Ten
Years of German Unification
Col.
Gen. Markus Wolf
ABSTRACT
The author discusses
the fate of the Foreign Intelligence Department of the
GDR, which he headed for over thirty years, and of its
colleagues and agents since the reunification of Germany
ten years ago. There was no transformation of this service
after the implosion of socialism; instead, it was liquidated,
and criminal prosecutions followed which continue to this
day. The author describes how this is connected to the
West German leadership goal of the "de-legitimization"
of the GDR. The operations of the western services are
described, as well as the actions of their collaborators,
who agree to make available, for a price, their knowledge
of sources, files, data and other evidence in order for
criminal prosecutions to be launched; i.e. the "Rosewood"
operation of the CIA, and the decoding of the data carrier
"SIRA" and its significance are discussed. The
author holds the view that the criminal prosecution of
the colleagues and agents of his service violates the
internationally recognized legal concept of "equality
before the law". Of the approximately 150,000 political
indictments initiated since the reunification, 7,099 were
for espionage. The article also addresses other subjects,
such as the inhumanely high prison sentences in the United
States. The author feels that, after ten years, a political
gesture should be made which would remove the last vestiges
of the Cold War.
Ten
Years Later
When
German unification became a reality on October 3, 1990,
I had already been retired for four years. My first book
had been successfully published in 1989 in both German
states and I was a writer full of plans. After the appearance
of my book in early summer of 1989, at a time when the
speedy disintegration of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) could not have been predicted, the West German chief
federal prosecutor, Rebman, obtained an arrest warrant
against me because of my position as the former director
of the Foreign Intelligence Department (HV A) in the Ministry
of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit -
hereafter, MfS) of the GDR. I was at that time the only
highly decorated individual in the GDR and the only general
of the Ministry to which this honor was afforded. Thus,
my creative existence as a pensioner came to an end. The
first seven years of German unification represented to
me years of persecution, as well as years of constant
concern about co-workers and agents for whom I was responsible
during my time at the Ministry. Although the court decisions,
convictions, and probations that the victors of the Cold
War brought against me have now, ten years later, been
suspended, the moral obligations toward the women and
men who performed their duties on the front lines remain.
It
is impossible to forget experiences which took place during
the Cold War confrontations, and the efforts in the East
and West to prevent a nuclear inferno. Now there are new
experiences, meetings which earlier would have been inconceivable,
with former opponents from "the other side."
But concern for former "soldiers" who, unlike
the agents of the West, are still subject to prosecution,
remains a heavy burden for me. Encounters with other mostly
retired colleagues from West and East, however, provide
hope. Therefore, I have agreed with pleasure to summarise
for "National Security and the Future" some
thoughts about my former service and its fate after the
German unification.
Disintegration
of the German Democratic Republic
The
last years of activity of the Foreign Intelligence Department
(HV A) of the GDR were shaped by the contradictory developments
in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership, and
by the negative attitude of the Socialist Unity Party
of Germany (SED) leaders towards Perestroika and
Glasnost in the USSR. Some of the offices within
the Ministry of National Security responsible for the
observation of the internal processes in the GDR had difficulties
objectively analysing the resulting phenomena, which invariably
developed into political crises. These difficulties soon
became obvious to the offices of the foreign intelligence
service. However, these offices were focused on the possible
consequences of Gorbachev's policies for the foreign policies
of the GDR, e.g., disintegration of the bloc confrontation;
reorientation with regard to the senseless, and for true
socialism, economically suicidal arms race; and the vision
of a new millennium free of nuclear weapons. Information
coming from the HVA could therefore contribute to a better
understanding of the western position in Moscow and Berlin,
and provide information about opponents of the détente,
armament control, and disarmament. Documentary information
from NATO-sources, for example, contributed in 1987 to
the formulation of a new military doctrine of the Warsaw
Treaty. The attitude of many colleagues was hopeful, as
they understood the politics of détente, but at the same
time they were also in despair over the rigid attitude
of the SED leaders, which contradicted verbal assurances
of friendship with the Soviet Union. The increasing internal
resistance in the GDR against these rigid policies had
serious consequences. In spite of efforts to support the
expectations and tasks of the political leaders, MfS information
on the country's internal situation reflected the internal
crises more realistically than in earlier years.
The
implosion of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in 1989/90 produced dramatic changes in all affected
countries. The special situation of the GDR consisted
in the fact that the ever present and influential "rich
brother", the Federal Republic of Germany, was always
ready to claim its "inheritance". One knows
today (even I was late in recognising this) that the GDR
was simply a marionette for Gorbachev in a poker game
for power with the West, not a partner considered worthy
of defending. Ruling circles in the Federal Republic of
Germany (hereafter FRG) jumped at this historical opportunity,
and consequently exploited it during the leadership of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In the last year of the GDR's
existence, the election campaign teams of the West German
parties controlled the field, and the Western advisors
of the last GDR government pushed in all areas toward
a speedy unification. In regard to foreign policy, there
was no resistance (excepting verbal) to the incorporation
of the GDR into NATO, and, therefore, the realignment
of the German federal armed forces and NATO onto the eastern
boundaries of Germany. Instead of initiating a reasonable
process for the establishment of a European peace declaration,
the agreements in international law at the time (e.g.,
the so-called 2+4 treaty) were dictated by the "victors".
The consequence for the GDR was that it was incorporated
into the FRG by means of a crash course, which resulted
in large losses for the majority of the GDR population:
economic status, loss of cultural specificity's, social
standing, and personal biographical characteristics, as
well as the persecution of VIPs, political and social
discrimination, and disenfranchisement of the GDR elites.
'Victors'
manipulation of the intelligence services
In
contrast to other eastern and central European countries
and the USSR (later GUS states) there was no transformation
of the GDR intelligence service, but, rather, its radical
liquidation. In other countries, national interests required
the preservation of the defence and reconnaissance organs,
so they were transformed into agencies befitting the new
political structures, which often meant that structures
which were relatively ideology-free were taken over unchanged,
including official and unofficial employees, continuation
of certain operations, and continued use of databases.
Espionage, defence from terrorism, and personal protection
were included in this process. West Germany's goal from
the onset was to destroy all GDR state structures, including
the intelligence service. This goal was given impetus
by the anger and hatred felt by a substantial proportion
of the East German population toward the MfS, a result
of the failed national security policies of the SED and
unjust repression executed by an oversized security apparatus.
A literal "Stasi hysteria" exists to this day,
carried forward from the former GDR. The plan to remodel
the security organs into democratically-led reconnaissance
and constitutional protection agencies proved to be an
illusion; the alternative was the complete destruction
of the entire MfS, including the Foreign Intelligence
Service, which was subsequently realised. This was a logical
consequence, considering the way in which the overall
integration of the GDR into the FRG had occurred. There
was no discussion about transferring highly qualified
employees into the services of a united Germany nor interest
in drafting a new constitution for the new country which
had emerged after the unification. However, a draft of
such a constitution had, in fact, been prepared, in agreement
with the citizens rights organisation represented at the
"Round Table".
But
the West German "advisors" in the Ministry of
the Interior of the last GDR government had only one interest:
to appropriate as much "booty" as possible.
This booty would include the names of possible traitors
among the MfS workers, documents, databases, and information
about sources, structures and modes of operation, material
objects and technical equipment, and, above all, evidence
which could be used to prosecute citizens of the FRG and
employees of the MfS, based on MfS documents. Contrary
to these efforts, the citizens movement and government
of the GDR succeeded in early 1990 in reaching a decision
to dissolve the HVA, but in an orderly fashion. A group
of approximately 250 workers was empowered to systematically
terminate the HVA activities and to destroy documents
on HVA activities, excepting selected documents intended
for a central archive. Despite this favourable decision
benefiting GDR reconnaissance, intelligence services of
the FRG and other NATO countries, especially the USA,
succeeded in gaining important information about sources
and activities of the HVA. In 1989-90, they exploited
the "political climate" to launch substantial
intelligence attacks against the MfS of the GDR. Immediately
after the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989), long
before the unification, employees of the BND (West German
intelligence service), the Agency for the Protection of
the Constitution, and the Secret Services of the United
States and Great Britain made substantial attempts to
establish contact with employees or agents of the MfS.
Using threats, promises of immunity from punishment, and
lucrative financial bribes (up to one million dollars),
efforts were made to pursued them to provide "voluntary"
details concerning former intelligence sources. Often
they claimed that these employees' superiors or other
co-workers of the former department had already co-operated
and were now "driving a Mercedes". Only a few,
though some were, unfortunately, high-ranking officers,
co-operated as traitors with these western agencies. They
revealed many important sources and testified willingly
in trials conducted by the prosecution. Particularly spectacular
was the 1990 CIA operation "ROSEWOOD", through
which the CIA gained highly secret HVA files and microfilm
reports. Media reports up to the present day have served
to disinform and obscure the details of this operation.
Some details from these documents were handed over three
years later and, after years of tug-of-war - 10 years
after the GDR ceased to exist - censored data about the
various personal files collected by the HVA were given
to the FRG authorities and other NATO partners. Due to
superannuating, these data can only be used for prosecution
in a few insignificant cases. But these HVA files still
attract German media attention and are continually exploited
to incite waves of espionage hysteria.
The
"disclosures" about the supposedly recently
decoded data carriers SIRA containing information collected
by the HVA serve the same purpose. The use or, rather,
the misuse of this information has thus far led only to
the rehashing of well-known and already concluded criminal
processes, which have now become the subject of political
manipulation in Germany. Similar use is being made in
some western European countries of the information in
British Professor Chr. Andrews' book about the ominous
Mitrochin Report and the highest officials of the KGB,
through further discrimination and open censure, and new
waves of lies, slander, and distortions. A proper historical
judgement of the security policies of the GDR under the
influence of the Cold War and the development of German-German
post-war history have thereby been blocked. The ruling
circles in the FRG have brutally applied their politically
motivated versions of history to the destruction of all
GDR structures, including even discrimination and prosecution
of its elites. In this regard, the former Minister of
Justice (and former president of the foreign intelligence
service) Dr. Klaus Kinkel stated on German Judge's Day,
September 23, 1991, that: "I know very well that
the courts alone cannot do all the work which needs to
be done. But a substantial part of it must be done by
them. There is no alternative. I am counting on German
justice. We must succeed in de-legitimizing the SED regime,
which has to the bitter end justified itself by its antifascist
orientation, and its dedication to higher values and alleged
absolute humanity. Meanwhile, under the guise of Marxist-Leninism,
it built a state that was in every sense as horrific as
fascist Germany, a state that was defeated and that, rightfully,
should never be allowed to exist again."
Criminalization
of former agents and colleagues
At
the international negotiations, the representatives of
the federal government had no apparent reaction to the
warnings of the Soviet negotiating partners not to pursue
legal prosecution of the "VIPS" in the GDR.
The reunification treaty provided that all complaints
against citizens of the FRG would be handled according
to the law in the GDR, which was in effect at the time
the alleged activity had occurred. In regard to any eventual
prosecutions of GDR espionage, massive political and legal
doubts were expressed in 1990 by several leading representatives
of the federal government as well as respected academics;
these activities were categorised as "offences conditional
to the division" whose prosecution after unification
was considered absurd. Dr. Schauble, at the time Minister
of the Interior and head negotiator of the unification
treaty stated: "I cannot imagine that in a reunified
Germany, we put erstwhile agents of the other side in
prison. What I also cannot imagine is that we put collaborators
of the GDR in prison and don't do it the other way around.
We are talking here about conditional offences that must
be declared unprosecutable." Similar statements were
made by the former federal president, Richard von Weizsacker:
"In cases where there was…clear espionage, we must
bear in mind that this was done both on this side and
the other side and, therefore, they must be handled in
a parallel manner."
Nonetheless,
in 1990 and the years following, a strange constellation
of political forces, members of the highest circles of
the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) parliamentarians,
thwarted a legal regulation prohibiting the prosecution
of spy activities for the GDR. Abusing the binding regulations
of the reunification treaty concerning the application
of GDR law, the federal German courts formulated adventurous
reconstruction's - even in their highest judicial decisions
- in order to enable massive prosecutions in the area
of politics, military, judiciary and secret service of
those presumed responsible in the GDR. Often, a simple
judicial ruling nullified the international principles
of a constitutional state, e.g., regulations on the superannuating
of criminal offences.
Due
only to widespread domestic and foreign protests, inquiries
by the uneasy lower courts to the federal constitutional
court resulted, in May 1995 (after almost all the processes
against agents and collaborators of the GDR had been completed),
in a decision by an outwardly close majority vote taken
by this highest Federal German court. In principle, the
Constitutional Court prohibited the further prosecution
(with a few exceptions) of the head officials of the foreign
intelligence services of the GDR, but gave an unrestricted
green light to the prosecution of sources of foreign reconnaissance
among the citizens of the old FRG.
A
final survey by the federal prosecutor's office showed
that since 1990, 7,099 cases had been initiated for espionage
on behalf of the GDR, of which 4,171 were citizens of
the former GDR and 2,928 citizens of the former FRG. According
to the data, only 82 complaints against GDR citizens had
been finally filed, resulting in 23 convictions and 22
prison sentences (which were partially suspended). These
numbers indicate the insubstantiality of the complaints,
but neglect to address the torment of those affected and
their families during these processes, which lasted for
years. 388 complaints were filed against citizens of the
former Federal Republic of Germany and 252 sentences were
passed. Of those, 51 received sentences longer than two
years. In many cases (since 1994 nine), sentences of 9-12
years were given for "treason".
More than 700 cases were partially suspended in lieu of
monetary fines up to 100,000 German marks. The prosecuting
authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany point to
the large number of suspensions of processes due to lack
of proof or minimal responsibility; that is, to the relatively
high proportion of suspended sentences, in order to prove
their "humanitarian stance" toward the prosecution
of espionage for the GDR. They are silent, however, about
the burdens which resulted for the accused, their family
members, and the witnesses who were exposed to police
and prosecutorial investigations, and about the social
and financial burdens which arose due to court and attorney
costs.
The
criminal prosecution for intelligence activities on behalf
of the GDR is classified with a general group of prosecutions
of so-called government and reunification crimes, for
which a special prosecutor as well as a special police
apparat was formed. Through these special government agencies,
more than 100,000 people were processed. The central processing
authorities introduced approximately 23,000 such cases
and in each of the new federal states, the number of preliminary
proceedings was about 20,000 to 30,000; that is, an overall
figure for the GDR of at least 150,000 preliminary proceedings.
The treatment of MfS employees and agents of the MfS was
a significant chapter in the process of incorporation
of the GDR the FRG.
The reunification treaty of August 31, 1990 (Document
1, Chapter XIX, Paragraph III, Number 5) contains a regulation
for special terminations of employment of individuals
in public service. In addition to charges of violating
basic human principles and constitutional law, a further
and more important justification for special terminations
of employees was if "they had been active in respect
to the former MfS". If so, "the termination
of employment is not unreasonable." Demands for a
case by case examination were consistently ignored and
a priori every activity for the MfS was used as grounds
for termination. This led to thousands of terminations,
all the way from employees in transportation services,
city sanitation, and landlords, to porters in schools
and museums and janitorial workers in health care institutions.
A large number of highly qualified colleagues in these
subordinate positions of the MfS were terminated, true
to the motto of the changing GDR: "Put Stasi
to work" (Editor note: Stasi, State Security
Services).
Specific
forms of isolation and discrimination toward former agents
of the Ministry of State Security occurred as a result
of the activities of the "Federal Office in Charge
of the Documents of the State Security Service of the
former GDR" (an agency which was called the Gauck-office,
after its director, Hans-Joachim Gauck, a former pastor
in Rostock). This agency acted as a tool of war in order
to continue the cold war by abusing the files and reservoirs
of the Ministry of State Security. The subordination of
this agency to the Federal Ministry of the Interior is
undemocratic, and violates the will of the last Peoples'
Chamber of the GDR, which intended, after motions for
the establishment of such an agency were passed, that
it be subservient to an organ controlled by Parliament.
Meanwhile, this agency grew to over 3,000 employees and
a yearly budget of approximately 250 million marks. A
particularly critical evaluation must be given to the
dubious "professional activities" of the Gauck
office, due to its politically motivated "pre-arrangement"
of the available documents and the corresponding "judgements"
on these materials. These evaluations and judgements were
utilised as political instruments within the context of
the already cited "de-legitimisation" of the
GDR, and affected leading personalities of the left wing
parties in Germany, e.g., the fraction chairman of the
Party of Democratic Socialism, Dr. Gregor Gysi.
The
unrestrained access enjoyed by the wealthy media institutions
and some representatives of the former civilian movements
to the "Gauck - Office" documents permitted
the targeted abuse of selected materials for political
purposes. This serves to continually inflame public opinion
and leads - as in many other cases - to a reversal of
the burden of proof for those affected; after their public
defamation, they are then expected to prove their innocence.
After
the Federal Constitutional Court prohibited criminal prosecution
of the head officials of the news service of the GDR for
espionage, the Federal Courts were forced to suspend the
six-year prison sentence they had already imposed on me
in 1993. The seven months long first process conducted
against me in Dusseldorf was a complete sham, since it
was initiated at a time when other courts had suspended
similar trials and when the constitutional courts were
investigating their legitimacy. Certain of my defence
motions were rejected. So that the criminal prosecution
would not have to be abandoned after the forced suspension
of the sentence, the case was sent back to the same court
wherein the first unconstitutional judgement had been
passed. The second trial, which lasted until May of 1997,
was a true farce. This time, charges were filed for "deprivation
of freedom" in three of the cases which dated back
to the 1950s, in order to reach a completely absurd verdict
based on GDR laws, by which the valid superannuating could
be ignored. These cases were on such slippery ground that
even a high official of the Operations Directorate of
the Central Intelligence Agency reacted in a letter to
me, and I used his quote in my final summation: "The
'kidnapping' charge, as presented by the authorities,
is laughable - any of us who were engaged in espionage
during the Cold War could be charged with the same ridiculous
accusation." The sentence which was brought after
the five-month long trial was two years probation, which
meant a bitter defeat for the accusers. I could forget
this sentence and the years that were robbed from me and
my family were it not for the criminal prosecutions and
violations of the constitutional principle of "equality
before the law" which continue to this day, and for
whose discontinuation I argued in my final summary and
still argue.
The
FRG officials have enthusiastically rehabilitated - claiming
unjust political harassment - and provided generous compensations
to properly and constitutionally sentenced spies, agents,
"handlers", and terrorists - including criminals
- who were charged during the 40-year existence of the
GDR. The Constitution of the FRG (Article 3, "equality
before the law") which is a recognised norm of international
law, has thereby been violated in the most profound manner.
Criminal prosecutions which are to be found in every sovereign
state are now subject to political evaluations (espionage
for the West is good and to be valued; espionage for the
East is bad and to be punished).
Political
gesture needed to remove vestiges of Cold War
Ten
years after German state unification, the criminal prosecution
of agents of GDR foreign intelligence continues, and there
are still instances of social degradation in the area
of pensions, chronic unemployment, and clear material
penalties. However, this does not apply only to Germany.
In the USA and other NATO states, people accused of having
had contacts with GDR foreign intelligence are being persecuted.
Many of the prime agents of my service are serving inhumanely
high sentences in the USA. One example is the Turkish
citizen Hussein Yildirim, who was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. He has already served
eleven years for an act which countless American agents
committed in our state. These American agents of the Cold
War are all free. In another case involving a very high
sentence, the American secret services illegally kidnapped
in 1991 a former member of the US Army, James Carney,
who was then living in Germany, returned him to the USA,
and sentenced him to a more than thirty-year term of imprisonment.
This was a true case of kidnapping, in contrast to the
cases attributed to me!
During
my time at the head of the service, we were successful
in every case in freeing arrested officers and agents
through exchange operations. The large number of Western
agents arrested in the GDR made this possible. It was
in part a very complicated "ring action" in
which attorneys, above all from the GDR, FRG and the USA,
were involved. We are now deprived of this possibility
and, therefore, the only opportunity to rid myself of
this moral burden is to appeal to the American colleagues,
- we are still bound by mutual respect and with some,
even a new friendship has developed - to the American
public, and the American President, to close this not
yet concluded chapter of the Cold War. The President of
the USA would lose nothing by pardoning the 72-year-old
Turkish citizen, Yildirim; in fact, he would benefit by
making this humanitarian gesture.
The
thousands of men and women who have experienced massive
violations of basic principles of democracy and constitutionality
due to the way they, as former employees of the ministry
or agents, have been handled in the FRG, will not easily
overcome these violations. This state of affairs also
contributes to the ongoing lack of German "inner
unity" which the political public deplores.
The
former leaders of the Foreign Intelligence Department
of the GDR, as well as the former head of the Military
Reconnaissance of the National People's Army of the GDR,
therefore took the opportunity, on the occasion of the
tenth anniversary of German reunification, to send a letter
to the German Federal President, Johannes Rau, and once
more call attention to the necessity to implement the
"equality before the law" regulations of our
Constitution in reference to the colleagues and sources
of the foreign intelligence services of the GDR. The letter
summed up with the following:
"In view of the historical roots of the rivalry between
the two Germanys, as well as the cessation of the East
West confrontation, could not a political gesture be made
which would put an end to the criminal prosecutions and
social isolation in order to promote a spirit of reconciliation?
"We
ask you, Honorable Mr. President, to use your high offices
in the realisation of this gesture."
Such
an act by the Federal Republic of Germany could be an
incentive for other countries, particularly the USA, to
remove the vestiges of the Cold War dating from the time
of the bloc confrontation. It would serve at the same
time to inhibit the continuation of the Cold War in other
forms, so that a more tolerant relationship between the
states and peoples can be effected in the future.
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