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US
Intelligence Community Estimates on Yugoslavia
(1948-1991)
Dr
Jordan Baev
ABSTRACT
The author considers
the relationship of the United States toward the former
Yugoslavia, based on declassified documents (1948-1991)
of the American intelligence agency. The US showed no
particular interest in Yugoslavia after 1945, considering
it a reliable Soviet ally. When the conflict broke out
between Stalin and Tito in 1948, it was believed that
a Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia was
probable and that there was a possibility of American
military assistance to Yugoslavia. In the mid-50s, it
was evaluated that in the event of an armed conflict between
the western and eastern blocs, the Yugoslav army could
be relied upon as a Western ally. During the 1960s, American
analyses became more critical of Yugoslav foreign policy,
which was in open contradiction to Western interests (non-aligned
movement, relationship toward the Israeli-Arab war). During
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, American
policy proposes a "very cautious and well-calculated"
position toward post-Tito Yugoslavia, with America avoiding
any kind of leading role or hasty initiatives. Evaluations
of the internal situation in Yugoslavia grow with the
creation of a unified Yugoslavia (which is in American
interests), to the total disintegration of the country
(the most dangerous scenario being the eventual outbreak
of armed conflict, which would be halted with the introduction
of Soviet troops into the eastern parts of former Yugoslavia
and western troops into Slovenia and Croatia). American
analyses do not lose sight of the fact that the regime
in Belgrade is repressive, especially in its relations
with Croatia and Kosovo, but conclude that the "Belgrade
policies, while not ideal, serve western interests."
Immediately
after the end of the Cold War, there appeared a unique
opportunity to access a great number of intelligence reports
and analyses of the two superpowers. The disintegration
of the USSR made it possible to release many analytical
materials of the KGB from the recent past. On the other
hand, certain collections of documents of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and
the US State Department are regularly disclosed in Washington
under the Freedom of Information Act, Presidential Executive
Order 12958 (April 17, 1995), owing to the efforts of
the "Moynihan" parliamentarian commission.1
The access to original new documents has provided the
professional community the chance to achieve a more accurate
understanding of many issues and to find answers to the
long-standing discussions concerning the essence and reliability
of intelligence analyses as well as the adequacy of the
analytic methods.2
In
many intelligence reports and analyses of the CIA and
the US National Security Council, the situation in the
Balkans and in the Mediterranean region is considered.
Surprisingly, instead of problems of the Balkan NATO allies
or members of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia is most often
mentioned. This article is based predominantly on newly
released documents of the CIA, NSC, DIA and the US State
Department Intelligence & Research Division, which
were declassified between March 1992 and September 1998.
Although in brief form, the document presentation provides
the possibility for studying the evolution of the US intelligence
concepts and estimates concerning post-war Yugoslavia.
The
Stalin-Tito Conflict
The
three day long Kremlin bargaining between Stalin and Churchill
and their foreign ministers Molotov and Eden in October
1944, which led to the well-known "percentage agreement"
on the Balkans, allotted to Yugoslavia a balanced position
with both of the Great Powers having equal influence.
During the first post-war years, the USA and Great Britain
demonstrated no great interest concerning the position
of Tito's Yugoslavia, which contrasted with their ongoing
interest in the course of events in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In most diplomatic and intelligence reports related to
the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito
is regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet Union and
as a "standard" Stalinist communist type regime
in East Europe. The attention of the leading circles in
the United States to Yugoslavia increases considerably
only when the conflict between Stalin and Tito is openly
acknowledged at the end of June, 1948.
Donald
Heath, the American ambassador in Sofia, uses a figurative
historical comparison - "a Protestant revolt against
the communist Vatican"3
- when commenting on the sudden break of relations between
the two most closely-linked East European countries in
his report to Washington, dated June 30. On the same day
in a cipher message, the US Military and Naval Attaches
in Belgrade first posed the question of the need for American
military support of Tito against a possible Soviet attack.4
Several days later, the first confidential American-Yugoslav
probe on the possibility of a military collaboration takes
place.5
In
their first information after the beginning of the Stalin-Tito
conflict, the Western secret services focus their attention
upon the probability of an outbreak of a military conflict
in the Balkans as the result of a possible Soviet attack
on Yugoslavia. From the onset of the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis,
the US military experts closely watch the course of events
and analyze the alternatives that might convert the political
controversy into a local war. In a report, submitted to
the US National Security Council on November 17, 1949,
four possible options of eventual Soviet actions are enumerated.
In a separate position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staffs formally poses the question of providing military
support to the Tito regime "since without our considerable
support we cannot expect him to achieve a success"
against a Soviet invasion.6
In another memorandum of the American Army Intelligence
Agency dated September 1950, it is noted that: "In
case of an attack on Yugoslavia the United States must
be prepared to give military support, eventually participating
with their own forces (underlined by the author)
in the hypothetical military conflict."7
This completely new stage in the Balkan policy of the
American administration is perhaps influenced by the outbreak
of the Korean war. In subsequent CIA reports, dated March
20 and May 4, 1951, and military intelligence reports,
dated September 24 of the same year, the US experts still
estimate as "serious" the probability of a Soviet
attack on Yugoslavia.8
At the same time Washington and Belgrade publicly announce
the contents of an agreement between the two governments
concerning American military support. The agreement is
signed on November 14, 1951.
Yugoslavia
in NATO?
The
exchange of messages relating to support of Tito, which
occurred between General Omar Bradley and the supreme
commander-in-chief of the NATO allied forces in Europe,
General Dwight Eisenhower, is of interest. In a letter
to "Ike" Eisenhower from September 4, 1951,
General Bradley notes: "We feel that the plan for
helping Yugoslavia is eventually a NATO matter."
In a new letter, dated September 19, general Bradley insists
on two-party discussions with representatives of the leading
countries in the pact "to the development of emergency
plans for giving direct military support to Yugoslavia
with such forces and facilities as the United Kingdom,
France and Italy may agree to make available to planning
purposes, in addition to those US forces of which you
are aware."9
Later it is assumed that political discussions in NATO
on the Yugoslav problem may meet with difficulty with
some countries, members of the Pact; therefore, it is
suggested that the providing of military support should
be negotiated on a three-party basis with Great Britain
and France. Fears that taking a relevant decision in the
matter might be blocked are reasonable. A year later,
at a session of the NATO Council in Paris, the Italian
representative De Gasperi firmly rejects the idea to discuss
the proposed NATO membership of Yugoslavia. (His principal
motive is certainly the continuing Italian-Yugoslav territorial
problem of Trieste). Nevertheless, in the Strategic Concept
for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area (December 9,
1952) it is clearly emphasized that:
"Yugoslavia
is the only "lapsed satellite", which, though
not a member of NATO, is likely to join in a defensive
war against the Soviet Bloc and thus afford the Allies
considerable psychological advantage as well as some military
aid."10
At
that time, the role of the Balkans in a future European
war is closely linked with the coordination of the actions
of the Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish armies, which finds
practical expression in the creation of the Balkan Pact
in 1953. As early as 1951, such joint military operations
are the topic of bilateral and multilateral consultations.
In a strictly confidential telegram from the US embassy
in Athens, for instance, the opinion of the Greek prime
minister, Sophokles Veniselos, is quoted: "Should
war break out he believes both Greek and Yugoslav armies
would move into Albania in coordinated fashion in order
to remove this threat to their rear."11
The
military collaboration with Yugoslavia remains on the
agenda even after the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav
relations and the meeting between Tito and Khrushchev
in Belgrade at the end of May 1955. In 1956 and 1957,
the Pentagon chiefs still include the country in their
lists for the providing of military support.12
The total military aid to Yugoslavia between 1950 and
1957 amounts to 745 million dollars.13
In a Defense Department report to the National Security
Council, dated September 22, 1958, it is explicitly stated
that: "Our strongest Allies in the European area
are our NATO Allies. Armed forces of the NATO countries
and those of Spain and Yugoslavia are impressive in size".14
At
the beginning of the sixties, the analyses of CIA become
more critical, as the fear became more pronounced in the
evaluating of Yugoslavia as a leader of the Movement of
the Non-aligned Nations. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia
clearly conflicts with the policies of the Western countries,
especially during the Israeli-Arab war of 1967. At the
same time it is pointed out in many intelligence analyses
that the propaganda attacks do not weaken Tito's pragmatic
efforts to extract benefits for his country from the global
duel confrontation of the Cold-War period. For instance,
in the CIA National Intelligence Estimate (May 23, 1961)
it is mentioned that:
"The
Yugoslavs, however, have refrained from formal relations
of alliance with the Western Powers, and the Balkan Pact
with Greece and Turkey, negotiated in 1953-1954 when a
threat from the Bloc still seemed serious, has become
virtually moribund. Belgrade nevertheless does not altogether
dispense with the connection because it provides certain
advantages in the relations with these two countries and
because the pact stands as a form of insurance against
a future revival of strong Bloc measures against Yugoslavia.
It is also a form of indirect contact with the Western
defense system, which might one day be useful to Yugoslavia,
even though its political line now condemns NATO."15
During
the sixties the Western intelligence services pay more
attention to the manifestation of ethnic separatism and
to the conflict within the party (between "the old"
and "the young" cadres) in Yugoslavia. Anti-Yugoslav
incidents in Kosovo-Metohia (Kosmet) and the "infiltration"
of Albanians into that region are reported first. In a
CIA report on the "Yugoslav experiment", considerable
space is dedicated to ethnic and national problems:
"It
is an immutable fact of Yugoslav political life that most
Serbs and Croats and Slovenes and Macedonians think of
themselves first as Serbs or Croats or Slovenes or Macedonians
and second, if at all, as Yugoslavs. National and ethnic
rivalries are endemic; they have long constituted a centrifugal
force which cannot long be overcome through liaisons intended
to resolve economic or political issues. Fears of a return
to "greater Serb" hegemony haunt all Yugoslavs
except the Serbs; some Croats and Slovenians speak earnestly
of a complete secession which no central government could
tolerate; and less drastic attacks on the federal concept
come from all regions."
At
the same time the CIA experts are inclined to give better
prospects to the living standards and the future federal
development of the country, even after the possible death
of the symbol of Yugoslav unity, Tito:
"We
believe that, over the long term, the principal accomplishments
of the Yugoslav system are fairly secure, that Yugoslavia,
even without Tito, will survive essentially intact and
will persist as a hybrid system. We also think, however,
that change and disarray will continue to confront the
leadership - especially the post-Tito leadership - with
a variety of serious problems."16
In
the days that followed the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia
in August 1968, Western military, diplomatic and intelligence
experts discuss again the need for urgent political and
military aid in the case of a hypothetical Soviet attack
on Romania and Yugoslavia. In spite of the fact that the
American diplomatic agencies in East Europe submit information
that: "we have no evidence pointing specifically
to preparation for action against Romania and Yugoslavia,"
attention is placed on consolidating contacts and coordination
with the Western countries in talks between Tito and other
Yugoslav leaders with American politicians and diplomats.17
In a memorandum dated October 1, 1968, which was prepared
by the US State Department, the possible forms of political,
economic and military support to Yugoslavia are listed.
In the document it is explicitly noted that:
"We
should be prepared to engage in military support operations
for Yugoslavia under these circumstances:
- Only
if requested by the Yugoslavs;
-
No involvement of US or NATO personnel beyond participation
in delivery operations;
- Heavy
equipment of a type requiring considerable lead time
for delivery should not be provided;
- If
portable, relatively easily deliverable equipment can
be furnished at any stage of hostilities, we should
take all necessary steps to grant it;
- The
Yugoslav military genius is in guerrilla-type operations.
We should orient our assistance in that direction."18
The
opportunities for American support are discussed in detail
at a meeting between US President Lyndon Johnson with
the Yugoslav deputy Prime minister, Kiro Gligorov, on
October 4, 1968. After his visit to Ljubljana in January
1969, the American consul in Zagreb provides the opinion
of the Slovenian leaders, Krajger and Brajnik, "that
Yugoslavia and the US have a strong mutual interest in
thwarting the linked Soviet moves and, similarly, that
the US, in considering how to cope with increased tension
created by the Soviets in North Central Europe, should
not lose sight of Yugoslavia's needs due to Soviet-created
tension in the Balkans."19
Post
- Tito Yugoslavia
For
many years before the death of the aging Yugoslav leader
Tito, American experts study in detail the possible "post-Tito"
evolution of the country. In a long 66-page Memorandum
of the National Security Council (September 13, 1971)
the possible options of the US policy in "post-Tito
Yugoslavia are considered."20
One of the most important recommendations is that a very
cautious and considered line of conduct should be followed.
This is characteristic for the American policy with respect
to Yugoslavia throughout the whole period until 1992:
"The
extent of US involvement must be carefully gauged at
each step so that we do not through our own actions
push the Yugoslavs in directions not in their ultimate
best interest. We must be mindful that even a limited
input from outside Yugoslavia at a key moment in a time
of instability could have a crucial impact on the evolution
of events and the development of Yugoslav policy. Accordingly,
our efforts in the main should be supplementary and
reinforcing, not leading."
Particular
areas of future bilateral collaboration based upon Yugoslavia's
significance for the protection of American interests
in this part of Europe are considered in the document.
Trade expansion, new American investments and credits,
continuing collaboration in science and technology as
well as intelligence and defense collaboration (including
admittance of Yugoslav army officers into American military
academies) and other extremely important aspects of national
security are among these areas. The useful exchange of
intelligence information about the Warsaw Pact forces
and plans in the Balkans is mentioned in particular. Concerning
the contacts of the secret services, it is explicitly
noted in the report that: "As the transition period
approaches in Yugoslavia, however, it could prove useful
to have established channels for intelligence exchange.
To establish such channels we could respond tentatively
to the Yugoslav initiatives, and further explore the possibility
of developing a mutually beneficial exchange."
The
US intelligence and military experts analyze four possibilities
for the future evolution of Yugoslavia, three of them
including a partial or total disintegration of the country,
mainly the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina,
Kosovo and Macedonia. In addition to declaring their support
for the preservation of Yugoslavia's integrity, the American
experts expect (as an ultimate measure) the possible use
of US and NATO forces with the purpose of restoring "the
strategic balance" in Europe. In the different cases,
it is recommended that the leaders in Zagreb and Ljubljana
be advised to restrain from the application of "secessionist
plans" which might endanger the stability of Yugoslavia.
The most dangerous scenario considered includes a direct
military confrontation, which leads to the division of
parts of Yugoslavia between the two military and political
blocs, the direction of division expressing the priorities
and differences in the attitude of the West towards particular
Yugoslav republics:
"...The
Soviets move troops into Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro.
In the Security Council we would demand the dispatch
of UN forces to Slovenia and Croatia, trying to force
this action by making clear that in the absence of UN
efforts, the US and NATO would have no recourse but
to take steps to guarantee the continued independence
and Western orientation of Croatia and Slovenia. In
the absence of UN action, we would move into the two
northern republics."
Similar
such estimates as those in the report dated September
13, 1971, can be found in CIA intelligence reports dated
July 5, 1973, September 25, 1979, and February 1, 1980.
In the 1973 analysis, special attention is paid to the
crisis in Belgrade - Zagreb relations, which had been
overcome only by taking draconian measures (repressive
actions against more than 800 Croatian functionaries).
The general conclusion motivating the position of the
West is that: "Over the years, NATO members have
in one way or another invested heavily in Yugoslavia…
It is generally agreed that while not ideal, Belgrade's
position and policies are advantageous to Western interests…"21
In the intelligence analysis from 1979, serious ethnic
and political problems in Yugoslavia in the eighties are
predicted.
"Of
crucial importance is the interplay among a number of
central variables, of which the most critical will be
the nature of Soviet initiatives and reactions, the efficacy
of Western assistance, and, above all, the cohesion and
adaptability of Tito's successors".
Authors
of the document remind us of the serious ethnic unrest
in Kosovo and Croatia in the past decade. Relevant to
Kosovo, Albanian accusations are quoted that the province
has been converted into "an economic and political
colony of the Serbs." The experts of CIA underline
the existence of two hostile fractions in the Yugoslav
leadership, but do not regard as realistic the possibility
of a military putsch or a drastic change in the country's
policies. As for the position of the Western countries,
the analysis points out that:
"No
amount or kind of Western support can stop Tito's successors
from engaging in a self-destructive succession struggle
or prevent Yugoslavia's constituent nationalities from
embarking on a civil war, if they are determined to do
so. However, skillfully timed and carefully designed and
orchestrated Western support could make a very large difference
to the consolidation and survival of a potentially viable
post-Tito leadership and thereby to the preservation of
a stable regional, continental and global balance of power."22
Within
the framework of the continuing Bloc confrontation, CIA
and DIA in their expert analyses underline the role and
position of Yugoslavia in the case of a possible global
conflict. In several successive CIA analyses entitled
"Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO" it is explicitly
noted that: "...We judge it unlikely that Yugoslavia
would grant the Pact permission to use its territory or
that the Pact would use force to advance through Yugoslavia
to attack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified,
however, by our uncertainly concerning future political
attitudes and development in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito
era."23
After
Tito's death, the situation in Yugoslavia and the future
fate of the country are the subject of investigations
and discussions in many research centers connected with
US defense and intelligence agencies, such as RAND Corporation,
the US Army War College, the Naval Academy, etc. Within
several months after the death of the leader, approximately
ten reports related to Yugoslavia were prepared.24
The
CIA analysis, dated January 26, 1983, and the analysis
of the National Security Council (March 14, 1984) are
particularly troublesome. Detailed estimates of the financial,
political and ethnic crises in Yugoslavia after Tito's
death are provided in the reports. In the CIA report (1983)
concerning the increasingly strained ethnic relations
it is noted that:
"Confrontations
among the ethno-national communities have been a recurrent
feature of postwar Yugoslav history and sometimes forced
even Tito on the defensive. Economic stringencies are
sharpening the conflict of interest among Yugoslavia's
republics and provinces. Following Tito's death, the federal
regime lost the prestige it derived as a result of his
dominant authority and unimpeachable reputation as an
ethnic nonpartisan. None of his successors has an even
remotely comparable reputation."
In
the report, the strained ethnic relations in Croatia and
Bosnia are particularly noted. Special attention is paid
to the "strategic significance" of the ethnic
unrest of the Albanians in Kosovo in 1981. Nevertheless,
a firm position is expressed that Western countries should
continue their considerable financial and economic support
to the federal government (2,4 billion dollars) with the
purpose of overcoming the aggravated economic crisis.25
American policy with respect to Yugoslavia is discussed
in a Memorandum of the National Security Council (August
10, 1989) at the end of the Cold War era.26
After
the Fall of the Berlin Wall
The
intensification of ethnic conflicts based upon increasingly
insurmountable disagreements concerning the "federation
or self-determination" dilemma, as well as the unknown
fate of another multinational country, the USSR, paralyzed
American initiatives for a short time at the beginning
of the nineties. The position of the leading countries
predetermined in many respects the development of the
Yugoslav crisis after 1991, thus converting it into the
bleeding wound of Europe. Many American experts, Professor
Daniel Nelson, for instance, warned that the Balkan Peninsula
is connected with "the future of European security"
more closely than any other part of Eastern Europe because
of the preconditions for numerous internal and international
conflicts which were laid in the past.27
The motives for the disengaged position of the Western
institutions at the first stage of the Yugo-conflict are
summed up in one of the expert analyses in the following
manner:
(a)
The conflict, at least at the beginning, is of internal
significance and is located "outside the NATO space";
(b) The conflict opposes the principle of self-determination
in favor of the idea of the inviolability of European
boundaries;
(c) The outbreak of the conflict is at a time of
NATO reorientation;
(d) The conflict and any international response
to it are regarded as a test for future ethnic and national
conflicts in Europe. The principle of precedent is considered
a serious consideration at the time of disintegration
of one of superpowers, the USSR;
(e)
The conflict manifests the differences in the geopolitical
orientation of the leading Western countries.28
It
was added in other analyses that the position of NATO
and the European Community is influenced predominantly
by the political line of the United States, which aimed
at preserving Yugoslav federal integrity due to its fears
that otherwise, there would be "an impetus to the
USSR disintegration."29
In
1992, the United States increased its activity and more
and more often the question of dispatching American forces
to the Balkans and conducting special military operations
was addressed on a government level. In 1992-1993, different
options of military operations on the territory of previous
Yugoslavia were discussed. For instance, in the summary
report of the US Congress, military expert John Collins
listed eight different possibilities:
A.
Withdrawal of the UN peace-making forces because it is
impossible to solve the problem by a military intervention;
B. Preserving the status quo;
C. Conducting peace-making missions by the peaceful
efforts of military forces;
D. Humanitarian actions in compliance with Resolution
770 of the UN Security Council;
E. Actions for "isolating the battlefield"
by air blockade, economic sanctions and arms embargo;
F. Retaliation operations with bombing of important
military and industrial targets;
G. Forced peace-making actions aimed at separating
the participants in the armed conflict;
H. A modified version of the previous option by
expelling the Serbian and Croatian forces from Bosnia
and Herzegovina and restoration of the pre-war boundaries.30
The
events which followed proved that most influential options
presented in the intelligence and political expert reports
find concrete expression in the American policies related
to the Yugo-crisis: peace-making operations, humanitarian
actions, embargo, air blockade, air attacks of the NATO
forces against military and civilian targets, at first
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at present against the
territories of Serbia and Montenegro.
The
Yugo-crisis was a springboard for a great number of new
serious economic, military, and political problems for
the Balkan countries and Europe as a whole, as well as
for the world community. The ethno-religious and territorial
controversies which have been for decades impossible to
overcome define at present the military and political
situation in the Balkans as a "permanent crisis",
with a trend toward long-term instability of the peninsula
due to these centers of instability.
NOTES
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Cover picture
was taken with permission from
Miro Andrić's book "Hrvatsko podmorje",
Zagreb: Car Herc, 1999, p. 8.
(Motive; 5m. below sea level,
island Palagruža)
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