Intelligence
and National Security:
Adjusting to a Post-Cold War Environment
Victor
Jackovic
Associate
Director
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
Current
Environment
The
post-Cold War environment is probably as challenging for
intelligence services as it is for the rest of us. The
demise of former structures - like the Warsaw Pact, the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - stimulated discussion about
the reorganization of international associations such
as NATO and OSCE. Especially with its enlargement into
former Soviet bloc territory and the new memberships of
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, NATO has become
more of a political association and less of a purely military
organization. In addition, OSCE stands every chance of
being used by the international community in the future
as a launching pad for preventive diplomacy, so that emerging
crises can be dealt with already in an early stage before
they become full-blown conflicts.
The
security threats of a bipolar world with two military
alliances poised against one another appear to have abated
with the demise of one of the super-powers. Our gain is
that the danger of world extermination through super-power
nuclear warfare has been averted. Our loss is the relative
clarity that this bipolarity implied. Now, instead, we
are confronted with transnational threats such as proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking
and organized crime. These threats were always there.
But, they have taken on new potency precisely because
of the demise of bipolarity and the concomitant emergence
of new states, some of which are still quite fragile.
Now the threats are more numerous, less visible, more
underground and - in an age of fast transportation and
communication - much more immediate.
And,
here is where the current environment really does offer
something new: transnational criminal and terrorist elements
are powerful enough to span the globe and emerge as virtual
equals to national entities. Nowadays, it is not just
the illicit activity itself that crosses borders (like
drugs or money laundering), it is the purveyors themselves
who control networks that ignore national boundaries.
Viability
of States
Today,
criminality and corruption are truly transnational phenomena.
Some organized crime networks are so large and powerful
that they have the capacity to hold an entire small state
hostage, to infiltrate government agencies and to merge
illegitimate activities into legitimate enterprises. Law
enforcement agencies and even intelligence services can
be corrupted and their members co-opted.
An
even more insidious dimension of the problem, however,
is the corrosive effect on society at large. There is
the danger that the population of a newly emerging state
could begin to perceive criminality and corruption as
ineluctable elements in the process of transition. There
are probably only two directions from such a point once
it is reached: acceptance of criminality and corruption
as permanent elements in society, or rejection of the
entire transition process and of democratization.
Neither
path is positive.
Four
Proposals
In
the interests of successfully modernizing national intelligence
services, the author proposes four actions that can be
undertaken by individual governments and by the international
community. These are: strengthening governmental and Parliamentary
oversight; enhancing salaries of intelligence operatives;
incorporating operatives into mainstream exchange and
training programs; and, initiating a program of special
support to intelligence assets of states in transition.
Let
me describe each of these four proposals in more detail.
Strengthening
government oversight
Traditionally,
civilian oversight over is administered through Parliamentary
committees or through subordination to the highest level
of government officials, such as the Prime Minister or
President. But such relationships place a tremendous burden
on these government officials. They also presuppose the
proper functioning of the highest levels of government.
Recommendation:
In order to assist newly emerging states with this
challenge, the U.S. and its Euro-Atlantic partners should
continue to provide assistance aimed at strengthening
governmental oversight over intelligence activities. Specifically,
we can work together to ensure that Parliamentary committees,
in many states very rudimentary and weak, develop genuine
oversight capabilities.
Priority
to salaries
Another
aspect of the issue is the relatively low salaries paid
to employees of intelligence services in emerging democracies.
Obviously, intelligence operatives will be attractive
targets to hostile or criminal elements not only because
the operatives possess a needed trade-craft, but also
because the outsiders often can provide better remuneration
for services than domestic agencies in emerging states.
Recommendation:
Governments in new states should re-examine the priority
in salaries given to intelligence operatives. At the same
time, international programs designed to provide budget
support to these states should take into consideration
this crucial area.
Education
and training
Still
another aspect of the challenge is in educational and
training opportunities for intelligence operatives and
their superiors. Ideally, an intelligence service and
its employees should share in the political and social
commitment of the entire state through its period of transition.
This cannot be achieved if the service's operatives are
not well educated, or have gone through a training process
segregated from the population at large.
Recommendation:
Governments of emerging democracies should strive to ensure
that high-quality educational and training opportunities
are available to intelligence service employees. Moreover,
the international community - in its exchange programs
directed at states in transition - should not overlook
the utility of including intelligence service operatives.
Program
of alternatives
Intelligence
operatives in countries where the transition period is
incomplete, imperfect, or perhaps not succeeding at all,
would seem to make prime targets for hostile services,
criminal and even terrorist elements. The expertise and
trade-craft of these employees can be a valued commodity
for international organized crime networks and the services
of unfriendly states. In some countries, this phenomenon
is abetted by an overzealous democratization process that
expels intelligence operatives of a former regime for
reasons of past affiliation. These former employees sometimes
disperse into society at large, where their talents are
lost to future versions of their home services. In addition,
they are frequently not able to make individual transitions
smoothly into these new societies. In other states, even
if the operatives are retained in their home services,
they could suffer from low wages and lack of motivation
described above.
Recommendation:
In order to blunt the possible impact of this problem,
the Euro-Atlantic community should launch the same sort
of program the U.S. initiated for Russian nuclear scientists
in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Under that program, the U.S. provided millions of dollars,
not so much in direct wages as in alternative employment
opportunities. We should do the same for valuable intelligence
operatives in states in transition. Though some might
dispute the overall success of our program aimed at Soviet
nuclear scientists, the principle behind it stands as
an outstanding example of an innovative preventive initiative
designed to head off a potentially explosive problem.
As in the case of Russia's nuclear scientists, there is
a dark side to the alternative: if we do not initiate
such a program, someone else - international organized
crime or hostile services - will.
Conclusion
In
sum, the future challenges for intelligence services in
states in transition posed by international organized
crime and corruption are real, potent and immediate. They
can erode the very fabric of society, especially in a
newly emerging democracy that is struggling to adopt the
political, economic and social reforms necessary for becoming
a modern state. In some cases, they may even be eroding
the psychological support we in the West assume exists
among the populations of these states for reforms, democratization
and free market entrepreneurism.
Intelligence
services are not immune to these corrosive processes.
Given the special advisory role these services play in
every government, it would seem prudent for us all to
consider ways to strengthen their professionalism.
In
the end, they may be no stronger than the states they
serve. But, they can provide significant support for the
positive directions a state and its people have chosen
to go.