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Crises
in Southeast Europe (1990-1999):
Have we learned anything?
Krešimir
Ćosić, Srećko
Domljanović
Institute for Defense Studies, Research and Development,
10000 Zagreb, Bijenička 46, Croatia,
Tel. +385-1-460-3800, Fax +385-1-460-3820
srecko@zvonimir.morh.tel.hr
ABSTRACT
Although Southeast
Europe has been a source and scene of wider European conflicts
in the twentieth century, crisis management by the EU,
NATO, OSCE, succeeded only temporarily in extinguishing
the fire and removing the sources of conflict. Therefore,
the international community should apply short-term crisis
management and devise long-term proposals for the region.
The Stability Pact may indeed achieve a stabilization
of the region if regional players are included and their
long-term goals are incorporated into the integral strategy
for the region. Both regional governmental and non-governmental
think tanks could significantly contribute to the creation
of progressive solutions within the comprehensive strategy
for the region and thus to the success of the Stability
Pact as the main vehicle of the strategy.
Introduction
The
20th century was a century of three world wars, with tens
of millions
of causalties on the Eurasian continent. Central European
powers, which dominated Eurasia at the beginning of the
century, lost their might in two bloody conflicts. Only
50 years ago the seemingly multi-polar balance of world
power was replaced by bipolar Cold war conflict. Brief
bloody conflicts of previous era were replaced by the
continuous struggle of the superpowers. Irrationality
of nuclear escalation made the Cold War environment last
for a long 40 year period. When the economically weaker
Soviet Empire collapsed at the end of the Cold War, political
leaders made us believe that important lessons were well
learned and that the "New World Order" will
not allow such enormous waste of human lives and potential
creativity to recur. But the conflict in former Yugoslavia
served as an unfortunate example that human nature has
not changed and that historical lessons were not learned
by all.
The
end of Communism challenged the European political elite
in ways that were not expected. Building democratic societies
and market economies in former communist countries in
Eastern Europe proved to be a difficult task. The collapse
of former Yugoslavia became the contemporary case study
of both failures and achievements of diplomatic intervention
that should be well analyzed. The wars in Yugoslavia have
more clearly than ever before showed the value of an effective
conflict prevention mechanism in terms of saving lives.
Different
states with different political systems left their marks
in the region usually called "the Balkans"1:
Ottoman and Habsburg empires, the first and the second
Yugoslavia. It is a region where Islamic and Christian
religions, and Eastern and Western civilizations and cultures
meet. The influences and interests of world powers have
always played an important role in shaping the regional
political map as well.
Susan
Woodward noted that conflicts were fed by old problems
stemming from relations between nations and territories,
which resulted from compromises, made after previous regional
and world wars.2
But, as Richard Perle has said, contrary to common wisdom,
the disassociation of Yugoslavia was not the result of
hundred years old hatred among nations, but of Milošević's
intentional program to obstruct a delicate balance which
was fundamental for the existence of Yugoslavia.
The
Stability Pact has recently been offered as yet another
attempt of Southeast Europe. However, it is important
to examine the Pact in a context of lessons learned from
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Too much time has
already been wasted on and Southeast Europe should not
wait any longer to join the rest of Europe in its democracy
and prosperity.
Short
historical overview
Supreme
Allied Commander for Europe, General Wesley Clark, recently3
stated that the region of Southeast Europe geographically
belongs to the European periphery, but strategically to
its center. The region has been for five centuries an
area of collision of tectonic plates of interests and
influence of European imperial powers. Each nation in
the Balkan region was supported by some European power
at some time in its history and those historical links
are still important up to a certain level today. Primarily
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Ottoman Empire,
but also imperial Germany, France and the United Kingdom
found it politically necessary to protect their own interests
in this region. But history has also produced religious
and cultural differences among the nations of the region,
which was an important inner source of numerous conflicts.
Southeastern
Europe has already suffered five wars in this century.
In 1912-13 the Balkan League was created to fight for
territories under the rule of the decaying Ottoman Empire.
During the summer of 1913, Serbia, Greece, and Romania
fought with Bulgaria over control of Macedonia. World
War I erupted after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand
in Sarajevo in June 1914 by pro-Serbian extremists.
The
Treaty of Versailles created a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia,
composed of Slavs and other ethnic and religious groups.
Its first official name was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes. Croatian and Slovenian political parties
wanted unification with the Kingdom of Serbia even before
the outbreak of the First World War in order to protect
their cultural and national identity from assimilation
in German and Hungarian culture. However, the new, enlarged
Serbian Kingdom was not formed in 1918 on a federative
basis as Croats and Slovenes had openly desired, but as
a centralized parliamentary monarchy, in which the Serbian
nation exercised effective domination over the police,
military and bureaucracy.
After
World War II, J. B. Tito established an authoritarian
communist regime in Yugoslavia. He was at first supported
by Stalin, but since 1948 Yugoslavia defined itself as
non-aligned in its international orientation. In this
communist Yugoslavia the sense of belonging to a nation
was replaced by the communist ideology. But Tito, who
was half Croat and half Slovene, created national communist
parties, unlike Stalin, and instead of completely suppressing
national feelings, used them in his favor, but in a very
controlled and careful fashion. The balance of national
power within Yugoslavia was possible because Tito was
a dictator able to easily eliminate any outstanding national/communist
leader.
The
West nurtured such a Yugoslavia. Former US Ambassador
in Yugoslavia W. Zimmermann noted: "Successive US
governments believed that Yugoslavia could become a model
for independence as well as for the Eastern European political
system that, though regrettably communist, could be more
open politically and more decentralized economically than
the Soviet satellites. Yugoslavia's position between hostile
Eastern and Western camps made its unity a major Western
concern. As long as the Cold war continued, Yugoslavia
was a protected and sometimes pampered child of American
and Western diplomacy."4
Some political analysts say that Tito's Yugoslavia was
the best-positioned communist country for transition to
a Western style market economy because of its openness
to western business and cultural influences, especially
in the Slovenian and Croatian parts of the country.
After
Tito died, Yugoslavia had no inner interests to preserve
the balance of national powers and continue its existence.
Specifically, Kosovo, an autonomous province of Serbia,
where ethnic Albanians comprise a 90% majority, was a
hot spot of ethnic strife between Serbs and Albanians,
which has existed continuously from 1912 when Kosovo became
a part of the Serbian Kingdom. Military, financial and
political power in the former Yugoslavia was tied to Belgrade,
the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav People's
Army (JNA). Through these institutions, Serbs dominated
all the republics and nations of the former Yugoslavia.
The military power was concentrated in the hands of the
JNA, with 70-85% of the officer corps consisting of Serbian
officers.
In
mid 1980s, the basis for conflict was set. The Croatian
and Slovenian political elite were openly opposed to the
use of repression against Albanians in Kosovo, fearful
that such treatment would be later applied to them. In
1986, Serbian nationalist intellectuals made public an
infamous document named "Memorandum" which had
two significant effects: it mobilized Serbian communist
politicians on a nationalistic basis; it also mobilized
other nations within Yugoslavia to oppose Serbian domination
in politics, military and government. The polarization
among nations was well under way in 1987 when Milošević,
an anonymous assistant to the chief of the Serbian communist
party, Ivan Stambolić, made his first public speech to
mutinous Serbs in Kosovo Polje, one of a few towns with
a Serbian majority in Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church
stood by him, and the Serbian political elite swiftly
supported him. In 1989, before the first democratic elections
were about to take place throughout Yugoslavia's republics,
Milošević gave an infamous speech in front of one million
galvanized Serbs at the place where Serbs suffered a historic
defeat from the Turkish army in 1389. In his speech, he
openly threatened war in an open manner with any one of
the Yugoslav nations if Serbian domination became endangered.
Due to their inability to achieve equality of relations
within the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav republics of
Slovenia and Croatia ultimately initiated a process of
peaceful disassociation based on constitutional provisions
in effect at that time. In the spring of 1990, shortly
after election results in Croatia and Slovenia were announced,
Milošević gave a speech in Rakovica, an industrial suburb
of Belgrade, in front of Serbian workers who demanded
their unpaid salaries: "If you are not skilled to
work, you are skilled to fight!"
Crises
management: UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, …
In
the summer of 1991, the JNA first attacked Slovenia and
then Croatia. Maintaining a unified Yugoslavia appeared
to be the only acceptable solution for the international
community5
at that time, former US Secretary of State James Baker
publicly stated that the JNA would militarily defeat Slovenia
and Croatia in less than 15 days. Such a public statement
from a senior US official may have served as a green light
for the JNA to trigger its military operations in Slovenia.
The armed conflict in Croatia, where Croats refused to
simply surrender, quickly escalated into full-fledged
war - many Croatian cities, such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik,
were heavily shelled and held under siege by JNA and Serbian
paramilitaries. The international community imposed an
arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia as a whole, which
in an ironic twist affected the victim and not the much
better equipped aggressor. The international community's
only assistance to victims of the aggression was in a
limited form of humanitarian aid.
The
war in Croatia resulted in thousands of casualties and
hundreds of thousands of refugees in Croatia by the fall
of 1991. Lawrence Eagleburger, the US Secretary of State
at the time, later claimed: "We didn't have an agreement
among ourselves on how important it was, how dangerous
it was, and by the time it got dangerous, there were these
splits within the Western community".6
By the beginning of 1992, Croatia and the other republics
of former Yugoslavia were recognized by the international
community as independent states on the basis of the findings
of the Badinter Commission.7
At the same time, Serb rebels and the JNA, using military
power, gained control of over 27% of Croatian territory
and proclaimed it as their state known as "Krajina",
which had never existed as a territorial or political
entity in the former Yugoslavia.
In
the beginning of 1992, with the approval of the European
Community, the JNA re-deployed their entire military arsenal
from Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local
Serbs employed the newly acquired heavy artillery from
Slovenia and Croatia around Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo
and Bihać, and the Serb shelling of civilian targets began
again. President George Bush, the victor of the Gulf War
in 1990, warned Milošević that the US would be prepared
to use force if the UN forces deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina
were attacked. In a way, this was the beginning of a dialogue
between the US and Serb leadership under Milošević, who
was always treated as the key player capable of bringing
peace to the region. W. Zimmerman expressed his opinion
with the following words: "Milošević in the full
flush arrogance was illustrating three important character
traits: his cynicism about Yugoslavia's unity and institutions,
his natural duplicity, and the pains he always took to
avoid direct responsibility for aggressive actions. The
third trait was to become particularly relevant to Milošević's
hidden hand in the Croatian and Bosnian wars."8
In
1992, the UN organized a peacekeeping operation under
the name of UNPROFOR and its forces were deployed to Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the biggest ever UN
peace keeping operation. Evident lack of leadership, stemming
from political differences and the particular interests
of nations, both in the Security Council and the United
Nations, and the unclear mandate of the UNPROFOR resulted
in such peculiarities as a double chain of command. Hence,
UNPROFOR commanders and officials from different countries
acted on what they believed were the interests of their
own particular countries and not on a common objective.
In general, UNPROFOR was not able to cope with numerous
crises, which were daily events in the region, so the
overall credibility of the UN significantly deteriorated.
It is enough to recall the incident when the Bosnian Serb
army took UN soldiers hostage and chained them to the
bridges and fences of military facilities, transmitting
their pictures to the world in order to humiliate them.
Another example is the fall of Srebrenica, the UN designated
"safe area", monitored and secured by Dutch
troops. The Bosnian Serb armies besieged the town and
killed more than seven thousand Muslims in less than three
days and UN peacekeeping troops were again humiliated.
Eventually, the spring and summer of 1995 showed that
one of the main problems for the international community
was not how to stop fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but how to extract helpless UN troops from the hell.
During
1993, the war in Bosnia reached its maximum intensity.
Well-armed Serbs gained effective control of over 70%
of Bosnian territory, meaning also that Croats and Muslims
were expelled or exterminated from Serbian controlled
territory. This situation created strained relations between
Croats and Muslims, and finally led to a war between them,
because of mutual distrust and fear of losing remaining
territories. This relatively short but nonetheless bloody
war between Croats and Muslims continues to be a source
of mutual distrust and political conflict even today in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In
March 1994, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
signed the Washington Agreements under influence from
the US In December of that same year, the Croatian Army
began an offensive along the strategic areas of the Croatia-Bosnia
border. This was the turning point of the war in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were many previous attempts
at the peaceful reintegration of Croatia, but overall
there was no success. Eventually, the Croatian Army undertook
Operations "Flash" and "Storm" in
the summer of 1995. In a couple of days, the previously
occupied 25% of Croatian territory was liberated. In the
fall of 1995, after a coordinated effort by the Croatian
Army, Bosnian Croat Forces and the Army of B-H resulted
in the liberation of over 50% of Bosnian territory. The
US, believing that a balance of military power was finally
reached and that negotiations could take place, called
for an immediate halt of all operations and prevented
the military defeat of the Bosnian Serbs. One may speculate
that there was a fear of total military victory of joint
Croatian and Muslim forces over Serbs in Bosnia because
it could cause a great flow of refugees into Serbia from
Bosnia, which would eventually destabilize Milošević's
power.
The
response of the Croatian Serb leadership, who were losing
militarily, was to order all Serbs to leave Croatia. The
same pattern has been repeated in Kosovo: although they
were given all assurances for their safety by the international
community, more than 70% of the Serbian population has
left Kosovo since the KFOR troops entered the province,
and the rest are leaving on a daily basis. It is obvious
that this large exodus of the Serbian population has not
been a result of organized ethnic persecution, but of
a carefully designed policy by the Serbian leadership
to retain Milošević in power.
However,
even this incomplete victory of joint Croat and Muslim
forces in the fall of 1995 created preconditions required
for bringing Serbs to the negotiating table and resulted
in the signing of the Dayton Agreements in 1995. Richard
Perle of the American Enterprise Institute concluded that
the crisis in former Yugoslavia was the result of an inaccurate
interpretation of events and lack of will from the international
community to act in a timely manner. His opinion is also
that the Dayton Agreements was made possible by the strength
and vigor of the Croatian and Bosnian military action.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina officially became a state consisting
of two entities. The international peacekeeping forces
under NATO leadership entered the country and a de facto
international protectorate was established. IFOR / SFOR
forces were successful in dividing warring parties, disarming
military elements, and, finally, in establishing and keeping
virtual peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The restructuring
of civil society and so-called nation building in Bosnia
and Herzegovina has not met with the same level of success.
Susan
Woodward from the Brookings Institute claimed that NATO
did not have the institutional capacity to develop a consciousness
about the real sources of the problem. The consequences
of that can be illustrated by the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which is barely able to function as a
state, and all its nations are unsatisfied by the political
provisions.10
The
UN High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in charge
of the social reconstruction provisioned by the Dayton
Agreements, was not able to produce the desired results.
The former commander of SFOR, General Leighton W. Smith
commented: "On the civil side, Carl Bildt, the first
HR, was given an impossible task. His challenge was to
coordinate the work of hundreds of private volunteer organizations
(PVO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), very few
of which wanted any part of being told what to do. Bildt
had no staff and no plan."11
In
1999, Slobodan Milošević decided to take the next step
in his thus far unsuccessful political program of creating
a Greater Serbia: his military and police forces intensified
the campaign of repression in Kosovo. The NATO air strikes
that followed did not preclude the humanitarian disaster
in the province. On the contrary, the ground offensive
intensified and resulted in one million refugees and tens
of thousands of casualties. After 78 days, the air campaign
over Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina, stopped
and international forces entered the Kosovo province.
Consequences
of the crises
Today,
the region of Southeast Europe enters the 21st century
faced with at least the same number of problems in 1991.
The situation in the region may be considered even more
complex today than ten years ago. It has finally been
realized, however, that those problems were inherent and
structural, and that they can be resolved only with a
comprehensive approach, addressing a wide range of issues
in a systematic manner.
A
tragic chain of events in the former Yugoslavia started
with war in Slovenia in 1990 and lasted for almost ten
years. The conflict in Southeast Europe has produced important
implications not only for Europe, but also for other parts
of the world. The results on the ground were hundreds
of thousands killed and over one million refugees, mostly
to Croatia, Germany, Italy, Macedonia and a few other
countries. In the humanitarian sense, the refugees fleeing
to neighboring and distant countries seeking aid were
not foreseen and anticipated by European power centers
in 1990.
Armed
conflicts in Southeast Europe from 1991 to 1999 have resulted
in the displacement of whole nations, massive human casualties
and traumas. Infrastructure has been devastated, economies
ruined, investments stopped, and many well-educated people,
who were capable of contributing to the recovery of regional
economies, have left the region permanently. The emotional
profile of individuals and of even whole nations has been
reshaped, and thus their political attitudes have been
changed. Differences among the nations of Southeast Europe
prior to the escalation of conflicts in 1991 have deepened
in the last ten years.
The
inability of the international community to predict events
and initiate a timely reaction certainly contributed to
this huge tragedy. It appears that the chief preoccupation
of the international community - primarily the European
Union - at the beginning of the crisis in 1991 was focused
elsewhere. At the time, Central and Eastern Europe and
relations with Russia were chief concerns. Events in Southeast
Europe were ignored and neglected. Unfortunately, the
implications of the conflict in Southeast Europe on relations
between European nations, between the European Union and
the United States, between NATO and Russia, and the decline
in significance of the United Nations, were severely underestimated.
Lawrence
Eagleburger admitted that the international community
was not ready to act at the beginning of the crisis, partly
because Southeast Europe was not perceived as a region
of significant interest. Had the international community
acted on time, the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia
(but not the disassociation of Yugoslavia itself) could
have been avoided.12
The
international community has not only failed to predict
these tragic events but also in rare instances when predictions
proved accurate has failed to prevent and respond to the
early phases of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
Some analysts predicted the Kosovo crisis even in 1994:
"If violence were to break out, many Kosovars would
be slaughtered and as many as 400,000 would flee. Massive
refugee flows would have drastic consequences on Serbia's
neighbors. Though many Kosovars could flee to Albania,
the majority are likely to go to Macedonia, where President
Kiro Gligorov publicly cannot even discuss plans for refugees
because it would destabilize the government. Since refugee
planning is totally inadequate and Macedonian resources
are non-existent, many refugees could not be contained
in Macedonia, so their movement in an effort to find safe
access to the West would likely continue south towards
Greece. Some would arm and return to fight Serbs in Kosovo."13
The international community was once again not ready to
act in time and thus not able to prevent the Kosovo crisis
in 1999 and its catastrophic consequences, in spite of
having previous experiences in engagement in the region
from 1991 to 1998, from Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
One
early response of the international community to the crises
in Southeast Europe was to deploy a number of envoys with
the difficult task of communicating with local leaders.
The international community frequently rotated its envoys,
which resulted in many confused attempts to reach solutions
that were either based on flawed assumptions and concepts
or failed at some point in the implementation. It is of
critical importance that decision-making is based on a
comprehensive understanding of the region and its diversities,
rather than ad-hoc decision-making by individuals entering
the region in a manner of rotating, shuttle - diplomacy
envoys.
Two
important lessons may be extracted from the history of
the region in order to apply accepted solutions. First,
short-term actions of the international community should
be consistent with long-term solutions, or short-term
solutions as a part of crisis management must be flexible
enough and open for later adjustments. Second, the preemptive
actions must be decisive and without delays. Timely reactions
save resources just as timing delays increase the costs
of regional stabilization. The actions of the international
community proved to be reactive as opposed to proactive.
Evidently, the international community lacks initiative,
which thereupon affects its power to shape regional politics.
The quick and timely deployment of 600 soldiers to Macedonia
in 1992 proved to be the most effective preemptive action
of the international community in the last ten years,
especially compared to the delay in sending 60,000 soldiers
to Bosnia, which resulted in little real progress. This
demonstrates the deterrent value and ultimate cost-effectiveness
of timely decision making.
"Prevention,
however, is not only a question of mechanisms, it is also
a question of resources and capacity. How do we generate
the political will and resources to prevent new conflicts
from breaking out? How do we build consensus on strengthening
preventive diplomacy in Nagorno-Karabakh or Central-Asia,
when Bosnia and Kosovo are laying claim to such enormous
resources?"14
A
Need for Comprehensive Strategy
The
international community must achieve two main goals in
Southeast Europe: sustain viable peace in the region through
the establishment of conflict-prevention mechanisms and
devise a long-range self-sustainable political solution
for regional stabilization. The instabilities of this
region seriously affect relations within the international
community, which cannot afford to invest in a regional
stabilization that shows no real progress. In the words
of D. Daianu, a regional expert: "However, it seems
to me that crisis management in this region is of a different
variety in that it has to be projected over the long term.
It has to be an exercise linked with the nature of conflicts
among the local players. It may take many years, if not
decades, for the wounds to heal. It may require the presence
of "outsiders" for a long period of time."15
He continues: "tackling Southeastern Europe, in my
view, needs to be viewed from two inter-related perspectives.
The first is an exercise in crisis management, which aims
at arresting (reversing where possible) bad path-dependencies.
The second perspective concerns reconstruction, a two-pronged
strategic endeavor: physical reconstruction (of the infrastructures
destroyed by war); and development (modernization), including
institutional and political change."16
Southeast
Europe has historically had many causal influences, which
are still visible in regional economic, cultural, religious
and demographic structures. As Istvan Gyarmati, senior
counsel to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Hungary, has correctly noted, reasons for western misunderstanding
of the nature of conflicts lay partly in the fact that
they were outside the experiences of developed democracies.
The values of the western democracies are unfortunately
not shared by two thirds of the world population.17
To
find a real solution to the crisis, the international
community first needs to better understand the origins
and characteristics of the problems and to learn lessons
from the past. Although all the conflicts in former Yugoslavia
between 1991-1999 seemingly had the same origins and were,
therefore, rather predictable - reactions of the international
community were late and inadequate, and lacked clear vision
and realistic goals. As the conflict spread and the suffering
increased, emotional factors came into play and the situation
worsened. The differences of opinion among members of
the international community and their inconsistent reactions
damaged its overall credibility.
In
the words of J. Simon: "The European Union (EU) and
West European Union (WEU) remain "blind" to
many of the region's countries and their problems. Unfortunately,
some of the actions these organizations have taken may
have had a negative effect on the region's stability."18
He
continues: "The roots of Balkan insecurity and instability
can be attributed to at least the following four interrelated
problems: (1) psychological factors; (2) state-building
challenges; (3) economic development; and (4) security/defense
issues. Efforts to eradicate the sources of Balkan insecurity
and conflict must attack all these problems simultaneously.
Because NATO is only effective in ameliorating two of
the four problems-psychological and security/defense-a
more comprehensive and coordinated strategy is necessary."19
The
international community was, until recently, focused on
efforts to bring an end to armed conflicts in the region.
Nowadays, when these efforts have brought results both
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, it is time to
initiate a process that will lead to self-sustaining long-term
stability in the region and to the establishment of regional
deterrents to discourage further conflicts.
The
active participation of local players in the region is
crucial for the achievement of long-term and sustainable
results, as they have a more comprehensive understanding
of events and are aware of realistic constraints. Thus,
they can actively contribute to finding a long-term solution
for the region. It is obvious that the analytical support
and education of the decision-makers regarding preventive
action and long-term strategies must be improved. An important
constraint that is often forgotten under the pressure
to achieve results is time dynamics. It is not realistic
to expect that deep emotional, psychological, social and
economic wounds can be forgotten and their effects neglected
in just six months (which was the intended duration of
the first mandate of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina - IFOR), or in a couple of years. In the
words of Knut Vollebaek: "Peace and stability cannot
be imposed from outside. The international community must
get people to work together in order to solve common problems.
I have no illusions about the complexity of this task.
It will take decades to achieve."20
The manner in which former Yugoslavia collapsed taught
us a valuable lesson: each of the nations in the area
needs time for its own "transition" and realization
of its full identity. Only after reaching this "stable
identity", inherent to a democracy, the sovereign
nations of former Yugoslavia will be able to reach excellent
neighborly relations. However, continuous convergence
toward a long-term solution can and must be assured.
The
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe
The
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is an initiative that
integrates political, economic and security efforts in
order to stabilize the region. The Stability Pact for
Southeast Europe is the result of an initiative by the
German EU Presidency, and was accepted with the consensus
of all members of the European Union on June 10, 1999
in Cologne. It is supported both by the US and Russia.
The Declaration of the heads of state and governments
of the participating and facilitating countries of the
Stability Pact and the Principals of participating and
facilitating international organizations and agencies
and regional initiatives was adopted in Sarajevo on July
30, 1999.
The
Stability Pact is a response to the need for comprehensive,
long-term and regional action in southeastern Europe.21
The Pact has been established as a forum where the participants
will be able to discuss measures to strengthen democracy,
respect for human rights, economic growth, confidence
building and arms control, and thus ensure greater security
and stability in the region.22
But this forum should also have the financial capability
to help its members in reconstruction and modernization
projects in the region.
The
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is a serious attempt
by the international community to find a strategy for
the prevention of future conflicts and aims to establish
a self-sustaining democratic and economic system in Southeast
Europe. To reach these goals, the initiators of the Pact
attempted to be realistic and based the Pact on the principle
of equality, since it hopes to make it acceptable to interested
countries.
The
Declaration of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe
at the Summit in Sarajevo23
states that "the countries of the region are the
owners of the stabilization process and their full efforts
and commitments to this undertaking are crucial for its
success." Possessing the capability to bring an end
to armed conflicts, NATO member countries should play
a main role in the stabilization processes. But only active
involvement and communication with the countries in the
region can result in natural and acceptable solutions
for regional entities leading to a successful regional
stabilization.
It
is very important to clearly state the final goals of
the Pact, and that those goals ensure achievement of strategic
political and security interests of regional states. The
activities of the international community must be consistently
focused on achieving that end-state, which for the countries
in the region is represented by general modernization
and westernization in both an economic and military sense,
and inclusion into Euro-Atlantic institutions, EU and
NATO.
The
economic dimension of the Stability Pact cannot be overemphasized.
"Ethnic conflict is often rooted in the economic
and social disparities in a region, both within and across
national borders. Regional economic growth and reduced
poverty therefore provide the best basis for stability.
The conflicts in and around the former Yugoslavia are
a good illustration of this. They show that to each long-term
solution we must focus just as much on economic reform
and development as on democratization, institution building,
respect for human and minority rights and military security."24
Regional economic discrepancies may be one of the sources
of political conflict among regional nations. D. Daianu
noted: "...the region is, by far, the least developed
of the Continent. There are also major discrepancies inside
the region resulting in the strong propensity of the better-off
countries (such as Slovenia, Croatia) to cut off links
with the rest of the region...."25
If
the international community does not want to repeat costly
failures made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which may be
viewed as a small-scale model of the whole region, it
must understand regional differences and must cautiously
approach emotionally changed issues. All participants
in the Pact should pay attention to the history and complex
relations among the nations in the region. A constructive
approach to stabilization in Southeast Europe for most
regional players can be achieved by accelerating economic
development, and by integration in international political,
economic and military organizations. In this way, values
of the West will be adopted in a most natural manner by
regional players and will lead to changes in their behavior.
Conclusions
There
are many important considerations regarding the characteristics
of a feasible, self-sustaining long-term solution for
disputes in Southeast Europe. Inaccurate assumptions and
simplification of problems can lead to unstable or unfeasible
solutions. In such instances, solutions tend to be difficult
to implement, very expensive to carry out, and are continuously
unstable. Realistic constraints - financial, cultural,
psychological, and political - have to be taken into account.
Otherwise, the proposed solutions, which seem good in
theory, are prone to fail in practice, as they are rife
with internal contradictions and become impossible to
sustain.
An
integrated analytical approach to the fulfillment of the
goals of the Stability Pact is required, which includes
the best methods for crisis management. The synergetic
effect in achieving adequate regional stability will be
obtained by stimulating the active participation of cooperative
regional players and regional think tanks in adopting
strategic solutions. In order to make the Stability Pact
a success, it is essential to fully include the experts
from the region into the process. The regional countries
involved should not be left out and viewed only as objects
of the stabilization process.
A
systematic approach to regional conflicts also requires
taking into account more than just military factors; it
must include economic, cultural, humanitarian, sociological,
religious, legislative, demographic, historic and other
relevant factors. In that context, an important component
of such an approach is a socio-psychological and emotional
dimension of the problem and recognition of the characteristics
of actors on the local, regional and macro level.
Given
the future changes in the regional political military
environment, there is a clear need to improve the training
and education of both military and civilian decision-makers
and analysts in international organizations, especially
in the region.
Militaries
clearly have to understand that it becomes more difficult
and complex to use military power in political-military
crises, especially given the new sources of threats and
instabilities. Analytical simplified models used in the
Cold War are now insufficient and the future will challenge
them even more. Rob de Wijk from the Clingendael Institute
for International Relations assesses that conflicts in
the future will emerge mainly within a country, not between
states. They will be conducted on a high technological
level, with very motivated combatants, often in urban
areas and with the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Such asymmetric conflicts will be the best choice of the
weaker side in the conflict.26
New security management oriented towards crisis prevention
rather than crisis management requires different training
of both analysts and decision-makers alike, but the education
of international and regional political leaders is critical.
Powerful
and reliable analytical methods require equally reliable
data, which rarely exist in the offices of public and
non-government institutions. It is therefore important
to skillfully coordinate data gathering, analytical activities
and decision making. Decision-makers need desperately
better analytical support to assist them in framing the
questions and weighing the alternative strategies, in
order to avoid unproductive decisions. Sound analysis
also requires the availability of the most accurate, timely
and focused data. The data gatherers must understand issues
that decision-makers are addressing to enable collection
of appropriate data. An initiative to develop coordinated
multilateral regional data collection and exchange system
regarding so-called "soft" security issues like
immigration, organized crime, drugs trafficking, and a
limited number of "hard" security issues like
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional
arms control, etc., may support these efforts in Southeast
Europe.
D.
Daianu noted: "...this region causes most of the
headaches for European policymakers, thereby adding fodder
to the talk about new dividing lines on the Continent.
It is true that a similar logic (language) can be applied
on an East-West axis, when one refers to Ukraine and Russia
as well. However, I would say that the sense of urgency
is and should be much higher for the Balkans. What has
occurred in the last ten years in this region, in terms
of losses of human life, substantiates this assertion."27
In
the future, one of the most important tasks of the international
community is to develop and maintain a comprehensive strategy
for the long-term stabilization of the region. Problems
in Southeast Europe are complex, chronic and recurring,
and therefore a thorough analysis and appropriate understanding
is required before solutions can be proposed. The international
community, including and relying on regional actors, should
quickly and decisively undertake preventive measures when
required, if it wants to avoid similar disasters in the
future, based on lessons learned from 1991 to 1999 in
Southeast Europe.
In
the words of K. Vollebaek: "We need to contribute
to what UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called 'a
culture of prevention'".28
No single security institution (OSCE, EU/WEU, NATO) or
country (such as the United States) is capable of resolving
all the sources of Balkan insecurity alone. Because psychological
factors, state-building challenges, economic development
problems, and security/defense issues are all interrelated
aspects of Balkan insecurity, a comprehensive "action
program" needs to be created and implemented.29
Political
stabilization must be based on economic prospects for
the region. All countries (including Serbia, when it transforms
into a democratic society) should have an equal position
in the search for solutions. As a part of Europe, the
nations in the Southeast have every right to strive for
a better future.
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andrić's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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