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From
Security and Intelligence Service
to Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency
Drago
Ferš, Former Director
Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency
Introduction
The
government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia signed a protocol
on accession of Yugoslavia to the Third Pact - that is,
on joining the Nazi and Fascist axis - on March 25, 1941.
As soon as the protocol was signed, the Communist Party
called the people to action, and from March 25-27, mass
demonstrations under the slogans "Bolje rat nego
pakt" (better war than the pact) and "Bolje
grob nego rob" (better the grave than a slave) took
place throughout the country. Outraged, Hitler ordered
his generals to attack immediately and dismember Yugoslavia.
On April 6, 1941, without a prior declaration of war,
the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces invaded
Yugoslavia and defeated the Yugoslav Army in twelve days.
On April 17, 1941, Yugoslav General Radoje Jankovie and
the former Foreign Minister, Cincar Markovia, signed an
act of unconditional surrender which took force at noon
the following day, April 18. The epilogue: Yugoslavia
vanished in a matter of days: the Germans, Italians, Bulgarian
and Hungarians had virtually dismembered it.1
On
April 27, 1941, a popular political movement, the Liberation
Front (OF), was established on the initiative of the Communist
Party of Slovenia, with the task of organizing a struggle
against the occupier. The OF was established by four political
groups: the Communist Party of Slovenia, the Christian
Democrats, the Slovene Sokol (Hawk) Association, and the
cultural workers. In autumn of 1941, they were joined
by several smaller political groups. The highest OF authority
was the Supreme Plenum (constituted on June 15, 1941)
which on Sept.16, 1941, proclaimed itself the Slovene
National Liberation Committee (SNOO). From June until
the end of 1941, the OF drafted its national liberation
program and announced it would take power once the war
was over and install a people's democracy in Slovenia.
After the capitulation of Italy, they called for assembly
elections of the Slovene nation in Koeevje (October 1-10,
1943) and elected the OF 120-member plenum and the ten-member
Executive Committee, which represented both the SNOO and
the SNOO Presidency, merging into the political and the
administrative authority. The foundations of Slovene statehood
were laid between February 19-20, 1944 in Ernomelj with
the election of the Slovene National Liberation Council
(SNOS) as the highest Slovenian representative body and
the SNOS Presidency as the National Committee of Liberation
of Slovenia (NKOS), which assumed the functions of the
government and formed the commissariats, commissions,
and other state bodies. On May 5, 1945, the SNOS issued
the Act on National Government, which was presented in
Ljubljana on May 10, 1945.
Thus
the OF, which initially had only political connotations,
expanded quickly into an administrative authority in order
to enable it to adopt normative acts of authoritative
nature, serving as the basis for the activity of its other
bodies.
Since
we intend here only to discuss the origins and development
of the intelligence and security bodies in Slovenia, we
will not address other areas of OF activity or the development
of state bodies.
Establishment
of NZ (National Protection)
Immediately
after its establishment, the OF answered the call of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia (CK
KPS)2 by issuing a special directive about national protection
and called for the establishment of Village Guards and
National Protection in towns and boroughs. Given the political
significance of the National Guards, the OF supreme plenum,
after having changed into the SNOO, issued a decree on
the protection of the Slovene nation, its liberation movement,
and unification, which provided a legal and factual basis
for the sanctioning authority. At the same time, the OF
leadership issued a resolution on the establishment of
the National Protection. The first organizers of National
Protection were the party's military desk officers, and
it got into full swing during the winter of 1941-42, developing
most quickly in the area around Ljubljana. It was established
to serve as the armed defender of the Slovene nation against
the aggression of the occupier, with the task of impeding
arrests, requisitions, and deportations of the Slovenes,
colonization of foreigners, burning of villages, and other
acts of violence.3
Establishment
of VOS (Security and Intelligence Service)
In
addition to the National Protection, the Security Intelligence
Service (VOS) was established, at the Initiative and under
the explicit patronage of the CK KPS. It was given special
powers in the struggle against the fifth column, traitors,
and enemy intelligence services. It also collected information
about the movements and activities of occupying troops
and traitors. The VOS was comprised of the most trusted
members of the KPS.
VOS
activities are best described by a passage from a letter
(29 March 29, 1942) by a member of the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,
Edvard Kardelj, to the General Secretary, Josip Broz Tito:
"The whole machinery actually consists of party members
and our people will not let it go nor permit its being
controlled. It is comprised of two parts: the intelligence
service and the executive apparatus. The leadership is
united, and consists of secretaries of the two parties
and the head of the service, who is directly tied to the
CK. The amount of intelligence work is immense, and numerous
reports arrive daily to district intelligence stations.
They even have a tidy file about people they watch, follow,
etc. They have "agents provocateurs" in the
White Guards organizations, etc. Thanks to this really
unique apparatus they are extremely well-informed about
everything and have already foiled attempts to infiltrate
provocateurs into the KP and OF. This apparatus functions
much better than the OVRA or GESTAPO in Ljubljana. They
have already collected precious military information (Italian
and German airfields, ammunition depots, fortifications),
although it was Gaš that has fallen with them, which is
what lies most heavy on him. The execution unit consists
of approximately fifty men, armed with revolvers and hand
grenades and well-trained. They have started now to increase
their number due to the increasing Italian terror and
the White Guards actions.4 These boys do all kinds of
things. Let me cite a few examples: informers and occupier's
servants are falling almost daily, etc. Police protection
is not sufficient for those who are targeted by the VOS
people. They come to a restaurant with revolvers, tell
the people there to raise their hands in order to identify
them if they are looking for somebody; arrest people on
the streets, whisk them away and interrogate them (the
arrested dare not call the Italians for help, because
the OF issued a decree stating that anybody who turns
to the occupier for help will be shot immediately), search
the White Guards houses, ransack and burn the White Guards
supplies, interrogate Gestapo members during the night
( in the center of Ljubljana), etc. For instance, they
raided the illegal printing press of Draža's people, and
seized the printing machine and characters they are using
to print the OF material, and 130 kilograms of paper.
They interrogated three "printers" who admitted
everything, then they burned everything they had printed,
loaded the material into the car, and drove off. This
is also how they apprehended some White Guards couriers
who were carrying leaflets against us; they seized the
leaflets and beat the couriers. Similar actions are being
taken by the National Protection, although they are more
of a military nature. The "security service"
is feared like hell, but it is precisely this service
and the National Protection and partisans - the OF - which
give the authority its real power.... The security service
has become so famous that nobody they target can escape…the
Italian police has been pretty helpless, considering that
the VOS people enjoys great support from the people, and
the traitors are afraid to show themselves."
The
VOS functioned as a specialized organization focused on
collecting information from the OF through field committees
in which "particularly trustworthy comrades were
in charge of organizing the massive intelligence service."
All information on "suspects collaborating in the
conspiracy against the nation" and on "all Slovenes
who collaborated with the Germans, Italians and anti-national
conspirators and the fifth column"5 was collected
there.
From
1941-42, the VOS was active in Ljubljana and Novo Mesto.
In other areas, it was still in its early stages.
Establishment
of the Military Intelligence Service
Due
to the need for intelligence and information on the movements,
strength, and activity of the occupiers, the Main Command
of the Slovene partisan troops was formed late in 1941,
and in 1942, a body of three members who were to establish
the military intelligence service to serve the needs of
the NOV (National Liberation Army) and the PO of Slovenia.
Initially, the military intelligence service was to be
organized independently, but experience showed that it
would be best to organize it the same way as the civil
intelligence service. Intelligence centers collecting
information and data from the Party and OF organizations
were established within the operative units. The area
of activity included "all information of relevance
for the Headquarters."
In
order to expand intelligence activities throughout Slovenia,
the CK KPS ordered the immediate formation of the KPS
Provincial Committee for the Littoral so that it could
"spread its network as soon as possible in Trieste,
where extremely important information was to be had."6
At
the same time, on November 27, 1942, the Supreme Commander
of the NOV and PO of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, gave
a special order to the General Staff of the NOV and PO
of Slovenia to start organizing intelligence services
in the Slovene Army. The order specifies the establishment,
within the GS, of a central intelligence center for Slovenia,
with four auxiliary intelligence centers (for Upper, Continental,
Lower Carniola, and Ljubljana). The auxiliary intelligence
centers would be divided into districts and then into
municipal or village commissariats. The division, brigade,
and battalion centers would be set up in the operative
units, whereas commissariats would be established at the
company level or lower. The intelligence center would
be set up within the area command on the liberated territory
and within the town command in the town center, the latter
in charge of organizing and expanding the intelligence
service within the village national liberation committees,
functioning through their commissars. The order also ordered
special "intelligence reports to be made every seven
days" to meet the needs of the Supreme Staff.
A
reply arrived from Edvard Kardelj on Jan 17, 1943, by
order of the Supreme Commander: :"We got your orders,
but our intelligence service has been structured somewhat
differently up to now, which is why we kindly ask that
you give us an answer regarding this question. Within
the CK KPS, we have had the "Intelligence and Security
Service Center", which is in the process of merging
the two branches of intelligence: military and civil.
The military is organized according to the system you
propose, and the civil according to the party's organizational
network. It has its people in the OF organizations and
elsewhere. The "special sectors" (occupying
army, White Guards, Mihajlovia's men, the police, etc.)
refer to the Center. This center sent its agents out,
and Angelo (Ivan Maeek Matija) will tell you more about
that. I hope we will soon get results there which will
also be important for you. We have done this at the request
of the Director (it has a secret for the Comintern Intelligence
Center) and we have directly connected our center through
Stevo (Ivan Krejaeie). We achieved success in Ljubljana,
but the apparatus doesn't yet exist in the field. We are
going to finish building it up in both branches, according
to your instructions. I think it would be the best if
things stayed the way they are, especially because of
the OF. This is precisely why we transferred this network
- along with the army - directly to the Party. Our center
will keep sending you reports. Angelo is going to bring
two reports. Neither will be of interest to you, although
there are some passages you should read (the issue of
Italy, 2nd front, and the presence of the Bulgarian Army
in Italy). Apart from the sectors you propose, we have
set up also the intelligence service for the Littoral
and Trieste (the Gorica Center). You will surely be in
agreement with this. As regards the rest, we will follow
your orders. Let us know if you agree with such a system.
Let me reiterate: the intelligence center of the CK KPS
here is above the intelligence center of the General Staff,
and merges army intelligence (according to your system)
with the civil (which you do not mention)."
Building
on and Enlarging VOS
The
order of the Supreme Commander of the NOV and PO of Yugoslavia
and the realization that the existing methods of the VOS
in Slovenia did not meet requirements induced the CK KPS
to prescribe special "Instructions for Building Up
the Intelligence Service in the Field and in the Army".7
The instructions called for the completion of two tasks
within the VOS organization:
a)
the VOS must be perfected to support through its intelligence
activity the military and political struggle against
the occupier. It is not meant to penetrate espionage,
but should become "the action weapon of the liberation
struggle for the destruction of the enemy on its own
positions by special methods intrinsic to the nature
of the VOS";
b)
the VOS must become a strong weapon which will deter
all attempts of the enemies of the Slovene nation to
impose national or any other kind of repression".
The instruction describes the VOS as a popular liberation
movement guided by the people's democratic rule, and
it is to carry out all the tasks assigned by the OF.
As such, the VOS is therefore "the most vulnerable
sector of the liberation battle and only the highest
KP leadership can be involved in its activities"....
This means that the appropriate Party organizations
must directly supervise and conduct VOS activities in
the interest of the entire OF". The instruction
states that the intelligence and security service, in
the field and the army, will be led by the VOS Central
Committee, which is directly accountable to the CK KPS
and CK KPJ and to whom both report. The VOS central
commission supervised and controlled two autonomous
areas:
The
VOS field sector (overseen by the VOS Central Commission)
The NOV and PO intelligence sector (led by the Main Intelligence
Sector within the Main Command of the SNOV and PO) which
was composed of the intelligence and counter-espionage
center.
The
military intelligence service was formed after the capitulation
of Italy and the liberation of vast territories, as they
requested continual defense. The NOV and PO General Staff
of Slovenia therefore issued the "Decree on Setting
Up a VOS Battalion"8 to secure Koeevski Rog. Other
"special VOS detachments to oppose the fifth column,
espionage, treason and other enemy actions were established
in the rear under direct command of the General Staff,
though they actually represented the well-armed VOS executive."
Abolishment
of VOS and Establishment of the Internal Affairs Section
(NZ Section)
The
Slovene concept of intelligence and security, therefore,
developed under specific circumstances; namely, during
the building of Slovene statehood. The peculiarities which
can be observed especially in distinguishing the political
organization from the organization of state bodies and
in the independent development of the highest Slovene
state bodies, expressed themselves fully after the OF
session in Crnomelj when the SNOO was transformed into
the SNOS. The separation of the political organization
from the state body was dictated by time, since the responsible
people were then expecting that the war would be over
by the fall of 1944. Namely, upon liberation it was urgently
necessary to present themselves at home and to the world
with as prefect as possible organization of all authority
bodies. During preparations for the session in Crnomelj,
the OF executive committee, which was also acting as the
SNOO Presidency (February 1944), proposed a re-organized
SNOS Presidency, along with the others9, and a section
for internal affairs to which all security-intelligence
services would submit. That Act disempowered the VOS as
a special agency with special authorization and powers.
The SNOS adopted three decrees in March 1944, by which
internal affairs were regulated: the establishment of
district stations of internal affairs sections; assigning
armed forces to the internal affairs section; and the
introduction and organization of the National Protection.
The district stations merged intelligence and National
Protection divisions. Intelligence officers of the disbanded
OF VOS went to the intelligence division, while former
security officials and guards comprised the new, armed
formation, the Army of State Security (VDV).
The
armed forces VDV was assigned to the internal affairs
section, but it was also part of the National Liberation
Army of Slovenia. The first organizational structure of
the internal affairs section was also created in March
1944. It was composed of four divisions: National Protection
Division, Intelligence and Records Division, Division
of the VDV Command, and Foreign Entities. This structure
remained unchanged throughout the activity of the section
and until the establishment of the National Protection
Department (OZNA).
The
internal affairs section composed the so-called BASE 24.
By
establishing the internal affairs section within the NOS
presidency, the NOV and POS completed the organization
of the intelligence service in the army and established
the intelligence division which had a sections in the
army, in the field, and abroad. The division also contained
a section for education, communications, administration,
and intelligence officers.
Establishment
of OZNA
Organization
of the intelligence services continued until August 1944,
when the President of the National Committee of Liberation
of Yugoslavia (NKOJ)10, Josip Broz Tito, issued (May 13,
1944) the Directive on Organizational Structure of the
National Protection Department (OZNA). This directive
prescribed the system of reorganization of the intelligence
and security system of the national liberation movement
in Yugoslavia. Edvard Kardelj was the first to inform
the Slovene political players of the preparations to establish
OZNA as an all-Yugoslav organization ( May 5, 1944).11
He wrote that the Yugoslavian party leadership had decided
to resolve the question of the fifth column in a different
way than had been done in Slovenia. This sector would
be removed from the internal affairs commissariat and
be subordinated to the national defense commissariat,
remaining within the military organizations. Kardelj wrote
further that there would be only two divisions left in
the interior commissariat: the administrative and the
militia. He pointed out that the term militia was introduced
in Slovenia to avoid confusing it with the newly established
section opposing the fifth column, the OZNA12.
Until
OZNA was established, intelligence and security tasks
were carried out by several organizations. In spring,1944,
the tasks were carried out by the Section for Protection
of Nations in central and western Bosnia, part of Croatia,
and Vojvodina; centers of territorial intelligence in
Croatian Vojvodina and Montenegro; intelligence division
of the Internal Affairs Section within the SNOS Presidency
in Slovenia; and intelligence service of partisan detachments
in Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. The reorganization of
intelligence and security could not satisfy the growing
needs of the Supreme Staff. OZNA was created as autonomous,
military organization whose unitary structure and centralized
leadership were to ensure a tough political line in the
intelligence and counter-intelligence services. All OZNA
tasks were divided into four groups, each comprising an
organizational unit.
The
first section (intelligence) organized intelligence activity
in other countries, enemy state institutions, and occupied
territory. It recruited agents and sent them to work outside
the borders of the liberated territory. It collected intelligence
on enemy agent networks, police, quisling state machinery,
and quisling military units. This was essentially an offensive
intelligence service, directed against foreign countries
and occupied territory.
The
second section (counterintelligence service in the liberated
territory) collected information from trusted informers
on political groups which had either joined the national
liberation movement or stayed outside it, on enemy agent
activities, and on armed groups of national traitors and
fifth columnists.
The
third section organized counter-intelligence protection
of armed forces and was active only in the NOV and PO.
The
fourth section performed statistical and technical tasks,
processed information, and kept records. This section
also included special photography, secret writing, radio
centers, and decoders.
A
fifth and sixth section were formed in OZNA in March and
April,1945.
The
fifth section was formed as a counterintelligence service
against foreign agent networks in Yugoslavia; that is,
foreign intelligence services. (In 1946, this section
merged with the new third section, which was created after
the military counterintelligence service became independent).
The
sixth section performed tasks dealing with counter-intelligence
protection of transportation, but was absorbed soon after
its establishment by the second sector.
When
the National Liberation Army changed its name into the
Yugoslav Army on March 1, 1945, the OZNA of Democratic
Federal Yugoslavia proclaimed by special directive ( March
24,1945) a new organization of the Yugoslav Army - OZNA.
OZNA was in direct command of counter-intelligence protection
of military command posts, institutions, and units. Sections
were set up within independent corps. In this way, the
OZNA section for the authority of the 7th Corps in Slovenia
was subordinated to the third section of OZNA for Slovenia.
This third OZNA section was in force until the end of
July, 1945, when the "military" and "civil"
part of OZNA began to separate and finally split in March,
1946. At that time, the Administrative Directorate for
Security of Yugoslav Army was formed from the "military
part" and the Administrative State Security Directorate
from the "civil part.
Since
OZNA was actually left without its third section after
the military counterintelligence service became independent,
it formed a new third section unconnected to the previous
one. It focused initially on reconstruction and operations
of the German intelligence service (especially GESTAPO).
Later, the third section assumed operations for all foreign
intelligence services, borders, and traffic of foreigners
(which were essentially the tasks of the fifth section).
After
the establishment of the Corps of National Defense of
Yugoslavia (KNOJ) on August 15, 1944, the VDV units merged
with it. The first was the Slovene Division of National
Defense. KNOJ was established as the armed military formation
which took over the task of protecting liberated territory
and the NOV hinterland. KNOJ was subordinated to the OZNA
directorate.
Directly
tied to the first OZNA section for Slovenia were the intelligence
organizations in Ljubljana and Trieste, which, due to
special circumstances, did not reorganize according to
OZNA instructions, but followed the principles of the
OF VOS. The first OZNA section for Slovenia was given
the special task of monitoring the situation in Istra
and northern Italy because of the expected disembarkation
of Anglo-American troops. A special line for Austria and
Germany, operating in Styria, was formed in the OZNA section
to collect military information on the approaching front,
and the activities of German intelligence services in
Styria.
A
special "CC" line was also formed in the second
section to collect information on fellow partisan combatants.
Gradually it was transformed and focused exclusively on
the so-called "internal enemy".
The
third section directed the surveillance of British, American,
and Czech missions at the Slovene GS and at staffs of
Zone Corps. It also monitored paratroopers who came to
the NOV from the English intelligence service.
The
fourth section continued filing information they had been
collected within the OF VOS since 1941. From initial information
files on 4,000 people, by the end of the war the number
had increased to 17,750.
OZNA
was led by a chief13 who was directly subordinate to the
Supreme Commander.
Redesignation
to UDV
In
spring 1945, OZNA was focused on the approaching military
defeat of the occupying forces, so in March, 1045, the
OZNA leadership started transferring tasks and cadres
to posts they would occupy when the partisan troops marched
into liberated Slovene towns. Every OZNA member knew before
the liberation where he would go and what duties he would
assume. It immediately occupied the headquarters of the
enemy's intelligence and police organizations, seized
and secured the archives, and started arresting enemy
agents and hostile elements. Simultaneously, they started
working under new structures appropriate for the post-war
period. After its arrival in Ljubljana, the OZNA occupied
the premises of the former bank SLAVIJA and started consolidating
the organization throughout Slovenia, particularly in
Ljubljana, Maribor, Celje, Novo mesto, Trieste, and Gorica.
After withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Trieste and
zone A (on 12 June 1945), a new OZNA was organized for
the eastern littoral district, with headquarters in Ajdovšeina.
OZNA
and the State Security Directorate (UDV) underwent after
1946 many security and intelligence changes due to topical
issues at that time: fighting gangs; protection of the
economy; Cominform; and bureaucratic aspirations)
In
1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDV was organized into
districts, and in 1947 (when the territory of the People's
Republic of Slovenia was divided into counties and localities)
into towns, districts, and localities. In 1950, when the
administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities
(see the Act on abolishment of authority, LRS Off. Gazette
no. 4/51), the UDV reorganized again.
The
intelligence and security activities focussed during this
period less on intelligence and more on security issues.
There was an emphasis on collectivism, equality, brotherhood,
social harmony, long term prospects, loyalty, and tolerance
towards those with different views. Deviation from this
set of values became an immediately issue for security
services.
Later,
the use of force was mitigated and when the process of
"decentralization of people's power" began,
intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization
in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness.
The Act on Internal Affairs (FLRJ Off. Gaz. No. 30/56)
and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs
Secretariat (SRS Off. Gaz. No. 10/59) regulated the intelligence
security authority in Slovenia as the prerogative of the
State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the
Interior. The next reorganization addressed issues within
the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border
traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and
dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
From
1963 - 74, security intelligence services dealt with a
series of domestic and foreign political events. At home,
there were political confrontation both before and after
the Brioni Plenum (1966), liberal flareups and massive
demonstrations in Belgrade (1969), "MASPOK"
(mass movement) in Croatia (1971), an incursion of a group
of nationalists (Raduša, 1972), and a revival of national
awareness in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia.
The most significant event abroad was the invasion of
the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia (1968).
These
were the circumstances at the time the first act on internal
affairs of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted in 1967(SRS
Off. Gaz. No. 13/67). According to this act, internal
affairs were handled directly by the municipal administrative
bodies and the republic secretariat of internal affairs
or by their provincial bodies. This was the first time
after 1945 that Slovenia gained control and greater influence
over its security organs and intelligence security service.
The State Security Service (SDV) was defined by law as
a professional service within the republic secretariat
of internal affairs (RSNZ). Naturally, most of its competence
remained within federal institutions, as prescribed by
the Act on Handling Internal Affairs Under Competence
of Federal Administrative Bodies (1971), which determined
that the federal secretariat of internal affairs coordinate
the work of the SDV in the republics and provinces. Further
steps were taken with the transformation of state administration,
adoption of the federal act on state administration (1978),
and the republic act (1978). The newly adopted act on
internal affairs tasked the Republic Secretariat of Internal
Affairs (RSNZ) with state security issues, which then
became RSNZ issues and were no longer given special handling
"at the RSNZ". This resolution remained in force
until the 1991 modifications of the act on internal affairs.
Intelligence
and security activity was organized in the following manner:
-
After OZNA was abolished, intelligence activity was
divided among various federal ministries: the Federal
Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Directorate,
i.e. Service14; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation
(SID), which collected foreign political information;
military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS
2nd Department.
- The Slovene SDV was not autonomous, but was tied to
the federal service which co-ordinated the work and
issued instructions.
- State security was regulated by secret legislation
(secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use
of special operations. The SDV performed house searches,
covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications
interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert
interception of letters and other consignments.
- Of primary interest to the SDV was the domestic -
identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic
enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing",
clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists,
and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed
less important and was under federal control. It is
interesting to note that an independent intelligence
directorate was not established until 1991.
- The SDV was a "political police", answerable
to the party organization from which it received its
guidelines and to which it reported. The SDV was so
deeply rooted in the political system that one of its
tasks was the preparation of "Political Security
Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally
all spheres of life.
- During its activity, the SDV enjoyed a wide range
of power, including classical police powers (identifications,
interrogations, and arrests).
- The SDV organization was constantly changing and making
improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit
in Ljubljana and smaller working groups in the field.
All information and data flowed into the central unit
in Ljubljana and sent on from there to the users. Field
groups had working contacts with the local authorities,
but did not answer to them.
The
role of Slovene intelligence and security changed after
1986, when a different mentality reigned within the Party
and the processes of democratization were initiated. The
situation was different in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.
Intelligence
security activities began to come under attack, and people
started writing about and criticizing the SDV. There were
no more taboo subjects. The party organization was abolished
in the SDV and the first attempts to introduce political,
i.e. parliamentary, control began.
The
Slovene SDV also had the role of protecting the Slovene
political authorities and at the same time had to exist
within the multi-national Yugoslav community. The Slovene
party and higher administration were the primary consumers
of information by the republic SDV, which explains why
the SDV came into conflict with the federal bodies. The
conflict between federal and republic interests forced
the republic bodies to make more decisions to protect
the constitutional order, which had been thus far sacrosanct.
In 1985 the Presidency of SR of Slovenia adopted a resolution
banning the SDV from acting against the republic's political
authorities (that is, against the President and members
of the SRS Presidency, CK ZKS Presidency, assembly spokesman,
executive council, presidents of the RK SZDL, RS ZSS,
TO ZZB NOV and president of the RK ZSMS). The council
for the protection of the constitutional order expanded
the resolution and extended protection from the SDV to
the entire leadership when it ordered that the Republic
Secretary of Internal Affairs was required to gain the
consensus of the Council for activities against presidents
and members of the presidencies of the social-political
organizations in the Republic (SZDL, ZSS, ZZB, ZSMS);
vice presidents of the SRS Assembly; union trade presidents;
vice presidents and members of the SSRS Executive Council;
members of the Republic Council; president of the SRS
Constitutional Court; president of the SRS Court of United
Labor; SRS public prosecutor; SRS social custodian of
self management; SRS public custodian; and president of
the SRS Commercial Chamber.
The
republic leadership thus protected itself against the
intervention of the SDV which by then was no longer ideologically
unified owing to changes in personnel and multinational
and heterogeneous cadres. This was the first time the
political and Party leadership of Slovenia had expressed
its distrust towards the SDV. Soon after, changes and
supplements to the Act on National Protection (RS Off.
Gazette 38/88) were introduced. This law determined that
"the RS Assembly, through a special body, exercises
control over SDV work". The appointment of a commission
to monitor the work was one of the most absurd decisions
made in intelligence security during the era of "social
democracy", since SDV activity was regulated by federal
legislation and regulations published in the secret Official
Gazettes. Neither the commission members nor its president
had access to these Acts. It was difficult to evaluate
information, since the commission had no investigative
powers or capability to verify information. The head of
the service was tasked simply to deliver requested information,
even classified, to the commission. The SDV was also still
receiving asks from the Party, although the supervising
commission lacked the powers to control those tasks. In
the same year (October, 1988), the Council for Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was established.
The above-mentioned events undermined the unity of the
SDV in SRS, which formulated its own, unpublished regulations
(sub-legal acts, ordinances, etc.). This made any protest
about violation of rights impossible, as the regulations
were inaccessible to the public.
Establishment
of Intelligence Section Within SDV Directorate
In
the late 1980s, a peculiarity unknown in other parts of
Yugoslavia came into existence in Slovenia. Due to an
increase in democratization and more "humane"
points of view, the term "bourgeois right" was
substituted for "internal enemy" in Slovene
intelligence and security practices. "Internal enemies"
had been clearly defined in the penal code and required
a legal response and punishment, whereas the term "bourgeois
right" did not require sanctions, though it was unacceptable
to the Party. The RS SDV could therefore act against the
"bourgeois right-wing" but were not required
to prosecute them. The Slovene political authorities took
an intermediate path which was less punitive than the
federal but nevertheless provided it with knowledge about
the growing opposition. Due to increasing criticism and
the processes of democratization, the work of the SDV
was reduced. In order harmonize the legal status of the
SDV with the current developments, the RS SDV leadership
prepared (March, 1989) a Directorate of State Security
Service law and set up within the SDV a section for protection
against the activities of foreign intelligence services;
a section to fight international terrorism; a section
to protect against the violent overthrow of constitutional
order; a section to protect individuals, facilities, and
specific areas; and an intelligence section. This was
the first time since the abolition of the VOS that a shift
was made from classical security to intelligence security.
A large part of SDV operations was re-directed into intelligence
collection .
Conflict with Federal Authorities
The
first democratic multiparty elections in April 1990, which
enhanced the process of democratization and led to a plebiscite
in December 1990, reverberated within the Federal Secretariat
of Internal Affairs (ZSNZ) and Federal State Security
Directorate (ZSDV), which were fighting to maintain control
over the SDV in RS. The latter became increasingly disunited;
it was still legally connected to the federal bodies,
but was becoming aware of the fact that it operated and
worked in Slovenia. Some professional cadres, especially
those in the "domestic field" (dealing with
the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, and
student movements), began leaving the service. Conflict
was increasing, and SDV archives were being systematically
destroyed. In its search for new roles, the RS SDV also
began to limit information it was sending to the ZSDV.
It ultimately restricted its information to foreign intelligence
services.
Along
with the weakening positions of the The ZSDV position
was becoming weaker and attempts by the JLA (Yugoslav
People's Army) Security Service to strengthen its position
in Slovenia and in the Slovene SDV were becoming more
numerous. The attempts failed because they depended upon
cadres of other nationalities still employed at the RS
SDV but who had no access to data bases and had no decision-making
power due to their "Yugoslav" orientation.
In
order to save what could be saved, the federal secretary
of internal affairs issued an act which mandated federal
bodies to perform an inspection in the RS SDV from 25
February-1 March 1991 with the goal of determining the
reasons for the failure of ZSNZ SDV to accomplish a unified
surveillance of subjects. Other questions to be answered
addressed were: harmonization of federal interests in
the Republic of Slovenia with Slovenian interests; decrease
in information intelligence from the Republic of Slovenia;
and decrease in quality, substance, and clarity of information.
In short, the objective was, as explained by the federal
secretary of internal affairs "to bring Slovenia
its senses". The secretary of internal affairs announced
this inspection in a letter of 11 February 1991. Slovenia
immediately rejected the move. The RS secretary of internal
affairs informed the federal bodies that Slovenia was
refusing the inspection because "such an inspection
violates current legislation" and reminding them
that a plebiscite in Slovenia on 23 Dec. 1990, voted for
an independent and sovereign republic in which constitutional
amendments regulating this area had been adopted. Since
the law placing domestic affairs under the control of
the federal administrative bodies was no longer in force,
the inspection was therefore impossible. The reply represented
a complete break in relations with the ZSDV.
Establishment
of VIS
Under
these conditions, regulation of security intelligence
and the role of the RS SDV had to be resolved. Even though
the Slovene democratic authorities rejected the "lustration
legislation" which had been adopted by other former
communist bloc countries, its decisions to disempower
the SDV, force administrative retirements, legislative
changes, reorganization and a reformulation of the work
program, leadership cadre reshuffles and, last but not
least, a renaming of the Security Intelligence Service
(VIS) created conditions in which the service was no longer
a threat, but still capable of confronting the increasingly
aggressive JLA.
The
VIS was legally regulated in 1991 by the Act on Changes
and Supplements to the Act on Internal Affairs, though
it had been adopted in 1980 and twice amended (1988 and
1989). It was organized as a RSNZ service responsible
for proposing measures addressing dangers to the security
and existence of the country. The work of the VIS included
tracking, recording, and analyzing information on activities
of foreign countries, their intelligence services and
other organizations, including terrorist, believed capable
of posing threat to defense, security, political, or economic
interests of the country. It was organized regionally
and empowered to use special operative methods (covert
co-operation and surveillance, purchase of objects, interception
of telephone and other communications and media, interception
of letters and other consignments, anti-interception inspection,
and technical protection of facilities), but it was forced
to relinquish classic police powers, thereby shedding
its label as the VIS "political police". Immediately
after it was established, the VIS found itself in a difficult
position, for the JLA, federal police, and customs authorities
began their aggression against Slovenia15.
The
VIS immediately focussed on information collection, and
discovering the intentions, goals, and activities of the
JLA and other federal bodies opposing independence. Within
its limits, it also thwarted JLA activities. For the first
time, the VIS disseminated information (through foreign
TV and radio stations) and assisted in spreading the truth
about events in Yugoslavia and Slovenia.
Even
though the VIS was professional and efficient, before
and during the aggression on Slovenia, later events brought
it to near collapse and retarded the further development
of the intelligence security system. However, as soon
as the last soldier of the Yugoslav Army left Slovene
soil, the first voices of dissent emerged between the
intelligence security service of Defense Ministry (VOMO)
and the VIS, which grew into open conflict in the following
years. The reputation of the intelligence security service
was called into question, and reached its lowest point
between 1994-9616. The reasons for this development were
numerous, among them:
1.
After the departure of the aggressor JLA from Slovenia,
the "value" of intelligence security information
decreased; what prevailed was glorification of the victory,
the concept of an all-consuming friendship with the
Western world, and the superfluity of intelligence work.
2. The foundations for the intelligence security system
had not been laid and the criteria for national security
had not been agreed upon. Intelligence security information
was being collected by different services with diverse
authorizations and powers.
3. The norms were devised based on short-term concepts,
and failed to address the differences between the new
and the former single party system17.
4. Intelligence security bodies (various services) were
dispersed throughout different ministries and subordinated
to superiors from different political representing different
political interests.
5. Due to earlier criticisms of SDV (i.e., uncritical
simplification and failure to distinguish between "internal,
counter-intelligence, and intelligence") the public
refused support to new services and reduced their efficiency,
as they were unable to acquire new agents.
6. Growing requests for the absolute disclosure to the
public made obsolete the concept of "SECRET"
which was still not defined under the new legal conditions.
Services' files were removed, agents' personal files
were made public, and controversial documents and archive
materials were misused or removed.
7. Intelligence security services were not under unified
parliamentary control until 1993. The control itself
was not exercised in practice, which resulted in frequent
deviations18.
These
factors politicized the intelligence security activity
to such extent that the word "UDBA"19 became
a synonym for evil and repugnance, and the term "UDBOVEC"
an insult which was legally sanctioned. Under these circumstances,
it was the opinion of foreign intelligence services that
Slovene intelligence was disintegrating and unable to
accomplish its mission, and that "Slovenia has become
a free training ground for the safe activities of foreign
intelligence services".
Establishment of SOVA
To
prevent further decline of the services, the Government
of the Republic of Slovenia adopted measures to end stagnation
and to further consolidate. One was the decision to remove
the VIS from the Interior Ministry and transform it into
a service of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.
Unfortunately, this measure was not fully implemented.
The VIS, which was renamed the Slovene Intelligence Security
Service (SOVA) did not become an autonomous service of
the government of the Republic of Slovenia, but was given
a supervising body composed of three ministers who were
to monitor the rights, duties, and authorizations of the
Service's Director and provide him with guidelines. Unfortunately,
the commission was formed on a political basis, without
considering the needs of trade-craft. Even though the
measure did not entirely regulate the intelligence and
security field (some tasks were still being performed
at the Defense Ministry), it represented a major improvement.
The
next positive step was the adoption of the Resolution
on Starting Points of a RS National Security Scheme (1993)
which defined "intelligence security activity"
as an instrument to provide the competent bodies with
important information and analytical and operative assessments
needed for making decisions about the security of the
Republic of Slovenia. The resolution also mandated the
State Assembly (the parliament) to formulate strategic
guidelines, direct the work of intelligence security services
and exercise parliamentary control, whereas the Government
of the Republic of Slovenia was to set priorities and
direct and coordinate the work of the Services.
In
order to regulate the intelligence and security in the
Republic of Slovenia, the Slovene government prepared
a draft on the law on intelligence security activity (1994).
However, it failed to win support of the parliament. Attempts
to regulate the intelligence security continued until
1999, when the State Assembly adopted the Act on Slovene
Intelligence and Security Agencies.
The
Act on Slovene and Intelligence Security Agencies (ZSOVA)
defines SOVA is an independent governmental service which
collects, evaluates, and provides users with information
to safeguard security, political, and economic interests
of the country20, as well as information on organizations,
groups, and persons who, through activities abroad or
in connection with foreign entities, constitute a threat
to national security and the constitutional order; it
also deals with security clearances. SOVA collects information
covertly and also utilizes special forms of information
collection such as monitoring international communications
systems, covert purchase of documents and objects, and
overt observation and surveillance in open or public places
by technical means. In exceptional cases, SOVA may collect
information through interception of letters and other
means of communication, including telecommunications,
if authorized by the competent District Court. The latter
can authorize the above measures in order to: combat covert
activities against the sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia, uncover operations of international terrorist
organizations, in cases of disclosure of classified information,
if preparations for armed aggression against the Republic
of Slovenia are underway; and to expose intelligence activities
of individuals, organizations and groups, and international
organized crime.
SOVA
is today a modern, professional, and efficient organization,
comparable to other intelligence security services around
the world. It is capable of dealing with more sophisticated
security challenges and actively cooperates with other
intelligence security services in the world as an equal
partner.
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