Round Table on
"Intelligence and National Security
at the Beginning of the 21st Century"

Dubrovnik, Croatia, October 27-28, 2000.

Session III

Subjects and methods of Intelligence agencies
at the beginning of 21st century: possibilities and limits

National vs. non-national Intelligence collection; cover vs. overt collection of information; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; Intelligence for international, national and private organizations; etc.

Moderators: Richard Kerr, W. Agrell

Kerr:

The subject is the nature and methods of Intelligence. Let me start just with my perception of the changes. I think the Intelligence during the Cold War was extremely important to the major issues in the East-West confrontation. Intelligence owned the information to a considerable degree; it owned the satellites and the communications intercepts. It had the clandestine networks it had built, it owned those instruments that process the information, and it also owned the reporting mechanisms by which that information was reported to the policymakers. So it was actually a closed shop. There were a few people outside who thought they had inside information, and they certainly did on politics, but on issues of strategic military forces of the major issues that threatened the survival of the countries involved, Intelligence did own and control that information. With the end of the Cold War, the threat to national survival of the countries became a less critical issue, and the kind of information that was needed for policy development began to spread out. More and more people knew more and more about the issues of interest to the policymakers. So Intelligence no longer owns the business of information; it is merely one of its many players. I think that changes in a very fundamental way the nature of the role of Intelligence. There are still a few areas where Intelligence plays a critical role, so I don't think one should say that there is no need for secret information. Terrorism is a good example. Nuclear proliferation is a good example, and also narcotics. I think though that criminal activities will in time tend to move into the law inforcement area. I think that's one of the other major changes in Intelligence. Another is the role of the defense establishment. For thirty years, forty years, the U.S. military forces never directly engaged, to my knowledge, the principle adversary, the Soviet Union. They never rubbed up directly against that force. It was all conducted through other parties. Other countries fought each other in the name of the East and West; the U.S. military was primarily a strategic force prepared to deal with the strategic, larger battle, but it really didn't engage. It trained other people and provided equipment. But within the last 10 or 15 years, beginning with Granada, and since then Panama, the U.S. military has become, in effect, a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy, whether you like it or not. I personally don't like it, but Intelligence has been a main supporter of that military activity. There's now less strategic Intelligence and much more tactical Intelligence. The other major change that I would suggest is that law enforcement has become a much more critical ingredient in the international scene than it was during the Cold War. The FBI is everywhere now. The FBI cooperates widely with other countries in law enforcement. The Drug enforcement agency in the U.S. works with other organizations, and it is no longer the exclusive business of Intelligence to conduct liaison and foreign liaison. So I would say that changes the very fundamental nature of the role of Intelligence, and also the role of other sources and other information.

Agrell:

I think you put your finger on something very important. What we have witnessed in the last 10 years is not a really a change of Intelligence structures as such, but a change in the environment, a change in the questions being asked. The questions that were central for the last 40 years are still present to some extent, but they are not that crucial anymore. There is a whole set of questions that the old system simply can't handle, because it's not constructed for it. There are other aspects of these changes, however, because of the objects the Intelligence structures are monitoring and analyzing. The world is also changing, and the technical premises for Intelligence collection are changing, and here are themes I think we should discuss. The first is the information technology revolution. "Information Overkill" is a term invented in the early 1970's in the U.S., describing a situation where one has access to much more raw information than one can ever use or need. In fact, one has more than one wants. In the 60's, 70's and 80's, this overload of information was a problem for the Intelligence agencies. Today we are all suffering from information overkill through the Internet. What does information technology revolution mean in terms of Intelligence? Is it solving problems or is it creating new ones? Another question is that of overt and secret Intelligence collection. Mr. Dedijer has been kind enough to leave an article here called "Spies". It claims that spying is not dying, but already stone dead, and that spying is a Cold War hangup, immoral and dangerous. Technology has outmatched spying and open sources provide better information than spies. Machines provide better Intelligence than humans.

Dedijer:

It's by Professor Johnson of the University of Georgia, who has written three books on the CIA.

Agrell:

I'm not sure he's right, and I'm being very diplomatic. The information technology revolution not only provides new open sources enabling us go to our computer, log in, search for information and receive the answers we need. It also provides new means for secret Intelligence collection, especially in electronic communications. There's e-mail, and also economic transaction systems that the global economy is more and more dependent upon. This is a new, weak spot in the system, and also a potential source for secret Intelligence collection, not only by agencies and institutions, but by other entities as well. The last question, which coincides with what Richard said, is: who is supposed to solve this more difficult task, who can do it? Can an Intelligence agency do it alone or is it too complex to be handled by an institution? Will we see Intelligence analysis task forces in the future which will be used for specific purposes, in the same way as peace enforcement task forces?

Dedijer:

I think it was a very good opening. I'm not a professional in Intelligence, but I was a member of the Communist party for 22 years, which was very good training for Intelligence. My experience is limited, but I've been studying Intelligence. When I left Yugoslavia I asked myself what was wrong with Tito and the whole Yugoslav elite. They didn't understand which way the world was going, and to understand where the world is heading, you need Intelligence. Everybody speaks about revolutions. Bill Gates of Microsoft represents the computer revolution. There is a revolution in everything. Since 1945, several colonial empires have disappeared. Two hundred new states have arisen, and one is fragmenting; namely, England. The conservative parties are asking where England is now. Scotland is breaking away, as is Ireland. There are dozens of revolutions going on: political, scientific, ecological, and so forth, and to understand the need for Intelligence, you must understand what revolution means. What is happening in the Intelligence communities? They are falling apart. They have no lasting goal. And nowadays, 100% of intelligence information can be gotten from open sources.

Leonov:

The topic of covert versus overt collection of information is another subject that requires special attention. I daresay that the proportion between the two is changing in favor of overt information. In the major, democratic countries, the number of policymakers participating in the formulation of foreign policy is growing continously. Among them are political parties, Congress and Parliamentary groups, research centers, influential mass media, prominent personalities, and so on. Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Albright came to politics from the universities. Their basic approach to major international problems is well known. In fact, their behavior could often be predicted in advance. Second, the mass media are always searching for their own secret sources of information, but as soon as sensitive information falls in the hands of the newspapermen, this information becomes accessible to everyone. For instance, we obtained the first information about the United States' secret plan to rescue the men from the sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific through California newspapers. The number of professional analysts who are utilizing public information is also growing, but in the process of analysis, they often enrich these data, draw conclusions, and make prognoses, which is valuable.
During the past decade, the Internet has become a crucial instrument if information support. In the coming century, its importance will increase even more. Personal electronic devices are less expensive, quicker, and provide more reliable information; that is, as opposed to misinformation often prepared for counterintelligence purposes. But I would like to conclude by saying that I believe the human factor will remain essential in the Intelligence world.

Boyadjiev:

I agree entirely with Mr. Agrell about the new possibilities for Intelligence gathering with the development and technical progress in the field of information and communication technologies and so on. The new trend here is that the number of experts able to do this is increasing tremendously. Not only Intelligence agencies and private companies can gather sensitive information, but now many individuals have the chance to obtain secret information just by surfing the Net through international communication networks. I'll give you an example. For the last several years, I've often been astonished while surfing the Web to find information that is considered to be secret, or at least confidential. Just one example: on a Russian server I found a handbook for terrorists and anarchists, with detailed formulas and manuals on how to make a chemical bomb, binary weapons, and other modern means of destruction, not to mention Molotov cocktails and other "trivia" that has been known for years. Today nothing on the Internet astonishes me. I recall a Bulgarian proverb that says that there is no good without evil. In this case, the good comes with a lot of evil. Here I see an objective which must be immediately included in the objectives of the secret services. Another example of the urgency of this issue is the case of the computer virus "Lovebug". Several months ago, the Lovebug, which began somewhere in the Philippines, attacked major American companies. That was nothing, that was a child's play in comparison to what can be done over the Internet and other communication networks. Every American battalion now in Kosovo or any other place in the world receives secret information through INTELLINK, INTELNET, and similar nets. Even though there is a very high level of security on these nets, they are not 100% secure. If even they are vulnerable, then imagine the lack of security on more common nets, where economic information is constantly flowing. Vital information affecting the lives of people all over the world, and not only in the States, can be attacked. Without much difficulty, an aggressive force can deliver a severe blow. The world economy can be placed in jeopardy, as well as other areas affecting not just a single country or state. Civilization itself can be endangered. That is why Wilhelm's remark was very appropriate. Here I see something that does not concern only national interests, but something which ought to become a common denominator in the cooperation of the different Intelligence services. It affects the interests of a wide variety of countries.

Tuđman:

In one of Plato's dialogues, somebody came to Socrates telling him that King Kadmo had invented the alphabet and that now everything would be remembered, and all knowledge would be at one's disposal. Socrates had a different opinion. He claimed that many things would be forgotten, because they will be in books and not in our heads, and that is not real knowledge. I agree with most of you that we are faced with a lot of changes. The information technology revolution is also going to change the nature of knowledge. Until recent times, knowledge in a philosophical sense was something that could not be separated from the knower, from the one who did the contemplating. Now we deal with information as physical evidence, and equate that with knowledge. But information is independent, not only from the knower. It is separate from motives and objectives. That is really what we are looking for: motives and objectives. That is why we have to take into account that the nature of information and knowledge has changed. We have to confront those changes. First we have changes on a national level, because until recently, Intelligence agencies were largely governmental and oriented to protect national objectives. Now we have many more actors and objectives which must be protected: governmental, non-governmental, and so on. Also, technology is changing the methods and procedures used to satisfy those objectives. But I also believe that the gap between Intelligence and knowledge will grow. Intelligence is a certain type of knowledge. Intelligence itself is related to objectives, to the predicting of future events, and supporting decision-makers. But I am not convinced that this enormous amount of information will immediately enlighten people about where they are going and what they want. Also, it's not a good idea to believe that everything is changing. Basic human nature is not changing, because otherwise we lose our human identity. These tremendous changes will not prevent us from understanding or reading Shakespeare or listening to Beethoven or enjoying the works of Michelangelo. That means something must be and is constant. Or to use another example: in spite of all the knowledge and information available about the reasons, objectives, and nature of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the conflict in Ireland, or the ten-year conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the conflicts have not been resolved. Something is still constant; human nature is not perfect and changes slowly, if at all. What I believe is that the environment and methodology are changing, but the actors and their problems remain constant. At the end of the twentieth century, we are talking a lot about globalization. But I believe the process is as old as civilization itself. The Roman Empire was the global solution for its time. The impact of the discovery of America was just as important as satellite communictions in the global age. Of course we have to respect circumstance and the dynamics of events. We have to be much more critical and less enthusiastic in our claims that everything is changing. Things are not the same as before, but we must not lose our identity if we want to survive.

Ćosić:

What are the opportunities and challenges of the information age and information technologies in the training and education of the Intelligence community? There is no doubt that conventional approaches to the education, training, and thinking in the Intelligence community must be updated and redesigned. What are the main differences in Intelligence in the information age compared with Intelligence in the non-information age? How can Intelligence function effectively when confronted with the flow of massive information? Instead of a lack of information in the past, in the information age, Intelligence sources and channels are now overloaded with information. Intelligence information comes in many different forms, amounts, and quality levels, which means that we have too much information at our disposal to make decisions. Therefore, new techniques and new formulas must be devised regarding the information collection, data correlation, and culling of data. The education of the Intelligence community in the information age requires the introduction of new curricula in information, computer, and communication sciences. Information warfare, cyber-war, computer sabotage, and computer espionage are the result of the expansion of information technologies. Information can even be a weapon for mass destruction. In cyber- space, new types of non-state actors may emerge, threatening the existing international order and stability. How can cyber attacks be uncovered and prevented? A new theoretical connection between information overflow and decision-making processes must be established. How can a decision be made when there is an excess of information and too little time? Artificial Intelligence and filtering systems then become very important. A new kind of technical expertise must be developed to support the Intelligence community in the information age. Strategic consulting is impossible in the information age without reliable strategic Intelligence. Security and business Intelligence on a global, regional, or local level needs strategic Intelligence advice, which is impossible without the additional education and training of the Intelligence community.

Wolf:

I agree it's necessary to discuss the kinds of issues you addressed in your statement. Naturally the question of information plays a big role because changes in technology, and how it is used, have been greatest during the last decades. But I think when we discuss the subject of Intelligence in this new century, about the ethics and legal norms, we can't avoid the question of whom the Intelligence services serve and to advance which goal. In reference to this, I see no principle difference between this and the past century. We discussed a bit yesterday how it's impossible to separate the use of the Intelligence service from policy. So I see only the big difference that, instead of a balance of power, we now have a more unilateral use of power, and more judgement calls on the actions of political forces, organizations, and individuals. We had that after the Second World War, examples of the use of policy and power from both sides. The services most probably served the Government successfully and gave them information about the threat from the other side, their weapons, and so on. The result was this very terrible arms race, and at the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s, the stationing of missiles on both sides. Of course the services had to give information, real information, and partly perhaps manipulated information. This increased the tension on both sides, inside the Governments, among public opinion, and in our own work as well. This was one reason for the big crises in the latter half of the last century. I see no real change in this situation.
Services, of course, are used by their governments; they're serving the nation, and do it perhaps more objectively now. This is the question we are discussing, and the last example from the last century, I think, is the intervention in Kosovo. It was a question of the use of power, but the information, and the information on public opinion, was one sided. I felt this very strongly in Germany, and we observed clearly the change from a bilateral to a unilateral balance of power. After the unification of Germany, it seemed incredible that German armed forces could have taken part in the war. Before the changes in Europe, and prior to the unification, this could never have taken place. The question is not whether this was good or bad, but I just want to say that we can't discuss the use of information as an abstact issue as it relates to every service. The Intelligence service is acting in the service of a nation, but not the whole nation. It serves a government. You see, the difference is a question of policy. We have now the situation that the presence of troops, American troops, in Kosovo is a not a objective necessity, because other candidates for president, George W. Bush, for example, has said he would like to remove the American soldiers. So the connection between real policy, the task at hand, and the priorities of the services is very close.
The main question is, in my opinion, whether the policy of the state and therefore the aims of the Intelligence services helped to prevent or produced new international crises. The past century has provided many such examples, and we can see in practice the difficulties in fulfilling international agreements regarding, for instance, aerial observation. There were some international conventions on this. This is the problem for the services: How to fulfill international obligations? Where is the biggest threat? Does it come from these rogue states like Libya or North Korea? Current events in North Korea show how policies change without clear reasons. Of course, there were some changes, but not substantial enough to justify Madame Albright's shaking hands with the "biggest bandit" in North Korea. Up to now, I have been unable to obtain a visa for the United States because of my "participation in terrorism". Our only participation was contact with the Palestinians, but Arafat has shaken hands with Clinton on the lawn of the White House. I would just like to stress the fact that there is a close connection between political ideas, plans, and aims of the government, and the priorities of Intelligence work. Another example: what is the arms lobby doing in the highly developed countries? Perhaps this is more dangerous and a greater threat than the weapons in secondary countries. The former number two man in NATO, the German General Klaus Neumann, had a lecture in Switzerland in March, and gave the example of bacteriological weapons. How dangerous are they? In Iraq, after the war, 8000 litres of anthrax were found. One hundred litres could destroy a city like Lucerne. I agree with all you have said about information. There's a big stream of information going to the services. Who uses it? How should it be used? My personal opinion is that for a successful service, human Intelligence will retain the main role in the future. You may have reached a different conclusion. My personal opinion is that it's possible to reduce the staff of the Intelligence services, and reduce it very radically, because there is no law which dictates that all the secret information and information coming from various sources must be collected and analysed only by the classic services. What may be most important are the ways of managing this huge stream of information. I believe the sense and raison d'etre of the services is to collect real, secret information; not about the actual situation, but about intentions, and potential threats coming from a real, potential enemy. Now information is often the continuation of the policy of power in the absence of a real threat. But if you have to know the real plans of a real enemy, you must have human sources and others kinds of secret information. I agree that it's very difficult to categorize them into what's more or less urgent, less important… we need a new kind of education, but it's still an issue.

Stolz:

I would like to come back to Markus's thing on reducing the size of the human Intelligence collectors . I agree, but I think it's important to deal with Stevan's cosmic views. He has elucidated the issues, but I submit that Intelligence officers are not futurists. For example, we can see trends right now. One of the things that I find extremely interesting is that when I was a lad at the university, we were taught that the nineteenth century was a century of nationalism and that the twentieth century, by God, was international. What do we see today? We see devolution in its mildest form - Scotland, Wales, and the United States. Recent court decisions are favoring states as opposed to the federal government. And of course you have the violence in Chechnya, India, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. It is different. I don't pretend to know quite why that is, but it's not difficult to see it. Another thing I think we overlooked is the population. Isn't it six billion? We know the kind of problems that will create, and we also also think of it as one solution to overpopulation. Another issue is the rich-poor - some call it the North-South - issue.

Shebarshin:

Abstract global problems, like the future of humanity and so on, hardly require secret, Intelligence information. Real life people, politicians, government officials, and businessmen may occasionally indulge themselves in discussions on these matters, but what they need is down-to-earth, practical information, practical conclusions and suggestions. I had to work with the government institutions of my country, and in later years with the Russian Business Corporation. The demand for specific, usable data is incomparably greater than for global predictions and conclusions. The mission of Intelligence is to uncover what is concealed from the public eye, and supply its clients with reliable and useful information.

Lacoste:

Yes, I fully agree with what you said. It was my intention to develop the same arguments. You were right to insist upon the difference between "information" and "knowledge". I will recall that, traditionally, French military Intelligence had two sides. We call the first one "documentary Intelligence", which is the best possible knowledge of the capacities, doctrine, and intentions of the enemy army; its assets, weaknesses, and so on. The second is "operational Intelligence", which is directly connected to the cause of the action and the operational choices of the authority in charge. The decision maker needs both knowledge and information; knowledge to understand what Intelligence issues mean in order to make the correct decisions.
There is another issue that has not really been raised here concerning the economic revolution. We have in mind the political and military aspects of the Balkan problems, but we should also pay attention to the economic issues. The shift from a bipolar strategic situation to a multipolar one has corresponding consequences for the global economy. Nowadays, large international corporations are more concerned with foreign affairs than many governments used to be. Their staffs conduct themselves like state governments, but under the pressure of huge financial and industrial interests they are taking full advantage of the new tools and the best products of the age of "information technology". I have observed in my country that no state administration, no politician, no secret service profits as well as the private sector from Intelligence assets. Private firms discovered the leverage effects of Intelligence collection through modern devices, "data mining", open networks, new interconnection procedures, and "knowledge management". I believe it is very important for government administrations and traditional Intelligence agencies to adopt new methods of managing information. Large international corporations represent an interesting model, because their leaders are excellent managers and strategists. They are actually and efficiently controlled by their shareholders, who carefully monitor their financial performances. It is not the same for politicians. They are supposed to be controlled by the votes of the citizens, whose appreciation is based on other criteria.
Another analogy between the state and private sectors is the development of electronic networks inside governmental systems and military systems. Traditionally, administrations and military structures are organized as a pyramid; orders go from top to bottom, and reports from bottom to top. Today, in the real economic world, management is based more and more upon various interconnected networks. The psychological effects are important for human relations inside and outside the organization. The traditional, bureaucratic model is no longer able to manage collective knowledge as well as modern methods, which use new information technologies and software assets.
This is a big challenge also for Intelligence agencies and the relations they have with their governments. There is a "revolution in military affairs" that takes into account these elements; for example, at the operational and tactical levels, where they actually mix command, control, and Intelligence information in fully integrated networks. It is a new dimension, and the private sector applies it more rapidly than public administration.

Agrell:

If large corporations are starting to behave like governments, then there will be legal problems, and we need to discuss the ethical and legal aspects of Intelligence this afternoon. It's a considerable problem. One week ago, the large Swedish multinational corporation, Ericsson, got into hot water because the Swedish paper revealed that it had paid around 170 million Swedish crowns through its intermediaries to consultants, who did not want their identities known. We can imagine what those consultants were doing. These are facts of life for big business in the world of globalization: the use of Intelligence, bribes, and use of connections necessary to close almost all big contracts. This also characterizes real business Intelligence; that is, Intelligence not obtained through the Internet or open media sources, and which provides a general view of the customer or country with which you are dealing. It is as General Shebarshin has said. The key is identifying the central figures, getting to know them, and making contact with them so that you can close the deal with the assistance of key persons. This illustrates the continuing importance of clandestine Intelligence work.

Lacoste:

Another analogy is the spreading of networks in government and military systems. It is a part of what I would call collective knowledge versus individual knowledge.

Doder:

I'm listening to this and I actually have no knowledge about the bureaucratic side of Intelligence, but I do know something about information and what to do with information. In the end it seems to me that the purpose of any Intelligence organization is not only to provide information to policymakers but to tell them what this information means. Despite globalization and the profusion of information, it seems to me that need for solid Intelligence services is greater now than before, because we face entirely new types of challenges ranging from narcotics trade and international terrorism to cyberspace crime and weapons of mass destruction being acquired by rogue states. It's a very specific kind of Intelligence, because it requires experience and a certain kind of knowledge. I'm told that actually today, it's very difficult to bug, because these are these obstacle cables that transmit millions of messages and it's very hard to locate who's saying what and from where. It's an enormous task. This is what one of the operators told me. It seems to me that Intelligence work for a private cooperation is something entirely different, because in the end, you have a national service to protect national interests, and provide leaders with the best possible assessment of potential threats and how to deal with the countries presenting them.

Dedijer:

After the Cold War, all national intelligence communities suffered from what I call "mental viruses", which are similar to computer viruses in their destructive capacity. These old ideas - "idols" as Francis Bacon called them - almost lost me my life in December in Bastogne, Belgium. In spite of the good intelligence they possessed, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley stuck to the mental virus that Hitler could not start a new offensive. The former CIA director, Robert Gates, describes the CIA in his book From the Shadows as "one of the most closed bureacracies in Washington, an agency hostile to 'outsiders' at any level, a complex and clannish organisation deeply averse to change". What is true of the CIA in the most open country, the United States, is true of all other intelligence agencies. Their reform, even the need for reform, is now being questioned. We live today in an emerging global civilization, a "global village" with 6.1 billion inhabitants and three billion organizations - from families, firms, workplaces, regions, and nations - all undergoing multi-dimensional radical changes; that is, revolutions. It is from this image of our planet that we must start to look at the "subjects and methods of intelligence agencies at the beginning of the 21st Century".
The world today is dominated economically, technologically, militarily, and in many ways culturally, by the U.S., which has less than 5% of the world population. The United States is the freest and most creative state in the world, but falls behind socially, as compared to the Scandinavian countries, which are also free and creative. This domination by the U.S. must not and will not last. I believe that the emergence of business intelligence and security, and the democratization of other countries, above all China and Russia, will lead to a competitive socialization of the world, and that my dream of a world without "prisoners of starvation" will be realized by global democratic capitalism.

Leijonhielm:

Just a few reflections as I listen to the debate. Sometimes I get a feeling that we are discussing the same topics and the same ambitions, but from a different perspective. There is, as we know, a tremendous difference between larger countries' capabilities in Intelligence as compared to smaller countries, and my views reflect the smaller country´s. If you have only 1% of the American Intelligence potential, you are forced to totally adapt your handling of threats in a way which larger countries do not. I would like to bring up a few points from that perspective. There are several trends which have been mentioned here. One is that HUMINT is not dying, and spying is not dying, but getting smaller, and this very much reflects the present situation in Intelligence. The rapid change in relations between developed nations and underdeveloped nations totally alters the need for Intelligence. For example, small countries like Sweden, which are not threatened militarily - even in the long term - must concentrate on specific possible threats in order to avoid information glut, which has been mentioned here. It is impossible to cover all things which might constitute a threat, and which are better covered by other institutions. I see a majority of traditional Intelligence tasks going to private security agencies or or other institutions. Traditional Intelligence techniques are of limited interest in evaluating new types of threats. Apart from military threats, the new type of threats are more uncontrollable and unforeseeable and will threaten new sectors of society - from electricity supplies to social services. We spoke earlier today about a Swedish hacker who managed to close down Florida's rescue service for almost two days. What I regard as another serious threat is weapons of mass destruction, because we have found, as we heard earlier, instructions on how to build such weapons on the Internet. One can find today relatively good instructions on how to build effective biological weapons in one's own backyard. This type of threat is very real. You also have technical progress in the conventional explosives sphere, which perhaps does not seem that important. But consider that today, it is possible to increase the energy intensity of conventional explosives by several times. This will enable terrorists to blow up World Trade Centers much more effectively in the future. Therefore, a high priority for military Intelligence must be technical developments and new military technology, because that is what constitutes the threats, also in the civilian sphere, in the future.

Kerr:

It appears to me that we would generally agree that Intelligence organizations and Intelligence are going to remain vital, and that the countries still need to support their foreign policy. They need information that is directed at their problems. And their problems are more diverse and complicated. Whether it's secret or open is less relevant than the fact that they still need information, and are still going to be faced with an enormous set of complicated problems. I would argue in some ways that more detail and finer-grained information is required. I think Doder was actually making this point - the world is in some ways more complicated then it was before. Because the level of detail that's required is sometimes greater and the knowledge at a greater level of sophistication. But if you make that assumption and we go to some of the other comments made, I would also argue that if I were a policymaker, I would say there are too many voices out there. There are too many people trying to help me and I would still need an organization that can give me coherent, relevent answers to my problems. Not to somebody else's problems, but to my problems. Then the question I would ask is: are the organizations that I have at my disposal good enough to do that? Can I be confident, in this complex world, that an organization can give me unambiguous, direct, and relevant answers to the questions that I have? I think there is a way to do that, but I am not convinced that the Intelligence organization I worked for has done that. I would argue that during the Cold War, we tried to do everything. We tried to be experts on everything, and built a huge organization that had great expertise on everything in the strategic area - from nuclear weapons, to terrorism, to economic, political, and social issues. Today, the organizations have shrunk in size, and are much more focused on current activities, so it's impossible for them to deal with this array of problems at the level of sophistication the policymaker needs.
So we can say, at least from the U.S. perspective, that Intelligence organizations can't be everything to everybody, so they need to change the way they think about problems. Analysts should not try to be experts on every problem, but should try figure out where the expertise lies. Who are the experts? And how can they obtain the information relevant to the problems with which they have to deal to support national policy? That is quite a different role, and it means locating areas of expertise, perhaps outside the goverment. In fact, many of them should be outside the Government, but we need to know how to use that array for our own particular self interest. It seems to me that this is the key, and it means admitting that we don't know everything. It's difficult for Intelligence officers to say "I don't know much about this problem; in fact, I don't know anything, but I'll find out." I would argue that this requires a whole change in the way one thinks.

Agrell:

I think Richard said something very important here about the change in the role of Intelligence agencies. In the 1990s, we saw the birth of a lot of strange new expressions, and one of them was "information broker". An information broker is a person who helps someone obtain information they cannot obtain on their own. Maybe what you are hinting at is that the government needs Intelligence brokers, experts who come in at the point where knowledge and decision-making intersect. The methodological problem is that they do not know the facts, because it's impossible to know them today. You can't even predict the questions that need to be answered. So this is a fundamental change not only in the organizational and source structure, but in the core profession.

Boyadjiev:

First of all I think that with our capable mediators, we have reached some level of telepathy around the table. We have started to think about many things that different Intelligence services have in common. I want to make some remarks from a very narrow angle. Not from the position of "We, the services," but of "Me, the Spy who was Left Out in the Cold". What do I mean by this?
A lot of Intelligence professionals in ex-Eastern Europe, some of whom have maintained their former sources, not only within their national borders but in other countries as well, are now dispersed within society. The majority is focused in private business. I mention this because I think special services in various countries will soon begin to feel the effects of this.
With the end of the Cold War, many terms and categories, such as "main adversary", "chief enemy", and so on, were discarded. Today, everybody is in competition. Former allies are competing against each other. Soon their national and private counterintelligence services are going to face additional problems presented by "friendly Intelligence" from Eastern Europe. This will most likely be on a private and not a state level, but this does not make it any less aggressive. So now we have not only the issue of global government interests, but the problem of competing on a private level.
Here I would like to make a comment about what General Ćosić said. He raised the question of educating Intelligence professionals. I think a majority of the professionals left in the cold are now doing exactly that - preparing or teaching young people and specialists from the private field in the craft of Intelligence. I know that Generals Shebarshin and Leonov and their colleagues are doing that. For several years, the first private, Russian, high-level educational, Institute for Security of Private Business, has been in operation.
The Bulgarian Euro Atlantic Intelligence Forum - our Association - has been doing the same thing for more than eight years. We have a group of nine people, professionals from Intelligence and counterintelligence, and we teach different aspects of Intelligence in several Bulgarian universities. So knowledge about the Intelligence craft is becoming known among wider audiences, and that will be felt in the competitive field of private business.

Jackovich:

We're touching on something that goes into another aspect, and I think Mr. Wolf mentioned this yesterday; that is, professionalism, the expertise that emerges from particular services, and what happens with it. I see a potential danger in terms of it. The infusion of this personnel into society and the loss to the professional services is one thing. The potential gain for some other entities is quite another. Here, I am thinking in two dimensions. One is something that Admiral Lacoste mentioned yesterday, and that is organized crime and criminality. Assets can be used in a positive way. If, for example, in the Soviet Union nuclear physicists and scientists that were connected with particular laboratories are the beneficiaries of a program, however meager and modest it, or its results, might be for the West. Is it out of the realm to think that the same thing might be possible in the Intelligence field? Maybe its not by virtue of the nature of Intelligence work. I don't know. But it seems to me there is a danger that, if something positive is not undertaken, then somebody will undertake something negative. You already have a situation where transnational criminality is expanding, and has capabilities that rival national Intelligence services, which I don't think we've seen to that extent in the past. You have corruption and criminality within a state that we tended earlier to think was part of a transition process. The longer the transition process goes on and the longer these groups operate in a transnational, active sense, the greater the danger that it becomes a permanent phenomenon in these states. Then you have the social reaction to it. If the people in these states begin to look upon that sort of development as an integral part of liberalization and democratization, then support for liberalization and democratization will weaken among the populations of those states. The essence of this is that the entire economy, entire states can be hijacked in today's world by the strength of criminal organizations which are perhaps the beneficiaries of fallen away Intelligence services.

Leijonhielm:

I believe that widespread criminality in transition countries is here to stay. I think there is ample evidence of that, and it fits well into Putnam's theory that, in a state where constitution building is not taking place, criminal structures tend to grow rapidly. People's faith in governmental institutions vanish where unemployment is high and poverty is spreading, as we see in almost all the transition countries. For example in Italy, this type of criminality is extremely difficult to eradicate. Of course, there are different phases in criminality. In its earlier phase it is most harmful, because then most revenues from criminal activity are exported instead of invested within the country, and capital goods are imported. Later, when reliance on institutions in the country has grown, the money will eventually return and be invested in the country. But now, my impression is that, for example, Russian organized crime is in its most harmful phase. I would also like to make a comment on what the chairman said at the beginning. I think we should move one step further in order to be prepared for new threats. Intelligence agencies must open up, and more effectively use the knowledge of possible threat scenarios which exist in open society by creating reference groups or knowledge centers to focus on specific problems. Not only should academics and Intelligence people be involved, but also individuals with vast experience in the targeted area. Devil's advocates are also needed. This mixture should eventually lead to a better understanding of imminent future threats.

Jackovich:

You're quite right about the export of profits. In the past, in the United States and elsewhere, things were built in the places which were producing the money, continuing the tradition of the robber baron who contributes back to his community, so the communities benefited. Today, with globalized economy, the profits are going to where they can be increased, and that means he exports the profits to make greater profits elsewhere.

Kerr:

In regard to the private sector, I was commenting to Admiral Lacoste that I watched the banks invest in the Phillipines in the early 1970's, as the economy was going into the pits, and lose literally millions and millions of dollars. U.S. and foreign business have not been all that clever in predicting the future. Consider their investment in South East Asia and the financial collapse there. So business does not necessarily have a clarity about the future that we might have implied. It also makes terrible mistakes even though it has a single minded focus on making money, whereas Intelligence does not have such a clear objective.

Doder:

Dick was saying how I think in a very polite and diplomatic way about Eastern Europe, and the former security people who were involved in shady business as consultants and so forth. The last time I was in Bulgaria, former athletes and former security people were the local mafia. Car theft was so prevalent that it was impossible to drive. Then they get hold of police uniforms and pull drivers over, take the driver out, and take the car. The Chinese embassy hasn't had a single car stolen. The guys that run the only kind of reliable parking lot in front of the main hotel are part of the mafia, too. They charge extortionist prices, but at least your car is there.

Boyadjiev:

A lot of stolen luxury cars are brought into Bulgaria through the nets of organized crime networks, even from Canada. But not only Bulgarians are participating in those rings.

Doder:

But what I'm trying to say is that many of these security services were extremely large, and then when they were dismantled, a lot of people couldn't find a job.

Kerr:

A lot of us have become consultants.

Dedijer:

In England you have Oxford and Analytica, put together by a CIA man who took 800 professors from Cambridge, Oxford, all the English universities, and organized them as consultants. You want to know what's happening in Uganda? You get three professors and three reports for 50,000 dollars. Such firms are rising up all over the world, consulting firms which do the work of other former Intelligence organizations.

Boyadjiev:

In Bulgaria, the process started with the establishment of "companies" selling "security". Most of them were registered by ex- wrestlers, fighters, kick box specialists, and so forth. That was a lower form of selling security - with a baseball bat. I hope this is a thing of the past now. What we are trying to do, and what General Shebarshin's Institute is trying to do, is to teach legitimate managers about company security; to prepare people with clean dossiers. We are teaching them law, economics, informatics and then, as a second part during the second year of their education, the special crafts of Intelligence services. We think that, in this way, we can help rid society of the false security "retailers" selling their "security services" through racketeering and force, and place trustworthy and legitimate people in this business.

Doder:

I have a friend who has a large business interest in Russia. He runs five or six factories, and I know from him that you have to hire security to do anything. It's not a normal operation, let's not kid ourselves. In other words, the former security people who don't have jobs become part of a mafia.

Tuđman:

Different countries have different security problems. For most transition countries, the initial problem was physical security, and then technical security. Croatia also started with the development of physical and technical security systems, but I do not believe in general that we should be satisfied with data protection and communication security. On the other hand, some countries developed all those systems under very precise legal norms and other measures necessary for the development of security systems. Having that in mind, I think what Todor said about education in this area is important. But there is not much formal education available on Intelligence, at least in the public education system. Our journal, National Security and the Future, is the only one in Croatia and in the transition countries. I hope the journal will provide professional and scientific articles which can contribute to both formal and informal education on Intelligence and national security.
In the first ten years of Croatia's existence, we established a Diplomatic Academy, a Military War School, and an Intelligence Academy. A year or two ago, General Ćosić, Admiral Domazet, and I prepared a proposal for a National Security Academy or National Security School. The basic idea was to combine the Diplomatic and Intelligence Academy and the War School, in order to concentrate the intellectual resources and facilities of our small country. The idea was not to discount the differences between Intelligence, diplomacy, and military, but to offer diverse national security programs in one school, and to integrate that school into the University. The proposal was not realized, but sooner or later it will happen.
There is an interesting review in the journal Intelligence and National Security. Two years ago, they published the names of people who took doctorates in Intelligence. They provide 20 or 30 pages with the names and titles of doctoral theses. I think we can expect the subject to become a regular university subject in the near future. In the European countries, at least, the introduction of a new scientific discipline in university programs always goes from the top down. A new discipline first appears as a subject on the postgraduate level, and then later in graduate studies. When Intelligence becomes a subject of scientific research and an element of university education, public opinion will change on the role and objectives of Intelligence agencies. That fact will impact on the education and selection of professionals for different national security services. In other words, education will be available for everybody, which presents a certain element of risk. Both good guys and bad guys can educate themselves on the same topics. Anyhow, I believe that in the future we can expect European countries to offer Intelligence as an academic subject at the university. As a result, people will not only be educated to work in governmental and non-governmental centers or agencies, but will also have an impact on the methods, tehniques, and development of the Intelligence services.

Lacoste:

This is a very important issue. This type of education is not only for future specialists in Intelligence. It is also necessary for understanding various branches of universal knowledge. I have observed that there is a legal aspect, in constitutional as well as criminal law. There is a sociological aspect and a psychological aspect; for example, if you want to understand how Hitler's or Stalin's brain operated. There is also an historical aspect, which is probably the main one, since historians normally take all these aspects into account. And this is why I personally tried to organize a group of French scholars - individuals from different backgrounds - police, diplomacy, sociology, army, Intelligence services, law faculties, etc., - to take part in a three year long university seminar in order to avoid the typical characteristics of the "French Intelligence culture".
I am convinced that when professional Intelligence officers from different countries meet, they will be in a better position to address common threats such as international terrorism or arms smuggling, and also to discover better ways to solve their own problems. In a way, it is the kind of work we are performing here which leads to better international understanding.

Ćosić:

We spent some time on the selection of curricula for the Croatian Academy of National Security, and there were some very interesting findings regarding curriculum composition. We analyzed the curricula and courses of leading educational institutions around the world in the areas of business administration, public administration, and information resource management and security. State of the art education on the Intelligence community and administration requires courses like strategic leadership, cyber-battle-space, cyber-war, organizational management, e-finance, and so forth. Selecting curricula in public administration, business administration, and information science must be properly done to meet expectations and needs in education and training of the Intelligence administration and community in the information age.

Stolz:

If I may, I would like to change the subject a little bit and talk about terrorism. International terrorism. Now you can disagree, but I will submit that we vastly overrate international terrorism, and spend an enormous amount of time on a subject that should be broken down into its individual parts. Now when I say terrorism, I refer to the generally accepted definition: killing innocent people for political purposes. It is not terrorism when Palestinians and Israels shoot each other or throw rocks at each other. That is not terrorism. A bomb in the public square is. A bomb on a destroyer is arguable. A bomb on the USS Cole is arguable. ETA's terrorist activities are indeed a problem, but it is a problem for Spain and France, not an international problem. In the same vein, the IRA and the PIRA are a problem for the United Kingdom and Ireland, not for the international community. Pakistan, Kashmir; that is a problem, but that's a potential war, it is not terrorism. They are killing each other every chance they get. I won't go through them one by one, but take Iran, for example. They have an agenda, and it's largely anti-US and anti-Israeli. I'm not saying we shouldn't take a look at these things, but these international counterterrorism centers are police matters in many cases. I happened to be in Geneva when the huge explosion took place in Oklahoma. Our former congressman from Oklahoma, who was the head of the House Intelligence Committee, said "Those Arabs will pay for what they have done." And of course, it was home grown. We often overdo it and fail to analyse the basic problems.

Dedijer:

I'm sorry, but the British services' terrorism is a poor people's war. You can see this in Israel, where they developed the technique of throwing stones. It is a wonderful invention. Fighting for the independence of Palestinians against tanks, planes, everything else. That is another way of looking at terrorism.

Doder:

Terrorism is also when thieves empty a bank account or similar actions by using hackers. Take the recent love virus. What hasn't been mentioned in the papers is that the virus was capable of getting passwords from bank accounts. It is now technically possible to send a virus which includes the capability to collect passwords from bank accounts and clean them out. It seems to me that that is an act of terrorism, because it invades my security. Maybe everything I have is in an account.

Stolz:

My definition is the killing of uninvolved people for a political purpose. That is my definition.

Lacoste:

I am no longer active in current Intelligence events, but I am wondering why the press never mentions a very obvious Intelligence goal; namely, to discover where Milošević's money is? It has been in Cyprus, it is certainly in various other banks, but it happens to be a type of information that is covered by the "law of silence". Sometimes there are indiscretions about other dictators' fortunes. I read an article on the plane two days ago about the money the former Nigerian leader had stolen from his people. Two or three billion dollars, which is not a small amount, were deposited in a Western bank. The money is certainly being used to generate new profits. When I asked questions about this to top financial authorities or politicians, I never received a clear answer. They preferred to "bury their heads in the sand", the "ostrich approach" as we say in French, than to raise such controversial issues publicly.

Kerr:

It is not hard in today's world to understand where money goes, what happens to it, who owns it, and where it is deposited. The problem is that the international banking community frowns on people interfering in that process. And it's possible to interfere in it, but if you intervene in the banking process you bring the wrath of a lot of people down on your head, because they feel this is sacreligious. You can't touch that!

Shebarshin:

I want to add to what Dick Stolz said about international terrorism. Dick pointed out quite correctly that terrorism has specific roots in every part of the world. Terrorism in the USA (remember Oklahoma) is one thing. Quite different is what happens in Kashmir. It is an offshoot of a real, undeclared war, which has been going on between India and Pakistan for fifty-odd years.
I think that people who inveigh against international terrorism often do not rely on hard facts. We hear a lot about the international character of terrorism in Chechnya and Afghanistan, about the almost mythical Bin Laden, and the convergence of Russian and American interests in this respect. And there is no doubt that it is the duty of all civilized states and their Intelligence organizations to eradicate terrorism in whatever shape it appears.
But one would expect hard evidence of the Taliban assistance to Chechen terrorists, or of their connection to anti-American acts in the Middle East. There is none. At the same time, Taliban enjoys the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all respectable states, but which support a regime labeled "terrorist".
I doubt the existence of effective working links between real terrorist groups of various persuasions. Such links would run counter to the very secretive nature of terrorism. Any outside connection, an extra person admitted to a terrorist group, sharply reduces its chances of success. Frankly, I regret the deficiency of contacts between terrorists of different countries, because they could have made penetration by specials services so much easier.
During the Afghan war, we managed to trace numerous connections between the Afghan opposition (who could have easily been labelled terrorists) and outside forces. They consisted of our current good partners: the United States, China, Pakistan, etc. Weapons supplied by them to Afghans, i.e. Stingers, are still killing people in terrorist acts. Yes, the Afghan opposition was getting support from Islamic organizations, but mainly moral support; they were supplied with propaganda material and Korans, but rarely with arms, unless the shipment was paid for by one of the countries mentioned, and they practically never got money. So let us not be duped by the myth of ideologically motivated Islamic solidarity, especially in the field of terrorism.

Kerr:

There is a difference between terrorism today and terrorism 10 - 15 years ago, when there was a fair amount of evidence of state-sponsored terrorism. In other words, there were terrorist organisations who learned tactics and trained together in various countries. There is much less evidence today, where a state is actually helping to organize and support terrorism. From a U.S. perspective, I think one of the more effective things that U.S. Intelligence has done is to preempt terrorist attacks, to stop them before they can conduct attacks. One of its real successes has been its cooperation with other organizations to preempt acts of terrorism. During the Iraq, terrorists were sent out and many of them were caught. After the recent bombings of the Embassies in Africa, other people clearly involved in training were picked up in Africa. So that's a very legitimate role for Intelligence.
We've also been talking about information, which is out there everywhere swirling around. It seems to me one of the most interesting problems for the future is disinformation and deception, using the very systems that we are talking about. There's the potential to inform people in a way you would not like them to be informed.

Doder:

The real problem is that the first spin you put on a piece of information becomes the prevailing view. The first spin is put by the guys who leak it. There's nothing that you can do. You know, the Clinton White House has been marvelous at that on the domestic level. If something's brand new, they immediately say it's six years old. It's the spin that colors the information and the speed it's disseminated, because we have 24 hour news channels. The spin is floated in a certain way and then you have the talking heads, who know nothing about anything, but have to talk about and discuss it in the original context. I can see how a foreign government can introduce something like this. The Russians were excellent at that. I'll tell you a story about when there was an assassination attempt on Brezhnev in 1969. All of the U.S. journalists were there, we saw the cosmonauts and the motorcades coming into Borovisky gate and it was all on television. All of a sudden, the television broadcasters lost their connections and we outside of the gate couldn't see anything. The limousines went in. The point is, a day later the Russians leak the story that there was a crazy guy who was shooting at the cosmonauts. If you're given information that a crazy guy tried to kill the cosmonauts, what do you do? I was working then for UPI and I wrestled with the problem.

Shebarshin:

They made a TV film on that, which I saw recently on the first channel. A documentary.

Kerr:

Of course my experience as a Intelligence officer is that the first report is nearly always wrong or partial or distorted. My first reaction when someone says something has been shot out of the sky or something has happened is: "Don't anybody move for a moment. Let's be calm about this, let's make sure we know what the hell we're talking about."

Dedijer:

All scientific discoveries are disinformation for most people, because they don't understand them. It's totally out of their world. And that was the case with the bomb. So all information can be disinformation for somebody. Now when you do it on purpose, that's another thing.

Lacoste:

Former international Intelligence problems were directly linked to international relations, security, and military affairs. Now they more than ever overlap with traditionally "internal" security problems. For example, terrorism is obviously a matter of concern for foreign Intelligence, but it also lies within the responsibility of police agencies. All Intelligence agencies nowadays must admit that police officers have a specific knowledge aobout the criminal world, that they have a better understanding of the criminal mentality and their courses of action. We must accept those facts, even if they create difficulties in managing interservice rivalries. I observed such problems in my country, when there was an increase in Islamic terrorism during the Lebanese conflict, and later on, with Algerian terrorism. The perceptions were not the same as seen through the eyes of police and of counterintelligence officers, putting aside their traditional bureaucratic hostility. I believe that Intelligence services and police agencies are complementary, and that they must discuss and compare their views, which means that there must exist a strong political authority to listen to both sides and impose its decision. Unfortunately, politicians generally prefer to play one agency against the other in order to maintain their personal power. This is a basic principle of Machiavellian politics, but it does not serve the country's best interests.

Leijonhielm:

Just a comment about validating information. You could argue that deception and disinformation works. I believe that is the conclusion we must draw from history, especially if it is constructed at a high level or by the state itself. There is, however, a large difference between disinformation regarding smaller subjects and deception on a national scale. I would argue that the Soviet Union managed for decades to spread disinformation about its economy and military strength. This worked very effectively, and led to overestimation of the Soviet economic and, subsequently, military strength in the West. The deception was not discovered until someone detected that, in fact, there existed a large budget deficit. So the pieces slowly fell into place. My other remark is that we also have the problem with disinformation given unintentionally, which is much harder to detect. Continuous and systematic overestimates of a country´s economic performance are very difficult to detect, unless you have access to all statistical, primary sources of production and financial transactions. I would go so far as to argue that in many transition countries, but also other European countries, the true state of the economy is only partially known.

Doder:

Take for example the Soviet statistics on the production of tractors. They produced roughly 2.7 million tractors per year. The total number of tractors in the country was about 2.9 percent of that. You look at the export figures and they should read that about 180,000 were exported annually. As you can see, millions of tractors are missing. In regard to the Soviet military budget figures, the figure stood at 17.9 billion rubles in 1968, and in 1982, it wa slightly less - 17.82 rubles - and the Russians were fighting a war at that time in Afghanistan. The figures were meaningless.

Tuđman:

We could also discuss the value of information and role of disinformation. First, there is a certain basic prejudice or belief that information is synonymous with reality. Obviously that is not the case, because today everybody - from Government officials, to businesses, athletes and film stars - has a spokesperson who tries to reduce the amount of bad press or negative perceptions and increase the positive coverage; not necessarily to fabricate, but at least to obscure certain details or to augment insignificant information which protects the image of the person or institution. That is the problem with the value of information. The question is, what represents reality in information? And how can we verify it? What kind of feedback can we get? We have the same problem not only internally in one country, among different groups, but also when there is a conflict of interest between countries. For example, the other day we discussed something which was not known to those of us who were not involved in Operation Storm in '95. Several years after the operation, there were attempts to convince the general public that Americans supported the Croatian Army during Operation Storm, and that, without that support, the Croatian Army would not have won. The fact is that in the summer of '95, the Americans were warning the Croatian Government not to run the operation, and in fact telling them they were not allowed to undertake it. And what is the general perception today of Operation Storm? There have been many efforts to reshape that perception.
From my point of view, information itself is not knowledge, and the value of unevaluated information is exaggerated. If something is available to the public, this does not mean it is accurate. Information can contain not only facts, but also fabrications, misinformation, disinformation, ignorance, prejudice, wishful thinking, and so on. Therefore, a critical approach to information is necessary. What I would like to say is that a large part of our knowledge of the world is based on ignorance. That is something we have got to admit.

Stolz:

Misinformation, as you just suggested, is when someone who really doesn't know the facts disseminates misinformation; this is in opposition to disinformation, which is deliberate, and usually state-generated or institutional. I think this is a distinction we have to keep in mind as analysts. We have "spin doctors" who sell their version of events to the public. What is the real story there? Then you get some bad stuff, which still bothers me, and which is not state inspired; for example, the crazy theory about the CIA selling crack cocaine in Los Angeles. There are still people who believe that.

Dedijer:

I want to raise a very important issue for the journal: the issue of secrecy and increasing transparency. Secrecy is essential in all human activities, including Intelligence. Now, Intelligence organizations are extremely bureaucratic. One man from the CIA man wrote very eloquently that 95% of the secrecy of Intelligence organizations is intended to hide failures and stupidity.

Boyadjiev:

As an example, the Bulgarian Parliament tried to pass a law in 1993 that all state secrets up to October 13, 1992, when the opposition came to power, were no longer secret. The next government tried to do the same thing. The only difference was that it changed the date to the date of its election victory. Fortunately, both attempts were unsuccessful, at least for now, since attempts are still being made. Here you have a good precedent as to how the problem of secrets can be resolved.

Dedijer:

I started turning against Tito when I realized that people were being punished not for committing crimes, but for pointing out that crimes were being committed. That was one reason Communism disappeared. The biggest socialexperiment in human history.

Shebarshin:

The greatest social experiment was not socialism, but Christianity, and it's still continuing.

Kerr:

I can't let Stevan off the hook. The idea that secrecy is designed to prevent the uncovering of failures and incompentence is absolutely wrong. First of all, most secrecy is introduced into the system before you know whether the action will be a failure or a success. I think that's greatly overexaggerated. I just believe we trumpet most of our failures. Harvard writes about them; every school and group writes about the failures and the occasional fiasco. Very few people write about and understand the successes, because they are usually more complicated, and success does not make as good a story as failure.

Doder:

I taught a class in contemporary public policy at the University in Washington, to 30 students. I had them read the Howard Kurtz book, "Spin Cycle", about how information is manipulated and so forth. But even before they had read this book, they said that none of them took seriously anything the Government said. They thought the press was manipulative and untruthful, and, strangely enough, their attitude towards television was the most positive because felt that pictures provided a greater amount of knowledge. I know that the Kennedy administration did a great deal to enthuse and inspire young people to perform public service and so forth. So I think information is not what we are really talking about. Mr. Dedijer is probably talking about something else: covert action. Of course you have to have secrecy in the Intelligence services. It's covert action, and the temptation to use it from one administration to another, that presents the problem; for instance, using the CIA the same way that the Kremlin used the KGB, as an arm of the executive. You know, some directors resisted, but some did not. And that's a real problem. Then you get the blame, no matter what, for some cockamamie scheme.

Wolf:

I want to say a few words about covert actions, or as we call them, active measures. Of course there's a difference between false information and disinformation. But looking back, I would say that the success of our activities in this field was zero. Of course there were activities, we had false documents, we used false documents to make the threat from NATO clearer to the public. Or, for example, we prepared falsified German documents, based on actual ones, to help our Bulgarian friends compromise the West German foreign policy toward Turkey. The only result was that our department issued a report that year about numerous activities they had undertaken. There was a brief mention in the papers, but that was it. Perhaps your experiences have been different. The only example I remember that succeeded in influencing public opinion, if only for a short period, was a document published by a well-known East German professor who specialized in this issue, stating that AIDS originated in American prisons, from experiments in American prisons, and so on. The problem was that I myself believed this was true, and that the evidence used in this document was true as well. I'm not sure, but I think it came from Moscow. So though I do not want to underestimate this problem, the evidence used during my trials, in documents and witness statements about "terrible" actions and measures, was over-estimated.

Kerr:

I think we have probably run the course for today's discussion. I think the issue that you raised here will come up in the next session about covert action.

Agrell:

I would only like to make a short final comment to General Boyadjev. I think we complain a lot about the media and all the shortcomings and unpredictability of the media, but maybe there is one hidden advantage of this, and that is that in the end, it's very difficult to predict manipulation of the media. One never knows what result one might achieve have from the manipulation, and this a marketing problem everyone who tries to influence the media has: they can't predict the impact of what they are doing. They are investing enormous resources with very little effect, and then, when they are doing nothing, everything blows up in their face and nobody can in retrospect explain why. Why didn't that work and why did this always have an impact?