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CASE
STUDY
THE
MEDAK POCKET
Miroslav
Međimorec
The
Political and Military Situation Before the Medak Pocket
Operation
After
the sudden - and for the Krajina Serbs, their army, UNPROFOR
and the international community - unexpected success of
the Croatian Army and police in executing the occupied
area liberation of the Maslenica Operation, a change in
the military and political leadership of the so-called
“Republika Srpska Krajina” (RSK) behaviour was expected.
The Croatian leadership was of the opinion that after
the Krajina action, politicians would be more prone to
negotiate and they would accept the relevant UN documents.
All of these documents unequivocally recognized Croatian
sovereignty over the occupied areas and asked for their
peaceful return under the Croatian constitutional and
legal system. The desperate Serb resistance during the
Rovanjska, Mali Alan, Tulove Grede, Velika and Mala Bobija,
Maslenica, Novigrad, Kašić and Zemunik battles, their
fierce counter-attack when the reinforcement troops arrived
from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina95 – this counter-attack
was for the first time prevented by the Croatian Army’s
“vertical manoeuvre”96, its soldiers and officers combat
readiness and bravery – that Serb resistance has shown
that the force and the Serbian army’s morale, though cracked,
was still high and their perseverance on their “independence”
and “parastatehood” was still abiding.
The
Krajina Serbs attributed their defeat in the Maslenica
Operation to “UN treason”97, to surprise, and to their
own relaxed attitude. The Serb military leadership claimed
their defeat had been caused by a number of unfortunate
coincidences.98 In order to somehow calm down the Krajina
Serbs revolt: military commanders claim to have prevented
a large scale Croat offensive, that the military balance
still held in their favour, and that Croatian military
forces did not pose any danger to the existence of the
RSK.99 FR Yugoslavia still provided them with significant
financial and military aid. Military hardware, ammunition,
fuel and people still crossed over Bosnian and Croatian
borders without any impediment.
The
Yugoslav Army and Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia considered
the whole area to be one, “large integrated battlefield”100,
which in the near future should become an all-Serbian
state.
Arrogance
and disrespect of diplomatic rules were the Serb politicians’
guidelines. After breaking off with the rest of Krajina’s
politicians, Goran Hadžić101, self-proclaimed president
of “RSK state” came to Geneva without an invitation. Krajina’s
politicians took sides of their preference, Hadžić chose
his to be Baranja and Vukovar, the remnants of the JNA
and ex-military cadre. It was an easy way out for him,
because eastern Slavonia bordered with FR Yugoslavia (Serbia)
and actually became its integral part at a time. Serbian
politicians from western Slavonia tried to secretly negotiate
with the Croatian government, but were discovered and
punished102. The hardest line was taken by the “Knin stream”
politicians, who were geographically the most far removed
from Belgrade and the political power’s centre - Slobodan
Milošević, from where the principal moves in Serb politics
were made. Knin politicians therefore acted independently.
After the June 1993 Erdut Agreement in Vienna103 a ceasefire
between the Croatian Army and the Krajina paramilitary
should have been signed. But instead of signing, the rebel
Krajina Serbs issued an ultimatum, asking for the Croatian
Army’s withdrawal from areas liberated during the Maslenica
military and police action. The agreement endorsed by
the international community consequently had not been
signed, Krajina Serbs stubbornly demanded their parastate
be recognized. It was again clear that the dispute should
be solved with arms.
The
situation in the area after the Maslenica action started
to slowly change, the Krajina Serb’s morale was low, especially
after the pontoon bridge over the Maslenica gorge was
constructed. The calls for a general mobilization were
issued daily, deserters were punished and some of them
had escaped to Belgrade. Rumors were spread about oil
being stolen, for which Goran Hadžić was blamed. Corruption
was in full swing. Money had been stolen and it was said
that Knin politicians deposited it in Belgrade’s banks.
Soldier’s wages were months late. The value of the “Krajina
Dinar” fell dramatically, and there were constant shortages
of basic food necessities and fuel.104 In order to boost
morale, which had fallen after the Maslenica Operation,
several groups of volunteers came from Serbia proper.
One of these was “Captain Dragan”105 – who, in Bruška
near Benkovac established the commando training centre
for the so-called “Knindža’s.”106 All the volunteers and
promises of further aid were just a pretence. The RSK
belief was that should a danger arise, FR Yugoslavia and
the Yugoslav Army was ready to help. That firm faith was
the guarantor of the RSK’s existence. The majority of
Krajina Serbs were not aware that Milošević’s politics
has changed. This change was caused by pressure from greater
powers and imposed sanction. Milošević’s politics shifted
to a more realistic goal – the lifting of sanctions imposed
on FR Yugoslavia and the creation of a Republika Srpska
in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without their
knowledge, Serbs in Croatia were left to fend for themselves.
War
Operations in Lika 1991 – 1993
The
JNA and Rebel Serb Army’s Military Organization
During
July, August and into mid-September 1991 Serb rebel forces
occupied areas of Lika where the Serb population were
a majority. According to previously drawn JNA plans107,
its counter-intelligence service (SSNO) – the state security
service (continued to be called KOS)108, had armed and
started to organize rebel units (Territorial defence,
partisan brigades, paramilitary and Četnik units) in the
13th Rijeka corps, whose territorial command the Lika
area fell under. The rebel attacks on Croatian police
patrols, control taking in municipalities and cities –
spread from Knin to Korenica, Gračac, Lovinac, Sveti Rok,
Medak and Gospić.109 Threatening rumours were spread among
the general population. This being part of a special psychological
war which JNA experts had studied at British colleges
for special warfare.110 So fear and panic had preceded
any army advancement. Terrorist shelling, psychological
warfare, targeted massacres of Croatian civilians in Lovinac,
Sv. Rok, and Široka Kula, had forced the rest of the Croatian
population in Krajina to flee to Gospić, Otočac, Perušić,
Lički Osik or other safer parts of Croatia. The best example
of this was the difficult exodus of the Lovinac villagers
over the massive Velebit mountains, to the security of
Croatia’s coastline.
The
Croatian Military and Police Forces Organization
At
the beginning of September 1991 in Gospić and Otočac three
battalions of the 118th brigade of the National Guard
Union as well as the Ministry of Interior police forces
were deployed. Their units were poorly armed with light
infantry weaponry and a few mortars at their disposal.
Military
plans and Military Operations development
It
was clear by their August and September military operations
that Serb rebels and the JNA tried to take control of
the Gospić - Karlobag and Gospić - Perušić - Otočac roads,
in order to encircle the town of Gospić. They also tried
to interrupt the Otočac - Brinje and Josipdol - Ogulin
route. If successful, they would have managed to cut Zagreb
from Senj and Split, and eventually would have reached
Rijeka to join General Čad’s troops111 - the 13th JNA
corps, still stationed there.
But
the National Guard Union (ZNG) and Ministry of Interior
police forces fortified their defence lines preventing
the enemy’s further advancement to the fictitious Karlovac
- Karlobag line, the future “Greater Serbian” frontier
– which was the strategic objective of the rebel Serbs.
The Croatian’s shortage of weapons was still an acute
problem, and the only way for them to arm was to break
into the JNA army depots and barracks in Lika. The decision
was made, and on September 14th 1991 the operation of
overtaking JNA army barracks in Gospić, Kaniža and Perušić
was taken, which successfully finished with Serbs handing
in the radar station on Panos over to Croats on September
22nd. At that point, the JNA started to crumble. Many
young conscripts had fled barracks and with the help of
the Croatians returned to their homes in Serbia, Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. What was left of
the JNA was professional officers and lower-ranking staff,
as well as local mobilized Serb conscripts. The Croatian
National Guard Union and the Ministry of Interior forces
had, in spite of the resistance, captured all JNA installations
and seized greater quantities of small and heavy arms.
The enemy tried to unblock their surrounded forces, but
failed to do so. During the Gospić action a JNA general
was taken prisoner112 and later exchanged for Croatian
prisoners. After arming themselves with heavy weaponry
– tanks, APC’s and cannons, the ZNG and police were able
to engage in more limited operations to liberate the occupied
territory. One such action was the attack on the village
of Divoselo. On November 16th 1991113 Croatian forces
broke Serb defence lines and entered Divoselo. But after
receiving the order to withdraw, they returned to Gospić.
That action, taken in a village that was a partisan-Četnik
symbol, that before 1991 determined all of the Lika region’s
development, had a hard-hitting psychological effect on
the Serb side. In a similar action taken on Divoselo on
October 3rd 1991 the leader of the “Beli Orlovi”, the
Belgrade paramilitary Serb volunteer unit, Đorđe Božović
- Giška114 was killed. It was yet another heavy blow for
the rebel Serbs. At the beginning of November in the Lika
area, the Croatian 111th and 128th brigade came from Rijeka.
With those enforcements a military balance was achieved.
Serb forces answered with heavy artillery attacks which
for the citizens of Gospić, Perušić and Otočac became
a daily routine.
Deceitful
Ceasefire
On
January 3rd 1992 the Sarajevo Ceasefire Plan was implemented,
but Gospić, Stari Lički Osik, Perušić and Otočac still
underwent artillery bombardments. On occasion they were
also under the enemy’s infantry attacks. The occupied
region of Lika bordered Mala Kapela in the north, and
the Velebit Ridge in the south. After the RSK started
to “govern it”, the non-Serb population was ethnically
cleansed - expelled or killed. The crimes committed on
the Croat population continued even during the UNPROFOR
mandate. Such was the one committed in Podlapača as revenge
for the Medak Pocket’s defeat. Lika had been, from the
Partisan and Četnik movement during World War ll, the
strategically important area for the realization of expansionist
Serb aspirations. In 1991 it became the “Krajina spine”,
the link between Banija and Kordun, with the central points
of the parastate being Gračac and Knin surrounding areas.
Lika also bordered and had a foothold in Serb areas in
neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. The radical Serb
indoctrination, which in Yugoslavia was masked by Communism
and Yugoslavism, was especially strong in Lika. One should
remember that Serb rebel units from Lika had moved first.
The first larger clash with Croatian special police forces
happened at the Plitvice Lakes resort on May 1st 1991
in Lika, when the first Croatian defender, Josip Jović
was killed.
Military Strategic Position
In
Otočac’s surrounding area, the Serb rebels occupied dominant
hills and kept roads on the Otočac -Josipdol and Otočac
- Gospić routes under fire. Near Lički Osik, the communication
route of Gospić -Perušić was under their direct fire.
Gospić had been and had remained the political and strategic
centre for the entire region of Lika. For Croats to lose
Gospić would mean losing Lika. Gospić was held by the
Croats while Serb forces held a semi-circle position around
them. Serbs held the surrounding dominant positions and
had the Gospić - Karlobag communication line under their
direct control. Although Croatian forces held most of
the Velebit Mountain positions as far as the Mali Alan
passage – the possible advancement and manoeuvre to that
area was under Serb control. The Serbs shelled Gospić
and its surrounding roads from Barlet, Medak, Divoselo
and Debela Glava. They threatened to overrun Gospić and
cut off all communication to it. The consequent capture
of the Velebit Mountain positions looked imminent. If
Serb forces had reached the Croatian coastline, and had
succeeded in cutting the country’s north from its south
regions, Croatia would have been in a catastrophic position.
The
Enemy’s Military and Political Situation
Serb
political dissension continued while the rift between
the army and the police widened. Civilians as well as
the army experienced the greater shortages of fuel and
food. The RSK Army’s great problem was their lack of manpower.
They thought that the lack of soldiers could be replaced
by heavy weaponry and by Serb volunteers coming from other
Serb-held areas. Or if danger would arise the assumption
was that Yugoslav Army troops would come to assist. Thanks
to the ineffectiveness of UN forces, the influx of Serb
volunteers was not completely blocked. The limited number
of Krajina Serb soldiers had to engage along a very long
frontline. The long duration of battle readiness had tired
and unmotivated these men. They behaved much like the
population of the Krajina had before; they lived in their
homes, worked their fields, and at the sign of an emergency,
took their rifles and went into battle positions. The
difference between civilians and soldiers therefore disappeared;
they all wore uniforms or elements from uniforms and they
carried arms.
After
Maslenica, at the Yugoslav Army’s HQ in Belgrade, “the
real threat strategy”115 was conceived and published –
the artillery and rocket barrage on the Republic of Croatia’s
strategic objects. Serbs believed that this strategy would
stop further Croatian Army attacks, and compensate for
the Serb shortage in manpower. Using heavy artillery,
the air force and surface-to-surface missiles combined
with small-scale terrorist attacks, the Serbs intention
was to create an overpowering effect and for their forces
to achieve constant battle readiness and alertness.
Before
the Medak Operation Serbs executed several terrorist attacks
– they massacred two Croatian special police members in
the Velebit Mountains. While a Serb reconnaissance and
commando unit was set on the Divoselo area to Potklisa
and the Gospić - Karlobag road. From enemy documents seized
after the Oluja Operation it became clear that they planned
on capturing Podklisa in order to control the route vital
to Gospić’s survival. A second document mentioned by General
Markač revealed the Serb plan to commence an attack on
Gospić from the same area (Divoselo)116 just fifteen minutes
before the Croatian Medak Pocket action on September 9th
1993. Confiscated Serbian Krajina Army documents confirm
General Markač’s claims as reported in the press. The
Serbian Krajina Army HQ wanted to pre-empt the intended
Croatian Army attack, which was visible in light of the
build-up and regrouping of Croatian Army forces. The 9th
mobile brigade HQ commanding officer, Colonel Jovo Kordić.
commanded an additional Serb force reconnaissance mission.
On August 26th 1993 he stated that: “…Based on tactical
and other available data, observation, reconnaissance,
and data furnished to us by the 15th corps command, it
is evident that the Ustaša forces are reinforcing the
front on the Kraljičina Vrata - Mali Golić and Dušica
- Visočica line. They firmly hold the Velebit ridge positions
and are endangering the positions of our 1st and 2nd mobile
brigade. In order to secure the brigade’s left flank and
to fully monitor the status and Ustaša forces deployment
on the Visočica - Mali Alan line, and their further intentions,
I have decided (Colonel Jovo Kordić – author’s note) to
order additional forceful reconnaissance on the lines…117
It was obvious that the data about: “the increased activity
of Ustaša forces on the northwest slopes of the Velebit
Mountains, whose objective it was to cut our brigade defence
area on the Visočica - Čitluk -Ornice line,” which members
of the Serb Krajina Army gathered during intense reconnaissance,
asked for greater alertnes. So on September 3rd 1993,
Colonel Kordić “ordered full battle readiness in the 2nd
mobile brigade, LAD PVO, MPOAD, HAD and TČ units.”118
Since
the gathered information became more grave, Colonel Kordić
wrote “…Ustaša forces are in control of military objects
on the slopes of the Velebit Mountains. They are building
a road on the Duler-Alanak - Delukino Vrelo route. Their
objective is to cut our brigade’s defence line at Visočica
- Lički čitluk - Ornice.” He then issues the command:
“a part of the 9th Mobile Brigade force has a task to,
on September 9th 1993 perform a forceful reconnaissance
in the region Mokra pećina - t.p. 665 - Velika kosa and
reach the Kosa - Dujmovača -t.p. 618 - Bukova glava -
Jelovac line.” This important document will be discussed
further, but at this point it is important to note that
the actual order for battle readiness was given on “September
9th 1993 at 08:00 hours”.
The
Croatian Army and Ministry of the Interior Forces Organization
and Countermeasures
The
9th Mobile Guard Brigade “Vukovi” Formation
The
9th Mobile Guard brigade was formed as the 6th Guard Brigade
on November 1st 1992 from elements of the 118th and 133rd
Brigade. Their achievements include the defence of Lika
and stopping rebel Serbs and the JNA advancement into
“Croatia’s backbone”. In January 1993 the Brigade was
renamed and became the 9th Mobile Brigade, known as “Lički
Vukovi” (Lika’s wolves) or for short “Vukovi” (wolves).
The Brigade took part in the Maslenica action. It successfully
mastered the difficult mountain terrain on the Rovanjska
- Jasenice - Tulove Grede line. General Bobetko especially
praised its armoured division. On the HQ’s commander order,
the Brigade returned to Lika and defended the frontline
from Gospić to Otočac. Engaging the enemy on a daily basis
the 9th Brigade prepared to undertake the most difficult
war efforts. Such an effort would be the September 9th
1993 operation – pushing off imminent danger from Gospić
and neutralizing the most important Četniks’ centre in
Divoselo – a village symbolizing the radical Serb movement
in the heart of Croatia.
The
Croatian Ministry of the Interior Special Police
The
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia special
police was constituted as an antiterrorist unit, but because
of the spreading of the war it soon became a much larger
and more respectable force. Its members were well trained,
armed and motivated. On Lika’s battlefield they held the
Velebit Mountains, prevented enemy advancement over the
Mali Alan pass to Zadar and Karlobag. The commander of
the special police, General Mladen Markač’s HQ was on
the Viševica peak. In the Maslenica action they liberated
Tulove Grede. The Croatian special police unit blocked
the Mali Alan pass and took Velika and Mala Bobija. These
experienced units knew the difficult mountain area terrain
and their enemy well.
The
Reconnaissance and Commando Group Actions (ID-Groups)
The
Croatian army and special police forces situated on the
Velebit Mountains tried through their reconnaissance and
commando groups’ incursions to identify the enemy’s weak
points and to divert their attention from real locations
of a Croatian attack. They also suffered some losses inflicted
by the Serb commando units. During July and August, Serbian
Krajina Army reconnaissance commando units undertook five
major attacks. On July 7th near Bilaj at the Ornice -
Jasikovac area, on July 22nd on the road connecting Otočac
and Jovići, and attacks on August 30th and 31st. The most
significant attack was the ambush and killing of two Croatian
special police members on the Velebit Mountains. This
was the trigger, General Bobetko writes, for starting
the Medak Pocket operation. The capture and killing of
Croatian special police members was part of a planned
attack and forceful reconnaissance mission commanded by
Serb Colonel Kordić (the command for additional forceful
reconnaissance given on August 26th 1993 and the actual
order for full battle readiness given on September 3rd
1993). On September 4th the Serbian Krajina Army commando
group, accompanied by artillery, attacked the special
police unit on Debela Glava - the prominent mountain t.p.
on Velebit from which there was a complete overview of
the river Lika valley from Gospić and Medak. Later that
area was called the Medak Pocket. Two Croatian policemen
were killed and massacred, while three policemen were
wounded. After that date, the Croatian Army main staff
HQ gave warning about a possible Serb commando attack
on Croatian positions along the Velebit Mountains. According
to a Serbian POW and confiscated commanding order dated
September 8th 1993, major forceful reconnaissance and
battle operations were planned to be executed on September
9th 1993 at 08:00 hours. After Croatian President Tuđman,
persuaded by General Bobetko’s arguments, sanctioned the
action, another operation was taken to distract the enemy’s
attention from the real target. It was the attack on the
village of Urije near Novi Lički Osik on September 6th
1993 that served as a diversion in which the reconnaissance
and commando elements of the Croatian 9th Mobile Brigade
destroyed an enemy checkpoint. The Croatian Army was certain
that the enemy forces were led to believe, (Serb documents
say otherwise), that the target of a full-scale Croatian
attack would be the ammunition factory “Marko Orešković”
in Novi Lički Osik and did not, (so the Croatian Army
assessed), discover the Croatian preparations for Divoselo,
Čitluk and Počitelj. That Croatian assessment was faulty,
because according to the commands given by the commanding
officer of the 9th Serb Mobile Brigade, Colonel Kordić,
it was obvious that Serbs were quite aware of the Croatian
special police forces buildup on the Velebit Mountains,
and the threat of cutting the “Pocket” on the Visočica
- Lički Čitluk - Ornice line. Both sides therefore had
at the same time engaged in preparation for a military
action. The Croatian side was to undertake a smaller scale
action in order to take better tactical positions and
push off the enemy from Gospić. The Serb side wanted to
take control of the Velebit Mountains, to secure the Medak
- Gračac road in order to prevent the second end of the
pincer movement to close (the first one was secured after
Croatian success at the Maslenica operation) that from
Lika and the Velebit Mountains threatened Gračac, Obrovac,
Benkovac and Knin. And, not the least, the Serbs wanted
to politically and militarily humiliate Croatia for daring
to attempt a decisive military action like Maslenica.
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