*
Paper prepared for the round table on "Intelligence
and national security at the beginning of the 21st Century",
Dubrovnik, Croatia, October 27-28, 2000.
The purpose of this short essay is to discuss the influence
of intelligence information on the political decision-making
process.
At
first glance, the problem appears simple: intelligence
collects and analyses all data related to a certain political
issue, prepares a report, and submits it to the policy
maker (PM). The PM makes a decision which is implied or
recommended in the report, acting under the assumption
that the intelligence collectors and analysts are first-class
professionals devoid of selfish or political motives,
and that the PM is a reputable statesman whose only concern
is the safeguarding of national interests.
This
is, of course, the ideal situation; from time to time,
however, intelligence reports are ignored by a PM.
A
classic example concerns Josef Stalin, who disregarded
intelligence reports about the impending German attack
of the USSR in June, 1941. Stalin was a shrewd and experienced
statesman, and Soviet intelligence was unsurpassed. There
was clearly something unusual in these events.
I
offer another example from personal experience: in the
perestroika period, Intelligence aggressively and repeatedly
warned Gorbachev, who at that time was the supreme Policy
Maker in the USSR, that the situation was deteriorating
in the so-called "Union of Socialist Countries",
and in our own country as well. Intelligence pointed out
particularly vulnerable areas, warned of future dangers,
and suggested necessary political remedies. The impact
of the Intelligence information on Gorbachov's policies
was minimal. Some now claim that Gorbachev and some of
his Politburo colleagues aimed at the destruction of the
Soviet Socialist state from the beginning of perestroika,
that they were in fact "stooges of Western imperialism",
and secret agents of Western intelligence services. There
is no reason to suspect Mr. Gorbachev of evil designs;
yet the fact remains that reliable and alarming information
was available and was not acted upon.
It
is easy for intelligence veterans to accuse the previous
political leadership of shortsightedness and even treason.
omponent of the KGB system); Ministry of Defense; General
Staff, with its Main Intelligence Directorate; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs; International Department of the Party
Central Committee; Ministry of Foreign Trade; etc. This
impressive though badly-coordinated machinery was augmented
by the efforts of the heads of politological, academic
institutions (The Institutes of Asia and Africa, USA and
Canada, Far East, Europe, World Economics and International
Relations). To this were added prominent political observers
of the national mass media, and, last but not least, individual
members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, who
often used their access to the General Secretary (the
supreme PM) to inform him of their views, or pass on inadvertently
acquired information on international issues.
This
tremendous amount of information was thoroughly screened
by the PM's aides, but quite often intelligence reports
were lost in the general melee. The personal contacts
of the information carriers to the PM were crucial.
In
order to cull diverse data on important issues (e.g. disarmament,
Afghan war, developments in Eastern Europe, etc.) and
prepare proposals for the PM, ad hoc commissions and working
groups would be formed. As a result, intelligence information
was transformed into anonymous analyses and proposals
which diluted the opinions of individual participants.
The opinions of academicians or political observers could
be ignored (and in fact, they were seldom summoned for
official consultations), but the Foreign Ministry, KGB,
Defense Ministry, and CC International Departments were
expected to present a collective view on all major problems.
In fact, internal harmony in the top echelons was more
important than external issues. Consensus was the foundation
of the system.
However,
there were exceptions to the general rule. Quite often
those closest to the PM (Messrs. Shevardnadze and Yakovlev,
in particular) were able to influence Gorbachev to disregard
the information and opinions of the KGB and military,
i.e., when Mr. Shevardnadze surrendered to the U.S. an
oil-bearing area in the Bering sea, obtaining a post facto
endorsement from Mr. Gorbachev without consulting the
KGB or Defense.
Intelligence
handles external issues which require decisions by the
PM. However comprehensive, reliable, and urgent intelligence
information may be, it can rarely cover all relevant aspects
of the situation, especially internal ones. Stalin's strange
"blindness" on the eve of the German invasion
of the USSR had an obvious explanation. Stalin was a true
policy maker who had no peers within the Soviet leadership,
and he was better informed than anybody about the actual
state of the Soviet armed forces and the preparedness
of the country for a major war. But he valued peace, and
was doing everything possible to stave off the inevitable.
It is worth noting that he gave an order to prepare the
total evacuation of Moscow three days after the German
attack, on the 25 of June, 1941, before the German forces
had reached Minsk.
Intelligence
professionals, both on operational and analytical levels,
should not allow the configuration of forces in the national
leadership to affect their assessments. Unfortunately,
this factor often plays a greater role in political decisions
among professionals than the actual merits of the case.
There is evidence, for example, that the idea of introducing
Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979 was originated by
the number two man in the Soviet hierarchy, M. Suslov,
who exerted great influence on L. Brezhnev. After these
two policy makers had formed their opinion, the rest of
the Politburo was forced to toe the line. Intelligence
assessments did come into the picture after the decision
had been taken, but were tainted by balance of power considerations
in the Politburo. Professionals are always subordinate
to politicians; their information and conclusions are
taken into account only insofar as they correspond with
the ambitions and prejudices of their political bosses.
Sometimes,
a PM gets caught up in an inexorable course of events
and loses his ability to control the developments, both
internally and externally, and, as a result, policies
assume a perfunctory quality. That occurred during the
period of perestroika in the USSR. Mr. Gorbachev would
occasionally express his irritation with intelligence
reports, not only because they did not coincide with his
views, but because he was helpless in the face of unpleasant
realities.
There
are other insulating layers between intelligence information
and political decisions. A Policy Maker in a democratic
country finds it difficult to avoid the temptation to
influence the mood of the electorate, especially in a
pre-election period, by initiating dramatic foreign policy
initiatives. And on occasion, foreign policy activities
are undertaken precisely to divert public attention from
embarrassing situations at home (a fictional situation
of this kind is presented in De Niro's film, "Wag
the Dog"). And there are numerous examples in history
when attempts were made to ease internal crises by resorting
to "a short victorious war", which would never
have been recommended by intelligence.
On
the other hand, intelligence professionals' complaints
sometimes stem from overestimating their own achievements.
An intelligence report can be absolutely correct in covering
a specific event which takes place at a given time and
place. If one's sources had obtained documentary information
of importance, i.e., the minutes of a top-secret meeting,
or something that demands attention and action on the
part of the PM, facts regarding the actual meeting and
its agenda can be confirmed by other sources. But if intelligence
is then unable to trace ensuing events and decisions,
it would be unfair to blame the PM for failure to act.
Everything
becomes more complicated when intelligence ust evaluate
dynamic, critical situations. The factual information
may reflect the state of affairs at a given moment, but
the overall picture changes constantly. As tension grows,
deliberative decisions become less significant, and spontaneous
forces and human error assume greater importance. Analysts
can, as a rule, predict logical moves of the parties involved
in a given situation, but are helpless when confronted
with human error. Their reports become vague as a result;
they propose various scenarios, and ultimately leave the
PM "holding the bag". If things go awry, the
PM is then held responsible.
In
sum, intelligence information is an important, but not
exclusive, component of policy making. The factors involved
are diverse, variable and sometimes appear irrelevant
to the problem at hand.
