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Prospects
for Stability in Southeastern Europe
Gordon
N. Bardos
Harriman Institute, Columbian Universit, USA
Since
the death of former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman
in December 1999 and the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic
in October 2000, it has become commonplace to talk about
"the Aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession,"
as if the wars and chaos of the past decade in Southeastern
Europe were mainly driven by these two men, and now that
they are gone, peace and democracy will inevitably follow,
and international policy in the region can now be considered
successful. Richard Holbrooke, for instance, claimed that
"Yugoslavia's tragedy was not foreordained. It was
the product of bad, even criminal, political leaders who
encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, political,
and financial gain."1 Along similar lines, Warren
Zimmerman has noted that "Yugoslavia's death and
the violence that followed resulted from the conscious
actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated,
circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic
designs. Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down."2
A rather confused version of this argument is provided
in a review of the Balkans by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS), which claims that due to
Milosevic's overthrow, "Although terrorist incidents
and localized violence will continue "in the Balkans",
the Balkan wars, which repeated themselves with terrifying
monotony during the last century, are now over."3
Here we have a perfect contradiction: now that Milosevic
is gone, there will be no more war in the Balkans, even
though these wars repeated themselves "with terrifying
monotony" for at least 85 years before Milosevic
came to power.
In
this paper I would like to argue something quite different.
First, I will argue that the international community has
had relatively little success in its attempt to control
developments in Southeastern Europe. Second, I will argue
that that the reason why the international community has
been unable to control developments in the region is because
of a fundamental misunderstanding or misinterpretation
of what has been driving the process of the disintegration
of the former Yugoslavia. Third, I want to argue that
the crisis in Southeastern Europe-if we define crisis
to mean the struggle to create and sustain stable democratic
states- is far from over.
I.
Judging the Success of International Policy
After
more than a decade, most of the problems facing the states
of the former Yugoslavia still have not been resolved.
What has changed over the past ten years is that the locus
of the crisis has shifted from the northeast - Slovenia
and Croatia - to the southwest - Bosnia & Herzegovina,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo and
Montenegro), and Macedonia. Even Albania has been in a
state of almost chronic instability since 1997. And in
this latter group, the political, constitutional, and
state questions which were open at the beginning of the
1990s are far from resolved.
Looking
over the events of the past decade, I would argue that
the international community has had relatively little
success in fostering stability, or imposing its will,
on the peoples and states of the region. International
diplomats were unable to prevent the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia, and it took 43 months to bring the fighting
in Bosnia to an end (and then largely on terms unacceptable
to the local factions). Postwar experiments in nationbuilding,
state-building, and running international protectorates
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have proven disappointing
(to say the least). And despite 10 years of advance warning,
international diplomacy was unable to prevent the wars
in either Kosovo or Macedonia.
Moreover,
despite the "international community's" official
policy and rhetoric about supporting multi-ethnicity and
multiethnic states, over the past decade the international
community has presided over the formation of ever-smaller
mono-ethnic entities. Thus, the former multi-ethnic Yugoslavia
has been replaced by a host of states and para-states
that are now over 90 percent mono-ethnic - Slovenia, Croatia,
Republika Srpska, Herceg Bosna, Bosniac-Bosnia, and Kosovo.
And we have yet to see what will happen to the rest of
the FRY and Macedonia.
II.
Misunderstanding History
Instead
of simply criticizing international efforts in Southeastern
Europe or placing the blame for events over the past ten
years on one or two individuals, what I would argue is
that the events of the past decade are part of an historical
and social process that cannot be controlled by the international
community, given the limited resources it is willing to
devote to the region. As Gale Stokes, a prominent historian
of Eastern Europe, has described this process,
Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one
of the major threads of postFrench Revolutionary European
history. The process began with the unifications of
Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states
at the end of World War I, and had its most catastrophic
outcomes at the end of World War II with the Holocaust
and the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe
. . . the wars of Yugoslav succession are not some aberrant
Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process
of European redefinition that has been going on since
the French revolution.4
Indeed,
as Istvan Deak adds, "the creation of nation-states
has been so much a part of modern European history as
to allow us to call it inevitable."5 If this school
of thought is a correct interpretation of modern European
history, and I believe it is, then the possibilities for
creating stable multiethnic societies in Southeastern
Europe are dim. But, unfortunately, I believe that the
effort to create even stable mono-ethnic democracies in
Southeastern Europe is going to be extremely difficult
for the foreseeable future.
III.
Factors Inhibiting Stability in Southeastern Europe
What
are the factors or realities on the ground that are inhibiting
or preventing the emergence of stable democracies in Southeastern
Europe? I would argue that they fall into three categories.
The first is the overall level of poverty among the population
of the region, and the weak state of the local economies.
The second is the existence of weak governments using
weak and/or ineffective political mechanisms. The third
category of problems is that most of the existing states/governments
lack popular legitimacy. We are unlikely to see major
improvements in any of these categories in the immediate
future. Let me now examine each of these categories in
turn.
The
first category of problems facing states in the region
is the depressed state of their economies. To emphasize
the importance of a strong economy for the maintenance
of a stable democracy, let me cite the words of a recent
study on the Balkans:
Few concepts in political science have been as widely
accepted (particularly in the Western world) as the
idea that socio-economic well-being is the crucial foundation
of a sound democracy. The formation and growth of a
middle class through robust economic development is
considered to be the bulwark of democratic stability.6
Unfortunately,
the reality of Southeastern Europe at this point in time
suggests that the economies of the region are far from
being able to support or sustain a robust middle class,
as income disparities and the gap between rich and poor
have both widened over the past ten years. Regional unemployment
(according to official statistics) is approximately 30
percentcountry by country, it ranges anywhere from 20
percent in Croatia to 60 percent in Kosovo. Living standards
in most of the former Yugoslavia have declined by 30-50
percent over the past decade. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Serbia, and Kosovo have suffered significant damage to
their economic infrastructures due to war. Most of these
countries suffer from a high degree of dependence on foreign
aid. In Albania, 9 percent of GDP comes from foreign aid.
In Montenegro, the state budget for the current fiscal
year is approximately $90 million. Coincidentally (or
perhaps not) Montenegro is also receiving approximately
$90 million in aid from the EU and the US this year. And,
of course, the provision of public services in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo is almost completely dependent upon the international
community.
Most
of these countries are also suffering from a serious outflow
of educated, talented young people, the so-called "brain
drain." In Albania, 40 percent of the teachers have
left the country since 1992. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
recent poll reported that 62 percent of the country's
young people would leave if they had a way out. It bears
stressing here that if these countries are going to have
a successful democratic transition, they are losing that
part of the population most likely to carry it out. Refugees
and displaced persons continue to cause severe economic
and social problems throughout the region. The devastated
FRY economy is currently supporting the largest refugee
population in Europe. The Bosnian economy is currently
supporting over 500,000 internally-displaced persons,
and the number of refugees and displaced persons from
the fighting in Macedonia is growing every week.
A
final problem regarding these economies is the phenomenon
and extent of organized crime in these societies. Milosevic's
Serbia, Djukanovic's Montenegro, and NATO's Kosovo are
the worst examples of this problem, but Albania, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia have significant and
serious problems here as well. The extent and strength
of organized crime syndicates in the region is so severe
that some observers claim they are the main impediment
to a successful democratic transition in the region. As
the former chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Ambassador Robert Barry, recently noted:
Organized crime and corruption are a more serious threat
to security and stability than military forces. The
growing nexus between extremist politicians, organized
crime, and the former communist intelligence services
is becoming ever stronger, and this is the single greatest
threat to democratic reform, economic investment, and
membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Rolling back
the mafia must be a central goal of the Stability Pact,
NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.7
Now,
the second category of problems: weak governments handicapped
by inefficient political institutions and mechanisms.
One obvious problem is the fractured party systems throughout
the region, and the politically polarized populations.
In Croatia, the government is made up of 5 (until last
week, 6) competing parties. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, in
the Federation, the government is composed of 10 different
parties. In Serbia, the DOS coalition is made up of 18
different parties, and I' ve lost track of how many parties
are formally a part of Macedonia's current national unity
government. Obviously, unwieldy coalitions made up of
competing parties will not be able to govern effectively,
or to agree upon the difficult decisions needed to implement
political and economic reform.
The
second problem in this category lies in the fact that
most of the governments in the region (with the exceptions
of Albania and Croatia) are using failed political mechanisms
inherited from the former Yugoslavia. Here I mean giving
sub-state entities high degrees of ethnic or territorial
autonomy; the use of ethnic vetoes, parity ethnic representation
in executive, legislative, and judicial bodies; decision-making
by consensus; and collectively rotating leaderships. All
of these are political mechanisms that failed to address
effectively the problems of the former Yugoslavia, and
they have not proven successful in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina
or in the FRY. Nevertheless, they are still political
"solutions" that the international community
will probably try to force Macedonia to accept in order
to settle the crisis there.
Finally,
the third category of problems inhibiting or preventing
the emergence of stable democracies is the fact that many
of the existing states in the region lack popular legitimacy
or support. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a recent poll found
that 72 percent of the people surveyed thought the RS
should either become an independent state or unite with
the FRY.8 Similarly, the results of the referendum of
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina organized in October 2000
suggest that a large percentage of the Croat population
in Bosnia is extremely unhappy with the current constitutional
arrangements there.9 Obviously, the Albanians in Kosovo
have no desire to remain a part of the FRY, and if anyone
is surprised by developments in Macedonia, it is worth
remembering that Albanians boycotted the country's 1991
referendum on independence. Montenegro is reassessing
its relationship with Serbia, and even if Montenegro does
become independent (which is beginning to seem more and
more unlikely) it will be against the will of roughly
half of its population. Albania also faces considerable
problems as its attempts to create a viable state within
its current borders face challenges from those who would
like to see closer ties between Tirana, Pristina, and
Tetovo. And even though Croatia is now overwhelmingly
a mono-ethnic country, the political system there is extremely
polarized between members of the current government, which
would like to wash their hands of the Croats in Bosnia,
and those who favor a more active and interventionist
approach in supporting them.
Conclusions
What
I have argued in this paper is that there are two ways
of understanding the problemsin Southeastern Europe. Much
of current international policy has been based on the
belief that the problems in the region have been caused
by one or two bad politicians. Now that those politicians
are gone, peace and harmony should characterize the region.
Clearly,
however, this is not happening, as the continuing problems
in Macedonia, Kosovo, the Presevo Valley, Montenegro,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that these crises have
different roots and different catalysts. What I have instead
proposed in this paper is that the wars in Southeastern
Europe over the past decade, are, unfortunately, a part
of the often bloody European model of state and nation-building.
This is a process of enormous historical and social force,
and it is naive to think that a donor's conference that
raises $5 billion, or a barrage of cruise missiles, can
solve these problems in the 3-4 years between American
presidential campaigns. As Timothy Garton Ash said in
a recent article, "What we are proposing to do in
our Balkan quasi-protectorates is not just to freeze war.
It is to freeze history."10 As we all know, however,
time waits for no one, not even for the international
bureaucrats trying to redesign and transform Southeastern
Europe. Consequently, since the so-called "national-questions"
of many of the ethnic groups of Southeastern Europe remain
unresolved, I fear instability will characterize the region
for the foreseeable future.
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