For Russia, the Balkan states rate a high regional priority.
From a geopolitical view, the region's problems are an
unremitting threat to European and, by extension, world
stability.
Many
of the regions' animosities are ages old and obdurate.
To these are added new problems, mainly recent and internal,
such as a plethora of refugees that have a dangerous,
destabilizing effect on the area.
For
this and other concerns, the Balkans are a point of tenderness
for European security, provoking new challenges for the
continent. So a long-term objective must be the integration
of stable Balkan states into mainstream Europe.
The
international community must find the means to prevent
new conflicts. The EU, NATO, and the countries of the
region must play a positive stabilizing role. The reputations
of European organizations and their officials are at stake.
The
outbreak of violence along Macedonia's northern boarder
with Kosovo, along with trouble in southern Serbia and
continuing unrest within Kosovo, did not come as a nasty
surprise to Russian experts. They easily noted that the
main problems of the region had not been solved by the
NATO bombing.
Let
me emphasize here the importance of non-military measures
for the management of conflicts. At the critical early
stage of conflict, all non-military means and pressure
(economic, diplomatic) must be applied. Nevertheless,
how effective this approach is remains a question.
At
the same time, the means to respond to this new generation
of threats to European security must be in place. These
are mainly soft security, yet the responses will have
consequences affecting peace and stability in Europe.
NATO-Russia
cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management in the
Balkans dates from 1995 and the creation of IFOR for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Russian forces joined IFOR in January 1996 and continue
to contribute to SFOR. Russian participation in SFORII
consists of 1,300 men of a total of 20,000 (following
the 1999/2000 restructuring and reduction of troops).
Russian
participation in KFOR in Kosovo consists since 1999 of
3,000 men (less than 10% of the total), who are deployed
in zones of Russian responsibility in the northern part
of the American sector along the border with Serbia, the
southern part of the French sector, and in the northern
German sector. There is a Russian Headquarters in the
British zone (at Velne), a Russian base at the Pristina
international airport, and a military hospital. No Russian
soldiers are in the Italian sector.
Russian
participation in SFOR and KFOR is through special arrangements
between NATO and Russia. Russia does not participate in
planning or decision-making. Like other non-NATO forces,
Russian troops take orders from SFOR and KFOR commanders
via their respective multinational divisional headquarters.
There are Russian liaison officers at SHAPE. Thus, in
SFOR the First Russian Separate Airborne Brigade (in Ugljevik)
operates under Russian command but is under the tactical
control of the US-led Multinational Division (North).
The
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council follows the NATO-Russia
Founding Act of May 1997. The two sides agreed to consult
on a wide range of security issues, including peacekeeping,
international terrorism, military strategy, and nuclear
doctrine.
The
NATO air campaign of March-June 1999 against Yugoslavia
caused Russia to withdraw from the Founding Act when the
air-strikes began. In July 1999, meetings of the PJC resumed,
but discussion was restricted to cooperation in peacekeeping
operations, in particular the NATO-led Kosovo force KFOR,
which Russia joined. In early 2000, NATO Secretary George
Robertson and Russian President Putin met and both indicated
a clear interest in improving relations. Soon after that
the PJC resumed its regular meeting schedule.
Now
to be decided is how to proceed in the future, how to
develop cooperation between NATO and Russia in conflict
management, and establishing the role of the PJC. SFOR
and KFOR are a success story of cooperation between Russian
and NATO troops. There may be political disagreement at
the top, but on the ground there is a common understanding
of the security problems.
Crisis
management denotes long-term engagement. The results of
this cooperation are positive; relations with NATO have
improved, but some frustration remains on the Russian
side. Russian representatives consider that their views
are ignored by the NATO Commander. NATO has avoided the
issue of the returning Serbian forces to Kosovo. Nevertheless,
Russia and NATO support the return of the Serb minority
population to Kosovo and its protection. The wider task
of fighting chaos, crime, drug-trafficking, and the spread
of Islamic extremism in Europe must become a priority
for Russia-NATO cooperation. PJC could strengthen its
institutional basis by creating a permanent secretariat
and a new cooperative framework, so that Russia could
participate in the planning and management of NATO operations.
The
EU crisis-management force is in the making; it will be
a division of labor between the US and Europe-EU, the
latter concentrating mainly on soft security tasks. I
support cooperation between a future EU crisis management
force and Russia. In this context, both parties decide
where and how such a force will be used as the EU becomes
more engaged in Southeastern Europe.
It
is also necessary to consider a possible US reduction
of its military presence in Bosnia or a general withdrawal
of its troops from Bosnia . The existence of Bosnia, and
its becoming a democratic, multiethnic state, depends
on fulfilling the Dayton agreement. Some suppose that
if troops are withdrawn from Bosnia, Bosnia will fall
apart. But are the Europeans responsible for developing
a peace-keeping force, completely replacing the US forces?
The EU countries have not expressed enthusiasm; such an
outcome causes only concern in Europe.
After
a withdrawal of American troops from Bosnia or their reduction,
would Bosnia remain under NATO control or be transferred
to the EU? Could OSCE provide leadership in managing operations
in Bosnia? If so, this would allow the participation of
all parties in the Bosnian operation, including non-members
of the EU. 1995 arrangements concerning Russian participation
in SFOR could be redefined. SFOR could be transformed.
The
Kosovo problem can be resolved by implementing the UN
Security Council Resolution 1244; by unequivocally supporting
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia;
and by assuring autonomy for Kosovo as an integral part
of the country. In the present situation, NATO needs to
assume a tougher stance towards the KLA Albanian militants.
Without
a stable, democratic, and multiethnic Yugoslavia, there
can be no stability in the Balkans. Yugoslavia should
become a base of its stability and security. The full
integration of Yugoslavia into the international community
would be achieved by lifting all remaining sanctions -
including the embargo on arms imports. Now more than ever,
Yugoslav leadership and institutions of power need the
understanding and aid of the international community;
only then can the continuity of the political and economic
transformation of FR Yugoslavia be assured.
Negotiating
the future status of Kosovo will begin after the scheduled
elections in Kosovo in November, 2001. The mission of
the international community is to force Kosovar politicians
to play a positive role in stabilizing the region. Wider
autonomy with political integration of Kosovo within Yugoslavia
would be optimal despite the opposition of the radical
wing of the Albanian Kosovar community. Any other scenarios
can only elevate the extremism of the Macedonian Albanians.
Now
is the time for every state and the international community
to decide whether they support those who want to build
a democratic, multiethnic Yugoslavia, or those who spread
ethnic division.
The
international community must admit that in Kosovo, southern
Serbia, and Macedonia evidence of international terrorism
abounds, and firm barriers must be in place to prevent
another explosion in the Balkans. After NATO's bombing
campaign in 1999 and the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK, Kosovo
has become a hotbed of terrorism.
Macedonia
faces pressure from the most openly extreme Albanian circles,
unquestionably the source and cause of insecurity in the
Balkans. Macedonian security is guaranteed by NATO; so
it is the international community's responsibility to
curb nationalism in the region. It can start by not implying
- directly or indirectly - that forming new states is
even a remote hope.
Terrorism
must be decisively opposed, for its nature and essence
have distinctly changed. Under the verbal tent of "nationalism"
congregate criminal anti-social elements and groups. But
these extremists will not succeed in staging a repeat
Kosovo adventure.
Today's
extremists are attempting to provoke the Yugoslav and
Macedonian governments to use force against ethnic Albanians;
they hope that the western media will again raise the
question of non-proportional use of force, ethnic cleansing,
and civilian casualties. But it is now clear to the world
that the actions of the terrorists do not enhance or promote
the interests of the peoples who live in these areas.
Nevertheless, attempts to negotiate the end of armed violence
seem only to further radical, terrorist activity.
The
international community faces problems not only affecting
the future of the Balkans but also the security of Europe:
that is, how to stop the violence, the ethnic cleansing,
the multiple civilian catastrophes, and the flood of refugees?
The solutions are not in unrestricted bombing or a massive
military presence. New approaches that stress and reflect
the political will of the countries involved are in order,
actively supported by the international community.
To
achieve this, Moscow proposes that regional states be
responsible for assuring strict respect for the basic
principles of international relations which are incorporated
in the UN Constitution; such as recognizing the equality
of states and respecting territorial integrity; the disuse
of force, and an intolerance of use of one's territory
for the organization, support, or participation in military,
semi-military, or terrorist activities. This document
could be attached to the OSCE as an annex to the Stability
Pact in the SEE. Implementing this proposal would change
the Balkans from a center of tension and turmoil into
a region of peace, stability, and prosperity.
What
other risks, threats, and challenges to European security
now exist in the Balkans? The political risks are characterized
by the incompetence and backwardness of democratic institutes.
Some countries can be described in modern political science
as "failed states"; the central authority cannot
effectively control the country. When analyzing Balkan
events the emphasis should be on the problem of central
authority . Only in stable environments can the new Balkan
states complete economic changes and become a presence
in the marketplace. At present, the states are dependent
on foreign credit, technology, and power resources.
The
societal risks are caused by the generally low standard
of living of a large part of the population. Unemployment
and economic emigration have reached a high level. Add
to this the economic burden of supporting a flood of refugees.
Regional
cooperation is linked directly to European integration.
The people of the peninsula see themselves as a part of
Europe.
There
are a host of regional and sub-regional initiatives that
are designed both to boost regional cooperation, and hasten
accession to the EU. Russia participates in these: the
SEE Stability Pact (full participation); the process of
cooperation of the SEE states (Russia is invited as observer
to the meetings of ministers of foreign affairs); the
Black Sea economic cooperation (full participation); the
cooperative initiative for SEE - SECI (participation).
Russia is a guarantor of the Dayton agreements, the negotiator
under article V of appendix 1-A Dayton concerning stabilization
in former Yugoslavia and its environs.
The
range of Russian participation covers maintaining security
and cooperation in the region and taking part in its economic
reconstruction.
In
the area of energy power, the Balkan countries traditionally
import Russian fuel and other energy resources.
Russian
oil YUKOS signed a $20-million contract with JANAF to
upgrade the Adria pipeline and integrate it with the Druzhba
pipeline. The new company, YUKOS-Adria, will carry out
the project, which will result in the export of five million
tons a year of Russian crude oil via Belarus and Ukraine
through Slovakia, Hungary, and the deep-water port at
Omisalj. YUKOS has guaranteed 2.5 million tons (50,000
bbl/d) for the pipeline; this will give Russian exporters
a direct route to world markets via the Adriatic Sea,
bypassing the congested Bosporus Straits.
Croatia
is a stable, reliable political and economic partner of
Russia in the region. Intensive political dialogue at
different levels between Russia and Croatia now exist
and are expanding. Bilateral documents were signed, the
major one being a mutual declaration of friendship and
cooperation (1998).
Concerning
trade and economic cooperation with Russia (about 700
million dollars), Croatia plays the leading role among
the countries of former Yugoslavia. This figure could
increase to one billion dollars in the near future, given
the Croatian potential in the areas of telecommunication
equipment, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, construction,
and tourism.
The
main objectives of bilateral relations are these:
To
develop regular political dialogue with the Balkan countries
based on international law, common interests, and mutual
respect.
To
intensify the participation of intergovernmental committees
and commissions so as to heighten their success in resolving
current issues.
To
maximize the mutual benefits that accrue from Soviet /
Russian technology and technical support.
To
expand traditional historic ties with the Balkan countries,
especially in science and culture.
To
employ the skills of the Russian Ministry on Emergencies
in solving specific regional problems.
