The purpose of this article is to discuss the changes in the tasks and roles of the Hungarian Military Intelligence Office (MIO). The introductory paragraphs give a short view of the historical roots of Intelligence, then go on to cite milestones of MIO history, and end with an outline of the organization of the MIO, stressing its strong link to Intelligence gathering and decision making. The major parts of the article explain first, how the MIO has adapted and responded to the challenges facing modern-era Intelligence agencies; and, second, its proposed restructuring, the result of Hungary's NATO accession. The concluding portion contains a summary of the MIO's goals.

The author discusses the fate of the Foreign Intelligence Department of the GDR, which he headed for over thirty years, and of its colleagues and agents since the reunification of Germany ten years ago. There was no transformation of this service after the implosion of socialism; instead, it was liquidated, and criminal prosecutions followed which continue to this day. The author describes how this is connected to the West German leadership goal of the "de-legitimization" of the GDR. The operations of the western services are described, as well as the actions of their collaborators, who agree to make available, for a price, their knowledge of sources, files, data and other evidence in order for criminal prosecutions to be launched; i.e. the "Rosewood" operation of the CIA, and the decoding of the data carrier "SIRA" and its significance are discussed. The author holds the view that the criminal prosecution of the colleagues and agents of his service violates the internationally recognized legal concept of "equality before the law". Of the approximately 150,000 political indictments initiated since the reunification, 7,099 were for espionage. The article also addresses other subjects, such as the inhumanely high prison sentences in the United States. The author feels that, after ten years, a political gesture should be made which would remove the last vestiges of the Cold War.

Although a formally non-aligned country with strong economic and security links to the Western powers, Sweden nevertheless developed an expansive national intelligence system during the Cold War. After the tumultuous shift of European security policy between 1989-91, Sweden realized immediate benefits in the area of national security; it went from the exposed position of a front-line state in the Baltic to an embedded position behind a new Cordon Sanitaire to the east. As other small European countries, Sweden in the 1990s was thus faced with the task of aligning its national intelligence system with new international premises and a broadened, but largely unknown, future security agenda. The attempts to reform its system offer insights into the process involved in changing intelligence agendas and institutions, and into the problems facing national intelligence policy caused by globalization and European integration.

The nations of the world increasingly are conducting business collectively, through international organizations. Intelligence services, traditionally focused on serving the needs of single nations, are being called upon to work within a larger international framework and to cooperate with counterpart services in pursuit of shared objectives. Decisions about sharing intelligence information present special difficulties and dilemmas when they must involve international organizations. This article traces the evolution of intelligence sharing policies - largely from a US perspective - and offers some proposed guidelines for making more effective use of intelligence in a multilateral context.

The author concludes that the world will most probably remain rife with conflict even in the twenty first century and that the traditional role of intelligence will not only continue but will increase in importance. He characterizes the international situation as being "more of the same historically"; that is, the existence of several different centers of power and mutual conflicts based solely on national interests. In order to protect and promote one's national interests, sovereign states will, on one hand, require its own military forces, and, on the other, its own intelligence service. In the future, the goals and priorities of intelligence services will be subservient to the interests of state policies, and the collection and analysis of information obtained by "special means" in support of national foreign policy will apply universally to all world intelligence services. The most important changes will take place in the technical aspects of intelligence. However, in spite of fears expressed about an "Orwellian" solution, which could in the future be at the disposal of intelligence services as a result of technological advances, the author believes human sources, humint, will remain the main intelligence tool. As far as "rules of the game" are concerned, they will also remain the same, though sporadic attempts will be made to devise some internationally acceptable framework for intelligence activities.

The issues, the activities and the relations preceding the formal international negotiations have increasingly become an area of a special theoretical interest. The prenegotiation or the prenegotiation phase is part of the broader issue of the dynamic interactive process of international negotiations. The Southeast European region or the Balkans, in particular its people and political leaders, could utilize much of the conceptual experience of prenegotiating in coping with the multitude of major and minor real and potential conflicts and other issues. Prenegotiations provide an opportunity to approach and be involved in managing significant issues, including conflicts, without taking the risk of formal commitments, as well as facilitating the very negotiations in areas as determining the participants, the agenda, etc. A basic benefit from prenegotiations by all parties is the possibility to understand better the specific mechanism of shaping the partner's and the own party's commitment to negotiate. Switching from the traditional bargaining model of negotiations to the problem-solving model in the Balkans, utilizing to the most the third-party capacity and the seminar and workshop experience of dealing with particular issues in an informal way are special accents in the prenegotiation potential applied to Southeast European issues.

The newly established situation in Kosovo, after the conclusion of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, has not resolved the open issues but, instead, introduced new questions in regard to internal, regional and European positions of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, questions which will in the long term be a burden on the security situation in the explosive "Balkan powder keg". The first priority in Kosovo is a speedy and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which will present a serious test for the international community. Results here will affect success in various moves for reconciliation in a variety of conflicts. On the Kosovo political scene, the main struggle in Albanian political bodies will be between representatives of former UCK-Tachists, which are characterized as extremists, and the moderate forces of the DSK, led by Ibrahim Rugova. In peacetime conditions, the moderate forces are slowly and effectively making political gains, and are more familiar with international community positions on multiethnic and multireligious entities as opposed to autonomy. In the area of security, serious threats might emerge from the former commanders in the paramilitary UCK formations, who are dissatisfied with their positions in the newly established transition government and civil administration.

The US undertook the Kosovo campaign without an appropriate coordinated military plan, for political reasons. The proper basis for Kosovo intervention was a valid strategic concern. Europe needs the US to operate out-of-area: only the US has the aircraft carriers, the lift capacity, the cruise missiles, the overhead reconnaissance capability, and other indispensable components of an out-of-area campaign. These are sensible criteria, which could help frame all debates about NATO intervention. Blair's address on April 22, 1999, offered a proposed doctrine for NATO intervention in non-member countries. It had five parts, and might be described as a NATO Powell Doctrine. "Are national interests involved?" Here, Kosovo qualifies fully as to the underlying reality. The Balkans remain a powder keg. The Vance-Owen Plan of cantonising Bosnia made sense, and should not have been dismissed by Secretary Christopher. The Russians have been essential to a solution. Wherever the Russian troops had been in control, the Albanian refugees would not have gone back, meaning a potentially unstable Macedonia. But with the NATO occupying force in place, NATO could dictate the terms of Russian participation.

Although Southeast Europe has been a source and scene of wider European conflicts in the twentieth century, crisis management by the EU, NATO, OSCE, succeeded only temporarily in extinguishing the fire and removing the sources of conflict. Therefore, the international community should apply short-term crisis management and devise long-term proposals for the region. The Stability Pact may indeed achieve a stabilization of the region if regional players are included and their long-term goals are incorporated into the integral strategy for the region. Both regional governmental and non-governmental think tanks could significantly contribute to the creation of progressive solutions within the comprehensive strategy for the region and thus to the success of the Stability Pact as the main vehicle of the strategy.