The
Role of Croatia in the Management of the
Humanitarian Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ivica
Kostović, Neven
Henigsberg and Miloš
Judaš
Center for Crisis Management, School of Medicine University
of Zagreb,
Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
ABSTRACT
Croatia played a crucial
role in the management and termination of the humanitarian
crisis caused by the aggression of the Yugoslav Army and
Serbian paramilitary forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Between 1992 and 1995, Croatia accepted three waves of
refugees and cared for more than 500,000 refugees from
B&H; it thus secured the basic precondition for the
survival of B&H as a state. Croatia invested more
than 1,000,000.000 U.S. dollars from its State budget
just for the care of refugees from B&H. Even today
about 130,000 Bosnian refugees are still accomodated in
Croatia, for most are still unable to return to their
homes. The European Community and the UN were unable to
protect the lives of civilians or to prevent grave breaches
of international humanitarian law. At the some time, the
Croatian military operation "Storm" in 1995
saved the lives of thousands of civilians in the Bihać
area. A careful analysis of the Croatian contribution
to the achievement of the Dayton agreements and the resolution
of the humanitarian crisis in B&H clearly reveals
that the positive role of Croatia has been seriously underestimated
and down-played by the international community.
The
humanitarian crisis
The
humanitarian crisis developed early and its prominent
feature was the aggression of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav
Army and Serbian paramilitary forces on Croatia, Bosnia,
and Herzegovina. Three factors were crucial in creating
this crisis: a systematic application of specially devised
methods of ethnic cleansing; low-intensity warfare; and
a complete disregard for the Geneva Convention and other
international humanitarian laws.
The
features of ethnic cleansing that resulted in the humanitarian
crisis were as follows: the creation of huge populations
of displaced persons and refugees; pervasive and terrifying
effects on the population of noncombatants caused by indiscriminate
shelling of civilian targets and similar abuses of military
power (including maliciously planted land-mines and booby
traps); extrajudicial and arbitrary executions of innocent
persons or helpless detainees; summary executions and
massacres of unarmed civilians; systematic, widespread,
and ethnically motivated rapes; deliberate obstruction
of humanitarian corridors for endangered civilian populations;
the creation of a number of ad hoc prisons and concentration
camps; systematic torture of detained civilians and prisoners
of war; and the wanton destruction and plundering of civilian
property (7, 8, 13). The aggressors blatantly violated
human rights and deliberately perpetrated grave breaches
of the Geneva Convention and other humanitarian laws.
All that resulted in immediate attrocities, and in pervasive
and serious long-term psychotraumatic experiences for
many of the victims. The impact of thus created humanitarian
crisis was especially devastating for civilian women and
children.
At
the beginning, the humanitarian crisis was concentrated
in the areas marked for ethnic cleansing within the framework
of creating a "Greater Serbia" (such regions
as "Krajina" in Croatia and "Republika
Srpska" in Bosnia and Herzegovina), but its effects
soon flooded the whole region. It is true that grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions (combined with the low intensity
warfare) were frequently encountered in almost all conflicts
during the last three decades around the world; however,
ethnic cleansing has generally been perceived as a particularly
prominent feature of the war in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina;
also, the humanitarian and refugee crisis thus created
was the largest in Europe since the World War II. As a
result, that crisis was the major subject of most UN resolutions
passed between 1991 and 1995, and its management was the
prime concern of the joint UN and NATO forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The
role of Croatia in the management and resolution of the
humanitarian crisis was crucial; Croatian authorities
and institutions were already fully and effectively involved
in coping with crises in 1992, i.e., significantly before
the international community managed to develop and introduce
workable solutions and mechanisms (such as the creation
of "safe heavens," humanitarian corridors, extensive
monitoring, and the continuous presence of UN forces and
NGOs).
The
first phase of the humanitarian crisis: the first wave of
refugees and other consequences of ethnic cleansing
In
April 1992, the first waves of refugees from Bosnian cities
of Ravno, Kupres, Foča, Višegrad, Zvornik, Ključ, Bijeljina,
Brčko, Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Prijedor, Jajce, and Kotor
Varoš, arrived in Croatia (Fig. 1). At that time, Croatia
already had 330.000 of its own displaced persons settled
in state-organized and private housing (9). The Croatian
authorities and nation were already stretched to the limit
in their efforts to secure the food and accomodations,
health care, and social care for those displaced persons,
as well as to preventing the collapse of the national
economy and complete disorder in the social system.
In
March 1992, the number of Bosnian refugees settled in
Croatia was 16,579; in April 1992 it reached 193,415,
in August 1992,it escalated to 363,270, and in December
1992, it peaked at 402,768. The total number of displaced
persons and refugees in Croatia at the end of 1992 was
more than 10% of the total Croatian population; 663,493
refugees and displaced persons on December 1, 1992, compared
to the four and half million total Croatian population!
That was a tremendous economic and social burden, generally
regarded as critical for the stability of any state even
in the time of peace - and Croatia was at that time exposed
to Serbian aggression and had almost 1/3 of its territory
occupied by the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary
forces.
The
Croatian Government responded by establishing the Office
for Refugees and its services throughout the country;
add to this the maximum involvement of the Ministry of
Health, Ministry of Social Care, Croatian military forces
and police, Croatian Red Cross, and Caritas. These institutions,
supported by a myriad of generous and self-sacrificing
civilians in all Croatian cities and villages, successfully
coped with the crisis and had a crucial role in the care
of thousands of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For example, the small town of Gunja in Eastern Slavonia,
accepted so many refugees from Bijeljina, Semberija and
Bosanska Posavina that the final number of settled refugees
exceeded its total initial population. Gunja's heroic
efforts were explicitely recognized and honored by the
European Community.
The
refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina were settled in institutionally
provided housing and in the private homes of Croatian
families. Primary health care was also provided to them,
a service that placed an extreme burden on the Croatian
health care system. Additional medical and psychosocial
care and treatment was provided the victims of ethnic
rape; Caritas provided the help for babies and infants
for whom their raped and victimized mothers were unable
to care. Furthermore, Croatian hospitals and medical professionals
gave without stint of their time, resources and money
in treating wounded civilians and soldiers from Bosnia
and Herzegovina and providing medical care for sick children
and the elderly. For example, just for the medical treatment
of Bosnian refugees in 1992/93, the Croatian Government
spent 54,320,121 U.S. dollars from the State Budget.
Simple
quantitative data will serve to illustrate the dramatic
scope and extent of that humanitarian crisis: within weeks,
67,763 refugees arrived from Bosanska Posavina, and another
30,710 from other parts of Northern Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Fig. 1). There were occasions when about 10,000 refugees
were entering war-torn Croatia in a single day (e.g.,
in Slavonski Brod). Some, in transit to other countries,
spent about three days in Croatia. However, it is important
to stress that other European countries (with the important
exception of Germany) were unwilling to accept those refugees,
although they did practically nothing to prevent their
expulsion from their homes. While Croatia at that time
was receiving up to 10,000 refugees in a single day, many
European countries did not accept even 1,000 refugees
during the entire period of the crisis.
What
follows are the key features of the first phase of the
humanitarian crisis:
In
1992, the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces
applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina the same methods of
ethnic cleansing they used in 1991 in Croatia. However,
after their negative experience with Vukovar in Croatia,
Serbian forces did not destroy the besieged enclaves
in Eastern Bosnia; they just encircled them and proceeded
on to conquer the remaining territory.
The
international community and institutions were unable
to prevent the outbreak of the humanitarian crisis and
were woefully inadequate in coping with it.
The
Republic of Croatia clearly demonstrated that, in spite
of Serbian aggression and war-related destruction, it
remained a well-organized state with an efficient administration
and infrastructure; it thus managed to cope singly and
successfully with the first wave of Bosnian refugees
without international help. Whereas these efforts vitally
contributed to the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the extreme burden exacted long-term consequences for
the Croatian economy and social stability.
The
second wave of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina
The
second wave of refugees began arriving in Croatia during
1993; this influx was caused by the further aggression
of Serbian forces, but also by the outbreak of conflict
between Croats and Bosniac-Muslims in the Bosnia and Herzegovina.
That conflict was a direct consequence of the successful
Serbian ethnic cleansing of large parts of B&H (1,
2). Namely, thousands of Bosniac-Muslims expelled by the
Serbs arrived in areas that were inhabited predominantly
by Croats throughout the centuries and tried to settle
there. Moreover, civilian refugees arriving in the "Croatian"
enclaves of B&H were accompanied by growing numbers
of Bosniac-Muslim soldiers who were unable to resist the
Serbian forces and retreated along with the civilians.
In effect, hundreds of thousands of Bosniac-Muslims and
Croats were squeezed into a small territory that until
then had been successfully defended by Croats against
the Serbian forces.
Everybody
was in desperate need of food and shelter, and civilians
and soldiers of both ethnic groups were together in a
chaotic mix. That conflicts and skirmishes broke out was
perhaps inevitable. Whereas the attrocities perpetrated
by Bosniac-Muslim forces forced a number of Croats to
flee from Central Bosnia and the region north of Sarajevo,
a number of Bosniac-Muslims were also forced by Croat
forces to flee from Mostar and other places (1, 2). As
a result, new waves of civilian refugees of mixed ethnic
origin started again to spill over the Croatian borders.
For
example, as a result of those confllicts, more than 12,000
refugees from Central Bosnia (Visoko and Kakanj) arrived
in Croatia in a single day. At that time, Croatia was
incapable of accommodating more refugees. The only remaining,
and certainly an unprecendented solution, was to put refugees
in hotels. In fact, hotels had been used to accommodate
displaced persons and refugees in Croatia during 1991
and 1992, but only to a limited extent. However, in 1993,
even the hotels in popular tourist sites on the seacost
were "invaded" by refugees. The economic consequences
were drastic. Many hotels were so damaged - even devastated
-after the prolonged use by refugees, that even today
(when tourism should be the major source of income for
Croatia) they cannot be properly used because of lack
of money for repair and/or modernization.
The
Croatian Office for refugees and other governmental agencies
were fully coordinated with the activities of various
NGOs, UNHCR, ICRC, and other international humanitarian
organizations serving the same cause (3, 4, 5, 6). Therefore,
the basic conditions of living and personal dignity were
maintained for refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina who
were waiting for transfer to other countries. Those efforts
also enabled the gradual integration into Croatian society
of the Croatian refugees expelled by Serbs from Bosanska
Posavina and by the Bosniac-Muslims from Central Bosnia.
The chances that those refugees will return to their homes
are remote; nevertheless, they insisted on staying in
Croatia; i.e., to remain close as possible to their homes
(hoping one day to return), and many of them asked for
and obtained Croatian citizenship.
It
has to be recognized that during the second phase of the
humanitarian crisis, the victims of Serbian aggression
(Croats and Bosniac-Muslims) unfortunately tried to use
the same methods of ethnic cleansing against each other.
It was most manifest in Central Bosnia and included civilian
massacres, summary executions, arbitrary killings, and
the obstruction of humanitarian corridors. Depending on
the local situation, the perpetrators of those grave breaches
of humanitarian law were either Bosniac-Muslim or Croatian
paramilitary forces. Whereas the Croats were the main
victims in the region of Central Bosnia, Bosniac-Muslims
faced a similar fate in the area of Mostar. For example,
almost all surviving Croats from Kakanj, Visoko, and Kreševo
are even today refugees settled in Croatia, and the same
holds for many Croats in Central Bosnia. It is important
to recognize that the UN and other international organizations
failed to protect the civilian population in those areas
and also were unable to secure the safety of the humanitarian
corridors.
The
third wave of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina
During
the last months of 1993 and into the following year, another
wave of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina crossed the
Croatian border. They were the remnants of the non-Serbian
civilian population from the northwestern part of Bosnia,
an area occupied by Serbian forces. During 1994, more
than 30.000 Croats and Bosniac-Muslims from Banja Luka,
Prijedor, and Kotor Varoš entered Croatia (11) (Fig. 2).
The last large group crossed the Bosnian-Croatian border
in the village of Davor on the river Sava in August 1995.
That act of ethnic cleansing was the revenge taken by
the Serbian forces after their defeat in the large-scale
military operation "Storm"; as a result, another
22,000 refugees entered Croatian in less than a month.
At
the same time, another group of Bosniac-Muslims, (about
20,000) left Velika Kladuša and simply entered Croatia
and settled in the area of Kupljensko near Vojnić. The
area of Velika Kladuša and Cazin (north of Bihać) was
where bitter and prolonged fighting occurred between two
fractions of Bosniac-Muslim forces; those who were defeated
fled to Croatia, fearing revenge by the winning fraction
of Bosniac-Muslims. For Croatian authorities, the event
was not just another serious financial burden, but also
a potential source of social and political tensions in
that part of Croatia. For this was a special case; one
was not dealing with the usual refugees, but with armed
persons who insisted on receiving political asylum in
Croatia.
The
situation was equally bizzare from the military and political
point of view as it was hyper-dramatic from the humanitarian
point of view, and caused Croatia multiple problems. Fortunately,
after weeks of hard negotiations, (conducted jointly by
UNHCR and governments of Croatia and Turkey), about 16.000
refugees returned to the area of Cazin and Velika Kladuša,
where trilateral police forces assumed their safety. However,
the remaining several thousand of Bosniac-Muslim refugees
refused to return to Velika Kladuša, thus exerting an
additional burden on the already fragile Croatian economy
and health care system. That case most clearly defines
how consistently and positively the Croatian government
and people coped with the humanitarian crisis during the
war period, despite military and political pressure exerted
from all sides.
The
period from 1992 to 1995 saw great fluctuations in the
number of refugees in Croatia, mostly because refugees
were leaving for other countries; few of them returned
to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fig. 3). From the autumn of
1995, new refugees entered Croatia only sporadically and
in small groups. 1996 onwards saw the extremely slow and
protracted return of refugees to the newly established
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The newly established
balance of military power and the much increased presence
of UN forces after the Dayton agreement made that return
possible, (but not efficient).
The
last phase of the humanitarian crisis
The
last phase of the humanitarian crisis occured during the
time when the population of the Bihać area was facing
extinction under the brutal assaults of the Yugoslav Army
and Serbian paramilitary forces. These Serbian forces
had shortly before perpetrated the huge massacre of Bosniac-Muslims
in Srebrenica, despite the presence of numerous UN forces
which had been reinforced by NATO troops. The UN concept
of "safe heavens" was at best completely inefficient
in protecting civilians, and it was apparent that the
same fate was imminent for Bihać.
The
large-scale Croatian military operation "Storm"
saved Bihac from destruction. Although the primary goal
of the "Storm" operation was to liberate those
parts of Croatia still occupied by Serbian paramilitary
forces (so-called Krajina), the opening of the safe corridor
to Bihać was also a major goal of the operation. "Storm"
is the best illustration of the positive role of the Croatian
military forces in terminating the humanitarian crisis
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a crisis which was about to
turn from the widespread tragedy into a total catastrophe.
The
total victory of the Croatian forces over the Serbian
paramilitary forces in Croatia, and in the neighbouring
Bosnian towns of Drvar, Grahovo, Glamoe and Mrkonjić Grad,
was crucial to the successful completion of the Dayton
agreements. As most representatives of the international
community have systematically neglected the vital role
of Croatia in the termination of the war and humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to stress
the immediate and positive effects of the Croatian military
operation "Storm": (a) It enabled the establishment
of peace as a necessary prerequisite for the return of
refugees and displaced persons to their homes; (b) It
promptly eliminated the suffering of the civilian population,
for humanitarian corridors were finally opened and intensely
used; (c) It hastened the release of a large number of
detainees from prisons and concentration camps; and (d)
It intensified the search for missing persons and/or mortal
remains.
The
drama of Bihać and its successful termination by Croatian
military forces illustrates two important points: The
Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces were determined
to pursue vigorously the policy of ethnic cleansing as
long as there was even a slight chance to establish "Greater
Serbia"; and decisive military action is the only
effective way to terminate the suffering of civilians
population in isolated and besieged enclaves exposed to
brutal aggression. One must conclude, therefore, that
the role played by the Croatian military operation "Storm"
in the successful termination of the war and humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been systematically
underestimated. Those who underestimate the positive role
of Croatia probably have a hidden political agenda, and
thus view a strong and stable Croatian state and army
as a threat to their interests in the region.
The
Current situation and the role of Croatia in alleviating
the consequences of the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
The
role of Croatia remains important today for these reasons.
Croatia has allowed Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina
to remain in the formerly occupied Eastern Slavonia and
Baranja (these are the Serbs from Bosnia who entered that
part of Croatia when it was occupied by Serbian paramilitary
forces). This humane policy has caused significant social
tensions in Croatia, but it has also helped the efforts
of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where the return of large numbers of Serbs would increase
instability. Furthermore, the Croatian government and
people still bear the costs of accomodation, food, and
health care for almost 120,000 Croatian refugees from
Bosnia and Herzegovina. On one hand, the Croatian state
budgeted supplies and monies for rebuilding the destroyed
houses of Croatian Serbs who fled to the Serbian part
of B&H (Republika Srpska). On the other, Croatia is
unjustly burdened with financing the accomodation of the
Croats who were expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina and
still cannot return because of the inertness, sloth and
negligence of the UN forces and international community
(12).
The
response of the international community has been insensitive,
if not openly immoral. Namely, Croatian refugees from
Bosnia and Herzegovina have settled in houses and/or apartments
of Serbs who left Croatia, simply because no other place
was available for the constantly arriving refugees. Now,
the international community is exerting a constant and
heavy pressure on Croatian authorities to evict the Croats
from the Serbian homes; but at the same time, UN and NATO
forces do nothing to secure the safe return of these exiled
Croats to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So the
vicious irony is that Croatia must support large numbers
of Serbs from B&H, while, and at the same time, it
provides care for more than 100,000 Croats who are unable
to return to B&H. These goings-on greatly enhance
the return of Bosniac-Muslims to their homes in B&H;
and it is clear that the efforts of the international
community are focused almost exclusively on realizing
that goal.
However,
neither Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Croats in
Croatia benefited from that policy, however, the Croatian
state is being financially and politically punished for
being helpful and cooperative. As there are still many
displaced persons in Croatia, whose homes and property
were completely destroyed by Serbian aggression, this
policy is certain to cause serious social and political
tensions and destabilize Croatia. Whereas its citizens
of Croatia that Croatia bears the heaviest economical
and social burden in helping to alleviate the consequences
of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they simply cannot
understand why they should be hostages of the political
situation in the former Yugoslavia. One hopes that the
international community is not intentionally blind to
the absurdity of this situation. Clearly, the international
community should objectively evaluate the role of Croatia;
and, at the same time, it should provide the means to
resolve the humanitarian crisis. Giving token financial
help only prolongs - not solves - the refugee problem.
Conclusions
The
purpose of this article was to discuss and highlight the
crucial role of Croatia in the management and termination
of the humanitarian crisis caused by the aggression of
the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The efforts of Croatia, especially in
the first phase of the crisis, were much more substantial
than the efforts of the international community and other
neighbouring countries.
Between
1992 and 1995, Croatia accepted and cared for more than
500,000 refugees from B&H; it thus secured the basic
precondition for the survival of B&H as a state -
the survival of the major part of its civilian population.
The
Croatian military operation "Storm" in 1995
saved the lives of thousands of civilians in the Bihać
area, as well as demonstrated the most efficient way of
dealing with humanitarian disasters in isolated and besieged
enclaves. Although it was apparent that "Storm"
was the only workable solution, the international community
did not apply it Vukovar, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo, despite
the presence of UN troops. The inertness of the UN machinery
and the endless deliberations of NATO, and especially
the lack of decisive initiative during the first phase
of war, were prime generators of the humanitarian crisis
and contributed to the tragic results. The European Community
and the UN were unable to protect the lives of civilians
or to prevent grave breaches of international humanitarian
law. On the other hand, the international community did
deliver food and similar basic humanitarian needs; this
occurred, however, only in situations and areas with a
low risk of armed engagement, or when the humanitarian
convoys were protected by disproportionatelly strong armed
forces.
Although
at war, Croatia invested heroic efforts in alleviating
the humanitarian crisis in B&H. The socioeconomic
burden of those efforts was tremendous - Croatia invested
more than 1,000,000.000 U.S. dollars from its State budget
just for the care of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Even today, Croatia plays a key role in repairing the
consequences of the humanitarian crisis. Namely, about
130,000 Bosnian refugees are still accomodated in Croatia,
for most are still unable to return to their homes. Conversely,
international pressure on Croatia to speed up the return
of Serbs from B&H or Yugoslavia back into Croatia,
is a constant source of social and political tensions
and a heavy economic burden. In comparison, the help which
Croatia receives from the European community and other
countries is at best symbolic.
A
careful analysis of the Croatian contribution to the achievement
of the Dayton agreements and the resolution of the humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly reveals that
the positive role of Croatia has been seriously underestimated
and down-playedby the international community. Moreover,
the biased focus of the international community on the
role of Croatia in the unreasonable, but probably unavoidable,
conflicts between the two victims of Serbian aggression
- Croats and Bosniac-Muslims - has obliterated the obvious
fact that Croatia had the crucial role in saving the lives
of half a million inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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