Globalization
and National Identity:
Lessons we did not learn from the crises
in Southeast Europe*
Miroslav
Tuđman
University
of Zagreb, Croatia
The
disintegration of Yugoslavia
The
process of national liberation of Croatia, Slovenia, and
then Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina began with the
first free and multi-party elections in 1990. The disintegration
of Yugoslavia was a bloody and difficult process, as the
Milosevic regime was not prepared to surrender Serbian
hegemony within the multi-national Yugoslavia. This process
resulted in many related wars waged by Milosevic: the
seven-day-war in Slovenia, the four-year-war in Croatia,
a somewhat shorter one in Bosnia Herzegovina, and finally
the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Former Yugoslavia,
that is, Southeast Europe, became the strategic center
of the European periphery (as General Wesley Clark recently
stated)1.
I
was a direct witness to these crises, as I served as a
volunteer soldier during the War of the Homeland from
its very beginning in 1991. As a professor of information
science at the Philosophy Faculty at the University of
Zagreb, I worked together with other colleagues in 1991
and 1992 on the composition and configuration of the Ministry
of Defense and the Croatian Army.
From
1993 on, my task was to organize the Croatian Intelligence
Service (HIS) and Intelligence Community2.
I was the director of HIS and the head of the Intelligence
Community of the Republic of Croatia on two occasions:
from 1993-1998 and from 1999-2000. Croatia's Intelligence
Service was from the very beginning a partner of the Western
countries - most often NATO countries - , not only providing
support to international forces on the southeastern territories
of Europe, but also an understanding of the crisis which
has, in some ways, repeated itself during the last ten
years: from the independence of Slovenia and Croatia,
to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the fall of Milosevic
in October, 2000.
Having
in mind the large scale engagement of the international
community, and especially the United States, in the resolution
of this crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia,
I don't believe it necessary to list the participants
or talk about how the events developed and were finally
brought to their final phases.
But
as one of the direct participants in and witnesses to
these events, I would like to share my views and warn
that there is a virtual "blockade" to a lasting
resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
well as in Kosovo. Although I do not wish to generalize,
I nonetheless feel that the same errors are being made
in the international community's efforts to establish
a "new world order" in other multi-national
crises: Northern Ireland, Chechnya, the Israel-Palestinian
conflict, and so forth.
Instead
of theoretical and academic analyses which attempt to
be "objective", and taking into consideration
what actually happened - that is, the objective repercussions
of certain actions - I would like to call attention to
what did not happen and what could have happened if the
criteria, vision and ways of thinking had been different.
I would especially like to pose the question as to why
the resolution of the crisis took a direction which has
not led to a lasting resolution? The presence of 100,000
NATO troops on the southeast European territory illustrates
the fact that the crisis remains unresolved.
Without
diagnosis of the crisis
Why
did the crisis last so long and why, in spite of the progress
made, was no lasting resolution achieved?
It
is a fact that the international community has at its
disposal reports, data, and information which are increasing
daily, but there is still no resolution to the crisis.
And we cannot expect a lasting resolution because there
is not even a consensus on an international level on what
constitutes the essence of the crisis. We have information
and facts, but lack a knowledge and understanding of the
core issues. Most of the actors lacked a basic understanding
of the reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and
therefore are incapable of formulating a means for resolving
the crisis in Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They
are unable to even predict the repercussions of the Hague
Tribunal's activities, or to properly regulate their relations
with Serbia and Montenegro.
I
am convinced that, first, without an accurate diagnosis
(causes and current status of the crisis), an accurate
prognosis cannot be made (ways and means of resolving
the crisis). Second, the globalization of multi-national
crises results in the imposition by the international
community of resolutions which endanger the parties' national
identity; by doing this, the international community only
suppresses or postpones, but does not resolve, the conflict.
(Examples are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kosovo,
and Northern Ireland, as these parties are in conflict
because they feel their national identity or some vital
national interests are being endangered.)
It
follows from the first thesis that we lack accurate knowledge
about the causes and reasons for the crisis.The second
thesis points to the fact that the international community
does not recognize the rights of the parties in conflict
to realize their national values and interests (as in
the case of Kosovo), or else imposes upon them a political
resolution which expresses the interests and values of
the international community, thereby invalidating the
arguments and values of the parties in conflict (for example,
Bosnia and Herzegovina).
I
would like to use the following arguments to illustrate
my theses. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, significant
changes took place in Europe: the dissolution of the Communist
system and the Warsaw Pact; the disintegration of many
multi-national states - the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia - and the emergence of new, national states;
the end of the Cold War and the transformation of NATO;
and war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, accompanied
by the inaction of European, or, rather, North Atlantic
security mechanisms.
The
Communist system the West had fought against for fifty
years collapsed over the summer like a house of cards,
but not due to economic or military breakdowns. Even today,
there is no commonly accepted interpretation of this collapse3.
The reasons given for the disintegration of multi-national
states are even less precise and accurate.
What
we can say is that at the onset of the crisis, the international
community did not have a true picture of the state of
the internal relations and conflicts which led to the
breakdown of the Communist system and of multi-national
states. This explains why there were huge differences
and misunderstandings within the international community
on how to understand and describe the situation, and problems
in accepting the vision and goals of national independence
in the case of the Czechs and Slovaks, Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro.
We
can learn a lesson and reach a general conclusion from
this: social and political scientists did not predict
the dramatic and radical changes in Europe at the end
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which means
that their knowledge was inadequate and obsolete, since
the task of knowledge is to predict certain scenarios
and events.
Intelligence
estimates and resolution of the crisis
My
second thesis is that the lack of Intelligence was not
the reason for the non-resolution of individual regional
crises. Intelligence estimates on the state in the region
are exchanged by all partner agencies. I can say with
certainty that there are no significant differences among
the Intelligence services in their evaluations of the
crisis, the roles of individual actors in the crisis,
and their motives and goals. The Intelligence services
exchange data and are able to verify the type of data
from their own sources, so there are no major contradictions
in the Intelligence estimates done by Washington, Moscow,
London and Ankara on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia or Kosovo. I say this on the basis of my own experience,
since the Croatian Intelligence community was a partner
in the collection and exchange of not only data and Intelligence,
but also evaluations on the crisis in the region and possible
ways to resolve it.
Nonetheless,
certain governments do not make use of the knowledge of
their Intelligence services to effectively resolve crises.
Why? Why do Intelligence estimates have no significant
influence on the politicians and their understanding and
resolution of the crisis? Why don't certain governments
(politicians) make more use of Intelligence estimates?
This is a practical as well as a theoretical question:
what are the practical, real limitations in the application
of our knowledge, that is, Intelligence, in the resolution
of a crisis?
Knowledge
and information enable insights into past and present
conditions. Intelligence enables insights into changes
and imminent events. Intelligence estimates on national
crises attempt to identify actors and their goals. The
goals are determined by interests, and interests are determined
by values.
By
their very nature, regional crises are characterized by
conflicts between national interests and goals. I am convinced
that an understanding of a conflict which emerges from
a conflict of interests and goals can be best understood
by becoming acquainted with the values honored by the
individual nations, values from which its interests and
goals are derived.
On
the basis of personal experience, I have become convinced
that Intelligence estimates on regional crises (regardless
of their accuracy) upset rather than assist governments
and international organizations. Why?
A
significant indication of historical development in the
twentieth century and especially after the Second World
War was the process of the integration of contemporary
civilizations on an economic, technological, communicational
and cultural level. Today our civilization has become
functionally integrated. Globalization is the ruling ideology
of the developed world, and its main values are human
rights, democracy, and the market economy.
Globalization
and human rights
But
parallel with this process of integration in the contemporary
world is the process of individualization on a national
level. The world is integrated on one side, but on the
other, we have a process of disintegration of multi-national
states, and the emergence of new states and new historical
entities4.
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, White Russia, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina have come into existence through the process
of disintegration. Perhaps even Montenegro or Kosovo will
emerge in this same way.
Often
this process of the creation of new states is described
as an anachronism, as the nationalism of small nations.
It is felt that these processes of disintegration destabilize
the existing world order because they endanger the balance
achieved in European and world integrations, and they
are often not acknowledged as one of the basic democratic
rights of nations to national independence, freedom and
development.
The
United States of America, as the leading world power,
has a key role in international organizations and NATO,
and is therefore able to successfully impose upon these
organizations its values and model of behavior. The United
States is the ruling world power, but the values which
ensure America's national identity and prosperity are
not universal.
American
policy was guided by the human rights principle as determined
by President Clinton's directive5,
Executive Order 13107, "Implementation of Human Rights
Treaties", December 10, 1988. This Executive Order
compels all governmental agencies to apply these principles
in the implementation of American foreign policy.
However,
American policy only acknowledges individual human right
and treats them as if they were universal human rights.
Individual human rights form the basic principle upon
which rests the American globalization policy. Unlike
the American approach, Europe acknowledges both individual
and collective human rights: the right to culture, religion,
language, nation, etc. The Greek-Turkish conflict on Cyprus,
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Israel, Serbian-Bosnian-Croatian
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Serb-Albanian
conflict in Kosovo are essentially about collective, not
individual human rights. It is because of their failure
to recognize this difference that the NATO troops in Kosovo
misdirected the goal of their mission, and, therefore,
KFOR is stuck with no prospects of ending its mission
for many years.
Individual
human rights are not necessarily universal; they differ
from culture to culture. Even "everyday" activities
such as music fall into the category of entertainment
in European culture, but in Indian culture, music is connected
to life philosophy. Privacy and public life have different
values in different cultures, as do politically nuanced
issues such as women's rights, etc. Basic political concepts
also create confusion, misunderstandings, and conflicts.
For example, three Bosnian-Herzegovinian parties accepted
the Dayton Agreement under the condition that Bosnia and
Herzegovina be a state consisting of three constitutive
nations; that is, a multi-national state. In the English
language, the expression multi-national has a different
meaning that in Croatian and other European languages
(according to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
multi-national means: comprising or pertaining to several
or many nationalities or ethnic groups6).
Americans speak of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Bosnia
and Herzegovina without showing any understanding for
a multi-national Bosnia and Herzegovina. National and
ethnic communities in European law are minorities, and
that is exactly what the Croatians, Serbs and Bosniaks
do not wish to be in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This leads
to open misunderstandings because the main political and
legal problem has redefined itself as a cultural and technical
problem.
Each
of the three nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina considers
itself constitutive, and each member of these nations
considers himself endangered in the event that his collective
rights are endangered, his right to his language, culture,
and religion - not as an individual but as a member of
the Croatian, Serbian or Bosniak nation.
The
international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
imposing a resolution which is based on the protection
of individual human rights, and this cannot satisfy all
three nations. A flag, coat of arms, hymn, currency, and
passports have been imposed upon Bosnia and Herzegovina.
People as individuals have accepted this, since they must
travel, shop, and live; but they have not accepted this
as the three nations. These symbols, therefore, do not
represent collective values, but rather technical solutions
imposed by the international community.
Globalization
and national identity
One
of the basic values of small nations is their desire for
their own state, national independence, freedom, and sovereignty.
In Europe a series of small nations, including Croatia,
has achieved this desire during the past ten years. The
paradox is that the international community considers
the majority of these movements nationalistic or right
wing, and not primarily democratic, liberation movements.
These are young states, and states in transition are still
in the process of constructing state institutions. Just
because they are confronted with problems which developed
countries have already resolved does not mean that the
motives, actions, and goals in these countries are undemocratic
or that they are historical anachronisms. It is therefore
paradoxical that America and the international community
have often assisted former Communists and their parties
to reassume power, all in the name of democracy.
The
refusal to acknowledge, validate, or accept collective
human rights - especially those which are critical to
national interests and the goals of some nations - leads
to unreal expectations about actions and operations that
have been undertaken.
The
military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is one example.
"The fact that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
advised President Clinton that Mr. Milosevic would fold
after a few days of bombing was a testament to how little
she understood Serbian intransigence"7.
After the removal of Milosevic and the election of Kostunica
as President of Yugoslavia, the international community
is again just as prepared to make false evaluations and
hasty conclusions. Another example is Special Envoy to
the UN Secretary General Carl Bildt's recent "non-paper"8,
which promotes stability in the "Balkans", but
by first placing these countries in quarantine, then integrating
them by the formula 5 plus 1 plus 1, and only allowing
them the right to satisfy the minimum of national interests.
Carl
Bildt does not see these countries as equal partners,
or as partners in European integration; they are simply
countries with "low-level sovereignty", in the
"waiting room" for integration with the democratic
world. Bildt's proposal does not respect the views, interests,
and values of countries in the region; it simply imposes
resolutions. This entire conflict broke out because individual
nations revolted against the hegemonistic dictates of
the stronger powers.
A
recent statement by George Bush, Jr., who said that American
foreign policy should stop being so arrogant and stop
imposing its political and cultural values on other countries
is therefore reassuring. I quote: "I just don't think
it's the role of the United States to walk into a country
and say, we do it this way, so should you..I think the
United States must be humble and must be proud and confident
of our values, but humble in how we treat nations that
are figuring out how to chart their own course9."
Not
all problems come from one direction. We know that problems
appear in a different light if measured against other
criteria or seen through other mirrors. Croatia is a small
country in Southeastern Europe. For various historical
and political reasons, it is very sensitive about its
independence, freedom, and sovereignty, and will therefore
expend all its energy in preserving its national identity
and prosperity. Croatia sees its future in European and
North-Atlantic integration and organizations. Croatia
is not interested in participating in this integration
on the basis of Balkan associations. Croatia wishes to
have good relations with its neighbors, but wants to be
an equal partner and member of the international community.
The
process of globalization has enabled the national independence
of small nations emerging from multi-national communities.
The democratization of Europe would not have been possible
without ensuring the rights of all European nations to
self-determination.
Small
nations who now have their own states have become subjects
on the international scene and have a chance to achieve
freedom, self-sufficiency, and development in cooperation
with other nations of the world. The process of integration
of the former Communist countries and new sovereign states
in European and North-Atlantic organizations is unavoidable.
The process of democratization and modernization of transition
countries will be painful, for these countries must pay
a high price if they wish to attain the high standards
which exist in Europe. But this process can also be wraught
with misunderstandings and unnecessary conflicts if the
international community does not "democratize"
at the same time; that is, if it does not envision integration
as a two- part process in which, on the one hand, new
states will fulfill the high standards of the international
community, but, on the other, their national identities,
security and prosperity are guaranteed.
NOTES