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Conference
on "Intelligence and the
Threat from International Terrorism"
Zagreb,
Croatia, November 30 - December 01, 2001
Participants
Section
IV
Problems
and prospects concerning
international intelligence cooperation
and joint action in counter-terrorism.
Lessons from the EUROPOL-cooperation
Lange:
Now
it is our last session and the topic is: Problems
and prospects of international intelligence cooperation
and joint action in counter-terrorism, and Lessons
from EUROPOL-cooperation. I cannot say much about
this, because I haven't been involved in police matters,
and because thus far there is too little data on EUROPOL
to make a judgement. I am approaching this topic a
bit cynically, especially in regard to cooperation.
Now where do we have real cooperation in intelligence?
There are three reasons for the lack of cooperation.
We should not be too enthusiastic about short term
prospects for meaningful cooperation. The first problem
is national interest. What does this mean? It means
that in a concrete situation, service A is trying
to exchange information with service B, and the guideline
is: always give the other one as much junk as you
can for as much gold as you can get. This poses a
big problem. If intelligence could transcend the boundaries
of national interest and if there were a supra-national
intelligence structure, then there could be cooperation.
I cannot see something like this emerging, so we are
still confronted with the trading, where one is trying
to cheat the other. The French often point to the
American actions during the Bosnian war; that is,
modifying satellite images in order to influence political
decisions. This is used by French colleagues to argue
for an exclusively European intelligence capacity
in this area. Then we have a major problem with international
intelligence cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.
These terrorist networks now entail economic networks.
I had the opportunity to look at a list of companies
established by Bin Laden cum Al-Qaeda in Sudan alone.
There are about 20 companies still active, with contacts
outside, and this is just one country. So we have
to start from the preposition that there are huge
networks, not only Al-Qaeda but others as well.We
have to take into account economic networks connected
to the regular economy, and if this is the case, then
international anti-terrorist cooperation must include
economic espionage. But when you throw your net into
the ocean of economic information wanting to catch
the herring, you also risk killing the dolphin you
are supposed to protect. This creates suspicion as
well, as one suspects the other of using the pretext
of anti-terrorist intelligence to commit economic
espionage. The third problem for cooperation is that
there exist different intelligence cultures. Just
to address one point of view: you know you have a
type of intelligence community clearly separated between
internal intelligence, counterintelligence, security,
and external intelligence; you also have those with
closely intertwined internal and external intelligence,
and it is extremely difficult for these two types
to exchange information in a meaningful way. One will
be more driven by domestic interests and have reservations
the other type of service doesn't have. So how realistic
is meaningful cooperation? What do we have now, and
what are the prospects? Or is it just a myth?
Smith:
I
think you are wrong when you say that there can't
be good intelligence exchanges; there can be. I've
been involved in some very good ones, and some very
bad ones. It varies. The best are between two services,
as opposed to multi-lateral exchanges; the more services
involved the more difficult it is. However, the war
on terrorism will require multi-lateral exchanges.
This was the case in Bosnia because a number of countries
were involved in operations there, and there were
productive exchanges among services in Bosnia. It
is a myth that an intelligence service spends a lot
of time trying to fool the service it is having an
exchange with. The only reason to have an intelligence
exchange is if both sides gain. In short, I think
that intelligence exchanges are always useful and
are vital in the war against terrorism because they
enable services to track terrorists. I think the response
from European services, as far as I can tell from
news reports, has been excellent following September
11th.
Boyadjiev:
OK,
I would like to approach the problem from another
angle. I agree entirely with Doug, but he is talking
about bilateral cooperation and I would like to speak
about multilateral cooperation. As I mentioned previously,
for more than 10 years I have been lobbying in Bulgaria
and elsewhere for the resurrection of an "old"
new slogan, "Spies of the world, unite!"
I think one of the active approaches for fighting
terrorism is cooperation. I know that it is still
utopian to think about an international intelligence
community but sooner or later, and I hope sooner,
it's going to happen. The enemy is a common enemy
for all democratic societies and we ought to find
means to work together against the common enemy. I
would like to start with two quotations by UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, because I found in them answers
to some questions we have discussed these past two
days. On November 18, 1999, Kofi Annan said in a speech
to the General Assembly: "We are all determined
to fight terrorism and to do our utmost to banish
it from the face of the Earth. But the force we use
to fight it should always be proportional and focused
on the actual terrorists." The second part of
the quotation: "We cannot and must not fight
them by using their own methods - by inflicting indiscriminate
violence and terror on innocent civilians, including
children." I think everyone will agree this ought
to be our approach and reaction to terrorism. The
second thing I think is important to mention is that
when you fight a shadow, because Bin Laden is a shadow,
Al-Qaeda is a shadow, the best way to fight the shadow
behind the scenes. I am not sure that using all possible
military power in the war against the terrorists of
September 11th will be more effective than, say, investing
1/100 of the money spent for that war to fight an
intelligence war. I personally believe that the American
services, with the help of other intelligence services,
would have been able to achieve the same results within
the same time frame - to catch Bin Laden and the leaders
of Al-Qaeda, and to take them to court - by using
an intelligence war. But this is my opinion.
Now, let's talk about some problems. With the end
of the Cold War, terrorism has become Enemy Number
One. A lot of money has been spent not only by the
American services but all over the world to fight
terrorism, and terrorists have demonstrated the ability
to hit any place and anyone. The events on September
11 marked a huge fiasco for international and national
security services, and represented a breakdown of
the democratic world's immune system. As I said already,
I felt responsible for what happened. I didn't have
any personal ability to do anything. But if a sound
Bulgarian intelligence service had still been in existence,
with the abilities it had ten years ago, I am sure
that it would have been in a position to detect some
preliminary signs. On September 12 I wrote an article
in a Bulgarian newspaper saying the next strike would
be a biological. Unfortunately, I happened to be right.
So biological, chemical, radiological, and ecological
attacks are all within the realm of international
terrorism. And we cannot rule out terrorists' ability
to make a nuclear strike at some point. An attack
on global information and communications systems would
also be devastating. I recall something Admiral Lacoste
said during his first visit in Bulgaria. He gave as
an example illegal financial transactions through
the Internet and the fact that they represnet more
than mere financial transactions on the stock exchange.
If the attack is focused here, and it's far from impossible,
it can cause horrendous repercussions. How can we
protect ourselves from these dangers? I see the solution
in broad international cooperation or, as I call it,
"Spies of the world, unite!"
I'd like to give some examples from Bulgarian experiences
fighting terrorism, and not just on a national level.
General Wolf will recall that the backbone of leftist
terrorism in West Germany was broken with the arrest
of the Baader-Meinhof group in Bulgaria, with the
participation of Bulgarian counterintelligence services.
That happened in the 1970's, and created problems
between the Bulgarian services and the GDR because
at that time, we were cooperating in the battle against
terrorism with "the enemy", the West German
services. The Bulgarian - Austrian agreement on combating
international terrorism signed approximately at the
same time created another problem with Warsaw Pact
members. We were accused of trying to act neutral
like Austria and then later seeking to reach an agreement
with NATO countries and so on. The third example I
would like to mention is the joint operation, Desert
Storm. One more thing is important. In Bulgaria on
April 8-10, 1992, representatives from 29 intelligence
services got together in an unprecedented meeting,
held under the auspices of the Bulgarian President.
The professionals discussed one topic - "The
Cold War is over, what now?" Terrorism was the
main issue. So it all began in Sofia. I know of no
other official meeting prior to that where these topics
were discussed at such a high level. I will finish
with the fact that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister
(UN General Assembly speech on October 7, 1996) was
the first to suggest the need for intelligence sharing
in fighting common evils such as terrorism. I will
finish with a potential invitation. I hope to have
the backing of the Bulgarian government and the new
Bulgarian President to hold another such meeting,
this time with a different format; that is, gathering
together active intelligence officers, politicians,
and veterans, to discuss the same topic - international
terrorism and how to fight it. My final thought is
this: Intelligence is not a force but an instrument
used to apply force. We must find common denominators.
We need new rules for a game that has no rules. Maybe
not official treaties like the Vienna Treaty but,
nonetheless, a new code of conduct, new rules, a new
kind of control and national and international oversight.
I know Dick still disagrees with this, but we'll need
international oversight and new level of accountability
as well.
Intelligence is the first line of defense. It was
relatively easy to count tanks and warheads. Now we
need real insight, the ability to analyze emotions
and peoples' ways of thinking, and achieve a cross-cultural
understanding. This once again means cooperation.
Finally, if the intelligence system is not able to
warn of catastrophes before they occur, then it is
outdated and useless. I hope the intelligence community
- national and international - will make changes as
result of the tragic events of September 11th. Let's
hope this happens sooner rather than later.
Tuđman:
We
are faced with a need for international cooperation,
intelligence cooperation not only in the field of
terrorism but also organized crime, drug trafficking,
and smuggling of people. Even in those areas it's
much easier to make an agreement than undertaking
the joint operation. On the other hand, when we talk
about international intelligence cooperation it can
be on at least two levels. First of all, it means
multilateral cooperation between the services and
international organizations. But who will supply the
organizations with intelligence? That's not often
discussed, but when the functioning of the organization
changes, they will share at least the same intelligence.
It's irrelevant how it will be collected. I believe
that bilateral cooperation is most important. There
are examples of effective cooperation but it's often
dependent on the quality of the services, not other
elements. But the main problem is that there probably
will not be multilateral cooperation because of the
nature of terrorism. If they plan activities in one
country, train the people in another country, finance
from a third, and perform activities in a fourth,
there is no chance of avoiding multilateral cooperation.
A joint operation on a certain problem can be the
first step toward multilateral cooperation. Maybe
we could begin with a small number of services. One
of the issues that we are faced with after September
11 event is multilateral cooperation. I believe there
is a dire need for multilateral cooperation; otherwise,
terrorist organizations and criminal groups will use
the advantages of globalization.
Dedijer:
Todor,
you forget the liberation movements of the world.
You've got to look at terrorism in light of liberation
movements. The Kurds, the Chechens in Russia, they
should be free. The only weapon they had was terrorism.
They didn't have tanks, they didn't have F-16s, or
anything else; they used what they had. There is a
danger in condemning all the liberation movements.
The second thing is that I think it's dangerous for
the President to start infringing on democracy, introducing
new rules, and so forth. Democratization of intelligence
is happening going all over the world. There are insight
and control committees, parliaments and so on who
want to know what the intelligence agencies are doing.
What have they achieved? What have they missed? and
all these scandals, the press wants to expose that.
Half the kids in the world have access to information
and they are eager to use it. In that sense, there
is a tremendous new wave going on in the world. Senator
Goldwater once said that half the intelligence in
the United States comes from their multinational cooperations.
Now the question is: will Government intelligence
supply the multinational cooperations or other cooperations
in their country with the intelligence they get from
abroad and from other countries. This is big problem.
If a German firm finds that Sony is making a new product,
will it communicate it to the German firm and say
"look what the Sony is doing."
Boyadjiev:
We're
talking about the private sector and intelligence
agencies. There is a problem, and I do not see how
it's going to be solved. The intelligence is paid
for by taxpayer's money. You cannot use the information
to help one company and not help all the competitors.
The only way is to make the information public. I
am afraid it is not going to happen soon. About Steven's
remarks on liberation movements. I am not talking
about liberation movements because that's another
topic. But I agree with you. The solution is a definition
of terrorism that will point out all the aspects and
not leave room for speculation about liberators, freedom
fighters, fighters for human rights, and so on. When
we are talking about terrorism, we are talking about
a crime against humanity. I think that is the answer.
Kerr:
I
have a comment on multilateral intelligence. We do
need to establish a network and communications among
the intelligence services because of the complex problems
in the world today. Many of the problems that face
us are global. Although the countries involved in
a particular crisis will change, you cannot wait for
the crisis to develop relationships. If you do not
exercise those connections you cannot establish them
when you need them. So you do need intelligence relationships,
just like you need diplomatic relations and other
relationships among countries. There are certain areas,
Miro mentioned some, where we can have broad agreements
for cooperation: terrorism, crime, narcotics, and
a variety of others that often involve law enforcement.
There are other areas where those partnerships can
fluctuate and involve some but not nations. I don't
think a UN intelligence service is a practical idea.
They have no assets, they have no resources, they
have no ability to keep secrets, and they have no
independent capability. Finally, on economic intelligence,
the CIA and other US organizations collect macro-economic
information. But intelligence organizations do not
provide this information to business. The Commerce
Department supports US business (not very effectively,
in my judgment) but intelligence is concerned primarily
with broad economic trends, corruption, and specific
issues such as oil. There is macro analysis. For example,
analysts do look at international banking, the larger
economic situation in important countries, the future
price of oil, and the impact of corruption and underground
economies. These are legitimate targets for intelligence.
Passing information on a foreign company to a US company
does not happen. That doesn't mean companies don't
go out and try to collect that information, but US
intelligence is not involved in supporting one company
over another. A US ambassador in a country is obviously
trying to support US firms and give them insight and
contacts, but intelligence is not a player in that
process. Maybe it should be, but it isn't.
Wolf:
I
don't know which type of international cooperation
exists now. I can only speak about the past. I think
the way to cooperate in the fight against terrorism
is bilateral cooperation. We have seen the difficulties
in European economic cooperation. But this is another
question. When intelligence services exchange information,
they have to protect their sources and so on. During
the last years of my active service, we had a project
established by the Soviet Service, SOUD. I don't know
how to translate this, but it was a recording done
in Moscow, using all possible technologies, of identified
members of secret services, intelligence services
from Western countries, suspicious persons, terrorists,
and others of interest to the services. It took a
long time to prepare; eventually, all the members
of the Warsaw Pact agreed to contribute information
about such persons to the system, but every time we
had to decide what to give and what not to give. We
had the formal right to use the system to obtain information
and answers to certain questions, but this was sometimes
a problem because all the members had the right to
use it. If we knew, for example, the identity of a
member of the American station in India, we would
provide the information. The whole thing was an attempt
to establish international co-operation. I don't know
whether the CIA has agreements with other services
about exchange of information of that type. But this
can realistically only be done step by step. Todor
said it could be done very soon, in terms of fighting
terrorism. I think it is necessary to create some
form of international monitoring in light of the kind
of terrorism we have been confronted with since September
11th. As far as this issue is concerned, I do not
see a political problem in recognizing the leadership
of the American services; of course, on the basis
of bilateral equal rights for collecting, providing,
and receiving information.
Lacoste:
A
Secret Service is essentially at the service of its
own country and is one of the main symbols of the
sovereignty of the state.
However, a national Secret Service may share intelligence
with other foreign or Secret Services whenever its
government has given it a formal agreement to do so.
But it not necessary to share all one's intelligence;
it is normal and legitimate that a country keep its
national secrets to itself.
In wartime, within a military alliance against a common
enemy, military intelligence is usually fully integrated
between the allies, because operational objectives
are well-defined. It is not often so clear with political
and strategic intelligence when, for example, war
goals are different.
In peacetime, alliances are much looser; many other
factors can also affect political co-operation, not
to mention the sharing of secret Intelligence.
After September 11, 2001, many countries declared
themselves ready to join the United States in their
fight against "international terrorism".
What does this mean exactly for the Secret Services
? We need to be aware of the difficulties and limits
of such cooperation.
Let me raise three points .
What exactly does the expression "international
terrorism mean" ? It ultimately depends upon
the context and, moreover, terrorism is expressed
in a variety of causes, forms, degrees, and participants.
In some situations it is limited to a single country;
i.e., the Irish IRA in the U.K., and the revolutionary
Red Brigades in Italy. In other situations it involves
two or three countries simultaneously: the Basque
ETA in Spain and France; the Kurdish PKK in Turkey
and Germany.
Patriots fighting against an occupation army on their
national territory are designated "terrorists"
by that army, and "resistance fighters"
by themselves and their friends. Many terrorist actions
occurred during colonial wars, and were qualified
as such by the former colonial powers. The liberated
people called them liberation fighters.
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Israel
has been fighting against Palestinian terrorists;
however, 50 years ago the founders of Israel practised
brutal terrorism against the British army. From one
point of view terrorists are criminals, and from the
opposite heroes!
When the spiral of violence and hatred is in motion,
words have no real significance on either side. After
the World Trade Center attack, the enemy was first
designated by Americans as "Islamic terrorism".
But this expression encompasses many different models,
such as Philippine terrorists, Hamas or Hezbollah,
Palestinian FPLP or FPLP-CG, Algerian GIA, Egyptian
Muslim Brothers, and so on.
It is necessary to designate precisely which form
of international terrorism we are speaking of in order
to fight against it. Today we should state that our
objective for the coalition is " Bin Laden's
Al Qaeda network".
2 ) Several rules must be observed to achieve cooperation
between intelligence services.
First of all, one must take into account that there
are differences in traditions and behavior between
criminal police investigators, foreign Secret Service
agents, and customs officers. Even when there is a
national "Intelligence Community", it is
often difficult to achieve open and full co-operation
between those services (an example of this is the
FBI, CIA, and State Department investigations of Al
Qaeda in Saudi Arabia prior to September 11th).
In Western Europe we have had good co-operation in
criminal and terrorist affairs for quite some time.
France initiated the TREVI group among the police
of several countries to deal specifically with terrorism,
the "Schengeningen" protocols to fight trans-national
crime, and the EUROPOL system to share police intelligence.
I think it is sometimes easier to share intelligence
between specialists of the same branches from different
countries than between different services of the same
country. But again it is not necessary to share all
criminal or terrorist intelligence; in joint European
organisations only what is of common interest is shared;
for example, when criminals are using open borders
to operate in several countries.
But intelligence is not the only issue; the justice
systems are also involved. There are many difficulties
because of the differences between national legal
systems, procedures, and so on. There might be some
progress on this in Europe since the New York and
Washington attacks, as European governments have agreed
to determine "Judiciary European Space".
However, it will take years to become fully operational.
3- "Politicization" of intelligence
When threatened by internal terrorism, many states
prefer to "export" the dangerous proponents
to foreign "battlefields" rather than keep
them inside the country. The King of Jordan did this
when he expelled the Palestinian extremists (the infamous
"Black September"). The Saudis preferred
to send their fundamentalists to Afghanistan. The
Syrian leader has been brutal against his own extremists,
and they now realize it is impossible for them to
survive in Syria.
Other nations, for example Great Britain, have a tradition
of political asylum, and allow many well-known Arab
extremists to live freely in London, under the condition
that they stay away from trouble inside the UK. It
is a "gentlemen's agreement".
In other places, the terrorists may have friends or
"fellow travellers" in neighbouring countries.
Some members of the Italian Red Brigades received
support in the early 1980s from leftist radical groups
in France, and the socialist government looked the
other way.
But it is not sufficient to have co-operation between
just intelligence and law enforcement services; the
judiciary systems must be involved as well. This is
a big problem, because, of the 15 countries of the
European Union, several observe "Roman Law",
others British, and a third Scandinavian, notwithstanding
their specific procedural customs or legal limitations
(e.g. the present arguments about death sentence).
In conclusion, I strongly recommend that co-operation
between Intelligence Services against international
terrorism be organised under the principle of specific
"task forces", and not through new bureaucratic,
multinational structures. Pragmatism is the rule here,
and bilateral or trilateral teams are more efficient
than large organisations.
Gömbös:
I'd
like to make some comments. I believe there are two
wars going on simultaneously: a military war and an
intelligence war led by the United States. Despite
the anti-terrorist coalition, responsibility for the
intelligence war ultimately cannot be shared. It is
an American duty. An important issue is the control
of the movement of money. Access to private banking
information would be important. But this level of
information would give American intelligence services
significant commercial information. So some countries
will be hesitant to provide unfiltered information.
The information filtered by a state can tainted in
many ways. There is the question of what to do with
secret accounts and covert corporations that provide
a primary source of income for some countries. These
countries will lose a source of income and will therefore
resist. There are many countries ready to co-operate
in the war against the terrorism; for example, Russia
and Israel. But these countries are also tring to
use the war for their own interests. They are trying
to influence the United States to gain maximum benefits.
Israel would like the main thrust of the operation
to be against Palestinian movements. The Russians
would like it to be directed against anti-Russian
movements such as the Chechens. The next issue is
- Because this is not only a military war but also
an intelligence war, the next issue is American operations
upon partner territory. They will want to limit American
activities on their soil. The partners will skew data,
so the Americans will have to take into account the
laws of the host nation.
Ćosić:
International
intelligence cooperation is important, but we have
to be aware of practical limitations coming from conflict
of interests in multinational international missions
and the particular interests of each state. The failure
of the UN in Bosnia, and the problems of IFOR, SFOR
and KFOR were the result of disintegrated intelligence
systems and the inability to successfully integrate
intelligence cooperation, since there existed different
interests and political attitudes among the key international
players in the multi-national missions. When you have
multinational missions, the games among the players
can get intense. Different political interests limit
intelligence cooperation. Valuable conclusions can
be drawn out from the lessons learned in BiH.
Ferš:
I
agree with Mr. Ćosić that multilateral cooperation
is different than bilateral cooperation. Who will
lead it, what is the main task and so on are some
of the questions we have to answer. But multilateral
cooperation is necessary, and must support it. Everything
must be codified, but not a formal act but by a "gentlemen's
agreement". We heard today that we are playing
a game; in multilateral cooperation, we do play games
but not a game of who will win or lose. It is a game
of trust. Without trust and clearly-defined tasks,
multilateral cooperation cannot exist. So we first
identify the targets, problems, and tasks, and then
we select the priorities. For somebody with good multilateral
cooperation, the priorities might be terrorism or
money laundering. Some services are more effective
in one area and others in another, but we never divulge
our sources. We then perform the concrete task. We
try to create a partnership because a partnership
is better than simple cooperation.
Međimorec:
As
far as I know, the Mediterranean countries are cooperating
multilaterally in the field of intelligence. A group
of European countries, members of NATO, have also
formed an intelligence community. Our service was
not yet ready to enter either of these organizations.
We lacked the experience for such a multilateral cooperation.
But from the bilateral ties we formed, especially
working with Bosnia and Herzegovina's intelligence
service, we learned many lessons, the most important
being that when both the common individual interests
of the state and the mutual interests of the two countries
were fulfilled, cooperation was successful. If there
were no such interests, intelligence cooperation was
unsuccessful. The best example is the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. After Dayton, foreign
fighters and mujahedeens were forced to leave the
country. The Croatian and Bosnia and Herzegovina services
had both collected a lot of valuable information about
them. Later on, we shared this documentation on the
mujahedeen with European and overseas services, and
even with some Arab countries, all of whom were happy
to have information important for natio-nal security
and the struggle against terrorism. This was a prelude
to the events of September 11th. The spread of terrorism
from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia and back to the Middle East and Afghanistan
marked the beginning of the process, which culminated
in the attacks on the US. I repeat, when mutual interests
are satisfied, cooperation is possible. If there is
trust between intelligence services and a high degree
of professionalism, multinational cooperation can
be successful.
Lange:
Tell me what would have to happen for mankind to unite
and heal this rift. Maybe if dangerous aliens were to
land on earth. But as far as I know, the September 11
terrorists are not alien enough to bring about this
international cooperation.
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New York,
September 11, 2001.
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