission.
The goal of the force maneuvers:
-
Total blockade of Croatia from air and sea;
-
Connecting attacks by major forces as closely as possible
with the "liberation" of the Serb regions
in Croatia and the JNA garrisons deep within the territory
of Croatia. To this end, intersectng Croatia along the
lines of Gradiška-Virovitica, Bihać-Karlovac-Zagreb,
Knin-Zadar, Mostar-Split. Use of most powerful armored
units to occupy Eastern Slavonia, which would thereafter
proceed quickly towards the west to join forces in Western
Slavonia, and continue on towards Zagreb and Varaždin,
i.e. onto the Slovenian border.34
At the same time, use of strong force from the region
of Herceg Novi - Trebinje, blockade of Dubrovnik from
the mainland, and introduction of units into the Neretva
Valley to join forces coming from the direction Mostar-Split;
- Upon
reaching designated objects (decision points), ensure
and hold the "border of Srpska Krajina" in
Croatia, pull out the remaining JNA units from Slovenia
and then withdraw the JNA from Croatia;
- Mobilization
and preparation of mobilized and supplemented troops,
and their transport to the planned directions of deployment,
should take 10 to 15 days, depending on the level of
combat preparedness of the units and their distance
from the direction of deployment.
Based
on the Serbian calculations, the main tasks of the transformed
operation plan were attained:
- One-third
of Croatia, with a predominantly Serb population, "was
liberated";
- "Krajina"
formed its own army, which the JNA equipped with the
appropriate weapons and battle technology;
- The
JNA withdrew its main combat forces from Croatia and
deployed them for future tasks. (Author's note: Bosnia-Herzegovina).
These
conclusions are realistic, except for the evaluation that
Croatia adopted the Vance Plan because it had lost the
war. Croatia did not lose the war. On the contrary, Croatia
won the war. Strategy is not merciful. It simply dictates
that the winner of a war is he who prevents the enemy
from attaining its set strategic goal. The set strategic
goal for the JNA was to defeat the Croatian Army and
arrive at the Slovenian border. Neither of the two
goals was achieved.
Croatian
Response to the Applied Strategy
Further
warfare gives advantage to the side which better utilizes
the suspension time. The Croatian strategy proved very
successful in this regard, as Croatia was able to wait
and to deliver the decisive blow at the right moment (the
final operations of the Croatian Army in 1995).
Stalling
has an exceptional meaning in the modern concept of strategy.
If the objective of a strategy is attaining the set political
goals by making the most of the means available, then
Croatia applied a wise and reasonable strategy and applied
it to the complexity of the actual situation. Moreover,
the adjustment of the Croatian strategy was influenced
by the following elements of the situation: the Armed
Forces of Croatia had grown in numbers, they had better
weapons, and mobilization was carried out smoothly. By
stalling and buying time, the Croatian leadership
knew that the JNA would eventually disintegrate not only
on ethnic, but on other levels as well. Croatia reacted
to this "crawling strategy" with a "strategy
of indirect approach." Politics and diplomacy,
and later economy, played a prevailing role here, so as
to enable Croatia to resist blows delivered during the
first stage of the war. As already stated, these elements
were important for buying time, in order to create a well
equipped and trained military which would be capable of
winning battles (assault operations, from tactical to
strategic level). At this point, one should remember one
of the postulates of the war doctrine, which states that
there is a strategy for every particular situation. A
certain strategy may be the best for one combination of
circumstances, and absolutely useless for another.
There
has been a lot of discussion as to the right timing for
the attack against the military garrisons. Under the given
circumstances (the beginning of the war), that operation
fell into the category of strategy. A war is either won
or lost at the level of strategy, and not at the level
of tactics. One can lose many battles and still win the
war. For a strategic move, such as the attack on barracks,
timing is of the utmost importance; when to launch the
action is crucial. The subsequent events confirmed that
the timing was well chosen and that a trap was thereby
avoided. Kadijević himself said that the attack on the
garrisons was a trap, and that it would have been much
better for the JNA if the attack had been launched earlier,
since time was not on the JNA's side.35
By not falling into the trap which had been laid, Croatia
was better prepared for the second stage of the war, from
which it emerged victorious.
Simulated
War
Finally,
the military option of the Greater Serbian scheme (which
has been outlined in this paper) cannot be fully comprehended
without an analysis of the war in Slovenia and without
addressing the strategic concept of "praxeology -
the study of human conduct." Here, the most important
principle is contained in this phrase: "It is not
important what is, what can be seen, but, rather, what
cannot be seen and what is aspired to."
According
to the JNA, the Slovenes treated them as though they were
an occupation army. The JNA, however, could not and had
no desire to treat the Slovenes in the manner of an occupation
army. Herein lies the answer to a never completely clarified
issue: What was the real intention of the JNA during the
so-called Slovenian War? The war has since been referred
to by many different names. For the Slovenes, it is most
certainly the greatest war they have ever waged and therefore
it is for them a source of national pride. As far as the
war's impact on Croatia, it can be referred to conditionally
as a "simulated war". The hidden agenda was
to involve Croatia. There is ample basis for this claim,
as corroborated by the three possible options for the
use of the JNA forces in the event of such a scenario.
The first option was to defeat the Slovenian combat formations
and then abandon Slovenia. The second was to use all the
available Air Force units to inflict damage on the Slovenian
infrastructure and thus force it to comply with the decisions
of the federal institutions. The third, which was subsequently
adopted, was to attain political goals by the combined
use of political means and military threat (JNA). In practice,
threats would be carried out incrementally, based upon
the reactions of the Slovenian side. The controversy and
absurdity of the first two options lie not only in the
fact that they both proposed a terrorist use of the military
force, but also in their objectives: to wage war (paying
a high price) and then withdraw. There would be no support
for strategic goals of this nature. Only an unbalanced
military mind could promote such an adventure.
The
third option was the most realistic, not only because
it represented the lowest cost for the JNA, but also because
it was instrumental in carrying out the hidden agenda,
which was to involve an unprepared Croatia in the war.
On July 18, 1991, a decision was passed that the JNA formations
were to be moved from Slovenia. The move was arranged
by "the Supreme Command" in such a way that
it served as a preparation for aggression against Croatia.
Kadijević would write that "this was the opportunity
we had counted on and we had a response ready and waiting."
The response was a strategic operation intended to lead
to the attainment of all the goals the JNA had set for
Croatia, and which are outlined in this paper.
Conclusion
The
JNA belonged to an ideological, all-embracing type of
military organization, which served as the overseer of
state and society, and devalued individual abilities.
Military officers representated the embodiment of conviction,
identification with officers (charisma) and politicization.
Thus,
the JNA could easily be transformed into a Serbian military
force in both of its components. Ideologically, this was
accomplished when the JNA adopted the Greater Serbian
idea or the "creation of a unified Serbian state,
which would embrace the entire Serbian nation within the
territory of Yugoslavia." In broader terms, the
transformation was carried out in the areas of language,
officer corps, reorganization and the use of strategic
groups, all based upon the strategic postulate of a "nation
in arms" - but only the Serbian nation. The long
and systematic process of transforming the JNA into a
Serbian imperial force was achieved by a sequence of events:
(1) a very sophisticated staffing policy was applied to
transform the military into a Serbian and not a people's
military; (2) military infrastructure was adapted to suit
deployment and use as foreseen in the plan to breaking
onto the Western Serbian border; (3) military forces were
adapted to suit the tactical needs of area pacification
and this was tested under "laboratory conditions"
even before the Serbian political goals were publicly
announced; (4) the operational use of the military forces
was tested for functioning under conditions of "extraordinary
events" and the entire exercise was camouflaged using
the cover of a possible total aggression by the NATO forces
(the syndrome of constant threat); (5) during the implementation
of the plan, the Yugoslav option was stressed and clearly
displayed to the world and then the "international
enemy - destroyer" was awaited, so that when he made
a move and launched the first attack, he could be defeated;
(6) under war conditions, during the final stage of the
process, the JNA was finally transformed into a number
of Serbian armies, and the main concern was to protect
the "threatened" Serbian people.
These
reflections on the implementation of the Serbian aggression
and the forms it assumed represent an attempt to understand
the time and events and hence to eliminate any doubts
as to when and how the JNA became an instrument of the
Greater Serbian idea. This can best be seen in the words
of its creators: "The JNA represents the foundation
from which three Serbian armies were created. This was
done in response to given internal and international circumstances
and in a very structured manner," (V. Kadijević,
1993).
If
the purpose of a strategy is to attain political goals
by the best utilization of available means, if it is a
"compilation" of information enriched by every
subsequent generation, if it is not just a repetition
of what has been learned, independent of coincidental
experience, then it should not have come as a surprise
that Croatia found a way to meet the challenge, and to
successfully oppose Greater Serbian plans as well as the
role which the JNA had assumed in such plans.
Aggression
Against Bosnia-Herzegovina
At
the overall involvement level, the role of the JNA in
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the same as in Croatia.
Likewise, the idea of occupation was part and parcel of
the whole plan. This paper puts forth not only the fundamental
idea which developed on the grounds of the S-2 war plan
(the total "aggression" of NATO against former
Yugoslavia), but also its modifications and the reorganization
(adaptation) of the JNA in order to create "new Serbian
armies".
In
this overview, the author also proposes an explanation
as to when and where the JNA, as the Serbian military,
reached its strategic peak. The appearance of this term
recently in analytical reviews, especially in the western
world, implies that the war upon the territory of former
Yugoslavia is no longer being regarded based upon individual
military operations and their consequences, the strength
and capabilities of the armies, the number of casualties,
the level and value of destroyed infrastructure and facilities,
but rather at the level of strategic considerations which
attempt to determine a "place" for every state.
An
analysis of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
cannot be based upon word games or impressions. It must
be derived from the set goals of the aggression, from
the means and especially the manner in which the means
were applied. In such strategic analytical reviews, the
point of departure should always be that the JNA armed
forces acted as the instrument of aggression. The intention
of this review is to illustrate the role of the JNA in
the Bosnia-Herzegovina War.
Introductory
Remarks
During
the war in Croatia, the JNA failed to attain its set strategic
goal, which was to defeat the Croatian Army and move
towards the Slovenian border, hence, in keeping with
the Memorandum ideas, to extend the "the western
borders of Serbia" and construct it along the
line from Virovitica via Karlovac down to Karlobag. It
was therefore necessary and draw Bosnia-Herzegovina into
the strategic game. Bosnia-Herzegovina was essential for
the realization of the idea of Greater Serbia. Kadijević
had stated that the basic criterion was the survival of
the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to
him, the Serbian people, by their geographical location
and number, were the cornerstone for the constitution
of a common state of the entire Serbian nation, either
in some new Yugoslavia, or in an exclusively Serb state.
He went on to say that "without Yugoslavia, there
will be no state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, everybody
has to be firmly and unconditionally supportive of Yugoslavia,
irrespective of personal inclinations."36
Such
an a priori claim leads to an obvious question: What was
the role of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Unlike the
war in Croatia, which occupied a significant position
in Kadijević's book and was afforded an analytical review,
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was totally ignored, covered
in approximately two pages37
and was given no analytical review.
Theoretical,
Organizational and Trial Foundations of the Aggression Plan
Comprehensiveness
of the Strategic Plan
It
is understandable that, at the level of comprehensiveness,
the role of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina was equivalent
to its role in Croatia, since it was derived from the
same strategic idea of the creation of a "Greater
Serbia". The comprehensiveness implies a long-lasting
and systematic transformation of the JNA into a Serbian
imperial force, per a structural, organizational, operational
and implementation plan based upon a unified idea which
is temporarily adjusted to the prevailing internal and
external circumstances, but always under the catch phrase
of "protecting the Serbian people and assisting
them to defend themselves" and "preventing
conflicts among nationalities."38
The
operational plan for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
also based upon the premise of a radical Western "aggression"
against Yugoslavia (war plan S-2), and it contained the
same structural elements: theoretical, organizational
and trial elements.39
The theoretical and organizational elements were the same
as for the war in Croatia, but the trial elements continued
and expanded to include the areas of Southwest, South
and Central Bosnia.
The
Summarized Plan of Action of the "Blue" - NATO
Aggressor in the Territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The
plan of action of NATO forces in a scenario of total aggression
against Yugoslavia was comprised of the following sequence
of events upon the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
After
airborne and amphibious landing operations on Adriatic
islands (D-D+2), the operative forces of NATO join up
with the "Jadran" operational group on D+6,
hit the beach in Ravni Kotari, that is, Slano. After that,
the landing groups were to be joined on D+15 by TG "ANCONA"
and the 10th Army Corps (AC). Together they were to continue
penetrating deep into Bosnia-Herzegovian territory
(Figure 4).
Forces
of the 10th AK would advance along the Neretva valley
towards Sarajevo until joining forces with 101st Airborne
Division (US Army Forces), which on D+17
would land on Ravna Romanija (to the West of Pale). Skirting
Knin, the TG "ANCONA" troops would move on towards
Sinj, Livno, Kupres and Bugojno, approaching Sarajevo
from the west and acting on the left wing together with
the 10th AC forces. To speed up the rate of attack, tactical
landing operations were to be undertaken at Vaganj Pass
(Kamešnica) and Aržano.
Actions
of the "Red" (JNA)
This
then was the "aggressor's" plan. The "Red"
(JNA) could react in one way only: by forming three groups
(Figure 5)
to achieve the following goal:
1.
First operational group (OG Mostar)40,
acting in the region of Mostar and Eastern Herzegovina,
was tasked to prevent penetration along the Neretva Valley
and stop "Blue" south of Mostar. This was the
fall-back position. After that, they would begin a counter-attack,
move on to the coast and organize their defensive positions
there;
2.
The mission of the second operational group (OG Kupres),
located in the region of the Kupres Plateau and Western
Bosnia, was to launch lateral blasts against the forces
of TG Ancona in the direction of the Livno and
Sinj Plateau, and extend their actions further
down towards Split, acting jointly with the forces which
were engaged in counter-attack operations in Neretva Valley;
3.
Third group (OG Sarajevo), acting along the semi-circular
axis of Central and Eastern Bosnia, were to perform rectifying
circular blasts against landing operations over Romanija,
and to "remove the blockade" from Sarajevo,
which was to be defended by circular defense.
The
operational deployment of "Red" forces, as in
the aggression against Croatia, was systematically tested
by the annual training plan, as formulated in the "Romanija"
Command and Staff War Game.
The
postulates of the direction of attacks of the "aggressor"
and the operational deployment of the "defender-red,"
show clearly that at a strategic level, the JNA Joint
Chiefs of Staff, determined that the following constituted
the critical points of pacification (read occupation)
of Bosnia-Herzegovina: (1) south-western part,
i.e. Herzegovina; and (2) Sarajevo - the capital.
The
successful defense of the south-western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
would save not only Bosnia-Herzegovina, but all of southern
Croatia as well.
The
Implementation of Strategy in the Aggression Against Bosnia-Herzegovina
The
desirable goal was for Bosnia to "fall silently".
However, when the JNA efforts (threats and selective use
of military force) did not yield the desired results,
especially with the Croatian people, who managed to organize
their army, the JNA shifted to the concrete realization
of the pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopting the
model used in Croatia. The only difference here, however,
was the fact that the vacillation of the Moslems in the
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina reinforced the impression
within the JNA that the war would be over quickly.
It
should be noted that the general plan regarding the creation
of "Greater Serbia" and a move onto the
western Serbian border was not changed; rather,
it was adapted to suit the prevailing political and military
situation. The major element of this adaptation was devising
the means for maintaining control of occupied Croatian
territories - with the "assistance" of international
forces - while Bosnia-Herzegovina was being occupied.
Then, once it was occupied, a plan for annexing nearly
one third of the occupied territory of Croatia and attaining
the set goal of creating a Greater Serbia was needed.
Such a "Greater Serbia" would have failed in
establishing its western borders along the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica
line, but the border would still not have been far away
and it would have followed the line Starigrad Paklenica-Karlovac-Pakrac-Nova
Gradiška-Sava River-Osijek.
Reaching
a Strategic Peak
The
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out after the first stage
of the war in Croatia. In regard to the war in Croatia,
i.e. the first stage in that war, there are various "doubts",
and even some understated hypotheses, as to who was the
winner and who was the loser, whether or not the ceasefire
agreement should have been signed, whether international
forces (UNPROFOR) should have been allowed in, whether
and what type of internationalization of the conflict
should have taken place.
Interestingly
enough, a theory has recently appeared which attempts
to "prove" that Serbia reached its strategic
peak towards the end of 1991,41
with the occupation of Vukovar. Such a hypothesis serves
as "proof" that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
could have been avoided and that, ultimately, the military
actions Flash and Storm would not have been necessary
at all.42
What
answer could a strategic evaluation provide to such a
hypothesis? There are no doubt strategic peaks in every
war. However, doubts arise as to exactly when they are
attained. Strategy teaches us that during a war the aggressor
finds it very difficult to determine its strategic peaks,
which would then tell them when to stop.43
The defenders' task is even more difficult, since they
require time to regroup, train and equip their armed forces
in order to move from strategic defense to strategic
attack. This is especially true of emerging armed
forces, as was the Croatian Army. In the case of Croatia,
this valuable time had to be gained, since the enemy would
have never granted it freely.
The
combat power, i.e. the projection of military force, does
not consist just in the number of people armed with patriotism
and combat morale, which Croatia undoubtedly had at the
time. It is rather a combination of equipment, training,
operational mobility and development, the ability of operational
control, and response to sudden and unpredictable (unexpected)
enemy actions: in short, in the persuasiveness of the
military force. When it comes to assault operations, even
at the lowest tactical level, not to mention the strategic
level, there is always the question of what would be
the price to pay, especially in manpower. The worst
strategy is one which pays the price in human lives, especially
when the resource is very scarce, such as in the case
of Croatia (with a population of 4,700,000 people).
Having
won the first stage of the war44,
Croatia needed a pause for two reasons. The first was
to avoid further destruction and to regroup the Army,
which implied that numbers had to be replaced by quality,
and to increase the mobility of the forces and develop
the possibility of transferring the decision points as
a condicio sine qua non for a successful assault
operation. The second was that it was irrational and impossible
to wage wars on two separate fronts when the main operational
roads (Zagreb-Karlovac-Rijeka; Zagreb-Karlovac-Zadar-Split-Dubrovnik;
and Zagreb-Nova Gradiška-Vinkovci-Osijek) were under constant
threat.
The
important fact is that the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
was determined exclusively by Serbian political and military
leaders according to a well elaborated plan. Having attained
a reduced strategic goal (the occupation of nearly one
third of Croatia, but failing to break onto the Western
Serbian border), the JNA and Serbia realized that continuing
meant a further waste of troops, and therefore became
irrational, due to losses, the upswing of operations,
and the internationalization of the conflict. The JNA
and Serbia had been clearly marked as aggressors. Therefore,
this was not about the strategic peak having been attained.
The military force was thus redirected and projected onto
those territories which, under the given circumstances,
would yield the best results. At that moment, the thinking
of the JNA and Serbia was as follows: if they managed
to resolve the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as
possible, they would be able to again concentrate on Croatia,
under different, extremely favorable conditions.
But
there remains an open-ended question: When would the JNA
and Serbia, and even more importantly, where (underlined
by the author) would they reach their strategic peak?
The geo-strategic position of Croatia, but also the Greater
Serbia objective, clearly indicated that this peak could
only be reached in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in its western
part. Strategic peaks are not determined by only one or
two factors of a war doctrine, but by all the factors
joined together in a mutual relationship. Space plays
a crucial role, since wars are actually waged to gain
control over a certain area. In addition to time and the
strength of the forces, the peak must also be placed in
space.
To
corroborate this postulate, the best answer is to look
at the organization and operational development of JNA
forces and Serbian rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
were carried out during the first stage of the war in
Croatia, and ended at the beginning of 1992 (January-April).
Operationalization
and Adaptation of Plan During Aggression
Organization
and Operational Development of JNA Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
between January and April 1992
To
better understand the strategic relationships within the
territory of former Yugoslavia in 1992, one must return
to previously mentioned postulates of the "Romanija"
CSWG. Three operational groups of the JNA were in charge
of defending the area of Western Bosnia-Herzegovina from
NATO, by implementing the circular defense of the city
of Sarajevo and moving to a counter-attack, directed towards
Mostar and the Neretva Valley, i.e. Livno and Split. This
type of defense and subsequent counter-attack clearly
show, first, the complete overlapping of JNA maneuvers
within CSWG Romanija and the JNA operations for the occupation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 (Figure
6) and, second, that the defense of the lines Kupres-Livno-Split
and Mostar-Ploče constituted the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but also of entire southern Croatia.
The
strategic dilemma for Croatia was whether to launch an
attack operation to liberate the occupied territories
with an army ill-equipped for such military actions, to
pay a very high price and then possibly fail to achieve
the set goal, which would mean a strategic defeat, or
to gain time, regroup the army, preserve the depth of
their operations, not only in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but also in Southern Croatia, and at the same time, attempt
to prevent the Serbs from realizing their transformed
goal.
The
second option, which was eventually adopted, was absolutely
correct, as subsequent events would show. Why? In strategy
there is one essential principle: the principle of opposition,
which implies that the interest of one side is in opposition
to the interest of the other side. War activities have
two forms: assault and defense, which are very different
and unequal in strength. If one side wishes to postpone
an outcome, the other must work for the outcome to happen
as quickly as possible, and vice versa. If a certain moment
is good for one side, but it is too weak and not ready
for an attack, it still will not lose its chance to wage
a successful defense. It simply must wait for a more favorable
moment in the future when it is certain to have accumulated
a convincing and measurable military power.45
The supremacy of defense, as Clausewitz would write, is
very substantial, much more substantial than its face
value, and his words are especially revelant during periods
when there is a suspension of war activities, which occurs
often during a war.46
The crucial question in this respect is which side is
going to better utilize the suspension and waiting time
in order to prepare itself for a final attack?
There
is another cause for a suspension in the war: incomplete
understanding of the situation, which is due either to
the overestimation of the enemy or oneself or the underestimation
of the enemy or oneself. Any attempt at a strategic analysis
requires a strict adherence to the principle which argues
that the slower a war activity evolves, and the more frequent
and longer the suspensions are, the sooner it will be
possible to correct possible fallacies. Strategy does
not forgive fallacies. The biggest fallacy during a war
is to attack at the wrong time. A strategic assault mission
for the liberation of the occupied territories of Croatia
in late 1991 and early 1992 would have been an attack
at the wrong time, since the strategic principle of opposition
and waiting had not been satisfied, i.e. the creation
of forces which would move from strategic defense into
a strategic attack.
After
an explanation of these strategic dilemmas, it might be
instructive to examine how the JNA and the Serbian political
leadership prepared for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
War
Preparations
As
Kadijević described it, the cooperation with Serb representatives
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian population as a
whole was very good during war preparations, and it enabled
the goal of a new Yugoslavia to be pursued. This was ensured
during the war in Croatia by a timely maneuver and the
shift of the JNA forces across Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
was of the utmost importance for the JNA. It was emphasized
often that the maneuvers and movements encountered difficulties
and were sometimes even obstructed, but never completely
obstructed. This permitted a successful mobilization in
the "Serbian part" of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
addition, it alleviated the burden of mobilization in
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
This
opinion affirms that the JNA, i.e. Serbian forces, were
not exhausted, and also that they had not by any means
reached their strategic peak, and that this second reorganization
of the entire Serbian military forces served a completely
different purpose.
The
purpose of the well-organized, equipped and armed Serbian
forces in the occupied territories of Croatia was to act
as the frontline task force and carry out defense operations,
and the second, strategically stronger task force was
used to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus indirectly
attain the set Greater Serbian goal.
It
should be noted that the JNA were forced to direct towards
Croatia a portion of the second body of strategic troops.
As Kadijević himself said, it had been their judgement
that after one of the Serbian armies had been formed ("the
Serbian Krajina Army - SVK"), strong JNA forces needed
to be deployed in the occupied territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
According to the viewpoint of the Serbian military establishment,
this would address every possible political option in
the development of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well
as the need for having ready-trained and strong forces
on the border with RSK as a guarantee that Croatia would
respect the Vance Plan. In addition to that, the following
statement indicates how justified they felt their decision
was to shift the second strategic task force towards the
occupied part of the Republic of Croatia: "The
constant aggression of Croatia against RSK shows how right
we were in having done this."47
In
operational terms, Croatia found itself at that moment
in a much more favorable position. Although the JNA forces
which were committed to aggression against its territory
still remained deployed, they were no longer positioned
across the entire depth of its state territory, but outside
of it. In this way, the projection of the military power
of these forces on to Croatia had decreased in strength,
and at the same time, the troops could not be used across
the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In strategy,
such a situation is referred to as a double binding of
forces.
Operational
Deployment and Maneuver of JNA Forces for the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
At
the moment the Vance agreement was signed, forces equaling
49 brigades (including the blocked formations of the 32nd,
13th and 10th Corps48)
were engaged in the aggression against the Republic of
Croatia. There were three armored brigades, six mechanized,
14 infantry, 18 Territorial Defense (Partisan) brigades,
12 territorial defense squadrons, various formations of
mortar and missile support, air defense, engineer corps
and other special units.
The
total strength of forces was: 90-95 thousand soldiers,
850-900 tanks, 700-750 armored personnel carriers, 1,200
artillery pieces of every caliber, including ground-to-ground
rockets R-65 "Luna" and anti-aircraft defense
missiles, 24 naval vessels (Vis and Lastovo). A total
of 350 aircraft of all types were engaged in combat.
The
JNA system of management and command adapted to the different
given situations - Slovenia, Croatia and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina.
When the Chiefs-of-Staff of the 5th Military Region (Zagreb)
and the Naval Region (Split) were unable to perform their
command duties, the tasks were taken over and carried
out by the SFRJ Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had direct
command over parts of the 1st Military Region, i.e. the
Novi Sad, Tuzla and Banja Luka corps, and especially over
the temporarily constituted OG-1 and 2 which were deployed
during the aggression against Croatia.
Such
conditions would prevail until December 1991, when the
JNA embarked on the reorganization of the chain of command.
The major reorganization of the JNA was finished by December
30, when the Serbian Federal President issued consent
for the dissolution and dismissal of the 5th Military
Region and Naval Region, headquartered respectively in
Zagreb and Split. Having mentioned this development, one
must bear in mind the broader circumstances of the situation,
which "forced" the JNA to act under unfavorable
conditions and prepare for the "battle for the preservation
of Yugoslavia", i.e. for the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
One of the unfavorable aspects of that situation was the
recognition of Croatia as an independent and sovereign
state and the mounting international condemnation of the
dirty war waged by the JNA and Serbia.
Spatiality
and Organization of New Military Regions
The
ultimate goal of the JNA's reorganization was to achieve
a dominant position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no
doubt that the JNA considered Bosnia-Herzegovina an integral
part of Serbia, i.e. Montenegro. The Eastern part of Bosnia,
east of the river Bosna, was assigned to the 1st Military
Region, the southern part was subordinated to the recently
formed 4th Military Region, and the remainder, predominantly
western and central parts of Bosnia, fell under the authority
of the 2nd Military Region.
For
the purpose of waging war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the JNA
established the 2nd and 4th Military Regions (between
December 1991 and January 1992) with the respective headquarters
in Sarajevo and Podgorica. In March of the same year,
under the retreat of the JNA from Macedonia, the Headquarters
of the 3rd Military Region was moved from Skopje to Niš.
With the already existing reduced 1st Military Region,
the JNA Army forces were organized into four military
regions, as groups at the strategic level. Their staffs
were in charge of the preparations, organization and harmonization
of the combat use of JNA in parts of the territory of
former Yugoslavia.
The
division - delineation (Figure
7) was comprised as follows: 1st Military Region (Belgrade)
- Vojvodina and Northern Serbia to the line between Kragujevac
and Užice, including Kragujevac and excluding Užice and
the northwestern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina49;
3rd Military Region (Niš) southern part of Serbia and
Kosovo50;
2nd Military Region (Sarajevo), western, northern and
central parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the line connecting
Foča-Kalinovik-Mostar51;
and 4th Military Region (Podgorica), south of that line,
Montenegro and south-western part of Serbia.52
The
military regions preserved the former structure, which
was based on corps of different power and composition,
as the operational level group, deployed in the directions
of planned use. Moreover, there were 1-2 combined artillery
brigades, combined anti-tank brigade, engineer brigade,
security motorized regiment (for the protection of military
region staffs, consisting of a military police battalion,
commando unit and a motorized battalion), signals regiment,
NBC defense regiment and a number of logistics bases,
as special components under the direct chain of command
of military region commanders. The 1st and the 3rd Military
Regions also each had an independent armored or mechanized
brigade.
The
total power of the JNA (2nd MR, part of the 4th and 1st
MR) deployed at the beginning of 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina
was: 83,000 men, 460-500 tanks, 400-420 armored vehicles
and 950-1, 000 mortars.
The
officer corps of the thus reorganized JNA (the officer
corps) consisted of 92.6% Serbs, 7% Montenegrins and 0.4%
others.
The
system of control and force subordination was such that
the MODs of SAO in the Republic of Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina
were under the direct chain of command of the Ministry
of Defense of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
"coordinated the execution of defense plans"
and whose common goal was the "protection of external
borders and their incorporation into the system of Yugoslavia."
The
Joint Chiefs of Staff were in charge of the operational
command over all the units of "VJ", "VRS"
and "SVK".
The
capabilities of particular corps or their units were less
than optimal. This could be seen from the characteristics
of the combat activities in the war against Croatia, especially
during the first stage of the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina.
There were many indications that the JNA had difficulties
in maintaining full composition structure of the brigades,
primarily due to problems with unit replenishment based
upon the required numbers and qualifications of recruits.
As the war continued, this problem escalated. For that
reason it became increasingly more common for the Army
to relocate soldiers from different formations, and to
use them as tactical ad hoc groups of different strengths
and purposes.53
The
Purpose of Military and Territorial Division
The
military and territorial division, as well as the organization
of forces, illustrate the fact that the 2nd and 4th Military
Regions, as the first strategic echelon in the occupation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were tasked to achieve area pacification,
based upon the already tested Croatian model. They were
to connect Serbian enclaves, cleanse the area of Croats
and Bosnian Muslims, and project their military power
onto the southern part of Croatia, as well as to assist
Serbian forces in the occupied territories of Croatia.
The second strategic echelon, the 1st and 3rd Military
Regions, served as strategic reserves. They were also
to provide some of their troops to reinforce the 2nd and
4th Military Regions and to be the vehicle to project
force onto the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
At
the moment when the territory of Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina
fell under the direct chain of command of the 1st Military
Region, Serbia's territory crossed onto the western bank
of the Drina. Likewise, by extending the authority of
the 4th MR over the south-western part of Serbia, its
short operational depth was extended.
The
demarcation line between the military regions showed clearly
that Belgrade wished not only to resolve the issue of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to indirectly provide for
the appropriation of the occupied territories from Croatia,
since the 2nd and 4th military regions had "natural"
access to the sea, with the demarcation line being drawn
form Vrlika to the Dalmatinska Ploča Cape (Figure
8).
Realization
of the First Stage of the Operational Plan
The
JNA already controlled a part of Herzegovina (Ravno, Popovo
Polje). In April, 1992, with the operationally developed
forces of the first strategic echelon (2nd and 4th Military
Regions), and part of the forces of the second strategic
echelon (1st and 3rd Military Regions), it embarked on
the realization of the operational plan of the occupation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
During
the first stage of the operation, a coordinated tong-shaped
attack and maneuver in two separate directions, one from
Grahovo-Glamoč-Kupres and the other from Trebinje-Bileća-Mostar,
were used to break the defense lines and penetrate into
the area of Central Dalmatia via Livno and Aržano, putting
pressure on the city of Split. Part of the forces were
supposed to continue the attack and reach the right bank
of the Neretva, i.e. via Stolovo, subdue the left bank
of the Neretva, access the Adriatic Sea in the region
of Neum-Ploee and unite with the occupation forces in
the region of Bistrina-Doli. If that operational plan
had worked, Bosnia would have been in a squeeze. The second
and the easiest stage of the operation then would follow,
directed towards Sarajevo and possible minor points of
resistance within Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have
consumed little time.
The
first stage of the operation failed to achieve the goal,
since on April 23, 1992, defenders managed to halt both
penetrations, in Livanjsko Polje on the Rujani-Čelebić-Korićina
line, as well as in Stolovi in the Neretva Valley. Bosnia
remained "unclamped".
As
a result, the operational bases in southern Croatia and
Western Bosnia-Herzegovina were defended. This spatial
basis had a strong strategic significance, which would
become clear during the further course of the war, and
especially during the final actions for the liberation
of the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia
and the assault operations in Western and Central Bosnia-Herzegovina
during the autumn of 1995. The integrity of the strategic
approach points to the fact that this area had the best
and the strongest projection of power during the war.
It was also the area where in early spring of 1992, the
JNA and Serbia reached their strategic peak. This was
the crown of the parabola from which the descending curve
of the Serbian Army would move more and more towards the
east.
New
Restructuring and Second Operation Stage
After
the failed attempt to clamp down Western Bosnia-Herzegovina
and to totally occupy Sarajevo, the plan had to be adjusted
and the JNA further restructured.54
The command over both the JNA and Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
would be given to General Ratko Mladić on 10 May.55
He was placed in charge of the entire 2nd Military Region
and smaller parts of the 1st and 4th Military Regions,
which would eventually form the Army of the Republika
Srpska. The forces of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Military Regions,
deployed in the territories of Serbia and Montenegro,
would enter into the system of the "Army of Yugoslavia"
as the military of the "new state."56
Upon
taking over the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army of the Republika Srpska, General Mladić immediately
embarked on the reorganization of his forces. The 5th
Corps was transformed into 1st Krajina Corps, the 9th
and 10th Corps were transformed into 2nd Krajina Corps,
the 17th Corps became the East-Bosnian Corps, the 4th
Corps was renamed the Sarajevo and Romanija Corps and
the 13th Corps became the Herzegovina Corps. From May
19, 1992 on, the G.S. acted as the supreme command in
the Army of the Republika Srpska, which monitored the
formation of other units and offices. (Operational array
of new corps - Figure
9.).
In
the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were six corps,
consisting of 135,000 men, 550 tanks, over 1,300 atillery
pieces and 430 armored vehicles during the first part
of 1992. These forces also controlled a substantial portion
of strategic armament reserves, ammunition and other equipment
important for independent combat actions over a long period
of time. At the same time, the first strategic echelon
of the "Yugoslav Army" was operationally developed
and deployed on the left and right banks of the Drina.
After
the reorganization of the JNA into two Serbian armies
(the Army of the Republika Srpska and the Army of Yugoslavia),
there was a new action aimed at appropriating as much
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible. According
to the plan, western Bosnia was to be connected with eastern
Bosnia via Posavina, Sarajevo was to be occupied and the
Neretva Valley penetrated. The entire 1st Krajina Corps
and the Corps of Eastern Bosnia, a smaller portion of
the 2nd Krajina Corps and reinforcing forces - special
units of the Serbian Police, the SAO Krajina Militia,
Valjevo Mechanized Brigade (2,500 men and 50 tanks), as
well as volunteer formations from Serbia - were all deployed
in furtherance of the goal of conquering Posavina, as
a decision point within the second stage of the strategic
operation. Air cover was provided from airbases in Batajnica
(Belgrade) and Banja Luka.
During
the operation, which commenced on July 15, 1992, Serbian
troops, having learned their lessons from the war in Croatia
and the first stage of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
took advantage of their superiority in equipment. Using
all sorts of support (artillery fire, rockets, close air
support) and the readjusted organization (combat and operational
groups), implementing a realistically conceived plan,
they succeeded in gaining control over Bosanska Posavina,
minus the broader region of Orašje. The aggressor's overwhelming
victory was most probably facilitated by the weaknesses
of the defenders of Bosanska Posavina, primarily in terms
of the organization of defense, the coordination of activities,
the training and equipment of units and the commanders'
abilities in planning and implementation of combat actions.
From
the point of view of operational skills, the cause of
the occupation of Posavina lay in the disproportional
balance of power favoring the aggressor. This disproportion
was primarily in terms of equipment, which was even more
significant in the operational base from which the military
power was projected, rather than in a willingness to defend
or not defend this historical Croatian region. It was
very important that the Serbs projected their military
power from a center, either by targeted dispersion or
centering, without having to negotiate major obstacles.
The defender was forced to do the opposite - a targeted
maneuver across a major obstacle, the river Sava, and
an elongated canalized road through the valleys of the
Neretva and Bosna. The major causes of the occupation
of Bosanska Posavina lay in this fact.
The
siege of Sarajevo transformed itself into an utter decadence
of the classical war doctrine (the medieval siege of a
fortified city), but was also to become a testing ground
for the uncompromising use of terroristic military force
before the very eyes of the international community.
The
penetration along the Neretva Valley representated yet
another failure for the Serbian forces. The counterattack
by the defenders liberated the left bank of the river
in its middle and lower course.
The
further development of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina took
place under the strong influence of international factors.
Unfortunately, each and every one of them would either
disguise their interests, or, if the interests were revealed,
would fail to properly coordinate them. The resolution
of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis would have to be "on
hold" for the final operations of the Croatian Armed
Forces. Under very complex international and national
conditions, Croatia was ready, after systematically creating
its Armed Forces, to meet the challenges posed in the
mid-nineties, and contribute to the establishment of peace
(the Dayton Accord) as a factor of strategic balance in
the region.
Concluding
Remarks
When
it comes to the attainment of the Greater Serbian goals
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian analysts will claim that
the JNA assisted greatly in the establishment of the army
of the Bosnia-Herzegovian Serbs, which it helped to "put
on its feet", and that the latter, in turn, "liberated
Serbian territories" and "protected the Serb
people." By stating that both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the JNA fought for the right of the Serb people to determine
their own future, the analysts reveal its true nature
and role as an imperial force in the service of a political
idea. In accordance with that concept, the Croatian and
Bosnia-Herzegovian territories represented a whole which
had to be conquered for the project of Greater Serbia,
in keeping with the international circumstances and the
internal concurrence of events.
The
military strategic operational plan for the occupation
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was implemented by the
JNA in increments, without revealing its true intentions,
but maintaining its overall domination with a sufficient
degree of adaptability. The operations were carried out
on only one strategic front. Other theaters were left
to a "new Serbian army", which was put in place
to safeguard what had been occupied. Benefiting from the
initial advantage in equipment, the JNA could easily adapt
its plan, determining the place and time of attack and
the duration of suspension. It could also shift its decision
point, but it could not exert any influence on the waste
of combat potential (men and equipment), which was very
much dependent on the efficiency of the defense.
By
reaching its strategic peak in the region of western Bosnia-Herzegovina
in spring of 1992, the JNA was transformed into three
"Serbian armies" under a unified command. It
continued the aggression, carrying out attacks of low
and partly medium intensity. Such a condition could be
interrupted by one or more attack operations which would
defeat not so much the Serbian Army(ies), as much as their
strategic idea. Having realized that they had lost strategic
supremacy after the final operations by Croatian forces,
and that the strategic balance had moved in space to the
line of the Danube-Bosna-Neretva - and that this was between
50 to 300 kilometers east of the "western Serbian
border" - the Serbian political and military establishments
signed the agreements.
And
finally, at the end of these strategic deliberations and
reviews, one would do well to remember Clausewitz and
his position that nobody starts a war, or better still
- nobody in their right mind should start one - before
having a clear idea about what they intend to achieve
by the war and how they intend to wage it.
Aggressors
tend to be "peace lovers". They always want
to appropriate or occupy foreign lands if possible without
any resistance. In order to prevent them, one must be
prepared to wage war, both in its initial or final stages.
Croatia had only one choice. During the initial stage,
due to the lack of arms, the choice was a strategic defense.
During the final stages, the only choice was a strategic
attack which resulted in a change - the establishment
of a balance of power and coordination of its capabilities
against the enemy's defensive power.
Only
an integral approach at the level of strategic considerations
can provide an answer as to what, when and why something
had to be done. It cannot be obtained by the analysis
of separate events, since this would inevitably lead to
simplification. A war is not and cannot be a simplification,
subject to one's own point of view, or worse still, to
a temporary political interest. Although aggression is
an act of abruptness, war does not arise abruptly, and
its outcome is not the result of an isolated moment. That
is why every analysis of the Homeland War must contain
a judgement on what was done and with what result, rather
than what, strictly speaking, should have happened or
should have been done.
The
Greater Serbian imperial idea was doomed to end in aggression.
The main domino in this idea, the one which had to fall,
was Croatia. This implies that the war was imposed on
Croatia, and that Croatia emerged from the war victorious,
attained its independence, and confirmed the power of
strategy.
ABBREVIATIONS
NOTES
REFERENCES
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andrić's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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