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The
Civil War in Afghanistan
General
Major A. Liakhovsky
ABSTRACT
Author analyses (a)
the causes leading to the Afghan Civil War 1979-1989 (the
war is above all the result of global rivalries between
the super-power states and conflicting political systems);
(b) Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan
(there is reason to believe that the leaders of the Soviet
Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation,
skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies);
(c) the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (brought
about an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict,
and brought about an abrupt international reaction, especially
from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the
Islamic world and China); (d) combat operations (the Soviet
troops conducted mainly partial military operations in
the DRA, with very limited forces and equipment); (e)
the national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan (A civil war should end through
consensus within a given society. Such a consensus has
not been achieved in Afghanistan to this day, and therefore
the war continues); (f) the Civil War without Soviet troops
(After Soviet troops departed, the scale of fighting between
the Afghans themselves increased); and provides (g) summations
and conclusions (The Afghan conflict facilitated the defeat
of the USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation
between the two super-powers, socio-political systems,
and military blocs. One million men passed through Afghanistan.
The dead numbered 14,626. About 50,000 men were wounded,
6,669 were disabled, and over 500,000 contracted various
severe illnesses. In addition, 147 tanks, 1,312 armored
vehicles, 233 artillery guns and mortars, 114 airplanes
and 322 helicopters were lost).
Causes
for leading to the Civil War
The
causes of the Civil War in Afghanistan can be conditionally
subdivided into internal and external, objective and subjective
causes, although they are, of course, interconnected.
During
the last two decades, events in Afghanistan have brought
this country, one of the most backward and poorest nations
of the world, increased attention from the international
community. The contentious situation arose in Afghanistan
during the mid-1970s, immediately after Prince Mohammed
Daud in 1973 overthrew King Zahir Shah, abolished the
monarchy and proclaimed himself president of the republic.
Supporters of the deposed king, as well as representatives
of leftist forces and Islamic fundamentalists, initiated
the struggle against Daud. Afghani-Soviet relations at
the time were good. By 1978, there were over two thousand
Soviet technical, economic, and military advisers in Afghanistan.
The total sum of Soviet loans reached a level of 1.265
million dollars, while American loans and non-returnable
grants reached a total of 470 million dollars.
The
situation in the country noticeably deteriorated following
the military coup in April 1978 carried out by a relatively
small group of people with the support of the army and
certain lower middle class elements. As a result of this
adventurism and voluntaristic action, the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was proclaimed. And although
the Soviet Union was not directly involved in the revolution
(it appeared to Soviet representatives in Kabul like "a
bolt from the blue"), in the USSR such a turn of
events was welcomed with satisfaction-even more so since
the members of the PDPA proclaimed a policy of establishing
socialism in the country. This, in fact, set the tone
for overall aid and support to the new regime from the
Soviet leadership.
From
that moment Afghanistan found itself drawn into the orbit
of the fierce confrontation that marked the apex of the
"Cold War" between two different socio-political
systems. This is precisely what makes it possible to explain
the importance attached to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union
and the United States, as well as other countries. In
my article, I will briefly examine some aspects of this
conflict, its results and the lessons learned.
At
first (after the military coup), the US administration
did not have a unified approach to the situation in Afghanistan.
However, the US national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
convinced the administration that although growing Soviet
influence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)
did threaten US national security, the situation also
provided a valuable political opportunity for the Americans
in their global conflict with the USSR. As stated specifically
in a paper submitted to the State Department: "…the
overthrow of the DRA would show the rest of the world,
especially the 'Third World,' the fallacy of the Soviet
concept of the inevitable socialist course of history."1
The
US, having accused the USSR of exporting revolution, began
to exert pressure on the latter, inducing it to abandon
support of the DRA and make concessions in a series of
other issues. After the situation created in Afghanistan
as a result of the military coup had been discussed during
the May (1978) session of NATO, and upon consulting with
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, that summer the White House
already took concrete steps to destabilize the state of
affairs in the DRA.
At
the same time, political priorities in the region and
the methods of realizing them were re-evaluated. A policy
was adopted to expand cooperation with various Arab states
and with Beijing, and then with Pakistan. Great efforts
were undertaken during this period to induce the governments
of the Arab states to pay less attention to local problems,
including to their relations with Israel. In February
1979, President Carter declared that the Americans are
prepared to protect their vital interests by any means,
including military force, be it in the Near East or anywhere
else.
Most
countries in the West, their allies in the Islamic world
and also China, reacted negatively, even with hostility,
to events in Afghanistan. They saw in them the threat
of a shift in the regional balance of power to the advantage
of the USSR.
The
new leaders in Afghanistan, on coming to power, began
to introduce radical transformations in the country and
implement an impractical maximalist course. In a feudal
society with deep-rooted remnants of a gentile-tribal
order and the domination of Islam in all spheres of life,
they proclaimed their intentions to establish socialism
in the shortest possible period, for which there was neither
a social nor an economic basis, nor mass support. Concentrating
their main efforts in three basic directions - the agricultural
sector, the national question and religion - they ruined
the system of village management, shaped over the centuries,
exacerbated ethnic tensions and provoked a harsh negative
reaction from the clergy.
The
new government also proved incapable of responding to
the expectations of the broad masses of the population
and enlisting their support. The land and water reforms,
as well as transformations in the social field, had a
piecemeal nature and did not take into consideration the
specific aspects of Afghan society. The government committed
the grossest errors and leftist deviations in the socio-economic
sphere, in ethnic issues and with regard to religion.
This pushed the population into the opposition camp.
Leaning
on support from the Soviet Communist Party, the leadership
of the PDPA was able to impose its will upon the people
and to take a line of action towards establishing an authoritarian
regime in Afghanistan based on fear and coercion. However,
in this country, with its traditional democratic liberties,
this could not but encounter fierce resistance from the
population. It was precisely the errors permitted by the
PDPA's leaders, who had strove to achieve quick results
through radical reforms and force, that brought about
civil war in Afghanistan.
It
soon became evident that the government was in no condition
to secure control over the situation in the country, even
more so since it did not have firm support in the armed
forces, and desertion became widespread.
The
military coup brought about a breakdown in the balance
of power that had been developing in the country for years.
It provoked a new spiral of tense rivalry between the
US and the USSR, since it was regarded by the Americans
as having reinforced the Soviet Union's position in this
region.
To
settle the conflicts that had arisen in Afghan society,
and to avert civil war, it would have been necessary to
pursue a flexible policy, based on the traditions and
customs of the Afghans, which would have taken into account
the real situation in Afghanistan and the distribution
of forces both in the country and on the international
scene. But this the members of the PDPA could not ensure.
In
a situation of political disorder and internal party strife,
the general secretary of the PDPA, N.M. Taraki, was soon
removed from the post of president and killed. "His
faithful disciple" H. Amin, a man with avanturistic
leanings, a dubious political profile and external ties,
demoralized the party and isolated the regime from the
people even more once he seized power through harsh repression.
This
created conducive conditions for setting the opposition
forces into action, as the latter immediately established
ties with Islamic states and the USA. With external support,
rebel fighting units began to form, relying on politically
backward peasants and artisans. The Muslim clergy, having
been subjected to persecution by the Amin regime, assumed
a hostile stance. Disturbances broke out among the tribes
whose interests and historical traditions the government
had not considered. Thousands of refugees began to flow
into Pakistan - and, partially, into Iran.
Rebel
military camps sprang up in Pakistan. These became a military
and political base for the Afghan counter-revolution,
and from them new and increasingly larger armed units
were sent into Afghanistan. Through Pakistan, the rebels
received increasing amounts of American, as well as Chinese
and other arms, and as diverse aid from Western and Islamic
countries.
The
Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan
Under
conditions of growing tension in and around Afghanistan,
the Afghan leaders began to send appeals for assistance
to the DRA, which would entail the direct use of Soviet
troops. They were delivered personally during meetings
between the leaders of the two countries, through Soviet
representatives in Kabul, and also during visits of top-level
party and government delegations.
In
such circumstances, the Afghan leadership frequently turned
to the Soviet Union, requesting military aide through
the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The first
such appeal was made by N. M. Taraki in March 1979, during
the Herat uprising, when he arrived in Moscow and met
with the leaders of the USSR, including Leonid Brezhnev.
However, the request was at that time categorically rejected.
The Soviet leaders acted similarly on subsequent occasions
as well. Yet in December their position regarding the
deployment of troops changed, because Brezhnev changed
his opinion. True, it should be said that his views were
not shared by some members of the Politburo of the Soviet
Communist Party's Central Committee, first of all not
by A. Kosygin, nor by a number of top General Staff officials
(N.B. Ogarov, V.I. Varennikov), and not by the head of
the ground forces, I. G. Pavlovsky.
Deployment
of Soviet troops was based on a corresponding article
(Article 4) existing in the Afghan-Soviet agreement (1978)
and also on the fact that the request by the Afghan government
and its acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union was
exclusively a matter between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan,
the two of which could, by joint agreement, regulate their
mutual relations. Just as any other member of the UN,
they had the right not only to individual but also to
collective self-defense, as provided by Article 51 of
the UN Charter.
At
that time, the Soviet leadership long refused to act on
the appeal of the Afghans to dispatch Soviet troops to
Afghanistan. Yet on December 12, 1979 a positive decision
in this matter was nonetheless made. The decision was
taken against a background of contradictory, rapidly changing,
and acute factors that directly effected the Soviet Union's
state security interests. The last straw that tipped the
balance in favor of troop deployment was a decision made
by the NATO foreign and defense ministers during their
December 12 summit in Brussels. They had approved a scenario
involving the deployment of new American "Cruise"
and "Pershing-2" mid-range missiles in Western
Europe. By moving arms to Western Europe, they could strike
at the territory of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of
Soviet leaders, after this step NATO no longer had anything
to lose. However, as the further events showed, the action
in question, taken without appropriate predictions and
considerations of the effect that the deployment of Soviet
troops would have on development of the situation in and
around Afghanistan, brought tragedy to both sides.
While
examining the issue of Soviet troop deployment in Afghanistan,
it should be noted that the realities and the evaluations
of the international situation at the time without doubt
effected the elaboration of Soviet policy in regard to
the DRA. Analysis of the international situation at the
end of the 1970s shows that it was characterized by extreme
tension. This was a period when détente was abandoned,
when the world was being drawn into a new escalation of
arms build-ups, when the West launched wide-scale activities
to undermine the USSR and its allies. The "Cold War"
was on. Global military and strategic confrontation emerged
between the two superpowers (the US and the USSR), the
two systems, and the two military blocks. It was still
unclear how events would develop in Iran, where Khomeini
had come to power. The anti-Shah revolution in Iran and
the establishment of an Islamic regime there had forced
the Americans to seek new site for military bases. Thus,
mass aid to the Afghan rebels and the increasing concentration
of US forces in the region, in the immediate vicinity
of Soviet boarders, could not but arouse serious alarm
among the leaders of the Soviet Union. Moreover, since
the end of the 1970s, the development of the détente process
in relations between the USSR and the USA had noticeably
broken down.
Under
pressure from Washington, a long-term program of armament
and rearmament was initiated in Western European countries.
The Carter administration unilaterally decided to freeze,
for an indefinite period, the ratification of the SALT-2
accords. This was interpreted in the Soviet Union as a
sharp change in the general military and political policy
of the United States. NATO examined the issue of annual
increases in the military budgets of its members up to
the end of the twentieth century. The Americans created
rapid intervention forces, etc. Pursuant to this, the
nuclear potential of the block was increased in an attempt
by the West to undermine strategic parity.
Such
a confrontational approach spread into virtually all areas
of the relationship between the two large countries and
their allies. The Americans placed an entire series of
world regions within the sphere of Western vital interests.
Naturally, the revolutions of 1978 in Afghanistan-which
the Soviet Union had not in any way instigated-and later
in Iran, were perceived largely in the context of this
confrontation. Attempting to compensate for a weakened
position in the Middle East, the US stationed its military-naval
forces in the Persian Gulf and developed plans for the
invasion of Iran. The Americans, as well as their allies,
had to ask themselves how far Afghanistan would go in
its relations with the USSR. A policy was adopted to change
the regime in Kabul.
Ideas
emerged on setting up American radio-electronic surveillance
equipment in Afghanistan to monitor the USSR, and maybe
some forms of missiles in case pro-Western forces came
to power in that country. The Soviet leadership had learned
of plans drawn up by the American and Pakistani intelligence
agencies to kindle nationalistic, pan-Islamic sentiments
in the Soviet Central Asian republics by using the territories
of contiguous states. It is easy to assume that under
such circumstances the Soviet leadership was most likely
inclined to conclude that a fundamental change in the
situation in Afghanistan, the strengthened position of
the USA and its allies in that country, would produce,
in regard to the USSR, an overall negative shift in the
balance of power, not only in the region, but also within
the Soviet Union's southern boundaries. The West, undoubtedly,
was hoping to stir up, through Afghanistan, a wave of
national-democratic revolutions. This was, precisely,
indicated repeatedly to representatives of brotherly parties,
who at the time considered Soviet-American rivalry in
the Third World as being natural.
Analyses
show that the Soviet Union was also disturbed by the fact
that the US and China were continuing to draw closer together
on an anti-Soviet basis. In particular, the two countries
had arrived at agreements on exchanging visits at the
level of cabinet members, trade delegations and military
missions; on reducing the number of US troops on Taiwan
(while maintaining the right of the US to sell arms to
Taiwan); on Chinese support for American peace efforts
in the Near East; on establishing discrete Chinese ties
with Israel; on using American influence to improve relations
between Saudi Arabia and China; on the willingness of
Washington to alter COCOM procedures so as to facilitate
the transfer of new technologies to China; on American
and Chinese aid to certain regimes in Africa, especially
to those that would be able to raise the cost of Soviet-Cuban
intervention, and also on issues such as Afghanistan,
aid to Pakistan and joint efforts in Southeast Asia to
obstruct Soviet support of Vietnam.
Taking
such a step, the Soviet leadership was acting on the basis
of assessments that existed at the time regarding the
situation in the world and in the region, and also on
the basis of views on the prospects of rivalry with the
US. The predominant opinion was that deployment of American
missiles in Europe had made Soviet installations vulnerable,
right up to the Urals, and that this action would make
it possible to reduce tensions and divert attention from
European areas. The reinforcement of aircraft carrier
concentration in the Persian Gulf and of the air force
on Diego García Island, created problems for anti-aircraft
defense in industrial locations and the main petroleum,
natural gas and coal extraction centers in Siberia. The
possibility of placing American equipment in Afghanistan,
in light of the revolution in Iran, intensified the situation
further. In the opinion of some experts, the danger existed
that the Americans might intervene in Afghanistan, which
would produce a threat to the security of the southern
borders of the USSR.
Moreover,
a considerable role was likewise played by the personal
factor, by the ambitions of certain Soviet politicians
(H. Amin could not be forgiven for having ignored the
request to spare N. Taraki's life, made by the Soviet
Politburo, and also in person by Brezhnev). It was precisely
the personal ambitions of the general secretary of the
Communist Party's Central Committee that had a decisive
influence on the other leaders of the Soviet Union, hence
eliminating wise statesmanship and forcing a change in
the previously expressed conviction that the use of one's
own troops in the internal Afghan conflict would be futile.
A certain role was played, apparently, by the wish of
Soviet leaders to prevent the establishment of Amin's
terrorist regime and to protect the Afghan people from
genocide, while also not allowing the opposition to come
to power, thus preserving an ideological ally. Moreover,
the style of the leadership was, at the time, dominated
by Great Power thinking. One could notice, at the time,
a somewhat condescending attitude towards the Afghans,
and not only towards them. However, underestimation of
one's opponent always leads to gravely negative results.
The
Soviet leadership was also greatly worried by the prospects
regarding the evolution of the regime. The personal power
of Hafizulla Amin was quickly rising in the party and
in the country. Representatives of the opposition forces
in the PDPA frequently turned the attention of the Soviet
side to the fact that the reckless actions of the Aminist
clique were leading to the complete physical extermination
of the country's national-patriotic and progressive forces.
Reports of Amin's collaboration with the CIA became particularly
severe.
In
addition, it should be noted that in their assessment
of the situation in and around the DRA, Soviet leaders
also reacted with alarm to declarations made by Islamic
fundamentalists that in the event that they came to power
they would carry the struggle under the green flag of
jihad onto the territory of the Soviet Central Asian republics.
Likewise, Soviet leaders found themselves in a situation
in which they could not refuse support to a "brotherly"
party - for this would not be understood by their allies
nor by other Communist parties. They strove to act in
the interests of state security on behalf of a higher
goal: to save the "socialist" course of development
in Afghanistan.
Based
on a comprehensive analysis of the complex measures taken
during this time by the Americans, not only in Afghanistan
(in particular, the Strategic Defense Initiative and the
"swing" in the American arms race), it may be
said that Soviet intelligence "swallowed the bait";
they were intentionally led into deception by the excellent
use of extensive misinformation on a strategic scale.
While amassing troops for deployment in Afghanistan, the
military command vainly nurtured illusions that it could
achieve the element of surprise and secrecy. Perhaps some
details even could be kept secret, but this was hardly
that important. The main point is that the Soviets found
ourselves in a trap from which they extracted themselves
only after great efforts and losses. Not having any idea
about the misinformation, Soviet leaders pursued the arms
race beyond all permissible levels, by which they undermined
the economy of the country and brought the subsistence
of the population to poverty. The same can be said for
the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The "Afghan
War" was a segment of the "Cold War" in
which the American strategists strove to achieve political
goals without direct armed force, but rather through the
application of other forms of coercion, undermining the
power and military organization of the USSR from within,
which brought victory without a fight and bloodshed.
The
Soviet Union underestimated the influence of the international
factor. It was assumed that Washington would not react
too keenly to such an operation. Well, isn't Afghanistan
a purely Soviet patrimony? This would not seriously effect
its relations with the US. After all, while the Vietnam
War was going on, for example, the Soviets continued to
cooperate with the Americans.
However,
objectively it was favorable for the United States to
have the Soviet Union tied up in regional conflict for
an extended time. The US received with satisfaction the
information that Soviet troops had been sent to Afghanistan,
and it protracted their stay in the country as long as
possible. The goal was to exhaust the Soviet Union economically
and morally, to force it to carry the back-breaking burden
of a drawn-out war.
In
my view, there was no overriding need to send troops to
the DRA. No objective circumstances, even then, necessitated
it. The subjective, "personal" factor was decisive.
And we went there to secure peace, but what did we bring
was war. It is extremely important to consider this fact
today, when making decisions on conducting peace operations
under the aegis of the UN. After all, the deployment in
combat zones even of multinational peace-keeping troops
will often play the role of detonator, provoking an escalation
of the conflict and showing itself to be scarcely effective.
The
officially proclaimed primary goal of the Soviet presence
in the DRA was peace-making. This was formulated unequivocally:
providing assistance to stabilize the situation, repelling
possible aggression from abroad. The Soviet troops had
to take up garrison duty and not be involved in internal
conflict and combat operations. They were ordered to offer
aid to the local population everywhere, to protect it
from gangs, and also to distribute foodstuffs, fuel, and
other necessities. It was predicted that the very presence
of Soviet troops would become a strong stabilizing factor,
that it would significantly reinforce the PDPA regime,
that it would have a restraining effect on opposition
movements… Today, of course, it is widely known that such
arrangements were unrealistic, but at the time it was
considered acceptable. In reality, the troops were expected
to secure Hafizulla Amin's removal from power and support
the establishment of Babrak Karmal's regime. According
to estimates, the Soviet troops should have been withdrawn
from Afghanistan in three to four months. If that had
happened, possibly there would not have been such severe
consequences for the Soviet Union. However, in life everything
turns out differently. The troops stayed in the country
for over ten years.
The
Deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
The
deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan brought about
an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict. The
Soviet military presence was associated with the spread
of institutions, foreign to the national peculiarities
and feelings of the Afghan people, which did not respect
the multi-structured economy and other specificities:
tribal, regional. The military and political situation,
contrary to expectations and hopes, did not improve, but
rather deteriorated significantly.
The
arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their later
involvement in the war on the side of the Kabul regime
brought about an abrupt international reaction, especially
from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the
Islamic world, China… They saw it as a direct attempt
by Moscow to disrupt-to its own advantage-the strategic
balance of power that had taken shape until then on the
global and regional level. In their opinion, owing to
further instability in Iran, there was no longer any other
barrier in Southwest Asia to a Soviet breakthrough to
the Indian Ocean. The arising imbalance was quickly eliminated
by the amassing of arms and supplies for the Afghan opposition
in Pakistan, and by reinforcing Western military presence
in strategically important zones in the region.
Among
Western states, the US was the most negative in its reactions
to events in Afghanistan. Disturbed by the acute crisis
in American-Iranian relations, by the possibility of socio-political
shifts in the oil producing nations of the Near and Middle
East, the administration concluded that events in Afghanistan
destabilized US influence in the region even more, at
a time critical to its interests. Recognizing that it
was impossible to directly intervene in the affairs of
the DRA with the aim of aiding the Afghan opposition,
the US placed high hopes in the use of Pakistan, the People's
Republic of China, certain Islamic countries, and also
its allies in NATO.
The
American government reached a decision to urgently send
arms and technical supplies to Pakistan, up to the sum
of 100 million dollars. The USA conducted consultations
with the leaders of Pakistan and China, and likewise within
the framework of NATO.
Pakistan,
which on the eve of the "Afghan War" had been
facing the threat of economic and political bankruptcy,
was transformed into a "front-line state" and
started to receive extensive military and economic aid
from the US and Saudi Arabia. The United States took an
unprecedented step - supplying such aid in circumvention
of American legislation that prohibited giving it to countries
that were developing nuclear arms. The regime of Zia-ul-Haq
also succeeded in establishing direct contacts with the
leaders of Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and Japan, having reinforced its role in the
Islamic world and consolidated its ties with China in
the business of developing nuclear weapons. In connection
with this, one may recall the actions of the US in the
analogous problem regarding Iran and Iraq.
Pakistan
expressed a strong negative reaction to events in Afghanistan,
deducing that the Soviet army would soon essentially be
present on the Pakistani border. Among Arab states, the
most negative response to the arrival of Soviet troops
in Afghanistan was that of Egypt. The move of the USSR
was condemned by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Tunisia,
the United Arab Emirates… Yet in leftist Arab circles,
the Soviet Union's actions were received with satisfaction.
The
actions of the Soviet Union provoked a negative reaction
in Beijing. Chinese leaders accused the Soviet Union of
trying to establish full control over Afghanistan and
expressed their readiness to support any American activity
in connection with events in the DRA.
After
making officially a negative statement on Afghanistan,
the political and religious leaders of Iran assumed a
relatively quiet stance, which was explained by the extreme
tensions in Iranian-American relations, by Khomeini's
desire to improve relations with the USSR, and by Iran's
interest in the Soviet "veto" during the debate
on sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.
The
further development of events showed the Afghan theme
interested the US and its allies in as much as it enabled
following a course of increased confrontation with the
USSR. Applying various methods of pressure, the Americans
strove to exploit the situation that had arisen here as
one of the factors in their external policy, after having
launched an extensive campaign to discredit the USSR.
When
Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan, the United States,
their allies, certain Arabic and Islamic regimes, as well
as China, openly announced their support and aid to the
opposition. This aid was shown even before, but now it
significantly increased. Afghanistan found itself isolated
on the international level and found support only in the
socialist camp, mainly in the Soviet Union.
The
United States launched a propaganda campaign aimed at
demonstrating to the leaders and people of the Islamic
states that the USSR, and not the US, was the "mortal
enemy of Islam." Thus, the US strove to undercut
the Soviet Union's position in the "Third World,"
primarily in the Arabic East, and also to exert pressure
on American NATO allies and Japan to obtain international
condemnation of the Soviet Union for its role in Afghan
events.
During
the session of the Security Council on Afghan issue on
January 14, 1980, most member states of the UN General
Assembly condemned the USSR's actions, calling for immediate
withdrawal of Soviet units from the DRA (104 countries
voted "for," 48 were "opposed" or
"abstained"). The actions of the Soviet Union
were also condemned by countries of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) and of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as by some
socialist countries.
Listed
concisely, the measures taken by US government took against
the USSR, after comprehensive deliberation and consultations
with its allies, included the following: pushing demands
in the UN Security Council for a condemnation the USSR
for open, unprovoked aggression against an independent
state; ending deliberation in Congress on the SALT-2 accords
until the aggression stopped; a temporary freeze of all
bilateral negotiations, top-level visits, transfers of
advanced technology and, possibly, imposing a ban on the
sale of grain; limiting loans for the USSR from the US
and its European allies; refusal to diplomatically recognize
the new government in Afghanistan by the USA and, consequently,
by the NATO member states; providing periodic aid to Pakistan
in order to reinforce its defense potential; reaching
an understanding with the governments of Egypt and Somalia
for the use, by the Americans, of military bases on their
territories in the event of a military threat to the Middle
East or the Persian Gulf region; adopting a covert program
to provide Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan with anti-tank
and anti-aircraft projectiles of Soviet make, possibly
from Egypt; encouraging China to provide aid to the insurgents
in the form of machine-guns, mortars, anti-personnel and
anti-tank mines; and boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow.
By
sending troops to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union crossed
the permissible limits of confrontation in the "Third
World." The benefits of this action showed themselves
insignificant in comparison with the damage that was inflicted
to the country's interests: in addition to two fronts
of opposition-in Europe against NATO and in East Asia
again China-a third dangerous hotbed of military and political
tension arose along the southern flank of the USSR, in
unfavorable geographic and socio-political conditions;
the anti-Soviet bloc surrounding the USSR from the West
to the East, was significantly extended and consolidated;
the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement,
especially on the Islamic world, significantly suffered;
détente was blocked and the political preconditions for
limiting the arms race were eliminated; economic and technological
pressure on the USSR rose sharply. Afghanistan had for
many years been to us a friendly country; however, after
deploying troops on Afghan territory, instead of a friend
it made an enemy.
The
United States did everything it could to make the Soviet
Union pay a high price for its involvement in Afghanistan,
choosing Afghanistan as a polygon for decisive counteraction
against "Soviet expansion." Defeat of the latter
had to bring about not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from that country and the downfall of the "pro-Communist
Kabul regime," but also destabilization of the situation
in the USSR itself.
A
plan developed by the CIA in collaboration with the secret
service of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, code-named "Program-M,"
counted on extensive use of the Islamic factor and, above
all, of the armed Islamic opposition in Afghanistan. It
foresaw a coordinated operation by all mujahidin units,
providing arms to them, organizing the training of combatants
in special centers, and the creation of a spy network
in the DRA and in the southern parts of the USSR. Realization
of the intended measures also entailed the engagement
of participation of various Islamic centers operating
in Islamic states, including organizations with a fundamentalist
character.
In
providing military aid to the Afghan democratic forces,
the Soviet leaders, contrary to the view of military experts,
had overestimated the effect that the very deployment
of troops to the DRA might have. Also, they had not sufficiently
studied the fact that, due to centuries of war with different
subjugators, a firmly ingrained view had formed in the
awareness of each Afghan, by which foreign troops entering
the country, even with good intentions, are always foreign
occupiers with whom one must do battle.
With
the arrival of Soviet troops in the DRA, the main unifying
ideological and political catchword of the anti-government
forces became the call to holy war, "jihad."
One should admit that this call of the Mullahs was understood
by a large part of the Afghan population, fed by centuries
of Muslim tradition and also the action of the Islamic
authorities.
It
is no secret that for many years the Soviet Union's policy
of foreign security had been built to a great degree on
ideological dogmas. These, precisely, became the criteria
for judging the validity of the decisions made at the
time. The state and national interests of the country
were subordinated to them. Particular attention was given
to supporting ideological allies.
Conducting
combat operations
Finding
themselves in Afghanistan, the Soviet troops conducted
mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very
limited forces and equipment. In all of the years of the
war, there was not one case when the entire body of the
LSTC (Limited Soviet Troop Contingent) simultaneously
and in all areas conducted active combat operations against
the rebels. Military operations were limited to the following:
- combat
with the most dangerous opposition units;
-
destruction or capture of their base areas, together
with their reserves of arms, materials and technical
supplies;
- control
of the main strategic communications with the aim of
securing stable administrative and economic ties between
the center and periphery;
-
escorting convoys with material supplies - both for
the LSTC and for the Afghan government;
-
rendering aide to government troops in blocking the
Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian borders, with the
aim of preventing the arrival of manpower in Afghanistan
for the opposition units and the passage of caravans
bringing them supplies;
-
providing support to Afghan troops during operations
against armed opposition formations.
However,
with the composition of forces and equipment at the disposal
of the Soviet troops in the DRA, it was impossible to
fully solve the entire complex of military tasks with
the necessary effectiveness. Yet even taking this into
account, the mujahidin could not stand up to regular troops
in open combat. They suffered defeats. But these defeats
did not cost them as much as victories cost its troops.
They
faced difficult specific problems when operating in high
altitude conditions, with low and high air temperatures,
green zones and desert areas, with a complex epidemiological
situation... The personnel turned out to be poorly prepared
for combat in the conditions of Afghanistan. Here everything
happened differently than predicted in tactical textbooks
and military manuals, different from the way in which
the troops had been instructed. Likewise, the Soviet army
had not participated in actual combat operations for a
long time. This why the war became a war of continuous
"surprises."
Soviet
regular military units, sub-units, and individual servicemen
turned out to be insufficiently trained for the operational
tactics of the small mobile armed groups of the opposition.
Until the middle of 1980, they conducted actions in a
traditional manner, conducting raids mainly along roads
and in valleys, where it was possible to apply military
technology; these proved highly ineffective, not producing
results. There were also problems with the control of
operations: if bits of information on the situation and
the troops came to government troops, they would immediately
fall into the hands of the opposition, as a result of
which combat operations proved ineffective.
It
was necessary to seek out totally different forms and
methods of conducting combat operations, different from
those that had been described in military manuals. Consequently,
operational tactics were continuously re-evaluated, corrected,
brought into line with local conditions.
In
Afghanistan, the 40th Army, fighting armed opposition
units, operated, as a rule, with success - although it
had to suffer great burdens and hardships, since it had
to fight in very complex climatic conditions. Mountain
and desert areas, high and low temperatures, sudden downpours,
low oxygen levels, the absence of water, infectious diseases
- all this contributed to make additional difficulties.
Yet throughout the "Afghan War," not a single
sub-unit of Soviet troops either retreated or surrendered
its position. However, partial successes did not lead
to reducing tensions, and the scale of the rebel movement
expanded. After all, the main causes lay not in the military,
but in the political sphere.
The
opposition quickly restored its forces. It created new
armed units from among refugees in Pakistan and from the
local population. It also did not experience a shortage
of arms. The main principles by which these armed units
conducted operations were: avoiding direct clashes with
the superior forces of regular troops; not transforming
operations into positional warfare, forsaking possession
of occupied territories for a long time; attacking suddenly,
extensively using guerrilla tactics, and also terrorism,
blackmail and the ideological preparation of government
soldiers and the population. The level of sophistication
of their equipment and arms, especially small-scale arms,
and likewise the use of terrorist fighting methods, enabled
the armed units of the opposition to solve strategic tasks
in the civil war with the use of small forces.
As
the war in Afghanistan showed, against terrorists it is
essential to apply forestalling measures, utilizing sub-units
specially trained for these purposes and applying special
fighting tactics. Negotiations with terrorists are, as
a rule, largely ineffective and encourage them in the
further implementation of terror. In local wars, a professional
army must be used, well trained and with battle experience.
The
intensity of the internal crisis in Afghanistan continued
to grow, and the Soviet military presence was associated
with the expansion of institutions, foreign to the national
character and feelings of the Afghan people, not in tune
with the multi-structured economy and other specific features,
such as tribal and religious factors.
Every
year the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated further.
The extent of the territory over which the PDPA held sway
persistently grew smaller. Declarations by the government
that it controlled the greater part of the country were
refuted by reality.
One
line of action was clearly visible among the leaders of
the DRA: fight the mujahidin on the whole with military
means. In this they counted to a great degree on the Soviet
army. But mere military measures could not attain the
desired result. Unless the opposition was deprived of
its social basis, of the possibility of reinforcing itself
with local and external resources, it would be impossible
to achieve a fundamental improvement of the situation
in the country in a short time. However, this is precisely
what the Afghan leadership did not want to comprehend,
or perhaps such a position suited it.
In
the USSR, many leaders began to understand that it could
no longer continue this way. To them, and not just to
military leaders, it was becoming increasingly apparent
that the internal Afghan problem could not be solved through
by military means. Such a course was leading to a dead-end.
Not immediately, but still, a conviction developed: new
approaches are needed, additional steps in the development
of a strategy capable of extinguishing the fire of this
fratricidal war.
Yet
some forces remained, primarily the US, to whom it was
advantageous that the Soviet Union remain in this war
as long as possible, suffering political and economic
losses. The Americans not only prolonged negotiations
on an Afghan settlement and provided aid and support to
the armed units of the opposition, they also did everything
to make the USSR pay the highest possible price for its
military involvement in Afghanistan. The director of the
CIA at the time, William Casey, conducted an active operation
meant to undermine the Soviet Union. In October 1984,
Casey made a secret trip to Islamabad. He suggested, and
the Pakistanis agreed, to extend destabilizing propaganda
activity through Afghanistan to the southern Soviet republics
with their predominately Muslim populations. Management
of this illicit activity was conducted by Pakistan's Interdepartmental
Intelligence Directorate. There were also suggestions
to conduct raids into Soviet territory, but fearing an
adequate response from the Soviet side and an unfavorable
effect of such an operations on Soviet-American relations,
the Reagan administration did not decide to initiate an
extensive underground war on the territory of the USSR
at the time.
In
March 1985 president Reagan signed national security resolution
No. 166, which provided for increased clandestine military
aide to the mujahidin and clarified the new goal of the
secret Afghan war: the defeat of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
by means of covert operations and a Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
At
the same time the Reagan administration, due to strategic
considerations, torpedoed negotiations on an Afghan settlement
that were being conducted under the aegis of the UN. In
particular, in June 1982, following the first official
negotiations in Geneva, President Reagan decided to increase
the amount of clandestine aid to the rebels. In December
1982, after the meeting between Yuri V. Andropov and Zia-ul-Haq,
during which the latter was told that the USSR would leave
Afghanistan "quickly" if Pakistan would stop
its support to the resistance, Reagan gave instructions
to the CIA to deliver more, and higher quality, arms to
the mujahidin. Then when Diego Cordoves, in May 1983,
declared that "95 percent of the text of the preliminary
comprehensive resolution is already complete," the
US government published information that it had shared
with Saudi Arabia expenses of up to 50 million dollars
on arms for the rebels. The negotiations immediately became
more complicated. In March 1986, Cordoves declared that
all elements were present for a comprehensive solution
to the Afghan problem. And the Reagan administration began
supplying the Afghan rebels with "Stinger" anti-aircraft
missiles.
The
passive, basically spur-of-the-moment and retaliatory
military actions, relatively limited in scale, that the
Soviet troops had carried out in Afghanistan, i.e. along
the lines developed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled
low-intensity conflict, could not bring about defeat of
the enemy, but at the same time it did wear down the Soviet
Union, either economically and morally.
In
connection with the participation of Soviet troops in
the internal conflict in Afghanistan, the international
prestige of the country began to fall: even in the eyes
of its allies. The arguments offered by Soviet leaders
on the righteousness of the Soviet military presence in
the DRA were not satisfying. It was condemned in various
forums, including in those conducted under the aegis of
the UN, and with an overwhelming majority of the votes.
The negative effects of this war started to make themselves
felt within the Soviet Union. The death of Soviet boys
in a foreign land aroused consternation not only in their
families, but also in all decent people. In the mid-1980s,
the Soviet leadership finally decided that it was essential
to bring matters toward a withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan.
The
national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan
In
1986 there was a change in the leadership of Afghanistan.
The post of general secretary of the PDPA, and later also
of president of Afghanistan, went to a new figure: Najibullah,
a man willing to seek out solutions to the problems and
who understood the expectations of his countrymen. He
began to implement a completely new policy, calling for
an end to the war - a policy of national reconciliation.
The Afghan leadership developed its efforts to consolidate
the armed forces and the local administration, to broaden
the mass base of popular rule. The leadership also set
to work on resolving socio-economic problems, turning
to the real needs of the entire population. In accordance
with this, the position of government rule began to strengthen.
One has to give credit to Najibullah and his colleagues:
they showed outstanding courage, resolve and consistency,
proposing and implementing a policy leading to the cessation
of military conflicts, wherever this was possible.
The
opposition, however, aware of the strategic orientation
of Soviet leadership to pull its troops out of Afghanistan,
and calculating that without the direct assistance of
Soviet troops Najibullah's regime would not know how to
protect its position, continued the course towards destroying
him by armed means. It became clear that the opposition
would not settle for sharing power today, if it could
seize all of it tomorrow.
On
April 14, 1988, with UN mediation in Geneva, the foreign
ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a package
of documents, calling for an end to the bloodshed in the
RA. The US and the USSR stepped forward as guarantors
assuring fulfillment of the agreements. The most essential
aspect of the agreements, as it seems, was that in principle
they provided the possibility of solving the main issue
in the Afghan situation: halting armed and other interference
in Afghanistan affairs from abroad.
In
a bilateral agreement on the principles of mutual relations,
the following was specified: Afghanistan and Pakistan
accept the commitment that their territories must not
be used in any way to violate the sovereignty, political
independence, territorial integrity and national unity
of either side, or to destabilize the other side's political,
economic and social stability; they pledge to abstain
from assisting, encouraging and supporting, directly or
indirectly, insurgent or separatist action, aimed at undermining
the unity, or overthrowing the political order of the
other side; they must not permit equipping, funding or
recruitment of mercenaries in their territories for the
purpose of hostile operations against the territory of
the other side and, consequently, they deny assistance,
including funds for training, supplying and transit to
such mercenaries; they will not permit any aid to, use
or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversives;
they oblige themselves not to permit the presence or sheltering
of camps and bases on their territories, as well as organizations
for training, funding, supplying or arming persons or
groups for the purpose of carrying out diversionary operations,
creating disorder, disturbances, utilizing the mass media,
or transporting arms, ammunition and equipment.
The
bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
the voluntary return of refugees obliged both sides to
take the necessary measures for resolving the problem.
In
accordance with these understandings, the USSR committed
itself to withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan within
a nine-month period, starting from May 15, 1988. In the
course of the first three months of the year, half of
all Soviet troops were withdrawn.
Pakistan
and the US had to stop all interference in the internal
affairs of Afghanistan.
On
the basis of these agreements, the Soviet Union pulled
its troops out of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, realized in exactly the period
specified by the Geneva understanding (starting on May
15, 1988 and ending on February 15, 1989), was conducted
in an organized manner and with minimal losses. At this
time, the Soviets experienced virtually no problems. The
mujahidin did not hinder the withdrawal of the troops
and did not use any force against them.
The
Civil War without Soviet troops
After
Soviet troops departed from Afghanistan, not much changed
in the country. The scale of the fighting between the
Afghans themselves even increased. More and more people
perished. It became clear that the cause was not, or maybe
not so much, the presence of the Soviet troops in the
RA! For they left Afghan territory and the war intensified!
Apparently, the bloodshed benefited those who had profited
greatly from the war, who continued to receive large dividends.
Likewise, an entire generation of Afghans had come of
age to whom participation in the war became a highly lucrative
profession.
Having
survived for three years after the end of military assistance
and support from the USSR, the Najibullah regime nevertheless
fell in April 1992. It would seem that now the war had
come to an end, all mujahidin leaders proclaimed unanimously
that they would establish peace and tranquility. But the
war flared up with new vigor between the mujahidin themselves-former
partners and rivals in the opposition party groups. The
mujahidin leaders were utterly unable to share power.
The country found itself divided into zones, where this
or that mujahidin group would manage affairs. The political
and territory integrity of Afghanistan was virtually shattered.
In
this context, the Tajiks (B. Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud)
had established their authority in Kabul and opposition
between the Pashtu and members of ethnic minorities increased.
A new force stepped onto the political scene in the form
of the Taliban Islamic Movement, which was also fighting
for power. In a brief time, the Taliban were able to take
control of the greater part of Afghanistan, and here they
established their institutions.
The
Taliban had stepped forward with the slogan to "clean"
the country of violence, murder, and lawlessness, but
instead of the promised relief, they threw millions of
Afghans into conditions of great severity, the likes of
which had never been seen in the past. In the zones under
their influence, they set up Sheri'at laws. Thieves would
have their fingers or hands cut off. Everywhere they destroyed
television sets and video recorders ("boxes of the
devil"). They issued orders forbidding the education
of girls and the employment of women outside of the home,
which placed many widows on the verge of death by hunger.
Women were forbidden to appear in the streets without
male escort. They had to wear traditional Muslim dress
that covered them from head to foot…
The
initial favorable impression of the Taliban rapidly turned
into disillusionment. The regime they established - a
mix of archaism and intolerance - was unacceptable for
Afghanistan. Through the ostentatious Islamic fundamentalism
one could detect a striving to restore the dominant position
of the Pashtu.
Today,
the country is virtually divided into several autonomous
areas or zones, controlled by diverse groupings (the Taliban,
Masud, Dustom, Khalil, Naderi etc.). The war in Afghanistan
has continued to the present, and there is no end in sight.
What
will happen in the future? Most likely a prolongation
of the conflict awaits Afghanistan, but, plausibly, if
the war stops, it seems the final result could look like
this: a traditionally weak central government as well
as powerful provincial (peripheral) rulers (field commanders,
most likely, that had replaced traditional tribal chiefs
in the provinces and with control over given zones), interacting
with one another on the horizontal level and making concluding
agreements… In order to remain in power in the provinces,
they would naturally defend their positions from any central
government - whatever it was. It is clear that the unity
of the country can be preserved only if some inter-ethnic
compromise can be achieved. And it is unlikely that a
leading position in the Afghan state could be taken by
members of non-Pashtu ethnic groups, such as Tajiks and
Uzbeks. The Pashtu will maintain a dominant influence
in the structures of power. A relative interethnic balance
might be restored, with some predominance of the Pashtu
people.
Since
it is not likely that the Pashtu will be able, as before,
to dictate their conditions to ethnic minorities, and
the latter also will not give up their gains, there is
also the likelihood that several autonomous zones or states
will be formed in Afghan territory according to ethnic
affiliations (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazarians). In this, however,
much depends on whether the present leaders of the ethnic
minorities will know how to arrive at agreements among
themselves, for their coalition is extremely unstable
and its basis is anti-Pashtuism. This is a very shaky
foundation. If it collapses, then the Taliban will have
the full strength to establish their control over the
entire territory of Afghanistan. Yet the war will not
end with this. Armed units from among the ethnic minorities
will prolong it through guerrilla methods.
The
possibility should also not be excluded that a confederation
of states or some other type of compromise, with consideration
for the balance of forces created in the region, might
emerge in the territory of Afghanistan. It is wholly possible
that new states on an ethnic basis will form in Afghan
territory and, partially, in Pakistan and Iran - for example,
Pushtunistan, Khazarajata, Baluchistan. Although this
process is very long, much depends on what sort of interests
will be pursued by influential foreign powers: first of
all by the USA, Western Europe, and the Islamic states.
Apparently
the Afghans themselves cannot stop the war and, in all
likelihood, international mechanisms will have to be introduced
to force the warring groups to make peace. However, priority
must be give to political methods of settlement, with
the participation of all interested sides.
Some
summations and conclusions
-
The experiment involving forced reconstruction of society
in Afghanistan ended in failure. This cost the country
great losses: thousands of villages (kishlaks) and irrigation
systems were ruined; enormous areas of fertile land and
gardens were destroyed; millions of peaceful inhabitants
became refugees, homeless persons, many died (according
to some estimates 1-2.5 million people) or were disabled.
Afghan society was hurled far behind in its development.
-
The consequences of the Afghan conflict for the Soviet
Union turned out to be most severe. It facilitated the
defeat of the USSR in a global military and strategic
confrontation between the two super-powers, socio-political
systems, and military blocs. The Afghan ordeal worsened
the political, economic, and ethnic crisis points what
began to be visible in the Soviet Union country in the
1970s. Afghanistan did not allow Soviet involvement in
looking for a way out of the crisis and in many ways it
contributed to the disintegration of the USSR and its
army.
Above
all, the Soviet Union suffered great material and moral
loses. One million men passed through Afghanistan. The
dead numbered 14,626, not including those that died in
captivity or that are considered missing in action. About
50,000 men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, over 500,000
contracted various severe illnesses - there were tens
of thousands of shattered lives, hundreds of thousands
in need of psychiatric rehabilitation. In addition, 147
tanks were lost, 1,312 armored vehicles, 233 artillery
guns and mortars, 114 airplanes and 322 helicopters.
-
There is never a winner in civil war; there is only a
draw. And in fact, the very war, as a rule, continues
until a point when a balance of power is established.
It is impossible to resolve political problems through
military methods. In the ideal sense, a civil war should
end through consensus in society. Such a consensus has
not been achieved in Afghanistan to this time, and therefore
the war continues.
-
The civil war in Afghanistan is above all the result of
global rivalries between the super-power states and conflicting
political systems. Had there not been interference from
abroad, it would not have had such an extensive, harsh,
and total character. Obviously, the war would have had
a much lesser duration.
-
In Afghanistan, the Soviets faced conflict-ridden confrontations
between several civilizations and cultures. Looking at
Afghan society, its socio-economic structure is patriarchal,
its spiritual-religious aspect is traditional, built upon
a system of tribal and gentile relations - elders and
religious communities. The Islam that lies at the heart
of the religiousness of many Afghans is not classical,
but rather everyday Islam, to some extent half-pagan.
And the Afghans could not comprehend very many things
that the members of the PDPA tried to proclaim and put
into practice with Soviet help. From the standpoint of
European civilization, many of the processes going on
in Afghanistan are logically inexplicable and, thus, the
recommendations that were elaborated frequently had an
abstract nature and could not be put into practice. A
type of democratic regime existed in that country for
centuries, which had enabled the nation to preserve itself.
The people took in with their mother's milk a spirit of
freedom and did not wish relinquish it. The East has its
own ways, its own sacred things, to everything its value…
-
The goals that the leaders of the DRA set for themselves
were, in themselves, to a certain degree progressive,
since the result of the projected transformations was
conceived of as an improvement in the lives of the Afghans.
However, there did not exist any objective conditions,
neither a social nor economic basis, nor mass support,
for the proclaimed slogans and for the political decisions
to bring about radical socialist transformations. The
replacing of old institutions with new ones is a difficult
and dangerous undertaking. Thus, before initiating changes
it is essential to take into account the active opposition
of those forces that are content with the old institutions
and the inertia of those who like the new ones, for usually
people do not believe in what is new until it is made
certain through lengthy experiment. Adherents of the old
institutions make ruthless attacks, while at the same
time partisans of the new institutions, as a rule, act
sluggishly. The nature of people is not constant, and
if it is easy to convert them to one's faith, to hold
them to it is difficult. If there are no positive changes,
then the people's faith rapidly dries up. The attempt
to introduce the Afghan people to a new ideology (civilization)
through force ended in complete failure.
-
The political actions of the leaders of the PDPA, especially
in carrying out water and land reforms, were effected
through voluntaristic and coercive means, without regard
for the realities accumulated in the country and the interests
of broad sections of the populace, with devastation of
natural regularities and destruction of age-old systems
of management and local self-government. The PDPA regime
could not resolve social problems and secure a better
life for the broad masses of the population - the peasants,
and without their support, the government could not hold
out.
-
The leadership of Afghanistan did not follow imperative
procedures, which might have enabled the party to maintain
its rule over the country. For the sake of avoiding civil
war, first of all it would have been necessary to achieve
unity among the leaders of the party and of the DRA government,
and also to devise a flexible internal policy, based on
traditional forms and methods of management that would
have helped secure implementation of vital gradual changes
in the key spheres of the economy and of the political
super-structure, helped attract a greater part of the
country's population to the side of the PDPA and, thus,
reduce the social base for the opposition.
-
The decision of the Soviet leadership to deploy troops
in the DRA was made without proper analyses of the situation
and predictions on the development of the state of affairs,
without appraisals of the causes, character, dimensions,
and forms of the conflict, and also without a clear statement
of the general political and strategic aims. The Soviet
leadership succumbed to an obvious over-estimation of
its own strength and to an under-estimation of the Afghan
ability to oppose them, of the general situation in the
region and especially of the external factor. Analyses
of US actions before the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
gives reason to believe that the leaders of the Soviet
Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation,
skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies.
Deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was very advantageous
to the United States, since it enabled the latter to solve
many problems, both in the region and in relations with
the USSR. An attempt to solve an equation from higher
mathematics with the help of arithmetic led to the conclusion
that Afghanistan became a "quagmire" for the
Soviet Union, just as Vietnam had been for the USA. The
Soviet leaders had a hazy notion on the strategy and the
end result of troop deployment.
-
Intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan by a third
force (Soviet troops) brought with it escalation and polarization
of the opposing sides; it was conducive to drawing formerly
neutral forces into the fight against "marionette
figures", and also brought about internationalization
of the internal Afghan conflict. In late 1979 there was
no overriding need to send Soviet troops to the DRA. No
objective circumstances necessitated it. The decisive
element turned out to be the subjective, "personal"
factor. The troops entered Afghanistan officially with
peace-making goals - to secure the territorial integrity
of that country and to support peace - yet they brought
war. It is very important to consider this fact when making
decisions on implementing peace-making operations and
activities aimed at forcing conflicting parties to make
peace, including those under the aegis of the UN and NATO.
After all, the entry into combat zones even of multinational
peace-making troops often plays the role of a detonator,
provoking escalation of the conflict, and proving ineffective
if they do not have sufficient strength and do not undertake
decisive action.
-
It is essential to strive, using all possible means, to
avert the outbreak of war, to look for a peaceful solution
to this or that conflict. It is necessary to seek out
any compromise and make maximum permissible concessions,
to preserve peace. Before deciding on war, all other solutions
must be attempted. Recourse to war should be taken only
when there are no longer any other options. Lawlessness,
however, should not be tolerated as a way to prevent war,
for then one cannot avoid war and loses the advantage.
And if a decision to initiate combat operations is already
taken, then one must not entertain illusions that all
will pass with minimal sacrifices. History has shown more
than once that one cannot play at war, and if it is commenced,
it must be fought properly. As the great Chinese military
leader Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) said: "War is a great affair
for a state, it is the foundation of life and death, the
way of survival or downfall."2
-
The tasks the political leadership of the USSR set were
set down in detail, but the forces provided to accomplish
them were insufficient. A relatively small number of troops,
an extremely short time for planning operations, inadequate
training of men and officers for anti-guerrilla warfare,
all this and more prevented the Soviet Union from realizing
its set goals. Hence, the conclusion - a politician makes
an error worthy of condemnation when he does not consider
his options and strives to reach set goals, not taking
into account all given possibilities.
Modern
small caliber arms make it possible to effectively conduct
combat operations against a regular army even with armed
formations that are significantly inferior to it in total
military potential. Hence, it is necessary to create a
powerful troop concentration, capable of securing real
control over the entire territory of the hypothetical
opponent and destroy its fighting units in a short period.
Moreover, such troops must be trained in advance and with
consideration of the specific aspects of the military
operation. Prior to commencing operations it is necessary
to complete thorough reconnaissance and assessment of
the opponent's fighting potential, make forestalling concentrated
bombings and artillery strikes against his most important
installations, paralyze his control over armed units,
and also put into effect a wide-range intelligence operations,
as well as sabotage and special measures. Only afterwards
can troops be introduced, preferably from different directions,
and immediately in all the key regions of the country,
in effect to establish their control in them. From the
very beginning, it is necessary to conduct active combat
operations, not permitting the opponent to recuperate
and organize, until his full defeat or surrender. It is
also necessary to take measures to cut all supply routes
of arms and ammunition to the enemy.
-
In a local war troops must act decisively and quickly.
After inflicting maximum losses on the enemy and fulfilling
political goals, they must withdraw from the country as
soon as possible, leaving resolution of issues regarding
the establishment of authority to the political bodies
of allies. A prolonged war is a disaster for a state.
If there is not a quick victory, then a long war is worse
than defeat. As even the ancients said: "If a war
drags out, it is unfavorable. War is like a flame: if
you do not blow it out on time, you yourself will burn
in it" (Cao Gong).3
It
is essential even in peacetime to maintain a certain number
of divisions and brigades in constant combat readiness,
fully manned and trained for conducting anti-guerrilla
warfare in diverse climatic conditions.
-
Against armed units acting with guerrilla methods one
needs to apply non-traditional tactics and strategies
for conducting combat operations. In this case, generally
accepted methods of waging war should be applied only
exceptionally.
Traditional
tactics for carrying out military actions in regions with
local conflicts, as shown by experience, frequently turn
out unfavorable. Here there is no solid front-line. Guerrilla
units evade direct clashes; they inflict sudden strikes
against individual installations, small garrisons and
obstruct communications, as well as conducting destabilizing,
terrorist and subversive activities. In combat operations
a maneuverable quality prevails, in combination with tough
positional defense on the level of platoons, companies
and more rarely battalions. Therefore, the types and methods
of combat operations, developed by Soviet troops in the
course of the war in Afghanistan, should be applied.
The
most effect method of combat operations in these conditions
was encirclement of the enemy and cutting off escape routes,
with successive destruction or capture.
The
success of combat operations depends on a well-organized
system of intelligence, extensive use of commandos and
airborne assault actions, effective use of diverse types
of maneuvers (side-sweeps, outflanking and their variations),
in combination with air and high-precision gunnery strikes.
When annihilating the enemy in fortified strongholds,
to achieve the set goals with the least loses, it is essential
to block in the defenders in due time, seize and hold
commanding heights, effectively hit exposed weaponry with
air strikes, artillery, tank fire and other firing means,
and simultaneously attack from all sides with the engagement
of the maximum number of troops.
In
order to route small mobile irregular armed detachments
of combatants in a (local) civil war, especially in mountains
and forests, one must engage a much larger number of troops
and equipment than is needed in conducting traditional
combat operations against a regular army, since insurgents
avoid direct battle clashes; they are dispersed over a
large area and they make use of guerrilla forms and methods
of fighting.
In
order to control territory, it is necessary to create
a complex security system, containing well fortified troop
garrisons, a network of pickets and outposts, regime-controlled
zones around airports and vitally important installations,
maneuverable on-duty sub-units, continuous watch by reconnaissance
and strike aircraft over the land and sky, and on-duty
assault landing or mobile airborne sub-units. For the
purpose of excluding attacks on equipment convoys, blockade-posts
(pickets) must be set up along transport routes near places
convenient for making ambushes, and when the convoys pass
through gorges commanding heights must be held. But the
blockade-posts must be strong and well fortified, or else
they will become targets of attack for the fighters. Each
convoy must have direct protection, for which special
road-commandeer units must be created. A major role is
played by an efficient and effective system for receiving
intelligence on the enemy near the convoys travel routes,
and also by engineering reconnaissance and continuous
air coverage of the convoys.
-
It is impossible to definitely defeat the opponent as
long as it receives reinforcements from fighter training
camps and there is an uninterrupted supply of military
equipment, arms and ammunition for his units. It is essential
to take maximum feasible measures to securely close the
channels through which aid arrives from allies. In Afghanistan,
the opposition received military aid through the entire
duration of the war. The efforts of the Soviet military
command to restrain it turned out futile.
-
Without creating the proper conditions and eliminating
the causes that had given rise to the war, appeals and
slogans of peace will never stop it. In order to achieve
national conciliation, there must be a sincere mutual
willingness among the parties in conflict to arrive at
a constructive compromise.
Negotiations
with an enemy who still has potential will not lead to
the establishment of peace, but rather only play into
its hands, allowing him to gain time and regroup his forces.
They give him the possibility of prolonging armed conflict
and of signing a peace accord under favorable terms. Therefore,
damage must be inflicted on the opponent to such a degree
that afterwards it cannot conduct wide-scale combat operations.
In
Afghanistan, the opposition had combat-ready armed units
and all the requirements for seizing power in the country,
and therefore it rejected a peaceful settlement of the
conflict; the policy of national reconciliation proved
highly ineffective.
-
Civil war may continue until a time when the central authorities
achieve decisive superiority in the balance of power.
Otherwise it takes on a permanent nature, as is observable
at this moment in Afghanistan. In such a situation, an
external force is needed, capable of exerting decisive
influence on the peace process. Such a force is an international
peace-making force, operating under the aegis of the UN,
OIC, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
OSCE or NATO. All the same, the air strikes put into practice
in recent times by NATO forces, for example in Iraq or
in Yugoslavia, in the absence of corresponding decisions
in the UN Security Council, lead to a break-down of the
peaceful world order that has been built-up so far and
may lead to a resumption of the "Cold War,"
or even to the Third World War.
-
The war in Afghanistan destabilized the situation in the
Middle East. New regions are being pulled into its orbit.
The efforts of Afghan Islamic radicals and extremists
to spread the spirit of "jihad" to neighboring
states, including territories populated by Muslims in
the CIS, with the aim of spreading Islamic fundamentalism
by force, conceal in themselves a real danger for Central
Asian countries and for Russia. The appetites of the Islamists
are also spreading to Europe.
-
However, one must bear in mind that Islam is an element
of major importance to culture and lifestyle, a pillar
of internal peace, a criterion of morality and law for
millions of people; clearly in such a delicate situation
it is necessary to act in a detached manner, proceeding
from principles, for to avoid harm is more important than
to reap benefits. This was proven by the sorrowful experience
of the "Afghan War"; to forget this would be
to ignore the tragic lessons of history, which inevitably
leads to new wars, new bloodshed, new suffering, and new
tragedies. This applies even more, since practically all
international and internal conflicts are dispersed along
the "arc of crisis" - from North Africa to Central
Asia, the main section of which runs along the line of
contact between the Islamic world and the post-Socialist
area (the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR).
-
There is the danger that Russia may be transformed into
a buffer between Christian and Islamic civilization. It
is important to avert antagonism with the Islamic factor
in the expanses of Eurasia, not allowing a clash between
Orthodoxy and Islam (the Orthodox against True Believers).
NOTES
1.
Department of State cable 0621, August 1979.
2.
Í.E. Eîí?aä. "Nóíu-öçu. O?aeoao î âîaííîi eneónnoâa",
Eçäaoaëünoâî Aeaäaiee íaóe NNN?, 1950 a., n. 137.
3.
Í.E. Eîí?aä. "Nóíu-öçu. O?aeoao î âîaííîi eneónnoâa",
Eçäaoaëünoâî Aeaäaiee íaóe NNN?, 1950 a., n. 85.
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andriæ's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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