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CASE
STUDY
THE
MEDAK POCKET
Miroslav
Međimorec
Canadian
Interpretation – Canadian Sources
“The
Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia Light Infantry/Battle
group was being commended..( )..for a heroic and professional
mission during the Medak Pocket Operation in the former
Yugoslavia in September 1993. In extreme peril and facing
enemy artillery, small arms and heavy machinegun fire,
as well as antitank and antipersonnel mines, members of
the 2.PPCLI Battle group held their ground and drove the
Croatian forces back. The exemplary actions of the battle
group caused the Croatian Army to cease their ongoing
tactics of “ethnic cleansing” in the Sector (South – author’s
remark), without question saving many innocent civilian
lives.” That is the quote from the citation the 2.PPCLI’s
Lt. Colonel Jim Calvin and a few hundred present soldiers,
protagonists of the Medak Pocket events, were awarded
by the Governor General of Canada and the Canadian military
forces Commander in Chief, Ms. Adrienne Clarkson, on December
1st 2002 in Winnipeg, Canada. That citation proves how
to impose a historical “truth.” Croats attacked Canadian
peacekeepers; a battle between them was waged, the Croats
were defeated and forced to withdraw, and after their
committed war crimes they became a nation with a tarnished
reputation in the eyes of Canadians and the rest of the
world. Was that really the historical truth? Or was that
an adapted, new truth, in which the Canadian Army was
embellishing something that did not take place and the
Croatian Army, state and its people were condemned for
actions they did not do perpetrate. Is that somewhat late
citation awarded as a cover for the ugly incidents Canadian
forces had been involved with in Somalia? Does that citation
help the Canadian Army reclaim the position and privileges
it had in Canadian society? Is the citation intended to
boost the Army’s morale and effectiveness in a time that
brings many uncertainties with it – even a proposal for
the Canadian Army’s radical reform and a new approach
to Canada’ involvement in the world’s peacekeeping, which
has been Canada’s pride? I do not think that the Canadian
Army, Canadians, or Canada are to be blamed for criminal
acts in Somalia. In Somalia, the brunt of guilt should
be put on specific Canadians involved, and they should
be punished. The same should apply to guilty Croatian
individuals in the Medak Pocket Operation. Much like Canadian
soldiers in Somalia, the evidence needs to be examined,
guilt proven and punishments should be passed without
changing the events of history.
After
a thorough investigation of the facts about the events
of the Medak Pocket some half-truths could be revealed.
Point
one - the citation the Governor General and Chief of Defence
awarded to Canadian forces for the mission accomplished
in the former Yugoslavia. At the end of 2002 the Defence
Chief disclosed the name of state as Yugoslavia, in order
to denote the place of the mission. According to international
law, UNPROFOR was a UN protection force with an initial
mandate applied to Yugoslavia. However, in September 1993,
Yugoslavia did not exist anymore. In its place, were the
five states that had been formed; the last one tried to
carry on with the name – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
It was not a UN member state. The four states created
from the former Yugoslavia were all UN member states.
If the unfortunate war had not been waged, the four states,
apart from sharing the same neighbouring area, would not
have any connection with the state that by that time had
already changed its name and constitution.248 Therefore,
in the citation, a much more adequate name to use would
have been Croatia, where the Operations had taken place.
When the citation was awarded, Croatia had already been
a UN member state, a sovereign state, for ten years. In
1993, (one year after international, including Canadian
recognition), one fourth of Croatia’s territory had still
been occupied by the aggressor (Serbia, Montenegro and
Serb rebels). The aggressor had been organized, armed,
and sent to occupy Croatia by that same former Yugoslavia.
Today – twelve years after Croatia acquired its sovereignty,
many a respectable historian and a journalist, state facts
already known to us. One of these writers is the 2002
Pulitzer prize authour Samantha Power. When writing about
the Belgrade strategy towards Croatia during that period,
Power calls it “the HYENA” strategy. This means “hyena”(
the aggressor)” refrains from its most aggressive actions
when international condemnation or pressure is at its
strongest. As soon as this ceases, the hyena continues
nibbling its prey. “249 The UN mandate was approved as
long as the formal Yugoslav state existed.
Point
two - The Canadian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief never
mentioned the name of the state that agreed on receiving
help from the peacekeepers, in order to achieve those
objectives – the full sovereignty and liberation of its
territory. The citation never mentions Croatia as a country
in which the heroic deeds of Canadian soldiers took place,
but names its army, the Croatian army – sic – “ill reputed”
because of its “constant ethnic cleansing”. It also mentions
the enemy, or, “Croatian artillery, heavy machineguns
and minefields” which to uninformed Canadians would suggest
that the enemies of Canada were the Croats and their “notorious”
army. While describing the difficulties Canadian soldiers
overcame in that unnamed country, whose army is called
“Croatian”, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief hasn’t chosen
the overstatements like “tanks, charges, heavy artillery
fire”250, but all the same she speaks of attacks being
repelled and positions that were kept under Croatian Army
pressure, the later aim being, the citation suggests,
to defeat Canadian soldiers.
Point
three - The motive. Why did Croats make such an effort
to overwhelm the Canadians? Did the Croatian forces try
to overrun and defeat the Canadians (and French) and therefore
start another war with Canada, France and the UN in general?
That is hardly likely, when one knows that at that time
(1993) Croatia was under adverse circumstances. It underwent
constant attacks from its occupied territory, international
community pressures (UN, EU), mistrust, and was considered
equally at fault as the RSK. This meant an open undermining
of Croatian sovereignty. Serbs were tacitly recognized,
their right to form a state within a state and a future
RSK secession from the Republic of Croatia was permitted,
if that meant an achievement of peace in the former Yugoslavia.
No, Croats were not up to opening a new front to wage
a war with powerful forces such as Canada or France or
with the UN. It is clear that one’s army on one’s territory
would defend its sovereignty, but even UNPROFOR had sometimes
behaved like an occupying force and not a UN protection
force.
Point
four - Croats were prepared to hold the ceasefire agreement.
By forming buffer zones in the Medak Pocket they were
up to reaching a compromise: allowing UNPROFOR to control
the Croatian territory, because they knew that was the
way to obtain their goal. The uncertainty and the slow
pace of the path was reluctantly accepted by Croatian
soldiers who were being killed or wounded in that area.251
Point
five - The Croats mistrusted the UN forces because until
that time, their behaviour proved to be questionable.
UNPROFOR has often shown sympathy for the Serbs, who were
skilled in manipulating it. Under UNPROFOR’s watch, the
Serbs tried to regain their lost territory.252 The Croats
experienced that during the Maslenica Bridge Operation.
Even UNPROFOR was afraid of a Serb military action – a
counterattack – as was quoted by the Sector South UN Commander’s
assessment given on September 16th 1993.253
Point
six - The Canadians were in a rush to implement the Medak
Pocket agreement because it was imperative that the international
agency, UN peace forces retain a degree of credibility
– and because they had proven many times to be inefficient.254
There were several more reasons UNPROFOR, especially CANBAT,
had wanted the situation in the field to change and to
impose the agreement without the Croatian side accepting
it, all of that not within the designated time frame.255
On the ground the Canadians had tried to change what had
previously been agreed upon between the UN and the Croatian
side. General Cot and the Canadians had not been satisfied
with such limitations, they considered the civilian bureaucracy
governing the UN ineffective – the soldiers would do things
better. That dissatisfaction (cost General Cot his position
as the UN Forces Commander) and transformed itself in
the impatience and their own specific rules of engagement
explanation. The stiff position UNPROFOR took versus Croatia
and its Army led to tensions, which were easily turned
into firefights, gun and heavy machinegun fire.256 On
one side the Canadians intermingled with the Serbs, while
on the other side, there were the Croats. In their reports,
the Canadians allowed for the possibility that the Croatians
were correct in that the Croats could have mistakenly
considered Serb provocations as Canadian ones, who fired
from their positions and consequently returned fire.257
The night conditions could favour this, because in the
dark most combatants are highly sensitive. In most armies
in the world these types of fire exchanges would be called
“scuffles”, “small scale incidents”, “small ceasefire
violations” – but the Canadians turned them into a large-scale
battle.258 This is how the non-existent battle259 took
place. “Canada’s largest scale conflict since the Korean
war”. Canada made that battle public and celebrated its
outcome no sooner than the year 2002 (for reasons already
explained), and the consequences of it are still felt
in Croatia. (Canada’s frigid relations towards Croatia
and a very strict visa regime imposed are a result)260
Emotional reactions of the Canadian soldiers, after finding
and seeing people killed in the Medak Pocket perimeter
are understandable, but it seems those emotions have clouded
the soldiers witnessing of the events. The Canadian foot
patrols were engaged in “hunting Croatians down”.261 What
they went through had, after the fact, formed what they
actually experienced. This was later given as the excuse
for the “decisive”, “strong” and even arrogant Lt.Colonel
Calvin and the Canadians’ behaviour, before facing death
and destroyed buildings. Canadians wanted to force their
way in the liberated areas of Divoselo, Počitelj and Čitluk,
earlier than agreed upon, only because they had “a hunch
ethnic cleansing was in progress”262, and they expected
“those bastards Croats”263 were up to some evil. They
wanted to start a “peace imposing” mission, a humanitarian
action, to save innocent civilian victims,264 although
UNPROFOR had never decisively answered to the crimes committed
by the other side. An example of this is the terrorist
sabotage on the Kusonja victims September 8th 1993 day
of remembrance – a day before the Medak Pocket operation
started.
I
do not question the existence of victims (and war crimes)
in the Medak Pocket. They were committed by those irresponsible
individuals who should have already been punished. About
alleged crimes, (they are alleged until proven otherwise
in a tribunal), the inquiry is ongoing. They are also
alleged because there was never any identification of
the victims to differentiate who were civilians and who
were military victims of war. Like granny “Danica,” being
glorified by Serb writer Momo Kapor.265 This granny had
often been viewed on Krajina TV programs. She was a Serb
heroine. A few days prior to the Medak Pocket Operation,
Kapor described her in a Belgrade newspaper as manning
the heavy machinegun and threatening the Croats. The old
woman Danica had been killed in the action. She later
became a civilian victim and proof for the committed Croatian
war crime. In the official data on Serb victims killed
in the RSK up until “Oluja”, not a single person killed
or missing in the Medak Operation had the exact location
or the manner of death attached to his or her name. Their
deaths are only listed as “killed during the Ustaša aggression”.
Why was such data concealed by the Serb military? In order
for all killed to become civilian victims? In order to
make the non-uniformed believe that in their ranks some
military order prevailed; that no old men and women took
part in fighting, or to make believe that in the Medak
Pocket there were only 400 poorly armed territorial defence
members, therefore civilians fighting.
So
the data speaks about those killed in fighting on both
sides, the pile of used confiscated arms, and facts about
combat units. The crimes did happen. It is necessary to
be exact in how many there were, who committed them, whether
they were commanded, done out of the criminal whim or
out of revenge. The indictments266 of General Janko Bobetko
and Rahim Ademi, speak of the commanding responsibilities.
The investigators have questioned Generals Markač, Stipetić,
Norac, Admiral Domazet, and are looking for the perpetrators.
It is only a question of time when the real culprits will
be discovered. The subject of this study does not deal
with why this was not done any sooner, and who the culprits
are, this is for the ICTY in the Hague or relevant Croatian
courts to decide.
Lt.Colonel
Calvin has for years since the Medak Pocket Operation
been active in achieving the citation for his troops.
He gave interviews, lobbied, attended the Canadian Parliament
sessions. In his thank you speech to MP’s for the Governor
General citation, Jim Calvin said: “…the citation is less
than to citate that the battle never happened…”267 And
so, the citation for something that did not happen, for
the battle, for the “intended, planned Croatian Army attack
on CANBAT”, “for the intended purpose of Canadian soldiers
to be killed and forced to retreat, their intended defeat
and surrender” has become the main proof that the battle
did exist, and that it “really happened”. A lovely logical
turn of words that served to soothe Canadian internal
political problems and served its main purpose – to re-establish
trust in the Canadian Armed Forces and to assure greater
financial aid to its retired soldiers.268
Canada
and UN Peacekeeping MISSIONS
Canada
has a long peacekeeping tradition. The first mission was
during the Korean war in Kapyong battle where 60 or so
Canadians were killed. That same battalion had been deployed
40 years later in the Medak Pocket, under the code name
CANBAT 1 / ROTO 2 / OPERATION HARMONY.269 The first Canadian
contingent of the UN force peace mission in the former
Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR – had been moved to Croatia from
Germany. It consisted of a basic unit – 1st battalion
“Le Royal 22e Regiment”, then the 3rd battalion “The Royal
Canadian regiment”, and one engineer platoon (pioneers)
of the First combat engineer regiment stationed in Lahr,
Germany. Engineers were a must for an area filled with
landmines (eastern Slavonia), where the Canadian contingent
was stationed at first. Canadian “blue helmets” were deployed
in Vukovar, later in Sarajevo, Visoko, Goražde and Srebrenica.
In Croatia they were deployed in Sector West and South.
The UN has required armoured transporter M-113’s, that
completely mechanized the regiment, to be exchanged for
trucks, for “blue helmets” to look as peaceful as possible.
Brigadier General Clive Addy declined that request (advised
by General Lewis MacKenzie) which later would prove to
be a great advantage.”270 Lee A. Windsor analyzed the
CANBAT organization: “...70 percent of soldiers in infantry
companies were reservists, seven out of twelve platoon
leaders came from the reserve, soldiers were prepared
for deployment according to squadrons and platoons – that
was enough for reconnaissance missions on observation
posts, and for the role of peacekeeping, but nobody had
the faintest idea that those platoons would have to join
and later form the battalion to engage in a battle.”271
2.PPCLI in the “Operation Harmony” were responsible for
the UNPA Sector West, situated in Croatia’s north-west
corner. There, Lt. Colonel Calvin and his soldiers had
among the belligerent sides, but also among friendly UN
troops, acquired respect for being honest, but hard soldiers.272
CANBAT
Armour
They
had armoured personnel carrier M-113, like those of the
American armoured cavalry. On the transporter a steel
turret was added to protect the gunner who manned the
Browning .50 caliber (12,7 millimetre) machinegun. Rifle
companies were armed with medium machineguns C-6 (7.62
mm calibre) and man portable antitank weapons, 84 millimetre
“Carl Gustav”. Infantry units carried C-7 machineguns
and C-9 (5.56 mm) light machineguns. The firepower of
the infantry company was supported by heavy armour – 81
millimetre mortars and TOW missile launchers, mounted
on armoured carrier’s M-113 turrets. Canada was the first
UN member to deploy such firepower in 1992 in Croatia.
After first arriving, the Canadians executed a military
exercise in Sector West, primarily to show the Croats
they were decisive in repelling any attack on UNPA zones.
Five months later the 2.PPCLI/Combat group had become
the most efficient and esteemed UNPROFOR unit. This is
why General Cot had chosen it for the Sector South mission.273
The armour on personnel carriers could protect Canadian
soldiers in Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, as well as
in the Medak Pocket, and TOW antitank missiles would garner
respect from all the belligerents. The 2.PPCLI Combat
group consisted of 875 soldiers, sergeants and officers.
Four hundred soldiers were reservists. The full name of
the battalion under the auspices of Princess Patricia
was the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry or for short, the 2.PPCLI, or militarily
even shorter the “Patricias”. Under the Canadian Army
code name “Operation Harmony” from April to September
1993 they formed a part of UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia.
After the Erdut Agreement in June 1993 in which the two
sides – the legitimate Croatian side and the self-proclaimed
Serb rebel side agreed on separating their forces – the
Canadian battle group under Lt. Colonel Jim Calvin’s command
and two motorized French infantry platoons started their
deployment in Sector South in order “to prevent further
Croat advancement, to oversee their retreat and to make
a “buffer zone” under UN control.”274 From the quote in
which Lt. Colonel Calvin claims that “this (Medak Pocket
Operation) was a unique action, similar to an offensive”
it is possible to comprehend how he assessed the situation
in the field and CANBAT’s position. He obviously did not
understand the political role peacekeepers had in Croatia275
and underlined its military character instead. Lt. Colonel
Calvin thought as a soldier would, he wanted to prevail
in the “offensive”, impose on his enemy, attack it, defeat
it, and if possible – to militarily excel.. The war between
the Croatian Army and the rebel Serbs - who were helped
by volunteers and professional soldiers from the Yugoslav
Army and the “Republika Srpska” Army - Lt. Colonel Calvin
considered to be a conflict in which the Canadians were
not deployed to separate the belligerents, but were to
fight against one side, the side that undermined the shaky
peace – and at that moment that side was the Croatian
Army. “…We have found ourselves literally as participants
of a small war and we were fighting for our lives… the
battle group held its position and after three days of
negotiations it repelled the Croatian forces and prevented
the “ethnic cleansing” of that area to continue.”276
The
Canadian opposition, antipathy, even hostility against
one side came as no surprise, because from earlier experiences
in eastern and western Slavonia, the mistrust and lack
of respect the Croats and Croatian Army had received was
visible. Expressions like “fucking Croatia” and “bastards”
used by Canadian soldiers were relevant to the Croats
and to clashes Canadians had with Croats in Garešnica,
Daruvar and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To illustrate
this point: the part of the Ministry of Defence liaison
office with the UN and EU (in the Short Analysis of the
UNPROFOR engagement plan realization) under the title
“UNPROFOR members misconduct” – on August 2nd/3rd 1992
members of CANBAT tore down and destroyed the flag of
the Republic of Croatia; on August 4th 1992 two members
of UNPROFOR belonging to the same unit had under the influence
of alcohol tried to steal an official Ministry of the
Interior vehicle; on September 20th 1992 at 13:00 hours
in “Papiga” bar in Pakrac Canadian members of UNPROFOR
started a fight with civilians; on the same day at 14:10
hours the members of CANBAT returned to the bar seeking
revenge. They cocked their weapons and tried to take prisoner
a reserve member of the Croatian police; on September
20th 1992 at 17:15 hours at a checkpoint, Canadians stopped
civilian Josip Stvara, beat him, gagged him and locked
him in a UNPROFOR bunker. The use of force and capture
had taken place out of the UNPA perimeters; on September
22nd 1992 at 21:45 in Pakrac, two Canadians, slightly
drunk, had insulted civilians and offered dollars to the
girls calling them whores; on September 22nd at 23:00
hours in Pakrac, Canadians beat up Croatian citizen Robert
Osterman a reserve policeman. The preconceptions with
which Canadians first came to keep the peace – the negative
ones about the Croats, “German allies”, and the positive
ones about the Serbs “pro-Commonwealth - allies in two
wars,” defined the relationship with the country they
found themselves in.277
Applying
the Agreement
“During
the Medak Pocket Operation, heavy shelling occurred along
the line, particularly in our area. We counted in one
six-hour period about one thousand rounds of artillery
on Donje Biljane and the company HQ area. They (Croats)
used multiple rocket launchers, 120 mm mortars, 105 mm
guns and lots of rockets. They used to use MRL’s against
Benkovac a lot and the shelling was going both ways too.
Somewhere around the middle of September we got word from
General Cot, the force commander of UNPROFOR, to be prepared
to go back and take over this area by force if necessary…”278
Describing the battle in which Canadians found themselves
(as the third party, in which as opposed to the French
in the Maslenica Operation, they didn’t have to remain
neutral), this participant suggests that the Canadians
were under a direct attack (as if they were a part of
the Serb forces). It is to be understood from one of the
Canadian reservists’ statements also, who obviously didn’t
understand what was happening around him, or he has just
repeated his superior’s opinion. “We were sent there to
stop an offensive operation, to repel the assailants and
to create a “buffer zone”. We were intercepted by the
heavy machinegun fire and mortar shells, and that lasted
for 36 (sic!) hours. “The peacekeepers” were forced to
answer with firepower.” The reserve soldier Marc Lundie
brags that “when the battle ended the Croats officially
reported 27 of their soldiers killed during the battle
with the Canadian army (other sources quote that number
as even higher – more than 100 Croats were wounded or
killed) while some Canadians had shrapnel wounds.”279
In that glorification, the praise of overpowering force
of the Canadian armour, the bravery of Canadian soldiers
and leadership is obvious; the much stronger Croatian
enemy was made to retreat. If one would be more cynical,
one would discover in that reservist’s account his military
machismo, his aversion toward one nation, and perhaps
hatred against soldiers whom Canadians had eliminated
in large numbers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina Canadians
called Muslims, they did not like “wogs” while Croats,
Lt.Colonel Jim Calvin he remarked in the book “Chances
for peace.” we did not like.”280 It is possible Canadian
soldiers were pleased that such a large number of Croat
soldiers had been killed. Croats, who were guilty of a
crime, were therefore worthy of such a punishment.
“At
12:00 noon (September 15th 1993) approximately 250 Canadian
and 500 French soldiers started rolling in between Serb
and Croat forces near the city of Medak. Croats opened
a hale out of 20 millimetre anti-aircraft guns, mortars
and machineguns.” The rest of the day (September 15th),
during the night and next morning (September 16th) Canadians
engaged in 20 separate fights using infantry arms…the
Croats retreated with 30 dead in the morning of September
16th…Canadians heard the burst of gunfire. Fires were
visible across the valley (coming from Serb villages)
behind Croatian lines. They were sure that the Croats
were killing Serb civilians and armoured transporters
platoon under Major Dan Drew’s command had rolled towards
the burning villages. The heavily armed Croat company
stopped the Canadian column…and there was a 90-minute
long tense pause (“Mexican standoff”)281. Such a dramatic
description could suggest to the reader that the Canadian
soldiers, like the knights in white armour, like the blue
blouse cavalry from Westerns, without being given the
command, at their own initiative, rushed to help Serb
soldiers and civilians in the Medak quagmire, while the
role of the “bad guys”, Indians, not organized and volatile
fighters was given to the Croatian army. But that moment
did not look as in the Canadian reservist’s disposition.
The Canadians moved as it was agreed upon (the agreement
being discussed on various diplomatic, political and military
levels for a couple of days). When they were stopped in
front of Croat positions – one might speculate why – because
the Croats were not informed, because the order to let
Canadians through did not come in time, because of the
24-hour extension of a withdrawal, stalling. According
to seized Serb documents, the Serb side also agreed in
order not to disrupt the UN agreement. Lt. Colonel Jim
Calvin had organized a press conference for some foreign
TV correspondents and a couple of Serb journalists in
front of the Croatian barrier. He immediately accused
Croats of stalling in order to be able to finish “ethnic
cleansing” of the occupied area. “A Croatian General who
was quick to grasp the political danger”, let the Canadians
through the blockade into the Medak Pocket. In Lički Čitluk,
the Canadians and French found 16 bodies, 312 houses and
farm buildings destroyed, and 130 livestock killed. In
a nearby field a 70-year old woman’s body was found, as
well as burned remnants of girls in their teens.”282 Several
witness accounts given by higher-ranking Canadian officers
that held high commanding posts in the UN mission, described
the events before they faced the consequences of the battle.
Therefore Lt. Colonel Jim Calvin’s need to describe the
events in such a picturesque and dramatic manner is understandable.
“…The 2.PPCLI soldiers were overpowered three to one,
they boldly faced tanks and artillery, and against all
odds they succeeded in repelling the Croats. The Canadians
had one soldier killed and four wounded.”283 This dramatic
description of the battle gives Calvin and his unit a
greater role than it played. General Lewis MacKenzie states
that “in the morning of September 9th Canadians came under
heavy Croat artillery fire. On 2.PPCLI positions more
than 500 shells were fired.”284 MacKenzie does not differentiate
between the Canadian and the Serb positions. They were
positioned together on the opposite side, and shelling
directed at these positions had the Canadians considering
it to be an attack directed at them. From the book “Tested
Mettle” it is clear that the Canadians were in Medak,
that their position was near the Serb HQ, and that the
primary shelling from the Croatian side was the HQ and
that important road junction. The Canadian Lieutenant
would, during that morning of September 9th re-deploy
part of his platoon at a new position, in a new building,
further away from the Serb positions. That was an indirect
admission that the Canadians had chosen an unfavourable
position and became a Croat artillery target. Part of
the blame should be put on the previously stationed French
contingent. The French had been using the building in
the vicinity of the Serb HQ, in the cellar they had a
nice quantity of original French wine cases.285 It is
understandable that many witnesses, describing the events,
overlooked their own mistakes. An example of this is the
exact date when the ceasefire agreement was signed. If
the agreement was signed on September 13th as stated by
General MacKenzie, then the impatience of Canadians to
enter the area Croats had to leave on September 14th and
15th should be understandable. Croatian President Tuđman
had on September 12th already ordered a unilateral 24-hour
ceasefire, for September 13th. All sides verbally agreed
to a ceasefire and for talks to commence. On September
15th the agreement was signed. The agreement’s exact timetable
was set – how it would proceed, at what time, its plan
and schedule was set. Various sources bring different
data on how long the firefights between the Canadians
and Croatians lasted – from three or four days, 36 hours,
16 hours or 15 hours. The evaluation about the number
of shells fired differs – several thousand, a thousand,
five hundred. The data about the type of weapons Croats
used in their attack also differs– heavy artillery, tanks,
multiple rocket launchers. The number of combatants is
also at odds – 2500 Croatian soldiers, the entire 9th
guard brigade. By magnifying the danger, Canadians obviously
wanted to embellish the drama that did not exist. From
UNPROFOR documents it was noted that “the Croats showed
co-operation and posed no obstacle to the agreement’s
implementation”286
After
Swedish General Wahlgren’s departure from the UN forces
command position (because of his disagreement with international
powers meddling in peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia)287,
French Army General Jean Cot took command. This was an
indirect rebuke that Wahlgren’s reproach of the powers
who had large contingents of peacekeepers in the former
Yugoslavia (France and Great Britain) for having separate
politics in guiding political events accordingly – had
been justified. The Serbs had fiercely accused the French
behaviour during the Maslenica Operation; there were some
conflicts about taking heavy artillery from the depots
secured by the “double key”. That French “blue helmets”
passive attitude (the French had an hour before the attack
been informed about it by the Croats) was the Serb reasoning
for their defeat. The French, traditional Serb allies,
socialized, drank and played football matches, with them
up until the Maslenica Operation. The Canadians accepted
the Serb arguments for being defeated in the Maslenica
Operation, and they used the same argument for the Medak
Pocket defeat. The weak, unarmed Serbs, had been prevented
by the French to arm themselves; therefore hundreds of
them had been killed during an unequal fight with the
Croats.288 It was now Cot’s time to give the French and
UNPROFOR back it’s credibility. Now was the time to enforce
the international community’s plans about Bosnia and Herzegovina
(the VOPP289) and to achieve an agreement in Croatia.
UNPROFOR was to retain its credibility and show Cot’s
personal ability and efficiency. As soon as the Medak
Pocket crisis started, Cot used all his energy to stop
the armed conflict and return to the “status quo ante”
the pre-existing state, and to achieve the return of the
Serbs to their land. General Cot had personally come to
the Canadian Battle group HQ290 to remind Lt. Colonel
Calvin of the “blue helmets” right to return fire if in
danger291. “During the early hours of the afternoon of
September 15th UN forces started moving to their positions
from the position of the Croatian 9th mobile brigade a
sporadic rifle fire was opened. When the armoured column
continued to move, they were met with a real cannonade
(?!). The Croatian Army would not allow them through.
The battle raged during the next 15 hours292. Canadians
were using old Serb trenches near the Lički Čitluk village.
They entered in order to stand in between the two sides,
and the 9th mobile brigade was stationed less than 100
metres away. Some soldiers first hand accounts, as quoted
by authours describing the event (“Tested Mettle”, “Chances
for Peace”), were filled with the event’s excitement.
The reports of battles being waged are contradicted by
the nature of the firefights. The “baptism by fire”, “the
soldiers initiation”, “soldiers’ bragging”, the excitement
of experience re-lived (the experience of live ammunition
fire or the experience of the battle being waged between
the Croats and the Serbs) where Canadians were by-standers
– is to be recognized in their overstatements. It is difficult
therefore, to conclude from these “soldiers’ accounts”
that a real battle had been waged in which the Croats
undertook several offensives, used 20 millimetre cannons,
larger calibre guns and mortars, with which they plowed
Canadian positions (Rod Dearing, 7th platoon)293. “Tracer
fire lit the sky” or “Scott LeBlanc woke with the start,
then himself cocked his C-9, fired short bursts at the
base of the tracer arching over his trench…which made
the Croats flee…” (?!)294. This account comes from someone
who puts on a brave face, it does not speak of a witnessed
event. It comes from someone who would humiliate his adversary,
paints the events in black and white, makes his judgement
who the courageous and who the cowardly side was (“…cocked
his C-9…fired a short burst” versus “Croats who started
fleeing”). Only by bragging, could that “scuffle” turn
into a fierce, dramatic battle in which “everything depended
on Canadian courage and military capability. Even an anonymous
officer of the Yugoslav Army admitted, “…this was not
a conflict according to Western standards.” He could not
refrain from adding that: “in terms of the Yugoslav wars,
it represented extraordinarily large fighting…”295 As
evidence, he listed the number of Croatian soldiers being
killed as between 20 and 50. The data itself makes us
conclude he referred to the Croat and the Serb forces
conflict. According to official Croatian data which the
Canadian and Serb side would question, 10 Croatian soldiers
were killed, which is half of the lesser number listed.
According to the Serb officer’s characterization of the
ferocity of the conflict, it had not applied to the alleged
Canadian/Croatian clash, but to the fight of the Croats
against the Serbs. The only trustworthy Serb source, General
Milisav Sekulić of the Srpska Krajina Army, does not play
the numbers game. He considered them untrustworthy, but
that does not prevent him from demonizing the Croats and
accusing them of the crime of genocide.
In
“the Canadian Military history: from 1945 to present –
Peacekeeping: Yugoslavia” the explanation of the Medak
Pocket events is put into a wider context in which the
battles between the Croatian and Serb forces have taken
place. The Canadian – Croatian clash in that interpretation
is even longer in terms of time period - “…Croatian forces
attacked Canadian soldiers for four days…” It is unclear
when the period of four days started, before September
16th/17th or after. If it includes the period after the
Canadian and French “blue helmets” were deployed, then
those 4 days include the incidents that happened after
the Croatian Army withdrew and the UN took control over
the area. Incidents when UNPROFOR entered the minefields
and there were warning night shootings, were interpreted
as a new Croatian attack on UN forces. It is visible from
UNPROFOR press releases dated September 19th and September
26th, about Canadian and French soldiers being wounded
in a minefield in front of Croatian positions. In those
releases, without inquiry proof, the Croats stand accused
of shooting and not allowing help to the wounded Canadian
and French soldiers296.
After
General Bobetko’s letter, in which he denied such accusations,
General Cot apologized. But the notoriety of “the bad
Croats” in future Canadian history books persisted. If
the four days of warfare applied to the period before
September 15th, from September 9th to 12th, it really
had been a period of the fiercest fighting – but fighting
between Croatian and Serbian forces. Apart from being
in the way, or exposed to indirect artillery fire, Canadians
dug themselves in, militarily protected themselves as
any professional army would do. During those first four
days of fighting they did not have any seriously wounded
soldiers. UNPROFOR documents do not prove that the Canadian
forces had been directly attacked by the Croats. The Canadians
themselves, admit their positions were too close to Serb
ones, allowing their soldiers to intermingle. Serb mortars
and machinegun nests were some 297 metres away from Canadian
trenches and the Canadians asked the Serbs to refrain
from firing on Croat positions50. In the UNPROFOR SITREPORT
of September 15th 1993, there is a note about undertaking
an attack on the UN forces: “…Two incursions or assaults
against UN personnel… both the Croats and Serbs fired.
Small arms fire at CANBAT forward positions. Fire was
returned and the aggressors stopped their fire. No more
casualties…” Canadian official military history continues
with mentioning that 875 soldiers – 375 from 2.PPCLI and
the reservists – 385 militia soldiers and 165 from other
regular forces mounted a general attack in order to take
control of the “buffer zone” (zone of separation). Although
the first objective was realized without a single shot
being fired, what followed was the tense standoff between
Croatian tanks and TOW armed Canadian APC’s298. It is
understandable that a military historian would often use
such expressions as “the general assault” or “to take
control of” in order to present the military position
as a serious one, and to make the role of the Canadian
forces more prominent. But in the very next sentence it
states that the first objective was accomplished without
a single bullet being fired. The tense standoff followed,
but firearms were obviously not used. There was pressure,
the writer of the chronicle does not deny that Croatian
soldiers were reluctant to accept the fact they had to
retreat, but they did not use their artillery nor their
tanks. In several instances soldiers mention the “new
tanks Croats were given by the Germans” (sic).299 The
question arises, why haven’t the Croats used them during
the artillery barrage against the Canadians? They had
not been used and it would have been easy to use tanks
in order to drive the UN peacekeeping forces out of the
area. “The Croats threatened to use antitank missiles”
or the “Croats avoided using new tanks for fear of them
being damaged” aren’t sufficient reasons preventing the
Croat forces from using all the armaments they had at
their disposal, if they truly wanted to attain the goal
Canadians claimed Croatians had wanted to achieve – to
make the UN forces flee and consequently defeat them.
Historians have stated that in that first phase of the
Operation, not a single bullet was fired. Where and when
had the battle between the Croatians and Canadians taken
place then? Not during the first four days, as writers
claim, because in that time frame Croatian and Serb forces
were belligerent. Many historians, journalists and politicians
write about the events that Canadian military history
hushed up. Sean M. Maloney had, in his analysis: “Canadian
national values and national security policy/policy options”
been more direct in naming the Canadian adversary at that
time, and who was to be punished for it. He writes: “…in
the Balkans the Croatians surely remembered us, because
of our readiness to, in the Medak Pocket in 1993, use
force against them… the Canadian flag flapping over our
soldiers shoulders must have discouraged them…” Member
of Parliament Ms. Bonnie Korzeniowski taking part in the
Parliamentary debate in Manitoba repeats what she had
read in the Canadian press, or officially attained from
the Canadian military brass: “…Canadian peacekeepers were
ordered on September 15th 1993 to make a “buffer zone”…
when they were taking their positions between the two
belligerent sides they came under Croatian fire. The battle
lasted for fifteen hours…they eventually forced the attacking
Croat forces to surrender…”300 The MP assigns one of the
belligerents to be the aggressor which should be forced
to surrender. The MP does not question how you could force
a legitimate military power on its sovereign territory
to surrender. Hasn’t the force which in this case “forced
the Croats to surrender” on their own territory also been
an aggressor? Was it not also helping the aggressor Serb
forces? Or was the Croatian attack on Serb terrorists
in the “Pink Zone” - which by all relevant UN Resolutions
was a part of the Republic of Croatia, and at a time when
Serbs realized their greatest territorial gains in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina- not been the disruption of
peace and an aggression itself? Forcing the Croats to
accept the status quo meant the acceptance and legitimization
of RSK or a Greater Serbia. The question remains whose
interests would be served by “making the Croat forces
surrender?” These were surely not Croatian interests.
It’s interests had been legitimate, supported by every
UN Resolution, and by the international community’s assurances.
When the citation for the Medak Pocket battle was met
by the Croatian press immediate negative reactions followed.301
The Canadian press tried to deny Croat claims at once.
“…The Croat weekly writes that the battle at the Medak
Pocket in 1993, known to be Canada’s largest scale conflict
since the Korean War – was a myth.”302 The strongest Canadian
argument was the numbers killed: “…27 to 31 Croats had
been killed in it, and only four Canadians were wounded.”
The already quoted official Croatian figures stated that
ten Croatian soldiers were killed.303 The Rijeka Hospital
pathology report304 found there were no wounds on the
dead which were caused by 5.56mm NATO calibre bullets.
(This was the same calibre used by the Canadian soldiers).
After
the September 15th Canadian advancement commenced and
after the Croats fired a few warning shots, the Canadian
attached the largest possible UN flags on their APC antennas,
and took care that their white painted vehicles came out
and were visible. The Canadian and French had started
their advancement which was followed by: “Croat rounds
of gunfire… the battle lasted for 15 hours with fire exchanges
lasting from five minutes to one hour at the longest,
after which the Croatians finally surrendered. Only then
the Canadian troops agreed on a ceasefire with the Croatian
army.”305 Such an interpretation of the events at the
Medak Pocket painted a excellent picture about what the
Canadian Army had done. The Canadian Army imposed a peace
in Croatia (which was broken by the Croats), the Canadian
Army forced the Croatian Army to surrender and negotiated
a ceasefire with the Croatian military, and not with Croatian
politicians. Uninformed persons might think that Croatia
in 1993 was a military dictatorship, when such important
issues were decided by its soldiers. Part of the Medak
Pocket misunderstanding is derived from the procedure
known to all democratic countries – but unknown to many
on the ground – politicians would negotiate the conditions
for a ceasefire, and demilitarization of the area, and
the military would execute what was agreed upon. In the
situation where the army had to comply to a 24-hour gridlock,
the timeframe in which to pull out, the command was sometimes
too late to reach all the units in time. This was quoted
by UNPROFOR; in the last minute details of the agreement
discussed at the Gospić meeting that finished at 22:30
hours on September 15th 1993. There was some Croat resistance
to accept the agreement on retreating and pulling forces
out. This was admitted in both Croatian and Canadian sources.
“It is hard to give up the ground you have just taken
over at a price…”306
It
is important to point out that the Croatian Army did not
attack but warn the Canadians, it did not surrender, but
retreated to their designated positions in an orderly
manner. The soldiers might not have been prepared to retreat
in such a quick manner – because of their bitter disappointment.
There were some rounds shot on the Gospić HQ building,
verbal threats were uttered to General Stipetić and Admiral
Domazet, the high brass from Zagreb who had come to oversee
the retreat307, but that dissatisfaction cannot be compared
to the panic, the anarchy and the armed conflict among
Serbs themselves that have taken place in Medak during
the night of September 9th. The Serbs fired on each other.
One Serb used a rifle grenade on his fellow fighters,
after which Serb soldiers attacked Canadians in the buildings
they were positioned in.308 The Lapac Brigade left its
positions in disarray, the Serb authorities arrested and
allegedly executed some of these deserters by firing squad
or by hanging. The data about court-martial executions
was furnished by Brigadier Krpina, but we could not find
mention of this from Serb General Sekulić.309 This information
was mentioned by Jurendić in an interview given to the
daily “Jutarnji List.” The attack on the 2nd mobile brigade
HQ is also mentioned in the “RSK” special commissions
report to the Serbian Krajina Army HQ. The disciplinary
measures were taken to get the paramilitary (Četniks)
in line.
The
Croatian demand for a 24-hour extension of the Croatian
forces retreat had been agreed upon. The new withdrawal
date was moved from September 16th to September 17th at
18:00 hours.310 Lt. Colonel Bryan Bailey, who commanded
a company of more than 100 soldiers in the Medak Pocket
used more plausible terms when he spoke about the Croatian
Army. This might have been to underline the bravery of
the Canadians. Lt. Colonel Bailey pointed out: “We went
up against a modern, well-equipped force and were successful…”311
He is more objective than others when describing the military
operation that took place between Serb and Croat forces.
(I repeat that in that operation, the Canadians were by-standers).
“On September 9th, after the artillery shelling, a pincer-like
movement commenced in which the Croats encompassed the
Serb defenders, throwing them off their heights, while
in the valley Croatian tank columns soon took four Serb
villages.”312 The new data about Canadian – Croatian clashes
during the next three days followed. According to an account,
this happened on September 10th, 11th and 12th. This data
is not even mentioned in Croatian and UN documents, and
is also non-existent in Serb sources. In these documents
what is mentioned is: the mass bombardment along the entire
frontline, the mobilization of Serb forces, the regrouping
of the RSK Army, heavy artillery from the “Pocket” towards
Knin313, the air force and rocket attacks.314 Not a word
is said about the Croatian clashes with Canadian forces.
It is clear why the Croats would not dare to take such
a venture – they feared UN retaliatory measures, international
community pressure and accusations. But why did the “blue
helmets” not report such a fictional story, which would
suit them well? Or did such an attack never happen, or
the authour just embellished his story. Documents warn
about Serb forces regrouping, about an imminent Serb counteroffensive.
The only documented fire from Croatian positions on CANBAT
positions was on September 16th at 22:15 hours, and it
soon ceased. At 23:45 everything was quiet in that area
(Medak Pocket – authour’s remark).315
Serb
sources mention Croatian forces in firefights with UNPROFOR
without any detailled evidence. In his book authour Ozren
Žunec mentions the confrontation between Croatian and
Canadian forces. He claims that data on the Medak Pocket
losses were embargoed316 - such a claim is mentioned nowhere
else.
“During
the next three days, in order to fulfill their protective
mandate, 2.PPCLI Canadian soldiers had engaged in large
number of fire exchanges with the Croatian special police…
the 2.PPCLI commander had without unnecessary emotion
made the Croatian commander withdraw his forces. Before
pulling out, the Croats slaughtered all the remaining
Serbs.”317 Calvin and Cot did not make the Croats withdraw.
The Croats withdrew because of UN Security Council pressure
and the guarantee given to Croatia that the Serbs would
not return to the liberated area under UNPROFOR control.
The risky stake in the Operation were all the trumps were
played out as Cot said: “the imperative return of UNPROFOR’s
credibility if the Medak Pocket mission was accomplished”.
He relied mostly on the possibility that his (Calvin’s)
troops might have to forcibly oust the Croat forces, and
Calvin was awed by the magnitude of responsibility that
had just been thrust upon his shoulders. For Croatia,
the guarantee Serbs would not be back meant a success
and gaining time in which it could slowly regroup its
military and economic strength to prepare for the final
rebel Serbs defeat. A military conflict was imminent.
It was not only foreseen by UN representatives who advocated
the Serb local officials and the Republic of Croatia’s
government to be treated equally when negotiating. They
believed that peace would prevail with the Serbs. To the
Croats, the historical experience clearly spoke of Serbs
believing only in the argument of arms. It was no sooner
than in 1995 that the official policy of the U.S., Great
Britain and France came to the same conclusion. Today,
the Croatian warnings from the early 1990s are confirmed
by Slobodan Milošević’s trial in the Hague – more than
ten years later.318
In
the Canadian parliament, Lt. Colonel Jim Calvin described
how his battalion, reinforced with two French armoured
infantry companies, had forced the Croatian Army to agree
to a ceasefire. “The conflict appeared when a Croatian
renegade general defied the withdrawal agreement achieved
by politicians in Zagreb and tried to “face down” the
Canadians and the UN.” Calvin involved himself at that
point into interpreting Croatian politicians and their
military relationship. Something he was not familiar with.
There were no “renegades” there, and no one rebelled against
the political decisions from Zagreb. Though the situation
was tense, the Defense Minister and the Chief-of-Staff,
did everything in their power to make the agreement work.
There were some dissatisfied soldiers. That dissatisfaction
probably served as the motive for some wrongful acts committed
during the retreat. But there was no rebellion. Calvin
and his soldiers “endured the heavy bombardment and mortar
fire they had been subject to and managed to pass through
minefields. When the Croats finally retreated, they left
a scorched earth behind them.“319 The Canadian Minister
of Defence was impressed by Calvin’s deposition. In his
response to Calvin’s address to Parliament and while addressing
the Medak Pocket veterans the Minister promised: “One
of underlying messages of this is to understand the courage
they provide, to make sure they get the kind of support
they need from us, here, in the political world, in everything,
from questions of payment to make sure they have a life
with dignity.”320 What has become clear is that Calvin
may have wanted to achieve – better veteran soldier status,
better pensions and higher danger pay for Canadian soldiers.
But isn’t it any government’s duty to take care of those
who give their life and health in order to defend their
society’s values? Was Croatia and the fabrication of what
happened there only a tool serving to achieve higher pensions,
better healthcare and life insurance for Canadian soldiers,
while in peacekeeping missions around the world, something
that has been denied to them by the Canadian government
and its politicians? This could be concluded from a statement
given by an anonymous witness working with the Croatian
Ministry of Defence. He claims that the Canadian Ambassador
asked that reparations be paid to Canadian soldiers who
became ill after returning from Croatia.321 He added that
after the reparation payment was refused the Ambassador
then “threatened “Croatia would suffer serious consequences.
Some could argue that those consequences are the Visa
regime with questionnaires listing questions to those
of military age, asking detailed information what they
did during the Homeland war (which each sovereign state
would consider a military secret). Those consequences
could also be viewed as cold diplomatic relations between
Canada and Croatia. Whether this is true or not, Canadian
soldiers have their Medak Pocket case capitalized in the
public eye, and their government has agreed to back their
danger pay.322 Calvin received a firm promise from the
Minister: “We should give a clear message for future behaviour
towards soldiers and their families, especially when their
wages and danger pay for stressful conditions they were
deployed in, are concerned.”323 A journalist reporting
from the Canadian parliament had taken various pieces
of a puzzle and tried to complete a picture to comprehend
what really took place in Croatia – that a fierce battle
had taken place but between the Serb and the Croat forces.
“The battle they had waged” (not the battle between Croatians
and Canadians, but between Serbs and Croatians) “had lasted
for three days. Serbs and Croats brought military reinforcements
and tanks. The Croats had advanced and thus pushed forward
the new frontline.”324 “On September 14th, Lt. Colonel
Calvin had received a command to enforce the agreement
by entering “the killing zone” in-between the two belligerent
sides.”325 The journalist further explains why the Canadian
commander had shown so much impatience while encountering
his Croatian counterpart. He had not attended the meetings
where the exact demarcation line between Canadian and
Croatian forces had been decided. He ordered his bulldozers
forcing back the Croatian positions. He accused the Croats
of attacking the wounded French and Canadian soldiers
in a minefield.326 Calvin found the excuse for his demeanour
towards the Croats regarding crimes they had allegedly
committed. “He had not liked them.” His superior Cot ordered
him to be extremely decisive and strong. The peace was
to be enforced this time. Not only was UN credibility
at stake, but also the political interests of France and
Great Britain, which were represented by both contingents
in the Medak Pocket. These two countries threatened enforcement
of their interests with air strikes from their aircraft
carriers in the Adriatic Sea. Was that the reason for
a British SAS member found in a Medak Bunker – to laser-guide
aircrafts to Croatian positions if such an air strike
would occur? To General Cot this was a known fact. Lt.
Colonel Calvin knew he could count on air strike support
in case an eventual open conflict with the Croats occurred.
This had been the reason for his arrogant and hard behaviour.
Behind that decisiveness stood General Cot’s military
vanity. He wanted to show those bureaucrats in New York
that their reluctance and lenience served to the Croats
advantage and therefore disrupted already achieved Serb
territorial gains and the peace offered by the Vance-Owen
Peace Plan. Because of the misunderstandings and his avoidance
to contact the UN, because of his conflict with the UN
Security Council Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali,
Cot was forced to step down.327 He was replaced by French
General de La Presle.328 The UN forces commander French
General Jean Cot said to Calvin that “the UN with its
constant retreat had achieved nothing but minor failures
(whenever someone opens fire, we’d retreat). This time
it is very important to have a successful outcome and
to impose will… (Cot) brought the unpleasant news about
the possibility the Croatian forces in Medak were probably
not aware of the political settlement in Zagreb.”329 Calvin
was worried: “You can imagine what that meant for us.
We had to cross Serb lines and advance to another belligerent
side which didn’t yet know that its high command had ordered
them to relinquish their positions, taken at a price during
fierce battle.”330
Quite
the opposite of Calvin’s surmising about Croatian lower-ranking
officers not being informed about their higher command’s
decisions was occurring. The Chief of Staff, General Bobetko
had, in order to make the withdrawal agreement workable,
sent to Gospić General Stipetić, the Zagreb commanding
area commander, Admiral Domazet, the Croatian army main
staff’s intelligence department chief, and liaison officer
with the UN Colonel Pleština. Defence Minister Gojko Šušak
had, after the Commander in Chief ordered an investigation
of the Medak Pocket events, sent military police there.
In Zagreb, they were aware of how serious the situation
was – international community pressure, the Serb threats
and Serb shelling of a large number of cities. Croatian
soldiers were dissatisfied because they had to retreat,
the strategic position of Gospić and Lika was left in
a risky position. It was all highly-sensitive before the
UN 871 Resolution was expected, which Croatia demanded
for the unequivocal sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia
over its entire state territory. All the responsible levels
of command were engaged in order to avoid any misunderstanding
with the UN, but also the return of Serb forces to the
liberated area and subsequent peaceful withdrawal followed,
and UNPROFOR was allowed to control the area. An Ottawa
Citizen journalist found in “the ROE (Rules of Engagement)
valid for the former Yugoslavia, the right to use fire
when under threat.” According to his description “…the
armed conflict (between Croats and Canadians) lasted for
15 hours. That evening Lt. Colonel Calvin asked for a
meeting with the Croat commander and passed the “no-man’s
land” on foot. After a lengthy, tense meeting, they agreed
to a ceasefire. Croats promised to withdraw from the problem
area until noon.”331 “Although they had seen smoke and
heard detonations behind the Croat lines, the Canadians
kept to their part of the agreement. They moved at 12:00
hours exactly, but were met with the heavily armed Croatian
company. The road was mined and Croatian soldiers had
tank reinforcements.”332 The journalist again described
the situation in which Lt. Colonel Calvin held his press
conference and accused Croatian commanders of “ethnic
cleansing” and for being responsible for crimes committed
in the Medak Pocket. He had not seen those crimes yet,
but reacted on a hunch. For such decisiveness, Lt. Colonel
Calvin was awarded the “Meritorious service cross” and
2.PPCLI General Cot’s citation, one of three in all given
during a long peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia.333
In “The Sunday (Toronto) Star”334 the most important parts
of Scott Taylor/Brian Nolan’s book “Tested Mettle” were
re-told, in which a detailed description of Canadian peacekeepers
from Somalia, Cambodia, Nigeria, Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina was given. The authours of this book use those
peacekeeping missions to analyse and fiercely criticize
the Canadian military establishment, which had led some
of these missions (because of some high ranking commanders’
and politicians’ goals, ambitions and vanity) almost to
the brink of disaster. In the last chapter of their book,
the authours propose a radical re-organization of the
Canadian Army in the new millennium. We were on our part
mostly interested in the chapter of the dealing with the
Medak Pocket analysis. Here are some of the accents from
the review the book received in “The Sunday (Toronto)
Star”: “On September 9th 1993 the Croatian artillery bombardment
rolled into the Medak Pocket like a wave of thunder. All
along a 25 kilometre valley, geysers of earth and flames
shot skyward. Lieutenant Tyrone Greene (2.PPCLI) was just
heading out of the door on his way to the morning orders
group, when he observed a shell explode about 5 kilometres
away. He thought he had best report the shot to Gračac
HQ and turned to go back inside. At that instant a 152mm
mortar round impacted just 20 metres behind him.” Again
an overstatement. In the Croatian Army’s amour there were
(and still are) only 152mm Howitzers, but that calibre
was not used by the Croatian side during that action.
The Croatians used 105mm Howitzers, and 130mm cannons.
It is possible that Lt. Green had mistaken the 120mm shell
for a mortar grenade, because in the very next sentence
he speaks of the “mortar battery”. The overstatement prone
Canadians would make some more mistakes with the facts.
“Seconds later Green knew this wasn’t just a couple of
stray rounds, when the rest of the Croat mortar battery
opened fire in earnest. Green’s platoon was to become
witnesses to the devastating barrage of the Serb forces.”335
In the battalion command post in Gračac, Lt. Colonel Calvin
didn’t exactly know what was happening. As the day passed,
Calvin was more and more under the UN New York officials’
pressure; they asked what was the exact assessment of
the situation that was obviously worsening. Using an APC,
he reached Lt. Green and ordered “they needed to establish
an observation post quickly to keep track of the battle’s
progression. For the next three days the men of Green’s
platoon were relied upon as the sole eyes and ears of
the international community. Despite the dangers, it was
imperative that they hold (do not leave – authour’s remark)
the ground.”336 Calvin had, on Cot’s initiative, firmly
decided that his battle group would not leave the battleground,
would not retreat like the French had done during the
Maslenica Operations. However, the pressure exerted on
the young, inexperienced Canadian reserve soldiers, the
stressful artillery barrage on Serb positions, though
the barrage was not directed at them(Canadians), and the
discipline of some lower ranking officers’ ambitions were
so strong that some soldiers, after re-deployment and
while preparing to return to Canada, tried to “poison”
their overzealous warrant officer Matt Stopford. The inquiry
about several discipline breaches, later led by an independent
Canadian Ministry of Defence commission, dedicated the
majority of its report to that attempted poisoning.337
The commission concluded that Medak had been a stressful
experience, influencing soldier’s health (PTSP), it had
questioned the core of the military discipline and the
Canadian Army’s Code (of behaviour), which put the individual
soldier’s security after the objective (accomplishing
the mission first, and soldiers’ security second). It
was concluded that in future, Canadian soldiers’ security
should come first in Canadian military doctrine.
“Although
they weren’t immediately aware of it, this shift in the
fire plan heralded the next phase of the Croat attack.
Atop the ridges, Croat Special Forces and dismounted infantry
launched a lightning pincer advance, rolling up the surprised
Serb pickets in a series of deadly, one-sided firefights.
The Croatian armoured columns then commenced their advance
down the valley.”338 The Croatian and the Canadian interpretation
of that event differ; for Croats the attack to take their
designated area had finished soon after midday (13:05
hours), while Canadian onlookers noticed the Croat attack
later in the afternoon. According to Croatian sources,
the action commenced in the morning of September 9th –
the pincer movement and planned taking of three villages.
It is unclear why the Canadians reported that action took
place by the end of the day, at dusk. Somebody was seeing
dusk in the morning, someone was reporting and making
incorrect notes for reasons yet to be established. However,
in the CANBAT situation report (SITREP) such data is listed,
in the Croatian liaison with the UN officer’s documents
that “Canadian” observation is non-existent. “Lt. Col.
Calvin was constantly calling Green for updates on the
fluid situation, as New York and Zagreb, tried to plot
the political ramifications of the offensive. Throughout
the morning, Green had regularly sent back his reports
– only to have his position immediately shelled by the
Croat mortars. It dawned on the young Lieutenant, that
Croats were using their radio-direction finding equipment
to zero in on his broadcast. Obviously, they had mistaken
his signals from those of the Serbian brigade HQ (which
was, in fact, using land-line field telephones to communicate
messages). From that point on, Greene used his radio only
in emergencies and tried to switch locations to do so.”339
On
the evening on September 11th “the tide of battle was
shifting and there was a major Serbian counter-attack
underway.” For the next 72 hours, the Serbs and Croats
fought a pitched battle – the three days that were mentioned
in the earlier Canadian interpretation, in “Tested Mettle”
are correct in calling it the battle between the Croat
and the Serb forces.340 The “gaggle” of soldiers and fleeing
citizens along the main Medak road were soon replaced
by the determined Serb reinforcement troops pushing forward
into the “Pocket”. Buses, tanks, and even armoured train
cars were rushing into the region from all over the “Krajina”.
The reinforcements had not come from the Croatian “Krajina”
only, but from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the SR Yugoslavia
as well. In the “Pocket” itself there were volunteers
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.341 In other instances,
Canadian soldiers witnessed an enormous amount of the
most advanced generation of tanks and modern armour Serb
forces were armed with. Some M-84 Serb tanks that were
close to the Canadian positions had occasionally opened
fire. “The next 72 hours (three days, September 12th,
13th and 14th – authours note) the Serbs fought a pitched
battle. The counter-thrust was successful in blunting
the Croat offensive, and both sides began digging in along
their new frontlines.”342 Here the Croatian intentions
and plans were misjudged. The Croats stopped on the line
already taken up to 13:00 hours on September 9th. On September
10th they were only defending those lines. (Sources: Bobetko,
Ministry of Defence archives, “Globus Military HQ”, UN
liaison office dated September 10th). The offensive did
not last until September 14th, but there was a Serb counteroffensive
in which the Serbs tried regaining their lost positions
in three villages. The Maslenica experience taught them
that if they were not successful in it they could start
counting the moments of the beginning of an end of the
“RSK.” The Canadians seemed to show constant sympathy
of the Serbian side, “backing the Serbs”, the “understanding”
for blows they had received and a wish for the Serbs to
succeed in returning “their land” (Serb territory). In
the Maslenica Operation, one could sense this sympathy,
but in the Medak Pocket these feeling were quite obvious.
The one-sided nature was visible in the behaviour of UNPROFOR’s
military officers. For them the former JNA officers were
real soldiers, as opposed to inexperienced Croatian Army
officers. General Cot often met Serb General Novaković.
The last time he visited when leaving the UNPROFOR commander’s
post, he allegedly received a Serb citation. In the beginning
of the Medak Pocket crisis, Cot sent Novaković his special
emissary. Later he had talks with him in Knin (as he talked
to Bobetko in Zagreb, after Bobetko had refused to receive
Cot’s emissary, considering him a lower rank). In this
way Cot treated as equals the “paramilitary” Serb commander
and the Head of the Main Staff of a sovereign state’s
army. He sent his emissary to Gospić. In several instances
Calvin refused to talk to the Croatian side. “He didn’t
like Croats”, but he had to communicate with them professionally.
His troops sympathies were with the Serb side. The Serb
assessment about whether or not their counterattack did
not succeed consequences, and they did not regain their
lost territory, had been proven. In recently published
RSK Army documents, and in General Milisav Sekulić book,
we learn that soon after the Medak Pocket Operation the
Serbs started training a civilian population evacuation.
In 1993 they became aware that militarily they stood no
chance against the Croatian Army and state’s growing power.343
They trained and prepared an evacuation from the Krajina
territory that was put into practice in the summer of
1995, during the Croatian military/police action “Oluja”.
Proof of this is found in documents confiscated after
“Oluja”344.
As
the military situation of September 14th became stable,
the UN put pressure on the belligerent sides to agree
to a ceasefire. The foreign press demanded the Croatian
“attackers” retreat to their pre-September 9th lines.
In order to increase the pressure, in the afternoon of
September 14th the Serbs launched a Soviet missile Frog/Luna
on one of Zagreb’s suburbs. A larger calibre rocket fell
in the field in the suburb causing no grave damage, but
the Croatians had decided to make a swift pull-out of
the Medak valley. “The buffer zone” formed should have
been taken by UN forces345. French General Jean Cot, the
Sector South commander (also incorrect data, General Cot
was the UN forces commander – commander of all UN military
in the region) knew that for the ceasefire agreement to
hold depended on a quick deployment of a strong military
force. Therefore, he decided to oversee the operation
himself, without mediation from Sector South’s HQ. This
is possibly what led the authour to conclude that Cot
was Commander of the Sector South forces. Lt. Col. Calvin
and his (2.PPCLI) battalion were ready to move within
24 hours. In order to reinforce his two infantry companies
(Charlie and Delta) already positioned in front of the
Medak Pocket, Calvin was to be joined by two French armoured
infantry companies. One of them was under the command
of General Cot’s son.
Imposing
the Ceasefire – Calvin’s Plan
“The
Croatian verbal agreement of September 13th 1993 led the
written Medak Pocket withdrawal Agreement on September
15th. The Canadian Battle group had the task of making
sure all sides honoured the agreement. Up to that moment
2.PPCLI played a passive role.” Many already quoted Canadian
sources conclude quite the opposite - that the Battle
group had played an important role, even before the implementation
of the agreement. “That soon changed… on September 15th,
two hours after the planned 12:00 noon “H hour”, Lt. Green
gave the order for his APC’s to advance into the “killing
zone”. Throughout the previous night they had been briefed
in detail on their objectives. That morning they had mounted
their APC’s and moved forward through the Serbian positions
to the frontline. As they rolled slowly forward, Green’s
men realized just how close the Serbs had been to losing
the town of Medak itself. The battle debris and bodies
indicated that at one point the Croats had even managed
to establish foothold in the northern most buildings,
before being beaten back.”346
In
his book, “Professionalism under fire: Canadian implementation
of the Medak Pocket agreement,” Lee A. Windsor explains
the plan’s elements and the Canadian battle group’s role
in the implementation of that agreement. “On September
14th 1993 at 16:30 Lt. Col. Calvin held the orders group
meeting with subordinate and warrant officers in order
to explain the plan of the future operation. The new withdrawal
agreement should be implemented in four stages. The first
stage was to start on September 15th 1993 by 2.PPCLI “Charlie
company” and one by the French company taking Serb forward
front positions. In the second stage, the “Charlie company”
under the vigilant eye of one anti-armoured platoon would
establish the crossing point on the “no-man’s land” between
the belligerent sides, on the main tarmac road along the
valley floor. Third stage: “Delta company” and the second
French company FREBAT 3 will advance up the road through
the secured crossing point until they take the Croat forward
front positions. The Recce Platoon of the 2.PPCLI and
the battalion’s tactical HQ will follow “Delta company”.
The fourth (and final) stage would be overseeing the Croatian
forces take their pre-September 9th positions. After that,
the separation of forces would be done and the new demilitarized
zone would be established.347 The Patricia, Alpha and
Bravo companies that just arrived from Sector West would
during the operation reinforce the rest of the CANBAT
1 area of responsibility. Canadians had to manage without
81mm mortars. As the battalion was to return home at the
beginning of October, mortars had already been sent back
to Canada.348 What would have happened if the Canadians
had their mortars at their disposal? They might have probably
used them and this would provoke a conflict with Croatian
forces. This would pull Croatia into a large-scale conflict
with the UN/international community, further punishing
the country for the break-up of Yugoslavia. A few hours
before the Medak Operation started (the morning of September
15th), General Cot personally flew into the Medal area
in order to speak with Lt. Col. Calvin. Cot took command
himself: “…the future events were too serious to allow
any disruption in the chain of command or misunderstanding
about what was going on. The mission was clear and the
stage in the area was set.”349 They went over planned
details. Calvin’s plan was for a broad, two-axis advance
push up the valley. The Canadian company would provide
the left-hand column, and the French Army was to match
their progress on the right. “Lt. Green’s 9th platoon
was the central unit of C Company with the 7th platoon
on the right and 8th platoon on the left. The plan was
for Major Drew’s D company to follow up Charlie’s advance.
They would then take up positions to prevent any subsequent
Serbian advances.”350 The Croatian forces, according to
that plan, had to withdraw to their old September 8th
positions, and Serb forces were to stay on their present
ones, in front of them the Battle group was to be positioned.
“On the afternoon on September 15th 1993 Leblanc was projecting
a C-9 light machinegun as A platoon advanced toward the
little village of Čitluk. Well off on their right flank
they heard the developing firefight between Green’s men
and the Croat defenders. Leblanc’s section, under the
command of Sgt. Rod Dearing had just reached a low hedgerow
when platoon commander Cpt. Dan MacKillop signaled for
them to halt. MacKillop had heard Green’s situation report
on the company radio net, and he spotted the Croat rifle
pits about 200 metres to his front. Word was passed for
them to start digging in. Fire team partners took turns
shovelling a shell scrap, one digging while the other
remained in a position to provide cover fire. Leblanc
was pumped up, the adrenaline flowing as the sound of
gunfire continued to erupt across the Medak valley floor.”351
Fierce
Fighting
“It
was obvious the Croats did not intend to let the Canadians
in. Charlie company and the front FREBAT 1 company were
stopped on the first suitable defence lines, mostly along
the former Serb fighting line. During the next 15 hours
the Croats used small arms to fire on Canadian and French
forces.” It is important to add that at that moment, UN
soldiers were intermingled with Serb soldiers, who on
their part kept shooting on the Croats ahead. How could
Croatian soldiers distinguish between UNPROFOR and Serb
soldiers? And when the unnerved peacekeepers joined the
shooting – it was even more difficult to make such a difference.
”From all the arms used by the Croats against the advancing
UN forces, only the deadly T-72’s known to be in the vicinity
were not in sight. The Croatian officers may have known
the TOW anti-armoured rocket’s quality and did not want
their precious new vehicles damaged.”352 It was too weak
of a reason to prevent the Croats from using their tanks
in such a serious fight. The anti-armour systems used
by the Serbs (and JNA) – for instance Osa, Maljutka or
Fagot – were equally mighty weapons as the Canadian ones.
That did not discourage and prevent the “Vukovi” from
using tanks in the Medak Pocket. No, the TOW rockets would
not make them refrain from using their superior armour.
The range of the tank cannon surpassed the range of a
TOW projectile and if Croatian tanks crews wanted to engage
in a duel with the Canadian armour, the Canadians would
probably be closer to losing such a battle. By all accounts
it looked as if the Croats did not have the intentions
attributed to them by Canadian analysts – to attack and
cause the UN forces such casualties, forcing them to flee
the Medak Pocket. They only wanted to be sure that the
Agreement would be implemented to the letter – and that
Serb forces hiding behind Canadian and French troops would
not return. The Croats did not consider fire-fights to
be as serious as the conflict they had with the Serbs
during which they had used their tanks and had lost one
of them. “MacKillop yelled to Dearing that combat engineers
were on the way with heavy equipment to assist with the
trench-digging. A Croat machinegun burst cut short MacKillop’s
comments. Dearing immediately took cover behind his APC
and started pumping rounds back at the next hedgerow.
The big burly sergeant had an air of confidence as he
plied his trade and his example was infectious. Young
Scot Leblanc switched his C-9 fire selector to automatic
and let loose a long withering burst toward the Croat
muzzle flashes.”353 With such an uncontrolled and emotional
reaction a Sergeant, a professional soldier, in the Medak
Pocket started the duel between Canadian and Croatian.
If that Sergeant had not returned fire that would have
made other combat soldiers refrain “from his infectious
example”. Canadian soldiers in their accounts claim that
the Croats had merely answered the Serb provocations.
As the Serb positions were close by. Answering a provocation,
a warning shot, a near miss or an irresponsible shot from
a Croat marksman - a barrage of fire was the Canadian
answer. As if Canadians could hardly wait, or was it already
decided by the more liberal ROE interpretation to shoot
when shot at? Had they only waited for such a provocation
from the Croatian side or did an order from General Cot
precede to impose UNPROFOR’s credibility and create respect
by force? The show of force in that complicated situation
could be called the lack of real military professionalism
and effectiveness. And would not the fire in an organized
army be opened only after the superior officer’s command?
From the description above it seemed that soldiers had
opened fire by their own will or according to their own
judgement. Return fire in organized armies was not just
opened at one’s own will. Had CANBAT not become equal
to the Croatian and the Serb side, which they had considered
to be those governed by anarchy and lack of discipline?
It was probable that Cot and Calvin gave their soldiers
a “carte blanche” to open fire and respond decisively
when fired upon. Even that would have been better than
if the firefight started at one’s will. The Canadian firing
was caused by earlier Serb provocations. From documents
it is clear that the Canadians had asked the Serbs to
withdraw and to refrain from provoking the Croats.354
The Serbs have done that with reluctance. “At dusk Major
Dan Drew shouted for warrant officer Matt Stopford to
prepare a section of soldiers. Calvin had just received
a phone call from the local Croatian general and it appeared
the Colonel wanted to negotiate a UN forces passage through
no-man’s land. It was agreed they leave a protection party
at the Croatian lines. Calvin had returned to his battalion
HQ while Stopford set up a duty roster for his six soldiers
by his two APC’s which were right in the middle of the
road.”355 What follows is Stopford’s dramatic description
of the events in the night that followed, and the witnessing
of an attempt to poison a warrant officer because of his
aggressive leadership style. The Croatians, according
to him, had immediately moved into firing positions around
the Canadian detachment. At almost point blank range they
set-up heavy machine guns and Russian made anti-tank missiles.
He was worried about the situation as he could see distant
flashes of tracer fire being exchanged in Čitluk between
Sgt. Dearing’s men and the Croat forces. But more troubling
for him was the activity of Croat troops to his immediate
front. “They appeared to be some form of a special forces
unit, unlike anything he had seen thus far in the Balkans.
Well-equipped with a wide range of modern weaponry, these
guys were all young, fit and extremely intense. The men
Stopford was observing were part of the new regular force
of the Croatian Army – equipped and trained by US advisors.”356
Stopford was impressed by these “new Croatian soldiers.”
At the same time he was angry at them for not being an
organized bunch of parasoldiers and freelancers. Now they
were equal to the Serb military, even better, because
they had beaten the Serbs. And Canadians should have been
aware of them, as the Croatians were trained by American
military advisors. They knew how to “engage in modern
warfare”. These Croatians did not focus their attention
on the Canadian soldiers. In the valley muffled explosions
could be heard. From the cluster of buildings just to
his front Stopford heard a scream, punctuated by a burst
of gunfire. A moment of silence was followed by laughter.
Seconds later a nearby explosion shook the ground and
a farmhouse burst into flames. “A couple of minutes later”
one of the Croats “came out of the house and wobbling
drunkenly approached Stopford with a pair of blood-soaked
panties on his head. For an instant, Stopford wanted to
kill the Croat so badly but could not bring himself to
commit the act. Then he raced back to his APC and radioed
HQ. In a voice cracking with emotion, he explained that
Croats had begun an “ethnic cleansing” of the Medak Pocket.”
“You’ve got to move now!” he shouted. “They are killing
people! We cannot wait!”357 “Calvin didn’t need Stopford’s
report in order to understand what was going on. Fires
were visible across the whole valley. He radioed the news
to the UN HQ in Zagreb and requested permission to advance
immediately. He was ordered to remain at the location.
The official order was for the peacekeepers to gather
as much evidence as possible for use at a future war crimes
tribunal.”358
At
12:00 noon on September 16th Major Drew’s D Company began
to roll forward to the designated crossing site. “The
long line of white APC’s bristled with rifles and machineguns
as the infantry sections rode topside with the cargo hatches
open. Big blue UN flags fluttered from the radio antennas.
For the tired, embattled soldiers of C Company the impressive
armoured column was a welcome site. However, the Croat
defenders were not so easily impressed. Their Special
Forces Company concluded their extra-curricular activities
and took up fire positions to block the main road. Somehow,
the Croatian General’s agreement had not been passed along
to his forward troops. The Croat company commander was
adamant that any attempt to cross his lines would be resisted
with all available force.”359 From the transcripts of
tape-recorded talks the Croatian and Canadian officers
held, (Calvin was present as well as UNMO chief Lt. Colonel
Nielsen), it was clear that UNPROFOR and military observers
had exerted pressure in order to have the Canadians pass
the crossing site as soon as possible. The Croatian soldiers
had refused to let the armoured column through until their
commander, Major Zlatko Rogulj showed up. He demanded
Calvin’s Canadian and French soldiers turn the muzzles
of their guns towards the Serb positions; otherwise he
would not let the column through. His demand was based
on the international war conventions and procedures “
gun muzzle of a tank approaching in peace should be turned
backwards!“
The
tense conversation was led with only one purpose – for
UNPROFOR to prevent the return of the Serb forces.360
Calvin promised he would turn his guns from the Croats
towards the Serbs when he takes over the entire area.
Rogulj was not persuaded. He repeated his request several
times. He felt that the Canadians had to turn their weapons
towards the Serbs and show their decision to deter any
Serb attempts at dishonouring the agreement. An UNPROFOR
member could hardly grasp the importance of such a demand.
The UN force never understood the true nature of the Croat-Serb
relationship, nor the reasons for their mutual mistrust.
The historical experience full of deceit and broken promises
had forced the Croatian Army to demand that the smallest
details be observed when the retreat and re-deployment
of forces was concerned.361 Not a single promise or a
single word would be as good as a gesture showing that
UNPROFOR (the Canadians) would not be lenient towards
the Serbs and hostile towards Croats. When Calvin finally
agreed to the Croatian demand, there were no further difficulties
in the Agreement’s implementation. This was confirmed
by SITREPORT’s that stated “the Croats have stalled”,
but the “Croatian constructive and truthful approach”
was also pointed out. But Canadians in their reports pointed
out that villages were “systematically and thoroughly
destroyed, buildings that still stood were flattened and
livestock was slaughtered.”362 First they “discovered
seven human corpses they handed over to local Serb authorities.
Three Serb soldiers were found alive, and were handed
over to the Serb military, while more than an estimated
100 soldiers had been cut off and could be expected to
arrive in a couple of days.”363
It
was raining all night (September 16th/17th) while some
Canadian UN soldiers left in no-man’s land waited for
either the Serb or Croat counterattack. On the drizzly
morning of September 17th UNCIVPOL teams finally arrived
“to probe the smouldering ruins. Rotting corpses were
catalogued and then turned over to UNPROFOR soldiers for
burial. The emotional impact on Canadian soldiers was
horrific. They saw a number of decomposed bodies, while
the previous night they had helplessly stood by and listened
to them die. However, news of the Croatian casualties
inflicted by Canadian peacekeepers boosted the Battle
group’s morale. Officially the Croats listed 27 of their
soldiers as having been killed. Unofficially that number
was 30 dead and over 100 wounded. Canadians had only four
wounded and not a soldier killed.”364 During the days
that followed, a take over of the area continued. Problems
emerged however with setting the demarcation lines. The
Canadians first bulldozed Croatian barricades, and then
admitted their mistake later. Fifteen Croatian soldiers,
who found themselves within the demilitarized zone perimeter,
were disarmed. The re-supplying of Croatian soldiers on
the Kamenjuša ridge was prevented. Two more incidents
happened when Canadian and French soldiers were wounded
in minefield incidents, which, with a little restraint
and professionalism could have been avoided. General Bobetko
warned General Cot of minefields set by the Serbs, but
this warning was not taken seriously. Cot had wanted to
use the confusion about the wounded soldiers against the
Croats and had accused them of shooting at the UN forces
again.365 The Croats by then had been guilty of everything.
Calvin would not attend the meetings with the Croatian
side where technical problems would have been resolved.
He stalled and humiliated Croatian officers. Finally on
September 22nd in Gospić, the demarcation line was agreed
upon and the borders of UNPROFOR’s demilitarized zone
were set. Both sides considered the situation to be tense.
The Canadians, because of the Croatian offensive and the
destruction committed during it, the Croatians because
of the Canadian arrogance. At one particular moment the
situation grew so tense that the Ministry of Defence liaison
office for UN/EU in a report signed by Colonel Pleština
suggested to the Croatian President and the Defence Minister
to ask the UN for Calvin to be relieved of his duties.366
But Lt. Col. Jim Calvin and his Battle group would by
the end of September finish their 6-month mandate, and
were to leave Croatia. Thanks to politicians, diplomats,
and military efforts, the situation had calmed down.
The
intention to accuse and demonize Croatia and its army,
because of the events in the Medak Pocket had become blatant.
When “The CANBAT 1 Final Report on the Medak Pocket Operation”367
and the “Memorandum” signed by Colonel Maisonneuve368
were handed in, they were immediately published in order
to become public knowledge. The events generally called
“The Medak Pocket Operation” thereafter became a crime
and nobody tried to explain the causes, reasons and the
real magnitude of it. In the Report’s conclusion, Lt.
Col. Calvin recommended the experience taken from the
Medak Pocket to be studied in a future UN limited Operation
undertaking.
High-ranking
bureaucrats in the Canadian Ministry of Defence in Ottawa
could not make the political assessment of that Operation’s
result. There was no point in attracting media attention
to a situation which, because of Canadian soldiers active
involvement in somebody else’s war, could easily be turned
against them. The elections were coming and the ex-Minister
of Defence Kim Campbell was now a candidate for the Prime
Minister’s position. ”So Medak was left only to memories
– no publicity, no finger pointing, no official reports.
Except for the Canadian soldiers who were the protagonists,
“Canada’s largest scale conflict since the Korean War”
– had not occurred at all.”369
The
renewed interest in the Medak Pocket Operation and Canada’s
role in it was initiated by reporter David Pugliese, the
parliamentary commission for national defence, and a military
veterans debate in April 1998. During the debate, apart
from Calvin, the floor heard other participants from the
Medak Pocket event requesting more money and benefits
for the troops that had taken part in that action. Finally,
these were granted to the troops on December 1st 2002.
Foreign
Intelligence Members in Croatia, their Role and Intelligence
Assessments
As
all other member states of the UN peace force had, so
too did the Canadians have their intelligence services
on the ground. These were used to assess “the enemy” and
the situation in the area. UNPROFOR also gathered relevant
information from its field units in co-ordination with:
UN military observers (UNMO), EU Military Observers (EUMO),
the UN and its civil police (UNCIVPOL), UNHCR, and other
non-government or government organizations, which were
situated on the Republic of Croatia’s territory, and co-operated
with the UN, via embassies and their staff. All these
organizations had either openly or secretly engaged in
information gathering in Croatia. Each country that had
its contingent stationed in the Republic of Croatia or
in Bosnia and Herzegovina had, independently from the
UN, collected its own intelligence for their military
or governments’ behalf, in order to define their policies
towards the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
and to promote their particular interests. The most secretive
intelligence and special operations were done by special
secret teams. One of these, the SAS,370 was attached to
the Canadian troops in the Medak Pocket. They shared a
bunker with Lt.Green.371 The traces of foreign intelligence
services’ work, no matter what their cover for secrecy
was, could be seen in that “large theatre of operations”
and were confirmed by various sources.372 The SAS has
been operational in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Its role was important in preserving the Goražde enclave.
They had been positioned in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. They
were under their ex-commander Sir Michael Rose’s special
protection and engagement orders. “While the shoot-and-scoot
counter-terrorism tactics of these elite soldiers struck
fear in the warring Bosnian factions, they also escalated
the scale of the conflict and prompted retaliation against
the UN. Since the standard line units lacked the training
and mobile flexibility of the special forces teams, their
more vulnerable and static troops were the most likely
to pay the price.”373 General Rose, during the Croats
and Bosnian government fiercest conflicts, road blockades,
Serbian threats and hostage takings had tried to create
such a situation in which he could legitimately use NATO
air strikes as a demonstration of the UN’s firmer attitude
towards peacekeeping in Bosnia. After the Russian representative
in Sarajevo, Viktor Andrejev agreed, “I (Rose)decided
it would be best to air strike the Croats and not the
Serbs.”127 In explaining the reasons why air strikes would
better be used on the Croats and not the Serbs, Rose’s
British slant towards the Serbs was revealed. The partiality
instead of impartiality was to be a renowned UN peacekeeper
characteristic. “The Croatians were not that important
to us, and if they reacted to air strikes by closing their
roads, they would not be able to persevere in it for long,
because of the numerous Croats in the Lašva valley depending
on UN help.”128 Rose not only spoke of Croats with contempt:
“Croats are scavengers376” but mentioning the air strikes
to punish Croats he wanted to give Serbs a message of
what would happen to them if they continued to endanger
UN troops. Where was the logic in this? Rose would not
threaten the Serbs but fiercely strike the Croats instead.377
The indications about foreign intelligence services, their
special role in cases like Ahmići, Mostar’s old bridge
and even Srebrenica, had been so obvious that a special
case study or an analysis should be dedicated to them
alone. SAS and SBS (Special Boat Services) were not the
only services to be present on the former Yugoslav territories.
The spectacular action of saving F-16 pilot O’Grady whose
plane went down in Bosnia and Herzegovina, his search
and rescue operation was done by a special American marines
unit, stationed on the aircraft carrier in the Adriatic.
Canadians also, based on the SAS model, had their special
unit – JTF – Joint Task Force – which was commanded by
Lt. Colonel David Moore. Based on his Bosnia and Herzegovina
UN experience had recommended it for service in Yugoslavia.
The Canadian HQ Chief had agreed and JTF’s who had been
trained for abductions, and hostage taking situations,378
had provided security for the Canadian Defence Minister’s
visit to Srebrenica. Many a country secret services’ task
was to make their countries interests in the former Yugoslavia
realized, to get their players in the game of war. Apart
from all possible legal ways, they used the cover of various
humanitarian organizations. In 1992, 1993 and 1994 these
multiplied. Another means of undercover intelligence work,
data gathering and trying to affect the course of events
so that they best served their countries interests, or
that events developed in a manner that suited those willing
to pay for such a service abundantly, was using “dogs
of war” or foreign mercenaries. In the period of 1991
and 1992 many came to fight within the ranks of all the
belligerent armies. Their role was important in the Medak
Pocket Operation, because the majority of volunteers from
SR Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska and other countries fought
in the RSK Army. While some mercenaries did fight on the
Croatian side. Such were the Dutch, who manned the 9th
Croatian guard brigade’s reconnaissance company. Their
commander Johannes Tilder van Basten had in 1994 under
suspicious circumstances been captured by the Krajina
Serbs, questioned, and under suspicious circumstances
been killed. His videotaped accounts have become ICTY
evidence for most of the indicted Croat soldiers regarding
crimes committed in the Medak Pocket. Although he accused
his fellow fighters, foreign volunteers and mercenaries,
not a single one of these had been arrested and taken
to the Hague. And the majority of these soldiers live
in the immediate vicinity of the ICTY and are within the
Tribunal’s reach. Why have none of these soldiers been
indicted for crimes van Basten had accused them of? Perhaps
they were sent to Croatia to execute special tasks and
to report directly to their powerful employers, who now
protected them. It is possible they had created the events
and directed them under their employers’ directives? Or
had they since become protected witnesses in exchange
for their immunity from the ICTY trials? The mercenary
circumstances in the Medak Pocket Operation will be dealt
with later. What did SAS members do in the Medak Pocket?
They were not the constitutive part of the legal UN forces
there. If they did anything it was done to serve their
country and its interests. The evidence about the presence
of secret service members and special forces being deployed
on Croatian and Bosnian and Herzegovinan territories have
yet been disclosed. At this point in time, because of
the SAS’ code of silence, these facts are still unrevealed.379
The
Canadian intelligence assessments show that the Croats
would probably try to straighten their frontline in order
for the operational command in Gospić (command post Gospić)
to be out of Serb artillery reach. The Serb artillery
had been positioned along the Medak Pocket valley floor.
Canadians assessed that the Croats also could try to open
a corridor to the Dalmatian coast and thus avert the public’s
interest from Zagreb’s domestic political conflicts. On
the other hand, UN intelligence reported that Sector South,
where the Canadians were deployed “should be very quiet
over the next few days.”380 According to their military
intelligence’s assessment, the Lika “Vukovi” Brigade was
well armed with tanks and artillery. That armour included
East German T-72 and older models of Warsaw Pact tanks
as well.381 The analysis done after the action caused
intelligence analysts to believe that the “Croatian troops
were equipped with all the necessary armaments for a modern
mechanized army, but used that military power in a primitive
way. Artillery had made a simple barrage curtain, while
the infantry and armour advanced without co-ordination.
While the Croat forces advanced the light infantry had
been active in the surrounding southern hills in order
to close the Medak Pocket from the opposite direction.
The Serb defence organized in an even worse manner, crumbling
under the rough but successful Croatian advance.”382 “If
the Croatians had expected their barrage of Serb positions
to make the UN flee - they were wrong.” (This was the
correct definition and characterization of the Croatian
target – “the barrage on Serb positions” – which for most
of the Canadians meant a direct assault on their positions,
or the reason for Canadian involvement in the battle.)
“In two days, Serb reinforcements from the former Yugoslavia
came to the Medak Pocket and succeeded in stopping the
Croatian advance.” (This was the admission of the Yugoslav
Army and the army of the Bosnian Serbs.) (The later had
already finished because the goals of the Croatian offensive
had already been reached.) “But not before the 10 kilometre
long and 5 kilometre wide “Pocket” was cut-off and the
conflict line strengthened some 3000 metres northwest
from Medak. The battle raged for another two days, hanging
in a bitter balance, until the Serb artillery started
pounding Karlovac and an earth-to-earth missile had been
launched on Zagreb…”383 “This was not a battle, at least
not by Western army standards, where an enemy position
was attacked by fire and manoeuvre. There were no infantry
attacks or tank advancements in order to gain ground held
by the UN forces.”384
The
military analyst Lee A. Windsor only confirmed what should
have been clear to any informed professional analyst –
there was no frontal conflict, no direct attack of Canadians
by the Croats. The Croatian Army did not want to push
the Canadians away, nor keep the ground they were pulling
out from and where Canadians were to be deployed. But
in the very next sentence the authour found the real reason
for such a move: “The frontal attack was not the way in
which the war in the Balkans was waged.” How could Croatian
forces “reach their planned goals – in a 10 km long, 5
km wide pocket” if they did not advance quickly? “The
infantry battles in the former Yugoslavia were waged in
such a manner that both sides would use maximum firepower
to make the adversary’s positions unbearable.”385 That
claim could be true in the case of the former JNA and
Serb rebel forces strategies. They applied the Red Army’s
military doctrine of “masirovka” – a massive artillery
barrage and then direct attack of infantry/armed forces.
From the beginning, Croatia started to use NATO tactics.
Being the weaker party in the war, as far as its manpower
and technical equipment was concerned, the heaviest burden
of the first years of the conflict was carried out by
its police and army “special units”. At the beginning
of the war in Croatia there were many commando units.
Everybody wanted to be a member of a special unit. In
contrast to the JNA’s experiences and teachings, such
units had stood up to the fourth most powerful army in
Europe. They endured massive artillery barrages, air strikes,
and stopped the advancement of the Yugoslav Army’s armed
forces. The best example of this was Vukovar’s resistance.
“As soon as the position became too dangerous to hold
because it was exposed to direct and constant fire, it
was abandoned.”386 That conclusion was incorrect. On the
Croatian side able officers like artillery specialists
and x-JNA officers, Brigadier Ademi and Major Ceku rarely
commanded the artillery. Their precise artillery marksmanship
saved the Croatian cities of Šibenik and Gospić. On the
JNA side, General Perišić’s heavy artillery attacks had
been destroying the cities of Zadar and Mostar. The artillery,
especially heavy 120mm mortars, was rarely operated by
an able territorial defence or JNA reserve officer. The
majority of these officers used artillery for terrorist
– special purposes – to generate panic among the civilian
population in Croatian cities. Artillery fire was rarely
effective.387 “Each move that included forces being exposed
in an open (field) is to be avoided.”388 In the case of
the Croatian operation in the Medak Pocket, the opposite
was true. The lightning co-ordinated manoeuvre of the
artillery and the infantry was in the open. The Serb defence
lines were broken in several places. The fighting was
fierce. The Croats were killed during their offensive
taken on the Serb fortified positions.389 The Serb tank
company commander was killed on the outskirts of Medak.
“In that area there was an enormous amount of weaponry,”
(mostly in the hands of the JNA and rebel Serbs; even
during the Medak Pocket Operation when the Croatian Army
finally managed to get some armour itself). “But there
were no professional soldiers, especially trained ones.”
(Canadian soldiers speak of well-equipped young and disciplined
Croatian soldiers trained by American military advisors
and “armed by Germany”390). Lee A. Windsor cannot avoid
old stereotypes of dividing Europe on “Axis” – Germany
and its satellites and the “Allies” – allied forces, like
they had been divided during World War ll. This had been
the basis for many similar foreign preconceptions. He
continued that “such a waged war could have been the legacy
of Tito’s guerrilla military doctrine.” This is an incorrrect
conclusion as well. Even during the later stages of the
war, especially after the Serbs were defeated in “Oluja”
and when their guerrilla resistance was expected – such
wider “partisan” activity in Croatia and during later
battles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia
did not happen. They were not used by JNA and territorial
defence units who were supposed to follow the Partisan
method of fighting. World War ll Partisan guerrillas had
influenced JNA military doctrine. The author writes: “which
had formed the core of the old JNA cadre and was taught
to the lower ranking officers; later active in ranks of
both belligerent sides.” Fortunately, the old cadre officers
and lower ranking commanders did not impose these characteristics
to the new Croatian Army; instead they initiated it with
courage and decisiveness, shown later by primarily non-professional
Croat soldiers. (There were some rare exceptions of some
JNA or foreign army professionals in the ranks of the
Croatian Army). Characteristics of the new Croatian Army
were also seen in how they fought against the old JNA
schematic military doctrine. The Croatian Army won because
it fought in a different manner than the JNA. The Croatian
Army had been learning from Western armies and used their
experiences in practice. The experience of some Croats
who had served in professional Western armies, and later
with the help of some Western army instructors (i.e. MPRI)
helped a lot. However Windsor concluded, on the basis
of such evidence, the battle had happened.391 His main
argument is that the Balkans definition of battle is the
exchange of fire. Under such a definition, the firefight
between the Croats and the Canadian and French soldiers
really was a battle.145 Windsor’s argument, when the “Balkans
definition” is exempt, leads us to conclude that there
was no battle, that the two sides only exchanged fire,
had a skirmish. The Croats had been afraid that the Serbs
would advance behind the Canadian and French soldiers.
These fears were not unfounded. There were still some
Serbs surrounding Divoselo and on the Velebit Mountains.
The Serbs had done such things later. Their commando units
entered into the Medak Pocket, behind the inexperienced
Canadian soldiers’ backs and fired on Croat positions.393
The Canadians, especially young and inexperienced reservists,
like all soldiers in an unknown, tense and dangerous night
situation would have been firing on anything that moved.
I witnessed such a skirmish in the battlefield. It happened
often when units would change shifts and new soldiers
would come and take positions. To the newcomer, who had
not mastered the area, any noise, shadow, movement or
a flicker of light looked like imminent danger, and he
would act instinctively, by opening fire.394 “It appeared
to Sgt. Dearing that this kind of battle was waged in
the village of Lički Čitluk. According to the Canadian
soldiers there, the heaviest artillery fire came from
less than 150 metres away.” In one instance, Croat mortars
and 20mm automatic guns started firing on Canadian trenches.
On several occasions the Croatian infantry tried to pass
around Dearing’s group, but each time they were repelled
by gunfire and the “Starlight” (night vision equipped)
machinegun fire. Regardless of how this action stood in
comparison with other larger conflicts, the Canadians
had in their history, for the Charlie company shooters
– this was the war (sic.)395 Had reserve soldiers been
less professional? Or did all frightened soldiers react
in the same inexperienced way? “Zero” losses on the Canadian
side as opposed to dozens of dead and 100 wounded Croatian
soldiers who, judging by the Canadians themselves, were
well-trained and intense fighters? Where were the Canadian
losses in that battle? We already know that some Canadian
soldiers were wounded during the first day of the action
– on September 9th. There were more wounded in a minefield
on September 19th. But the only person killed was Captain
Decoste in a road accident.396 During the 15 or 16 hour
long battle on the night of September 15th/16th 1993,
not a single Canadian soldier was wounded. It is true
that Canadians were protected in their trenches. They
held defensive positions. How was it that mortars, cannon
projectiles or 20mm anti-aircraft guns, wounded not a
single man? If that was the truth, that “several consecutive
Croatian offensives were launched” or that “the Croats
were to surmount Canadian positions” – the non-existence
of casualties on the Canadian side is even harder to believe.
If between 26 and 50 Croatian soldiers had been killed
and more than 100 were wounded, it is quite impossible
that not one Canadian soldier was either killed or wounded.
Either the battle was not fierce enough, or somebody is
not telling the truth. “On the right flank the French
company had more luck. Each of its mechanized platoons
had one VAB infantry vehicle with a 20mm gun in its armoured
turret. When they answered the enemy fire using that mighty
and precise weapon, the Croatian forces were less ready
to fire back. The firefights went on for most of the following
night and morning.”397
The
Negotiations
“During
the night Colonel Jom “Mike” Maisonneuve, UNPROFOR’s chief
operative officer, arrived from Zagreb in order to force
the Croats to negotiate. Maisonneuve, Calvin and an older
UN military observer (Lt. Col. Nielsen) had driven down
the main road to talk to the local Croat commander. After
a heated discussion Ademi agreed not to interrupt the
2nd operational stage and allowed the Canadians to secure
the crossing point that night (September 15th/16th 1993).
Operations stage 3 would commence the following day at
12:00 noon sharp, when D company would pass through the
crossing point and reach the Croatian trenches.398 “The
Patricias woke up on the morning of September 16th to
see a horrific picture…smoke…burned houses…special police
had not finished with the “ethnic cleansing”. Lt. Col.
Calvin and Col. Maisonneuve asked to meet General Ademi
again. Unfortunately, with only four companies deployed
and without any tank and artillery support, Calvin’s forces
didn’t stand a chance to engage the entire Croatian 9th
armoured brigade. Even if the Canadians had the force
to engage in a full frontal attack – it would have been
in breach of the UNPROFOR mandate.” Windsor did not exclude
the possibility of an all-out attack on the Croats because
of the assumed “ethnic cleansing” in the area Canadians
were to be deployed, but he was aware of the consequences.
“To return fire in self-defence is one thing, but to start
an all-out attack is another. Canadians could do little
more but to sit and wait for 12 noon.”399 The Canadians
were constantly wishing for an offensive action to start,
during which they would quickly and forcefully throw the
Croats out of their held positions and punish them for
the evil deeds they were about to commit. The Croatian
military action was legitimate. The area liberated a “Pink
Zone” – which by all relevant UN decisions should have
been integrated into Croatia’s territory. Croatia’s fight
against terrorism and the protection of her civilian population
was legitimate. To the international community, especially
those states with their troops on the ground, it was difficult
to admit that Croatia had the legal right to bring the
so-called RSK under local administration and recognize
Croatia’s sovereignty. Even before the accusations of
alleged crimes, in those international community circles,
including Canada’s, the antipathy towards the Croatians
was visible. The Croats were the guilty party, they were
the disruptive factor, the ally of their ancient (German)
enemy. The right of a sovereign state, to solve internal
problems with all legal measure, even if that meant using
military and police force to fight terrorism, and after
it to peacefully solve the minority Serb problem – was
constantly questioned. It might have also been caused
by the wishful thinking of many that an independent national
Croatian state crumble and return to its’ previous status
before the former Yugoslavia fell apart? The majority
of analysts find excuses for CANBAT’s tough attitude and
express empathy for them not being able to start an all-out
attack on the Croatians. But they had to obey Zagreb’s
UN command – sit and wait.400 The hard stand before the
accusations of alleged crimes is later excused by crimes
committed after the military action and withdrawal.
The
Agreement’s Next Implementation Phase
“The
D company had moved according to the timetable (12:00
hours), with a couple of TOW vehicles accompanying it.
As soon as they moved, they encountered a Croatian road
blockade. On the left side of the road there was a deadly
heavy T-72 tank, a gift from Germany” (sic).401 Here too
the Canadian analyst could not avoid the old preconception
about (the bad) Germany who was helping her old war ally.
The tank in question was probably a T-72 or even a T-84,
a Yugoslav improved version of the basic Soviet model,
a good quality tank the Croats had already sold to Kuwait
to be used in “Desert Storm”. The Croatian factory “Đuro
Đaković” had mastered its fabrication and some of the
T-84’s the Croats had captured during their previous fighting
against the JNA. “On the right side, two anti-tank guns
and a large number of anti-armour rocket types called
Sagger402 were aimed at the Canadian column. The Croatian
infantry company, protected by an improvised mine chain,
had manned the barricade. Weapons on both sides were ready
for action. During the show of force, well-trained and
disciplined Canadian soldiers kept cool heads while the
Croats became less and less sure of themselves.”403 Such
a psychological assessment speaks of the analyst’s partiality.
He observed his soldiers with awe, and underestimated
the force of “the enemy” who became weaker and their morale
lower. The only rationale for giving the Croatian soldiers
such a general psychological profile is propaganda.
The
war crimes in the former Yugoslav wars had taught us that
those criminal, murderous acts had been committed by special
paramilitary forces or units (as in the case of Vukovar
and Srebrenica) or groups of criminals.
“Lt.
Col. Calvin had a heated argument with Croatia’s high
ranking officer Brigadier General Mezić. It was Mezić
who stalled in order to give the special police enough
time to cover the evidence of “ethnic cleansing”. D company
moved in at 13:30. Calvin’s inspired idea, (to summon
the improvised press conference in the middle of the road
– authour’s remark), did not prevent ethnic cleansing…but
had enabled the “blue helmets” to enter three villages
before all the traces of the Croatian crimes were destroyed.”404
Later, the CANBAT Battle group had (un)fortunately been
stopped by higher ranking UN officials who insisted the
exact timetable to enter the “Pocket” be observed.” On
September 17th UNPROFOR soldiers had access to the entire
area. They found 16 bodies. Later a mass grave was discovered
with 50 bodies in it.” This data was never confirmed.
Ten years later in Obradović Varoš, ten corpses were discovered.
“The Medak Pocket had provided the world with the first
proof that Serbia was not the only perpetrator of ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans.“405
When
all the pieces had been put into the puzzle, it seemed
that this was the objective most analysts tried to reach.
The decisiveness with which the Canadian peacekeepers
wanted to fulfill the UN mission, their aversion of the
Croats, their shock caused by crimes and their wish to
prevent them by force before they happened, became even
more clear and hid the motives of the Canadian Army’s
actions. It’s goal was to make Croatia equal to Serbia,
to balance both parties’ blame, to make both countries
shoulder the political responsibility for the war. It’s
purpose was to clear the international community’s conscience,
to acquit it of the co-responsibility for crimes, (during
the peacekeeping mission in Croatia in the UNPA zones
600 people had been killed by Serbs paramilitary and official
armed forces)), and the international community’s ineffectiveness
in dealing with the wars in the former Yugoslavia406.
This was underlined by the leniency Canadians had shown
to the weak Serbs and their Krajina while under attack,
the antipathy towards the Croats, “we didn’t like them”,
who were aggressors on their own land. Many an interpretation
of the Medak Pocket events, not only Canadian ones, reveal
a bias when referring to some “sources” and the “impressions
of some witnesses”. Analysts have jeopardized the truth.
By fabricating the events, they question the right of
freedom and existence of a people in whose country UN
soldiers were stationed. By magnifying and dramatizing
the situation, by demonizing only one side, such an analyst
creates a myth, a virtual and false painting of the events
that took place in the Medak Pocket. In that way he rearranges
not only Croatian but also their (military) history.407
“The
Canadian action in Medak had reinstated some respect for
the UN forces, which they had lost in Maslenica.” By the
end of September, Canadian officer Colonel George Oehring
took over the command of Sector South and felt the consequences
of Medak best. He witnessed that the credibility of UNPROFOR
was returned, the talks between the belligerent sides
resumed, and led to an unofficial ceasefire in November
(1993) This lead to a wider, official ceasefire on Christmas
and to a very comprehensive, bilateral general ceasefire
agreement signed on March 29th 1994,408 also known as
the Zagreb agreement. “We (Canadians) were in September
of 1993 (before the action) hated by everybody. They threw
stones at me and threatened me before I left for Zadar
to meet the Croatian commander (General Ante Gotovina
– authour’s note). Medak changed all this. The Serbs had,
up to the moment of my departure, a year later, spontaneously
been mentioning Canadian courage and honesty shown at
Medak, while the Croats, reluctantly at the beginning
but later with more readiness, started to respect Canadians
in Sector South.409” Oehring concludes: “The community
of international peacekeepers, in 1993, had not yet been
ready to take decisive steps as were taken in Kosovo.”
This kind of balancing of Serb guilt of genocide committed
in Kosovo with the guilt of military/police actions in
Croatia implied that the Croats had committed genocide
on the Serbs in 1993 and should have been punished. How?
Was the international community to hit Zagreb with air
strikes, its planes bombarding Croatia and its army? Was
it to defeat Croatia in an infantry battle, force it to
surrender and occupy it with peace forces? Should they
have punished Croatia by annulling its membership in the
UN, by taking away its international recognition and placing
it under a protectorate? With minimal knowledge of the
nature of the conflicts in Croata, it is ludicrous to
so equalize Croatia and Serbia. The Serbs had ethnically
cleansed Kosovo of its’ Albanian population. In their
own country, the Croats had tried, after peaceful measures
had failed, to prevent Serb terrorists from attacking
civilian targets. The Serbs had refused to return under
the legislative Republic of Croatia’s constitution. The
Serbs had in that obstruction and refusal of Croatian
sovereignty been greatly helped by political games and
the international community’s interests, which up to Kosovo
helped Milošević and the Serb policy of hegemony.410
“The
Medak Pocket Operation had happened at the beginning of
the UN peacekeeping transitional period. The Canadian
Battle group had great firepower, and had shown it’s readiness
to use it. However, many other UNPROFOR contingents were
totally unprepared as far as their equipment, training
and political will was concerned, to involve themselves
in such an action the Canadians had involved themselves
at Medak.”411 Lee A. Windsor’s professional analysis ends
in a way that best suits the Canadian military and political
establishment – praising its military forces. “They have
in spite of scandals in Somalia, Cambodia and Croatia,”
(the full report about “Operation Harmony” and 2.PPCLI
speaks about an attempt to poison warrant officer Matt
Stopford, soldiers involved in brawls allegedly exposed
to radiation, involved in an attempted rebellion, their
incompetent military commanders are mentioned – Minister
of Defence and Canadian chief of the main staff army HQ),
“remained to be the serious generator of security and
promoter of Canada’s foreign policy. The organization
able to produce soldiers who will under ever-changing
conditions such as Medak, show efficacy and not collapse
as easily as someone would think.”412 In the conclusion
of Windsor’s study, one can clearly see what the purpose
of remembering the Medak Pocket Operation was – to rebuild
the damaged confidence of the Canadian Army, due to a
number of its commanding officers’ misjudgements, scandals
and mistakes, it had been at it’s lowest point, and nearing
its own “collapse”. Citations to heroism and professionalism
shown were to restore some of that old Canadian Army’s
glory and the trust people had in it. But why at the expense
of the Croatians? I will conclude this review of the Canadian
Medak Pocket interpretation with two Canadian reporters
accounts. “Thirty C company soldiers were positioned in
a two-storey concrete building in Medak, the city held
by the Serbs. The UN was afraid 400 Serbs in four unprotected
villages in the Medak Pocket would be slaughtered.” The
Croatian assessment of the number of Serb soldiers deployed
in the Medak Pocket was the same: 400 soldiers. Where
were the civilians and how many were there? The civilians
in Divoselo, Počitelj, and Lički Čitluk had been organized
into a territorial defence. They continued to live on
their land but at the sound of an alarm they would take
arms and go to war. These villages had obviously been
protected by a reserve force in Medak, a tank company,
and 80 to 100 soldiers of the 103rd Lapac light brigade
deployed there. “During the next five days, the Medak
Pocket was attacked by more than 2500 Croatian soldiers
(the number is overestimated) and helped by tanks, rocket
launchers and artillery. The Serbs had finally stopped
the Croat forces’ advance on September 12th.”413 “At noon
on September 15th 1993, about 250 Canadian and 500 French
soldiers engaged the Croatians in 20 separate firefights,
using light arms. The Croats retreated with about 30 of
their soldiers killed. The Canadians and the French had
one killed and four soldiers wounded. The medal for bravery
was awarded to a Canadian soldier for saving his French
colleague from a minefield.”414
A
Summary of the Peace Imposing Operation in Accord With The
Medak Pocket Agreement
August
6th 1993 – the Canadian Battle group HQ in Camp Polum
near Daruvar in Sector West was abandoned. By the end
of July, Lt. Col. Calvin had transferred two companies
in Sector South, and the rest of 2.PPCLI forces followed.415
C company, (recce group), took the old French positions
in Medak, situated in an old schoolhouse, only 200 meters
away from the Serb HQ (sic). After the first artillery
preparation, Sgt. Green found a new building some 100
metres away and ordered Sgt. Tronholm’s units to move
into it. The evening of September 9th an incident took
place involving some drunken Serb soldiers, who during
a scuffle between two of their own units, fired a grenade
at each other. Later they fired at Canadian soldiers and
the Canadian soldiers answered.416 The Croatian offensive
started with the advancing of the 2.PPCLI through the
Serb occupied area from Gračac to Medak. On the morning
of September 9th, the Canadians were under heavy Croat
barrage fire. The Canadian position received about 500
shells. At 06:05 hours the Croatian artillery preparation
started (“Tested Mettle”). Medak was their prime target.
The Serb HQ was situated in it and it was also the transport
junction. The Canadian battalion HQ (CANBAT – Calvin)
had been situated in Gračac. The fierce battle between
the Croats and the Serbs lasted for the next three days
(“The Ottawa Citizen”). On the evening of September 11th
the tide of the battle turned. The large Serb counteroffensive
was on the way. For the next 72 hours the adversaries
were fighting a pitched battle. The ceasefire and the
withdrawal agreement were signed on September 15th. On
September 13th only a verbal agreement had been reached
that preceded the agreement’s signing.
On
September 14th the military situation in the area stabilized.
In the afternoon, the Serbs launched a Luna rocket (known
as a “Frog” by NATO) on a Zagreb suburb. Lt. Col. Calvin
received an order to enforce the agreement regarding UNPROFOR
entering the zone between the belligerents. At 16:30 he
held a meeting with his subordinate officers in order
to explain their future operation. The plan consisted
of four stages: Stage one – On September 15th take the
Serb forward front positions; Stage two – establish crossing
points in no-man’s land; Stage three – the Canadians and
French were to advance along the road and take the forward
front Croatian positions; Stage four – to oversee the
Croat forces withdrawal to their pre-September 9th positions
and form the demilitarized zone.
On
September 15th General Cot flew to the area of Medak and
spoke with Lt. Col. Calvin. The Canadians and the French
started entering the zone between the Croats and the Serbs.
At 14:00 hours, the Canadians entered the war zone, where
they were stopped by the Croats. At dusk, Colonel Maisonneuve,
Lt. Col. Nielsen and Lt. Col. Calvin held talks with Brigadier
Ademi in Gospić’s command post HQ.
On
September 15th and 16th the Canadians engaged the Croats
in 20 separate firefights. The battle lasted for 15 hours
(according to General MacKenzie), 16 hours (according
to Lt. Col. Calvin in an address to the Canadian Parliament).
Canadians were situated in the old Serb trenches near
Lički Čitluk, opposite the Croatian 9th mobile guard brigade.
The Croats “at several times charged Canadian positions.”
Canadians admitted that the causes could be Serb shooting
at the Croats behind the Canadians’ backs. Early in the
morning of September 16th the Croats engaged the Canadians
for the last time. They withdrew with 30 dead. (sic) (The
UNPROFOR report dated September 16th 1993 – at 22:15 stated
the Croatian Army engaged the Canadian battalion who returned
fire – the only official UNPROFOR report I could acquire417)
On the morning of September 16th the Canadians saw gunfire
and smoke behind the Croatian lines.
At
noon on September 16th (phase three), the Canadians advanced,
but the heavily armed Croatian company stopped them with
T-72 tanks. Lt. Col. Calvin had a heated discussion with
Brigadier Mezić. The tense break lasted for 90 minutes,
which the Canadians started entering the Medak Pocket,
where they found the first killed.
On September 17th at 18:00 hours the Croatian forces withdrew
to their agreed positions.
On
September 18th a new misunderstanding about the demarcation
line, a new meeting and new drawing of maps followed.
The Canadians reported being threatened by armed Croatian
soldiers.
On
September 19th a mine incident occurred, (Shannon Boyd,
UNPROFOR spokesperson’s statement, accused the Croats
because of alleged firing on the “blue helmets”).
Canadian
soldiers hit a mine and disarmed a group of Croatian soldiers
in the demilitarized zone. General Cot protested to the
Croatian side because the peacekeepers were attacked.
Misunderstandings concerning maps and demarcations between
the Croatian and the Canadian side continued. Croatian
soldiers were cut-off at Kamenjuša and were not allowed
to be re-supplied.
On
September 22nd the final agreement on the demarcation
lines and borders of the UN “buffer zone” was reached.
On
September 26th a new incident arises regarding mines and
Croatian soldiers allegedly shooting Canadian and French
soldiers. There is a mutual exchange of serious accusations
between General Cot and General Bobetko.
On
October 3rd General Cot sends a letter to General Bobetko
about mounting tensions and efforts to reach a lasting
peace.
On
October 4th General Bobetko replies.
On
October 7th 1993 CANBAT 1 (UNPROFOR’s) final REPORT on
the Medak Pocket Operation – destruction, carnage, slaughter
and burning – “scorched earth” and “ethnic cleansing”
are underlined.
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