Case Studies
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The Civil War in Afghanistan
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
Author analyses (a) the causes leading to the Afghan Civil War 1979-1989 (the war is above all the result of global rivalries between the super-power states and conflicting political systems); (b) Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan (there is reason to believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation, skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies); (c) the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (brought about an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict, and brought about an abrupt international reaction, especially from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the Islamic world and China); (d) combat operations (the Soviet troops conducted mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very limited forces and equipment); (e) the national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (A civil war should end through consensus within a given society. Such a consensus has not been achieved in Afghanistan to this day, and therefore the war continues); (f) the Civil War without Soviet troops (After Soviet troops departed, the scale of fighting between the Afghans themselves increased); and provides (g) summations and conclusions (The Afghan conflict facilitated the defeat of the USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation between the two super-powers, socio-political systems, and military blocs. One million men passed through Afghanistan. The dead numbered 14,626. About 50,000 men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, and over 500,000 contracted various severe illnesses. In addition, 147 tanks, 1,312 armored vehicles, 233 artillery guns and mortars, 114 airplanes and 322 helicopters were lost).
Autor: Redakcija | Objavljeno: 18 tra 2000 06:19:00
The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Or the Unacceptable Lightness of "Historicism"
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The author in this study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because the current level of research does not enable this. The only way to understand this conflict is through facts, not prejudices. However, such prejudices are particularly acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors. They base their claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable in its destruction. Relying on mainly unpublished and uncited documents from the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually challenges basic and generally accepted claims. The author offers alternative responses to certain claims and draws attention to the complexity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been mainly viewed in terms of black or white. The author does, however, suggest that in considering the character of the war it is necessary to examine first the war in Croatia and the inter-relationship between the two. The main focus is on 1992 and the Muslim and Croat differences that developed into open conflict at the beginning of 1993. The role of the international community in the war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also discussed.
Autor: Davor Marijan | Objavljeno: 18 tra 2000 06:16:00
How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA into a Serbian Imperial Force
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The most significant changes in the JNA and the way they were carried out so that it could become a Serbian imperial force are identified and explained. The following is emphasized for its significance: (1) reorganization of the "ideological equality" type military; (2) the characteristics and the purpose of the reorganization that had been put into effect before the idea of creating "Greater Serbia" was made public; (3) war plans and the role of military strategy and its theoretical, organizational and trial foundation; (4) the implementation of such strategy in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the aforementioned, the Serbian strategic idea is explained, i.e. "...that in a low intensity conflict, including the prevention and elimination of extraordinary events, and counterstrikes from distance, the enemy be decisively defeated and Yugoslavia protected," which makes up the operational plan for the employment of JNA. Regarding the implementation of the plan in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the segment that is invisible, not always recognizable, in a word covert, but crucial for making own strategic decisions, is explained. The covert nature of the plan is always a good basis for debate, in which the exchange of ideas and views is a continuos process, and the result questionable. Therefore, it is essayed in this work to bring to light this other, less visible side.
Autor: Admiral Davor Domazet - Lošo | Objavljeno: 18 tra 2000 06:13:00
US Intelligence Community Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991)
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The author considers the relationship of the United States toward the former Yugoslavia, based on declassified documents (1948-1991) of the American intelligence agency. The US showed no particular interest in Yugoslavia after 1945, considering it a reliable Soviet ally. When the conflict broke out between Stalin and Tito in 1948, it was believed that a Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia was probable and that there was a possibility of American military assistance to Yugoslavia. In the mid-50s, it was evaluated that in the event of an armed conflict between the western and eastern blocs, the Yugoslav army could be relied upon as a Western ally. During the 1960s, American analyses became more critical of Yugoslav foreign policy, which was in open contradiction to Western interests (non-aligned movement, relationship toward the Israeli-Arab war). During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, American policy proposes a "very cautious and well-calculated" position toward post-Tito Yugoslavia, with America avoiding any kind of leading role or hasty initiatives. Evaluations of the internal situation in Yugoslavia grow with the creation of a unified Yugoslavia (which is in American interests), to the total disintegration of the country (the most dangerous scenario being the eventual outbreak of armed conflict, which would be halted with the introduction of Soviet troops into the eastern parts of former Yugoslavia and western troops into Slovenia and Croatia). American analyses do not lose sight of the fact that the regime in Belgrade is repressive, especially in its relations with Croatia and Kosovo, but conclude that the "Belgrade policies, while not ideal, serve western interests."
Autor: Dr Jordan Baev | Objavljeno: 18 tra 2000 06:11:00
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