NOTES

1 Mustafa Imamović, "Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Immediate Consequences," in Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Struggle for its Survival 1992-1995, (Sarajevo, 1997), p. 9.
2 A representative example is the recent critical article by Adnan Jahia, Muslim formations in the Tuzla region during the Second World War, Tuzla, 1995.
3 In a speech delivered at the "Dom ljiljana" on December 9, 1993 before participants at a seminar organized by the Department for Morale of the Supreme Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović drew parallels with the Second World War. He said, "we have on our scene Chetniks and Ustashi again, but in much worse degrees than before." He also said that a third army exists, "our national army," upon whom he called on to be "like the Partisans in the last war." See Alija Izetbegović, Selected Speeches, Letters, Statements, Interviews, Zagreb, 1995, p 14. Mile Stojić, alluding to a similar statement by Izetbegović at the beginning of February 2000, stated that Izetbegović "characterizes the enemy as either Chetnik or Ustashi, leading to the logical conclusion that "we" are in all this Comrade Tito. With a minor difference that Tito created a multinational army on the ashes of a collapsed state, while Izetbegović turned a multiethnic army of a country in short time into a national army. Therefore, to the extent that his opponents are the Chetniks and Ustashi, he is not a Partisan... SFOR forces are today the Partizans." See his article "Partizan," Dani (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, February 11, 2000.
4 A completely different predicament arose for Croats in the Republic of Croatia, who constituted a high percentage of the Partizan forces. Dalmatia was crucial in this regard because it was the strongest Partizan center in the whole of former Yugoslavia.
5 After the fall of Aleksander Ranković, the well-known Bosnian and Herzegovinian Communist official Cvjetin Mijatović, by nationality a Serb, stated in Eitluk: "I am ashamed that I am a Serb when I see so much injustice inflicted in the Croat population here." Cited according to Bahrudin Bijedić, "My Cousin Džemal Bijedić," Dani (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, March 15, 1999.
6 Mladen Ančić, "The Historical Dimension of Croatianhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Herceg-Bosna or ..., Mostar, 1996, p 32.
7 "Bosnia and Herzegovina," Encyclopedia Yugoslavia, Zagreb, 1982, Volume 2, p 167.
8 Mustafa Imamović, The History of Bosniacs, Sarajevo, 1997, p 24.
9 "Personality of the Decade," Dani (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, December 29, 1997.
10 According to Darko Tanasković, 'Bosniac is a name referring to an ethno-political concept, which is essentially in the ancient history of Bosnia (and Herzegovina), older than Serbia and Croatia, as its autochthonous population with continuous ethnic, cultural, psychological, and even continuos statehood from the early middle ages to the present live Bosniacs, and that this is the only appropriate national name for the nation.' See Darko Tanasković, "Contradictory NeoBosniacism," collection of essays Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Middle Ages to Recent Times, Belgrade, 1995, p 47.
11 The pioneer in this field is Dr. Enver Imamović.
12 Mladen Ančić, Putanja klatna. Austro-Hungarian Kingdom and Bosnia during the 14th Century, Mostar, 1997, p 8.
13 Miroslav Krleža, On Religion, Sarajevo, 1982, pp 99-113. See also Nada Klaić, Medieval Bosnia, Zagreb, 1989. For more details, see M. Ančić, 1997, pp 26-32, ibid., 1996, pp 11-12, 31-32.
14 Mladen Ančić, Who erred in Bosnia?, Osijek-Zagreb-Split, 1999, p 28.
15 ibid., Ančić, pp 28-29.
16 Ivan Lovrenović, "The War: 1992-1995, and its Aftermath: Is there a future?," Jukić 26-26, Sarajevo, 1996/97, p 212.
17 Stanko Nišić, The Serbian Strategy, Belgrade, 1995, p 53.
18 Hasan Efendić, Who defended Bosnia?, Sarajevo, 1998, p 237.
19 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999, p 381. Se also op. cit. H. Efendić, 1998, pp 238, 329-330.
20 op. cit., H. Efendić, 1998, p 328.
21 Dušan Bilandžić suggested the following: "Towards the creation of an anti-hegemonistic coalition, Tito forced the augmentation of the so-called Yugoslav peripheries-strengthening the sovereignty and autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro to establish a certain balance and symmetry between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Tito sought to make Bosnia and Herzegovina as sovereign as it could be to work as a buffer republic between Serbia and Croatia, ... frequently visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tito encouraged its leadership by telling them not to 'give in to either Belgrade or Zagreb.' From the mid-60s ... Bosnia and Herzegovina began to free itself from the federal administration in three important respects: the declaration of Muslims as a nation, reducing repressive measures against the Croats, and restricting Greater Serbian forces." See Dušan Bilandžić, Modern Croatian History, Zagreb, 1999, pp 577-578.
22 "Decision on the Founding of the Serbian People's Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of October 24, 1991," Smail Eekić, The Aggression against Bosnia and Genocide against the Bosniacs 1991-1993, Sarajevo, 1994, appendix IV.
23 "Decision on the Verification of the Declaration of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast in Bosnia and Herzegovina of November 21, 1991," ibid., appendix VI. On this day, the Serbian People's Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognized the Republic Srpska Krajina as a federal unit of Yugoslavia, ibid., appendix VII.
24 Ibid., appendix VIII., p 30.
25 "Conclusions from the Joint Meeting of Herzegovinian regional communities and the Travnik regional community of November 12, 1991, ibid., appendix XVI. Eekić interprets the decision as the so-called "Herzegovinian regional community" and the so-called "Travnik regional community" on the establishment of the "Croatian state."
26 "Decision on the establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna of November 18, 1991," ibid., appendix XVII. As in the previous case, Eekić uncritically interprets this decision as the decision of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the declaration of the "Croatian state" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A reproduction of the Decision by Karlo Rotim is identical to Eekić's in the first six articles, while the remainders differ. Eekić does not include the concluding article. See Karlo Rotim, The Defense of Herceg-Bosna, Široki Brijeg, 1997, Vol. 1, pp 518-519.
27 Op.cit., Lovrenović, 1996/97, p 217.
28 Op.cit., The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 378. R. Mahmutaehajić questions whether the Patriotic League was structured in such a way that it could be said that, 'well, before the war the Muslims created their own paramilitary organization.' See R. Mahmutaehajić, interview in Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), March 9, 2000.
29 Sefer Halilović, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo, 1997, p 120.
30 Ibid., pp 166-168.
31 Information, Command of the 4th Corps, SP No. 75-1, May 7, 1992.
32 Information on the situation of responsibility of the 2nd VO, Command 2, VO, Int. No. 25/142-777, April 18, 1992.
33 For Serbian plans for creating military superiority at the beginning of the war, along with the complete ignorance of the basis of such superiority, material and technical resources that they inherited from the former JNA, see S. Nišić, 1995, pp 52-53.
34 For example, the 5th Corps on May 21, was renamed the 1st Krajiški Corps, and contingents from the 9th and 10th Corps were transformed on June 2, 1992 into the 2nd Krajiški Corps, the 13th Corps on May 26, 1992 became the Hercegovaeki Corps.
35 Expose on the results on the front, the status of the Army of the Srpska Republika, problems and tasks in the specified period, General Headquarters of the Army of the Srpska Republika, September 1992.
36 Ibid.
37 It is significant that military publications of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in writing about the first months of the war focus on the defense of Sarajevo, while less attention is given to other areas of confrontation. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the Bosniacs start from the view that in contrast to the other two "foundations," foundations based on the arms bearing the name Bosnia and Herzegovina, controls Sarajevo as the capital city. The successes of the HVO and the role of the Croatian Arms (HV) in the survival of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina is completely ignored. See H. Efendić, 1998; Jovan Divjak, "The first phase of the War 1992-1993: The Struggle for Survival and Continuation of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, pp 181-205.
38 List in the chronology appended in The War Against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 389. See also op. cit., I. Lovrenović, 1996/97, p 216.
39 Both brigades were decorated with the Order of Nemanjić, the second highest decoration in the Srpska Republika, because of their successes in Posavina. "Recipients of the Order of Nemanjić," Srpska vojska (Sarajevo), July 15, 1993.
40 The Croatian Army, HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were unable to establish an armed brigade during the war. The 1st Krajiški Corps of the Army of the Srpska Republika.
41 "The Homeland War," The Croatian Lexicon (Hrvatski leksikon), Zagreb, 1996, Vol. 1, pp 280-281.
42 In operation "Vrbas" for the liberation of the city of Jajce within the formation of the 30th pd included the 1st mixed anti-armory artillery division, the 1st, 11th and 17th light infantry brigade and the 1st battalion of the light infantry brigade. See the Report from the Command of the 1st Krajiskog Corps, Top Secret, No. 174-643, October 26, 1992, General Headquarters of the Army of the Srpska Republika.
43 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p. 392. The Commander of the Operative Zone of HVO North-eastern Herzegovina reported to HVO General Headquarters about the conflict in Prozor and its impact on Jajce. He stated that "in the zone of responsibility of the Gorni Vakuf there was no escalation of conflict, however assistance for Jajce (ammunition and grenades) are located in Prozor because traffic towards Central Bosnia has been disrupted. The representatives of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina Territorial Defense have agreed that assistance be allowed through on the condition that along with this convoy four cistrene fuel trucks be allowed to pass for the OS of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Tesnju. This convoy was to travel along the Makljen-Gornji Vakuf-Bistricka rika-Sebesic-Prkosi-Fojnica and further to Jajce. Private Luka Sekerija believes that the convoy be allowed to pass because it would assist Jajce. We seek your instruction regarding this matter." Extraordinary Report of the OZ S-ZH, Top Secret, No. 50/92-1, October 24, 1992.
44 The compiler of the chronology of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995 claims that the operational focus on the eastern bank of the Neretva, known as the Dawn of June, was the counter-attack by Croatian and Bosniac forces in Mostar, a claim that is unfounded. The Lipanjske zore operation was conducted exclusively by the HVO. Bosniac forces in this alternative interpretation would have required a Mostar battalion, which existed as an integral component of the HVO, one of ten Mostar infantries. See The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 388. The principal Commander of the Bosniac-Muslim Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina also claims without foundation that the Mostar Battalion was not an integral part of the HVO. Furthermore, some military analysis's describe the conflict between the JNA and the Croatian Army and HVO in Herzegovina as an armed incident, a local disagreement and conflict which was not in accordance with relations between Tuđman and Milošević.
45 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, pp 385, 388.
46 Report of the Head Quarters of the HVO to the Government of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna for the period from April 14, 1992 to December 31, 1992, No. 01-240, February, 4, 1993.
47 At the end of 1992 the HVO consisted of approximately 45,000 soldiers in four operative zones. The units of the Operative Zone Southeastern Herzegovina were completed up to 95 percent while the Operation Zone Posavina the least with approximately 45 percent. The other two operative zones in Central Bosnia and Northwestern Herzegovina had approximately 60 percent of soldiers that it required in terms of its organization. In the professional units of the HVO consisted of 855 members, including 85 officers, 91 non-commissioned officers and 670 soldiers. See Report of the Head Quarters of HVO to the Government of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna for the period between April 14, 1992 and December 31, 1992, No. 01-240. In comparison the 3rd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to information provided by its commander, at the end of November 1992 consisted of over 40,000 armed soldiers. See the Memorandum from the meeting between the Commander of the County stozer of Novi Travnik and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Novi Travnik, County Headquarter, Novi Travnik, No. 362/92, November 26, 1992.
48 Order of the Headquarters of HVO, No. 01-10/93, January 8, 1993. Request from the Headquarters of HVO, No. 01-57/93, January 13, 1993.
49 Information of the Headquarters of the Army of the Srpska Republika, Secret, No. 17/11-75, December 23, 1992. The Declaration on the end of the war did not mean that the war had ended, but an expression of the readiness of the Serbian nation, as stated in the Information. However, the conclusion to the war depended on the readiness of the Muslim-Croat coalition and the aggressor army of the state of Croatia to end the war.
50 Op.cit., M. Ančić, 1999, pp 36-37.
51 Regular Military Report, Command of the 30th partd. Top Secret, No. 174-66, April 2, 1992.
52 The Croats and Muslims were in some ways equally held hostage by Central Bosnia. Neither side was able to gain an absolute hold over compact territory, which lead from gradual intolerance to open war that occurred in other areas in at least two respects. On the one hand, there were areas from which the conflict expanded to other mixed areas, and on the other hand, the conflict brought into question accessibility of roads and traffic, including humanitarian and military. After the battles for these areas more ethnically clear enclaves were created, often more than less. In such cases, neither of the two sides benefited, but only the third party.
53 The responsible HVO units in Gorni Vakuf reported on April 26, 1992 that the situation in Gorni Vakuf was on the verge of conflict, and that units of the Territorial Defense were attempting to seize power in the city. The following day, armed incidents occurred between the HVO and the Territorial Defense. See Report by HVO Gorni Vakuf, April 17, 1992; Report by OS HVO Gornji Vakuf to the President of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna, Top Secret, No. 1-5/4-2/92, June 22, 1992.
54 The nature of this conflict can be understood from the Command of HVO Busovaea, No. 62/92, May 10, 1992, published in H. Efendić, 1998, pp 196-198.
55 The conflict occurred on June 13, 1992 after the Territorial Defense incursions in the Serbian village of Katići and Predjele, whose Serb population expressed their allegiance to the HVO and handed over weapons that they had received from the JNA. HVO's attempt to protect those Serbs lead to a conflict that resulted in deaths and wounded on both sides. See War Crimes by the Muslim Military forces against Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1997, p 20.
56 Report from the Center for Intelligence and Research in Novi Travnik, June 20, 1992. The underlying cause of the conflict was an attempt by HVO to control all institutions and important buildings in Novi Travnik with the aim of realizing the idea of Herceg-Bosna and this area (Zenica), as assessed by the Official Report of the Center for Security, Sector SDB, Zenica, June 27, 1992.
57 Request from the OŠ Konjic, No. 19-92, July 1, 1992.
58 The Defense Department HVO accused personally the head of the Headquarters of the OSRBH for the incident. See correspondence from the Defense Department, No. 03-34/92, September 3, 1992 to the Commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Protest from the Head of the Defense Department, No. 03-50/92, September 11, 1992 to the Headquarters of the OSBH.
59 Correspondence from the Command Headquarters OZ SB, October 15, 1992 to the Supreme Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Zenica.
60 Report of Activities of the Commission monitoring the situation in the County of Novi Travnik, No. 1215/92, November 6, 1992.
61 War Crimes by the Muslim Military forces against Croats from central areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1996, p 13; Glasnik HVO, No. 2, p 13.
62 In the military-territorial structure of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno, there were the 3rd Corps, while these areas were within the composition of HVO there were OZ North-western Herzegovina. In the conflict the 3rd Corps had a significant advantage because the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovian Gornji Vakuf had ties with units of the army in Prozor and parts of the hinterland in Operative Zone in Central Bosnia, which blocked access for the Operative Zone North-western Herzegovina. This role of the units from Gornji Vakuf was not accidental because in comparison to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bugojno (which was cut between the forces of the Army of the Srpska Republika from Kupres and Donji Vakuf), had a better relationship with its rear and a tactically better placement. At the end of the year when the 305 Mountain Brigade was located on the Gornji Vakuf area, composed of Muslims from Jajce, tensions were further heightened, so that it is of no surprise that precisely in these areas the conflict between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina began in mid-January 1993.
63 Regular Report OZ S-ZH, Top Secret, No. 47/92, October 21, 1992.
64 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 390. However, it should be acknowledged that this claim is significantly better than the assertion that the Republic of Croatia committed an act of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the attacks in Prozor and Novi Travnik, and that in the assault on Prozor the 113th Split and a part of the 114th Šibenik Brigades of the Croatian Army were involved. In addition, in the assault on Novi Travnik, it is alleged that the other part of the 114th Šibenik Brigade and the 123rd Varaždin Brigade of the Croatian Army participated also. See S. Eekić, 1994, p 226.
65 Before joining the Army of Bosnia and Herzeogvina he was the Head of the Anti-Aircraft Defense of HVO. See the Report by the Headquarters of the Operative Zone of the North-western Herzegovina, No. 135/92, November 10, 1992 to the Main Headquarters of HVO on the cases and basis of the conflict between HVO and the Territorial Defense.
66 Statement by Muharem Šabić of November 27, 1992, Supreme Commander of the OSRBH.
67 Report of the Commander of the County Headquarters in Novi Travnik from a meeting with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Novi Travnik, County Headquarters-Novi Travnik, No. 362/92, November 26, 1992.
68 Report of the Headquarters Operative Zone North-western Herzegovina, No. 135/92, November 10, 1992 to the General Headquarters of HVO.
69 "The People of the Krajina defend Jajce," Bosnjak / Bosniac, April 4, 1995.
70 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 391.
71 "The Homeland War," Hrvatski Leksikon / The Croatian Lexicon, Zagreb, 1996, Vol. 1, p 281.
72 Order from the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 01/93, January 16, 1993.
73 Marko Attila Hoare, "Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995," in The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 218.
74 "The Destruction of Multiculturalism in the Cities," Interview with Dr. Hidajet Repov, Dani (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, March 24, 2000.
75 Report of the OS HVO in Gornji Vakuf, Top Secret, No. 1-5/4-2/92, June 22, 1992 to the President of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna.
76 After the conflict in January 1993 in Gornji Vakuf, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfilled the HVO request that the 305th Mountain Brigade composed of Muslim refugees from Jajce withdraw. In a brochure about the war history of this brigade it was asserted that the reason is treated as confirmation that the soldiers from Jajce are the true defenders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not the factors that destroyed an ethnic balance. See The War Path of the 205th Mountain Brigade, Zenica, 1994, p 10.
77 An example of both pro-Croat and pro-Serb options are the two officers of the JNA from Varaždin, both having the rank of Generals in the Arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the war. Sead Delić in the defense of the military barracks on the side of the JNA was wounded. When he joined the Arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina he reached the rank of Commander of the 2nd Corps. Fikret Auskić joined HVO where he was an officer in the 1st Mechanized Brigade. In the summer of 1992 he joined the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a commander for its elite forces, the 17th Krajiški Knights Brigade.
78 The text of the agreement was published in K. Rotim, 1997, pp 316-317.
79 A shorter account of the meeting in Travnik was held on August 15, 1992, County Headquarters of HVO Gornji Vakuf.
80 Report from the Headquarters of Central Bosnia, No. 01-555/93, October 7, 1992.
81 "Jaganjac and Praljak are in some joint command which should be located within the Supreme Command in Sarajevo. What else will this war bring? Who should we listen to?," as stated by officer of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mirsad Aatić in his diary of November 13, 1992. "War Diary of the first Commander of TG Igman," Dani (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, April 7, 2000.
82 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 3989.
83 Order to implement the military activities of the commander of the 30th Partizan Division, March 4, 1992 to the Headquarters of the 1st Partizan Brigade.
84 Official note of the Center for State Security, Sector SDB, Zenica, June 27, 1992.
85 Gordan Malić, "Dossier HVO," Globus, Zagreb, March 17, 2000.
86 General Hasan Efendić's approach could be any different because of the influence of the former army that he served is affirmed in the case of another former JNA officer, General Slavko Lisica. They only differ in terms of the side on which they fought. In contrast, S. Eekić is a historian who followed the established path of political historians whose purpose was provide evidence to excuse prejudices. In the first part of his book devoted to the Bosnian Serbs, Eekić uses documents captured from the Command of the 2nd Military Region of the former JNA, which gives a persuasive account of the emergence of the Army of the Srpska Republika and the arming of the Serbian population. The second, smaller part of the pamphlet is devoted to the Croatian arms and the fascist elements in the HVO, which does not match the quality of the first section. This section is clearly based on /bad/ information gathered by the Military intelligence service of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose knowledge of the Croatian Army was low, so that the Croatian Army is listed as an "aggressor" and units which did not exist or were absolved after the transformation of the army in the autumn of 1992. See S. Eekić, 1994, pp 223-232.
87 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 391.
88 If there is any basis to this claim, then it is an isolated act because it was unnecessary for such measures to be taken in the circumstances as the Croat majority areas power was held by the HDZ and HVO.
89 Although Efendić is rarely reliable, in this example he was accurate, H. Efendić, 1998, p 240.
90 Correspondence from the 42nd bbr "Bregava," No. 01-1024/93, April 13, 1993 to the 1st Brigade HVO R/ABH.
91 Report of the Main Headquarters of HVO, No. 02-2/1-01-1245/93, June 30, 1993 to the Defense Department.
92 K. Rotim, 1997, pp 314, 318, 319, 326.
93 Sefer Halilović, the head of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, claims that the president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović from November 1992 considered the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Halilović's The Cunning Strategy, 1997, pp 18-20. According to Rusmir Mahmutaehajić, Izetbegović accepted the idea of partition of Bosnia in 1993. See his interview in Slobodna Bosna, Sarajevo, March 2, 2000.
94 The 1st Krajiški Battalion was organized at the Zagreb Fair grounds in the summer of 1992. This was one of the units which made up the 17th Krajiški "Knights" Brigade. See "The path from volunteer to hero," Bosnjak, April 11, 1995.
95 When the Regiment entered the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina it was renamed to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Brigade "King Tomislav." See the Decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina PR, No. 1170, May 27, 1992. This document is reproduced in H. Efendić, 1998, pp 138-140.
96 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, p 381.
97 The author uses the term "su-djelovao" in describing the role of the international community-translator's note. I am using the Serbian term "sadejstvo," which could be translated into Croatian as "suradnja" / cooperation. In English the term's equivalent would be coordination or cooperation, and in German Zusammenarbeit or Mitwirkung.
98 In a report on the progress of the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the Command of the 1st Krajiški Corps of the Army of the Srpska Republika informed its units that the conference in Geneva "has brought more quality results that previous negotiations," and that the approach of the co-chairman of the conference on the former Yugoslavia Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance was objective and that the "accept the existence of the Srpska Republika as a political reality." Our delegation in formal and informal contacts was treated as a state delegation. Report from the Command of the 1st Krajiški Corps, Secret, No. 711, October 1, 1992.
99 The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, pp 392-393.
100 According to Rusmir Mahmutaehajić, it was a war against Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Mahmutaehajić, "The Road to War," The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995, pp 161-179.
101 On the position and meaning of Bihaa, see interview with General Imra Agotić in Slobodna Bosna, March 16, 2000.