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Intelligence
in Transition -
The Case of Republic of Macedonia
Grozdan
Cvetkovski
Skopje,
Macedonia
ABSTRACT
In Macedonia, intelligence
gathering dates back more than 100 years. However, the
modern structure and system was for almost half a century,
was directed by Yugoslavia during the last fifty years.
The Macedonian Intelligence Agency was officially established
in 1995. Its status and function were defined by law,
but there were obstructions and attempts at revision;
that is, the restoration of the previous model. This caused
a three-year delay in the transformation and establishment
of modern Macedonian modern. Conditions have gradually
changed since 1998, and the Intelligence Agency has begun
to operate as a separate state institution for foreign
intelligence. Preparing a case study of the development
of intelligence in a post-communist state faces the challenge
of representing conditions comprehensively and objectively.
This challenge cannot be met fully, for the time period
under analysis is still in transition, the data incomplete
and fluid. Hence, the time of the adjustment of the secret
services to the conditions and circumstances will differ.
Introduction
or Basic Dilemmas
Preparing
a case study of the development of intelligence in a post-communist
state faces the challenge of representing conditions comprehensively
and objectively. This challenge cannot be met fully, for
the time period under analysis is still in transition,
the data incomplete and fluid. Hence, the time of the
adjustment of the secret services to the conditions and
circumstances will differ.
The
decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the
end of the Cold War acutely demonstrated the turbulence,
shocks, and controversies within and around the intelligence
services of former communist systems. In fact, it is an
impressive indicator of the "child diseases"
that intelligence contracted in the transition from a
totalitarian to a democratic system. The problems and
dilemmas arise, basically, from two tendencies. The first
and radical one, is total nihilism and anathema towards
all former structures, followed by an effort to disband
them using "revolutionary" methods and then
forming completely new ones. The second tendency is a
counter reaction to the first principle; that is, some
things should probably be changed, but in the way that
allows things to remain as before. However, it was immediately
apparent that both approaches were in deep collision with
the stated goal of bringing intelligence into conformity
with the Euro-Atlantic orientation.
Thus,
the decade transition of intelligence services was a critical
time of profiling and adjustment, which in some post-communist
countries is still in process. Proof of that are the recurring
reports of diverse intelligence activities, affairs, and
scandals. Because of the above, analytical "vivisection"
of intelligence in transition, is analogous to an orthodox
believer facing this dilemma: If he tells the absolute
truth, he will be right before God, but he will make superior
angry. If he beautifies the unpleasant truth, he will
satisfy the vanity of his superior, but he will conceal
the truth before God.
Hence,
obtaining a comprehensive and objective "tell-all"
of intelligence is to be hoped for, but probably would
prove a mirage. Simply put, today's facts and truths are
tomorrow's fictions and biases. Because of recidivism
of prejudice and negative fixations from the former system,
intelligence services find it difficult to break with
the past. The abandoning of the old without a new set
of values or clear rules in place leaves the role and
function of intelligence activity in transition countries
either adrift or in limbo.
History
of Intelligence in Macedonia
Intelligence
in Macedonia historically has deep roots. Although the
intelligence service was formed formally and officially
in 1995, its existence actually dates back more than 100
years. In 1896, the Central Committee Congress of the
Secret Macedonian-Odrin Revolutionary Organization formed
a secret police unit to observe the "internal and
external enemy." The intelligence service was under
the jurisdiction of the "investigative division"
which conducted surveillance, collection of evidence,
and detection of enemies. But this was the romantic, idealistic
part of the revolutionary fight of the Macedonian people
at the close of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.
Modern intelligence in Macedonia is organically connected
with the previous Yugoslav security-intelligence system.
Specifically, during the Second World War, documents dealt
with creating an information network and infiltrating
the most sensitive areas of the occupying forces, all
within the framework of the united Yugoslav national-liberation
authority.
The
modern structure and function of Macedonian intelligence
(for almost half a century) was determined and directed
both by the State Security Service in the Federal Secretariat
for Internal Affairs and by the corresponding federal
intelligence services of the Ministries of Defense and
Foreign Affairs. However, the ideological component was
the main pillar of this powerful communist security-intelligence
structure.
The
monopoly for a united system of internal and foreign intelligence
was founded on broad, repressive police powers with the
added flavor of classical political police. The spheres
of competence and powers was broad and diverse, but still
the main task was to collect data and prevent individuals,
groups, and organizations from undermining or destroying
the constitutional socialist self-management order. Thus,
the main thrust of foreign intelligence was focused on
"external enemies", with a special emphasis
on "adversary emigration."
All
intelligence services from former Yugoslav Republics operated
as an integral component of the Federal State Security
Service. There was no authentic, independent intelligence
service; it was part of the security system which had
long had the power, authority, and prestige, and thus
had established itself as the dominant security pillar
in the former united federal state.
Security
and Intelligence System in Republic of Macedonia
The
modern history of the autochthonous Macedonian intelligence
is an integral part of the short history of independent
and sovereign Macedonia. With the implosion of the former,
structural changes in the former one-party totalitarian
security-intelligence sphere were mandated. The first
was to differentiate between intelligence and counterintelligence;
that is, to set up spheres of competence, and to induce
cooperation between civil and military services. This
first step guaranteed that there would be no arbitrary
or vague interpretations of the jurisdictions of the civil
and military services in the conduct of domestic and foreign
intelligence.
The
lack of understanding between the two services and their
reluctance to merge overlapping functions prolonged the
reforms of Macedonia's security and intelligence system.
Five years later, following the declaration of independence
and autonomy of our state, a Law established the Intelligence
Agency as the sole and special body of state administration
for conducting foreign intelligence. The Law was a logical
epilogue to the reorganization of the Interior Ministry.
The State Security Service was divided into the Security
and Counterintelligence Directorate and remained within
the Ministry; the Intelligence Agency was designated a
special state institution. The status thus defined differentiated
between counterintelligence and foreign intelligence and
set out their spheres of competence.
Unfortunately,
the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate (to which
the Defense Ministry Counterintelligence and Intelligence
Sector belonged) continued to raise objeactins and obstructions
even after the status and functions of the Intelligence
Agency had been legally defined. The players of this often
public dispute argued to continue the status quo, each
protecting its old positions and concerns. One, that "the
Defense Ministry had no intention of leaving military
strategic intelligence to the Intelligence Agency";
the other, that "the Intelligence Agency should be
placed under the Interior Ministry and should operate
as an organizational unit within the Security and Counterintelligence
Directorate." These arguments and accompanying actions
were unsuccessful; they were transparent attempts to restore
the organization of the security and intelligence structures
which had been part of the former system.
The
doubtful reasoning and spurious effort in support of the
status quo (i.e., for "cementing" the former
State Security Service) was a paradigm of the "mental
code" of the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate;
they simply did not want (or failed to understand) that
internal and foreign intelligence are different entities
and thus must not be confused. They were convinced that
both components (counterintelligence and intelligence)
could operate jointly.
The
Security and Intelligence Sector at the Defense Ministry
also ignored the fact that intelligence gathering today
is an exclusively civil function, relatively detached
from the executive power, especially from the police and
military structures. In fact, the current Defense Law
only determines internal security in defense. The military
units collect data and information via operational and
tactical reconnaissance conducted in the unit's zone of
responsibility and through military attaches.
The
reasons for this division of tasks between strategic and
tactical military intelligence are to avoid duplicating
or overlapping the agents' networks and to avoid or eliminate
unnecessary expenditures, tasks and activities. Also,
military-defense structures are usually regarded as a
narrow framework for conducting strategic intelligence,
which has a higher significance for a state.
Towards
Modeling of a Modern Intelligence Service
However,
unlike democratic states which are pragmatic and rational
when modeling stable, efficient intelligence services,
post-communist countries (many still "fluid")
have to overcome the left-over doctrines and dogma from
the former system; i.e., party influence, political narrow-mindedness,
and revenge. Following the old model of an intelligence
service generates instability and criminalization in the
countries in transition.
The
practical experience of the German BND after World War
II illustrates the importance of intelligence when national
interests are concerned. Germany's top priority was to
safeguard the state and its national interests. Because
of his expansive professional experience (which was crucial
to preserving, developing, and maintaining tradition),
former Nazi General Reinhard Gehlen was given the job
of forming a new German intelligence service. The main
objective of the German nation was to suppress political
foment and political paranoia, which unavoidably lead
to loss of confidence, increased opposition, destruction
of the service, and, eventually, loss of illusions and
the desire to create democratic institutions.
However,
this view of a modern intelligence service was not favored
by other countries in transition, including the Republic
of Macedonia. Fortunately, the attempts to restore the
old, worn-out model were unsuccessful. However, the young,
undeveloped democracy of the Republic of Macedonia still
faces latent, chronic temptations and challenges to the
establishment of an efficient, professional, and expert
intelligence model.
Vestiges
of these misunderstandings affected the Intelligence Agency's
ability to function and carry on its work. Because of
the lack of office space, materials, financial aid, and
manpower, two years passed at "idle speed."
The Intelligence Agency only began to function in the
second half of 1997. The working staff consisted of employees
from the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defense.
However, it was immediately apparent that among them were
those no or negative professional references, poor work
records, and ones who were (deliberately) put on the "transfer
list". Problems soon surfaced in adapting these personnel
to the new intelligence service. They found it difficult
to abandon ingrained police standards, rules of work,
and behavior, and to adopt a different methodological
approach regarding operational and analytical intelligence
work.
For
post-communist countries in transition, paramount was
the necessity to depoliticize or, better, remove the party
influence on security services. In principle, this view
was ideal; however, in reality its implementation was
impossible; for such an undertaking in a period of transition
is a long-term process, its results uncertain.
Party
influence in the old system dominated all spheres; anything
could be politicized; debates were endless. Intelligence
services were not exempt, being the "driving force
of the only party." However, the imperative to change
the system demanded quick liberation from the virus of
party influence and an adjustment of the professional
rules regulating every day operational and analytical
work. But events proved that these rules were not only
ambiguous, unclear, and confusing, but also contradictory.
In
countries in transition, negating party influence and
de-professionalizing the security and intelligence services
remain a priority; however, recidivism of the one-party
system is a survival technique of the ruling party. Instead
of recruiting public officials who will work in the interest
of the state, regardless of the political party in power,
untrained personnel are recruited who are sympathetic
to and promote the development schemes of the ruling party.
However, in practice, party soldiers sooner or later become
the gravediggers of the party and the national interest
as well. For it is absurd and tragic when marginal, inexperienced
figures, who also lack professional credence, become modus
vivendi and creators of intelligence.
The
past decade of transition showed that party soldiers are
used to support and solidify the power structure. However,
at the same time, the "power" was not only ungrateful
but quick to sacrifice its soldiers, all with the end
of remaining in power. This attitude corroborates the
conclusion of Zbigniew Brzezinski that the "journey"
away from communism will probably last for as long as
its "stay" in it. So the period of transition
for post-communist countries (optimistically forecast
to end in ten years) proved an illusion. It is now clear
that it will be indefinitely longer.
Some
problems in implementing reform programs were caused by
the lack of full cooperation between the President of
the Republic and the Government. Because of different
political options, the cooperation between the two holders
of the executive power (the President, who was from the
ranks of the former government, and the new Government,
formed after the parliamentary elections in 1998) was
fragmentary at best. Thus the unbalanced competence in
the sphere of intelligence between the Government and
the President of the Republic had a negative influence
on the functioning and establishment of the Agency; namely,
pursuant to the law, the Government has the authority
to authorize and adopt the acts for the organization of
the work and systematization of jobs, and to determine
the means and methods of work; it also determines the
budget for the Intelligence Agency. The President of the
Republic has the authority only to appoint and/or discharge
the Director of the Agency. Thus, although the law provides
that the Director answers to the Government, in practice
that liability was not always operable. As a result, following
the resignation of the Director in 1999, the President
unilaterally appointed an acting Director of the Intelligence
Agency, who was discharged a year later by the newly elected
President of the Republic.
Since
a Law on the System of National Security has not as yet
been passed, there is no precise demarcation of the spheres
of competence of the segments of the security and intelligence
system. Instead, the bases for the organization, operation,
and spheres of competence and cooperation are regulated
by special laws relating to the services and fields for
home and foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence. Thus,
for instance, in the current Law on the Intelligence Agency,
this obligation is regulated by a general provision which
is not applicable to other security structures. The absence
of a legal regulation for the national security system
is relevant, for it has been demonstrated that in regular
or emergency situations, special laws cannot standardize
forms and obligations for mutual communication and exchange
of information.
Causally
connected with the above is the presence of a body with
executive power to coordinate the tasks and activities
of the security-intelligence structures. This would enhance
forecasting, which is invaluable if the political leadership
is to make suitable decisions.
However,
the negative experiences regarding the status and functions
of intelligence are now old news. It is a fact that conditions
are changing significantly in all respects. The objective
obstacles of space, material, and work conditions have
been removed. A basic organizational structure now overlooks
the selection of staff and the establishment of partnerships
relations with a number of foreign intelligence services.
Its result is a small, but modern, efficient, and professional
intelligence service. In fact, the organization, development,
and function of intelligence services in transition countries
is a continuing process, requiring constant review.
The
turbulence and ferment that racked intelligence services
in former communist countries produced a crisis of identity.
This was reflected in an erosion of the established service,
caused by the vacuum created after the break with the
former ideology, and the difficulty of implementing a
new system of values. These concerns impeded the efforts
for fast and efficient reform of post-communist intelligence
services.
In
this interregnum, the media's role is to report accurately
and thoroughly affairs, scandals, and piquances connected
with intelligence activity. Their obligation to report
the facts that they uncover is a given. In most cases,
however, the media do not stop with just printing the
facts. They may start with them, but they immediately
go on to make inferences and judgments based on them;
the result is an opinion piece expressing the biases and
politics of the newspaper's publisher.
This
style, deliberate or not, often leaks security-intelligence
knowledge and data. This style and manner derived mainly
from the confused atmosphere during the transition, but
more probably from political manipulation. There are two
explanations. On one hand, the former, highly bureaucratized
intelligence structures erected a "bronze gate"
to shield their activities. On the other, the democratic
public and media favored and fostered maximum transparency.
The first tendency is rigid and seclusive. The latter
is extremely liberal and open. The latter approach, however,
overlooks the fact that absolute transparency is counterproductive;
in addition, it questions the possibility and even the
need for intelligence services.
Politicians
who mistrust intelligence officers discreetly continue
to make them instruments of everyday political and - sometimes
narrower - party objectives. Intelligence officers, in
turn, "read" the politicians' minds and then
provide "adapted" knowledge that satisfies their
wishes and expectations. This symbiosis is the product
of the vanity and frustration of the new "democratic,"
transitional politicians, and the moral and mental gymnastics
of the intelligence officers.
Black
and White Views
Another
important issue is whether officials from the former State
Security Service should remain in the new intelligence
structures. This question was posed by the political paranoia
that arose after the destruction of the communist system.
Two attitudinal responses (black and white) emerged. One
was that the secret services generally represented the
classical mafia organization, based on violence and total
citizen control. In truth, these accusations can be somewhat
substantiated. However, to the mafia's benefit, its main
function was to protect national interests from external
threats and negative influences.
The
second response merges with the first; it then proceeds
from the prejudice that in post-communist intelligence
structures (after ten years of transition), conservative,
like-minded persons, and desperadoes who oppose reforms
are one of the factors generating organized crime. Time
has shown both the black and white view are an unconvincing
alibi meant to mask the incapability of the new authorities
in post-communist countries.
After
the break with the old ideology, post-communist countries
began letting go their personnel who were the most loyal
and professional and who had survived the security barricades.
However, post-communist countries soon realized that greater
damage was caused by the dissatisfied and rejected intelligence
officers released from their ranks than by their opponents.
Because of this, and to avoid compromising and depleting
the services, "consolidation" rejected the philosophy
of a two-sided, strict division of intelligence activities.
The new approach to intelligence activities would afford
equal treatment of both potential enemies, allies, and
partners.
One
reason for this change in attitude was the unprecedented
harassment of former intelligence officers after the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Some officers, to make a living, established
contacts with representatives of foreign intelligence
structures and released concrete intelligence data, names
of agents, networks, etc. Some of the dismissed turned
to private enterpreneurship and established consulting
offices, detective and security agencies, and became consultants
in the media and other legal businesses, in which their
professionalism and expertise were welcomed. They knew
the proceses for quckly gathering and organizing data,
and possessed the analytical skills needed to evaluate
and forecast.
A
third group was involved in organized crime; they affiliated
with mafia structures and had the status of so-called
"outside associates"; or they entered a close
circle of politicians and became their instruments.
These
ex-officers had the expansive knowledge, experience, and
connections, but they were not in a positoin to exploit
it. In some terrorist actions, in addition to the terrorists,
the mafia recruited former intelligence officers; they
became "hit men," professional executors, murderers
for hire.
Thus
was created a shadow intelligence structure, a parallel
form of influence in politics and the economy. A new,
powerful network of business advisors was created from
the ranks of former intelligence officers. But only the
"firm" was changed - from the Government to
their own firm, an established company, or a criminal
organization.
Initiative
for Balkan Intelligence Conference
The
many obstacles faced by the post-Communist intelligence
services leave the false impression that their aims were
amiguous and their competence suspect. But if one considers
the fact that their security-intelligence segments have
always been slow to alter or change old habits and adjust
to new forms of technology. Historical examples are illustrative
enough; and transition is just the latest proof for this
conclusion.
One
asks the question now: what are the future expectations?
The most serious question faced is how to complete the
transformation? The answer will probably come from the
collective thinking and imagination of those deciding
the function and role of intelligence in the new democratic
and legal milieu. In this context, intelligence in the
Republic of Macedonia functions as part of the Balkan
and European market of information. The initiative now
is to establish a Balkan Intelligence Conference as a
forum of civilian intelligence services from central and
eastern European countries. Members would exchange intelligence
information and views and cooperate bi- and multi-laterally.
Finally,
one must concede that intelligence in transition involves
slow, carefully planned and monitored change to achieve
the "new reality." I am convinced that intelligence
and political astuteness will prevail.