NOTES

1 An Introduction to National Archives Records Relating to the Cold War, Reference Information Paper 107, NARA, Washington 1998.

2 MacEachin, D. CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges. An Intelligence Monograph. Center for the Study of Intelligence. CIA. CSI 96-001, May 1996.

3 National Archives & Record Administration /NARA/, Washington, RG 59, Decimal File 860.H.00/7-548.

4 Assessing the Soviet Threat. The early Cold War years. Center for the Study of Intelligence. CIA 1997, No. 84, Daily Summary, June 30, 1948.

5 Public Record Office, Kew, Foreign Office, Political. 371/72 582, 72 583.

6 Foreign Relations of the United States /FRUS/. Diplomatic Papers, 1950, vol. IV, Washington 1980, pp. 1339-1344.

7 Ibid., pp. 1391, 1441-1444, 1454.

8 The Soviet Estimate: US Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991, The National Security Archive Special Collections, Chadwyck-Healey 1995, CIA, NIE 29-51, Probability of an invasion of Yugoslavia on 1951.

9 NARA, RG 218, Chairman's JCS Files, Gen. Omar Bradley, Box 3.

10 NATO Strategy Documents. 1949-1969, Brussels 1998, p. 217.

11 NARA, RG 59, Lot File 52-26, Box 39.

12 NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, 1958, Box. 23.

13 FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. X, Part 2, Washington 1993, p. 313.

14 The National Security Archive /NSA/, Washington, PPRD Collection, Box 10, NSC 5819, p. 8.

15 The Soviet Estimate, NIE-15-61. Outlook for Yugoslavia, p. 11. An important role in backing the American position concerning Yugoslavia with arguments was played by the reasonable suggestion of the US ambassador in Belgrade, George Kennan (November 28, 1962) that a more flexible political line should be followed in view of the US strategic interests - FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Washington 1994, pp. 292-309.

16 The Soviet Estimate, NIE-15-67, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 3, 10.

17 US Department of State, Intelligence Note, No. 827, October 22, 1968.

18 FRUS,1964-1968, vol. XVII, Washington 1996, p. 108.

19 NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Box 1917.

20 NSA, PPRD Collection, Box 5, US Policy and post-Tito Yugoslavia - NSSM 129.

21 The Soviet Estimate, NIE-15-73, Yugoslavia after Tito, p. 9.

22 Ibid., NIE-15-79. Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia. The additional comments in the CIA analysis, dated February 1, 1980, are that after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan there are no reasons to change the previous estimates.

23 NARA, RG 263, Entry 29, Box 17, NIE-11-14-79, p. 64.

24 The Library of Congress, Washington, 89/160, Europe and NATO: Special Studies, Reel 10, Frame 655-1224.

25 The Soviet Estimate, SNIE-15-83. Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis, p. 11. See also: NSDD 133, March 14, 1984, US Policy Toward Yugoslavia.

26 NSC Memorandum. "Comprehensive Review of US - Yugoslav Relations, August 10, 1989. /Still Classified/

27 Nelson, D. Balkan Imbroglio, Westview Press 1991; Balkan Perspectives, Strategic Review, Winter 1993, p. 27.

28 North Atlantic Assembly. AJ 243 DSC (92) 7. The Alliance Security: New Context, New Challenges; Steinberg, J. The Role of European Institutions in Security after the Cold War: Some Lessons for Yugoslavia - RAND Paper 1992.

29 North Atlantic Assembly, AJ 238 CC/CSCE (92) 8. The Yugoslav crisis; AJ 264 PC (92) 6. The War in Former Yugoslavia: Prospects for Resolution.

30 Collins, J. Balkan Battlegrounds. US Military Alternatives - CRS Report for Congress No. 92-679 S, p. 18-23.