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The
Yugoslav National Army Role in
the Aggression Against the Republic
of Croatia from 1990 to 1992
Davor
Marijan
ABSTRACT
The essay analyses
the role of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in the war
waged against Croatia from 1990 to 1992. The author draws
attention to the fact that from the end of the 1980's,
the JNA was an active party to the Serbian expansionist
aspirations that gripped Yugoslavia after Tito's death.
The Army's role is chronicled from the point of Croatia's
democratisation in 1990 to its retreat in the spring of
1992, after having only partially executed the tasks that
Serbian expansionist policy had delegated
Following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entered the crisis-ridden
1980s. This decade was marked by incidents in Kosovo in
1981 and 1989, chronic economic crisis, and a rise in
Serbian expansionist nationalism directed towards the
federal state, which had been defined and formally adopted
with the enactment of the 1974 Constitution. The Yugoslav
National Army's involvement served to show that Serbian
expansionist ideas had deeply affected even that institution,
in which Serbs dominated1, and which had for years represented
itself as the prime defender of Tito's legacy2. The JNA,
which was publicly touted as a microcosm of Yugoslavia,
evolved into a small-scale Serbia by the beginning of
the 1990's. The Army, which had been an "imposing
political factor" and the defender of the socialist
state3, was unable to remain a peaceful bystander during
the political changes that occurred in SFRY.4
The JNA, along with the Territorial Defence (here-after
referred to as the TD), constituted SFRY's integrated
Armed Forces5. The JNA was the operationally ready, well-armed
federal component, while the TD was the inferiorly armed
and relatively less mobile component at the republic level,
and was envisaged as an all-pervasive support mechanism
for the JNA6. In terms of their interrelationship, the
JNA and the TD were completely equal, and in wartime,
these two components were intended to complement one another
through a nation-wide armed resistance concept. As with
the JNA, where the competent authority for its deployment
was the SFRY Presidency, the same was the case with the
Territorial Defence, which in peace-time was under the
jurisdiction of Republic level and regional authorities.
After Tito's death, these republic and provincial authorities
reinforced their political influence7. Equality between
the two components which comprised the armed forces was
legally affirmed in the provisions of the 1974 Constitution.
This is one of the measures that prevented the centralisation
of Yugoslavia and thereby thwarted the most populous nation
from dominating the others through any of the federal
institutions.
During the mid-eighties, a reorganisation of the JNA was
carried out under the "Unity" Plan. In terms
of the military ground forces, the former "armies"
(six in total and one independent corps) were abolished.
With the exception of Croatia and Serbia, the "army"
zones, which were roughly identical to the jurisdictional
areas of the republics, were abolished and replaced with
corps structured military districts8. Prior to the transition
to that plan, a long period was required for the military
elite to convince the various federal institutions that
the formation of military corps district commands would
not deprive the republics and provinces of their rights
and obligations, but rather would enable the JNA to centralise
its operations both in wartime and in peace. The proposal
was adopted despite the fact that the question of republic
and provincial subordination was again raised. At the
beginning of 1998, the political leadership of Slovenia
requested that this decision be revised, as they had realised
just in time that the JNA, despite statements to the contrary,
was heading toward unitarianism. On the basis of a ruling
by the SFRY Presidency, republic and provincial TD commands
were rendered subordinate to the military corps district
commands in wartime; likewise, TD units were rendered
subordinate to corps commands. The position of the JNA
representative was that in this manner "duplication
of strategic, operational and tactical commands was avoided."9
In
Zagreb on the 25th of December, 1988, the command of the
5th peacetime military district, also known as the Command
of the wartime Northwest military district, became operational.10
According to the new division, the Northwest military
district came about by merging the 5th and 9th armies
and encompassed Slovenia, northwest Croatia, parts of
Istria with Gorski Kotar, Lika, Kordun and Banovina. In
1988 four corpuses were formed in that region. Two were
in Slovenia, the 14th in Ljubljana, and the 31st in Maribor.
The northern part of Istria and the Croatian coastal region
were assigned to the 13th corpus in Rijeka. Northwest
Croatia was the region of the 32nd Corpus in Varaždin.11
The larger part of Kordun was the region of the 6th proletarian
infantry division in Karlovac, while Zagreb and the surrounding
area had a separate "Defence Command of the city
of Zagreb".12 Air support to the 5th military district
was given by the 5th corpus of the air force and anti-aircraft
divisions located in Zagreb.13 The remaining, larger part
of Croatian territory was divided between the 1st military
district and the naval district. The 1st military district
was located in Belgrade and encompassed Slavonia and 17
corpuses in Tuzla. The naval district was in Split and
generally maintained its existing organisation: a fleet
and three naval sectors with a newly formed 9th corpus.
The naval district was responsible for the Adriatic coast
and part of northern Dalmatia. Northern Dalmatia encompassed
the zone of the 9th corpus in Knin, the 5th naval sector
in Pula was responsible for the northern part of the Adriatic
coast, the 8th sector in Šibenik for the middle, and the
9th in Kuboru in Boka Kotorska for the southern part of
the Adriatic coast.14
The victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) at
the first free and democratic elections in April 1990
in Croatia was a signal for the armed forces to interfere
with Croatia's road toward sovereignty. A few days prior
to HDZ's assumption of power in Croatia, the JNA (May
23rd, 1990) confiscated the weapons of the territorial
defence of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and put them
in storage in its warehouses.15 This was done on orders
of the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Armed
Forces of the SFRY on May 14th, 1990 "due to the
secure placement and protection of arms and ammunition
of the territorial defence".16 The confiscation of
weapons violated the official concept of people's defence,
in respect to the TD as an equal component of the armed
forces, and was carried out without the confirmation of
the Presidency of SFRY".17 Army General Kadijevia
justified the actions by arguing that the weapons were
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the army, and not
the republics which had no right to them. He consoled
them by stating that the weapons could be returned once
the republics could guarantee "good defence conditions".18
Confiscation of the TD weaponry resulted in organisational
and formational changes in the 1st and 5th military districts
(m.d.) as well as the naval districts. The 1st m.d., 10th
motorized brigade in Mostar was reclassified from "B"
to "A", the crucial factor being the incorporation
of an armoured and mechanised battalion into its system
per "A" classification.19 In Banja Luka the
329th armoured brigade was also transformed from "B"
to "A" classification and located in part in
Derventa. The Knin corpus, in which the 221st motorized
brigade was partially transformed into "A" classification,
also incorporated an armoured and mechanised battalion.
The armoured battalion was located in Benkovac, and the
mechanised battalion in Knin. As in the case of the 10th
motorized brigade, this was an unusual formational change
for this type of brigade.20
The most significant changes, however, took place in the
5th military district. The 6th proletarian infantry division,
as well as the defence command of the city of Zagreb,
were eliminated. The region surrounding Zagreb as well
as Kordun and Banovina were incorporated into the new
formation of the 10th corpus. The formation of the 10th
corpus, located in Zagreb, was placed "outside regular
activity in the organisational and formational changes
according to the "Unity 2 and 3" plan".
The newly formed corpus was enhanced by the 32nd corpus,
140th motorized brigade "B", and the 31st mechanised
brigade "R"; from this amalgamation the 140th
mechanical brigade of "A" classification was
formed. The 4th armoured brigades located in Jastrebarsko
and Karlovac were reclassified from "B" to "A"
and were placed under the command of the 10th corpus.
The formation of the 10th corpus separated the JNA from
the territorial defence of the city of Zagreb. The 32nd
corpus, 265th mechanised brigade from Bjelovar and Koprivnica,
was also transformed from "B" to "A"
as well as the 13th corpus, 13th proletarian motorized
brigade located in Ilirska Bistrica and Rijeka. Changes
also occurred in Slovenia where the 14th corpus, 1st armoured
brigade in Vrhniki was also reclassified from "B"
to "A". These formational changes directly resulted
in strengthening the formation's offensive strength and
firepower while increasing its mobility outside of transport
routes. Formations directly under the command of the 5th
military district, the 580th mixed artillery brigade in
Karlovac, and the 288th combined anti-armour artillery
brigade in Virovitica and Križevci were also reclassified
from "B" to "A".21 Further developments
showed that most of these formations, until the outbreak
of the conflict in the summer of 1991, were used to form
what the JNA promoted as a "buffer zone", while
they were in fact interfering in the work of the legal
bodies of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic
of Croatia.
In reclassifying formations of the 5th military district
into "A" class, the military command was attempting
to avoid having to rely on manpower in units where Croats
were in the majority, and instead brought in new recruits
from other parts of Yugoslavia. Insisting on armoured
and mechanised formations was logical as they were equipped
with complex combat technology, which is most effective.
Reliance on such formations was based on the success they
had displayed in Kosovo in the 1980's.22
The revolt of Croatian Serbs in the summer of 1990 marked
the beginning of the crisis in the Republic of Croatia.
The police station in Knin rejected (July 3rd, 1990) the
authority of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic
of Croatia.23 In the Knin region (August 17th) armed Serb
civilians blocked transport routes. Attempts by Special
Forces of the Croatian Interior Ministry to quell the
revolt at its inception were blocked by the JNA, which
openly supported the armed Serb civilians from the moment
they took to the streets. The Federal Secretariat of the
People's Defence of SFRY justified air force intervention
by citing the unannounced flight of Croatian helicopters
lacking airspace confirmation.24 This violation of the
sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia had the popular
support of Serbs in Bosnian Krajina and Serbia proper
at various rallies urging an armed uprising.25 Immediately
thereafter, on August 18th, 1990, rebel Serbs attacked
police stations in Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Graeac,
Obrovac, and Benkovac. Next an attempt was made to create
disturbances and destabilise the constitutionally defined
order in the region of Petrinja - a mixed ethnic region
where Croats comprised the majority. The disturbances,
however, occurred in the periphery where Serbs were in
the majority. During the attacks on the police stations
in Petrinja, Glina, Dvor na Uni, and Obrovac in northern
Dalmatia, local Serbs confiscated 200 rifles and compact
rifles, 150 handguns, 23 machine guns, and approximately
110,000 pieces of ammunition.26 The convenient repositioning
of the 9th corpus in the Knin region allowed the rebel
Serbs to quietly organise their armed forces and broaden
the uprising to other parts of the Republic of Croatia.
Due to the unequal distribution of power, the Croatian
leadership did not even consider a direct confrontation
with the JNA; the weapons at the Croat` s disposal were
useless against a well-armed federal army. Achieving calm
and order in parts of the country had to be achieved indirectly.
The unarmed government of the Republic of Croatia had
to take possession of the weapons in order to quash the
rebellion, which was a danger politically and economically
to the young Croatian state.
In addition to the formation of the generals` party, "the
Communist Union-the Movement for Yugoslavia", two
other events are worth mentioning in regard to the federal
armed forces' actions. The first was the renowned statement
by the federal defence secretary Kadijevia in an interview
for the Zagreb weekly "Danas": "The territorial
defence, as formed at the end of the sixties and the beginning
of the seventies, is objectively…a deliberate act of deceit"
which, after the collapse of the political concept on
which it was founded, proved to serve as "the foundation
for the republic armies".27 Kadijevia`s interview
was a clear message and threat to Croatia and Slovenia,
republics which offered a confederative model for the
peaceful redefinition and redesign of Yugoslavia. It was
also a direct attack on Tito' s legacy, which the JNA
publicly pretended to uphold. The second event was the
formation of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command,
a body that is active only in time of war.28
Once the federal ministry of defence reported to the Presidency
of the SFRY on December 11th, 1990, that armed paramilitary
units were being unofficially formed,29 the Presidency
decided to disband armed paramilitary units (January 9th).30
This decision illustrated the insurmountable differences
that existed. The Croatian government considered the paramilitary
units to be in Krajina, while the JNA considered the legally
organised units of the Croatian Interior Ministry to be
the actual paramilitary units. After an unsuccessful attempt
to disarm the republic, the JNA launched an intensive
media campaign against Croatia at the end of January 1991.
Several Croatian citizens were arrested, and the military
court in Zagreb attempted to court-marshal the Croatian
Minister of Defence, Martin Špegelj. The military journal,
The People's Army, released two issues titled "The
truth about the arming of the HDZ' s terrorist formations
in Croatia", dedicated solely to this issue, which
they distorted. Meanwhile they ignored completely the
intensive arming of the rebel Serbs.31 And led by members
of the Serbian Democratic Party, they continued to form
their armed forces in which they engaged retired officers,
including security forces of the JNA.32
The situation in Croatia intensified on March 1st, 1991,
when rebel Serbs attacked the police station in Pakrac
and disarmed the policemen of Croatian nationality. The
next day, due to the intervention of special units of
the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Croatia, the
rebellion was quashed. Without assembling the Presidency
of the SFRY, the president of the Presidency, Borisav
Jovia, ordered the JNA to intervene. Units from Bjelovar,
Virovitica, and Zagreb were sent to Pakrac, while the
command of the 32nd Corpus relocated its HQ there.33 The
military journal The People's Army mentioned in a report
done a few days later "the take-over of police stations
and new police administration", which clearly indicates
their solidarity with these acts and legitimises the rebellion
of the Serb minority in Croatia. Headquarters commander
of the 5th military district, General Dobrašin Prašeevia,
stated in Pakrac that they had come to prevent "an
ethnic conflict, to show and convince the people that
they will not be left at the mercy of special units (of
the Interior Ministry), and to allow them (the special
units) to witness our readiness to prevent savagery and
bloodshed."34
The events in Pakrac triggered a request by the Headquarters
of the Supreme Command for a declaration of martial law
in the country and a suspension of all "normative
acts in contradiction to the constitution of SFRY and
federal law" (Presidency meeting of SFRY held on
the 12th to the 15th of March 1991). The Presidency of
SFRY rejected this request in a 4-4 vote. Montenegro,
Serbia and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo
voted in favor of the proposal.35 The military elite,
acting as the extended arm of Serbia, believed that the
source of the problem was the multiparty system in which
non-Communist parties triumphed in Croatia and Slovenia,
and that the only solution was a return to the old system.36
This was one more instance in which the JNA distanced
itself from its constitutional obligations, and one step
closer to its transformation into the armed forces of
the Serbian nation, within and beyond Serbia proper. This
position led soon after to JNA engagement in the arming
and training of rebel Serbs in Croatia.37 The deputy security
chief of the commander of the 10th corpus organised between
April-July, 1990, the withdrawal of large amounts of weaponry
and ammunition from the military warehouses in Lika for
use by the Serbian Democratic Party.38
The following major incident occurred at the end of March,
when Serb paramilitary units barricaded the area of Plitvice
on the road from Slunj to Titova Korenica. Special units
of the Croatian police successfully intervened and prevented
the arrival of armoured units of the JNA from the 1st
and 5th military districts, which were intending to create
a "buffer zone" between the opposing parties.39
The "Radan" plan for extraordinary circumstances
clearly indicates that the true purpose for creating a
"buffer zone" was to prevent the consolidation
of "an elected government and constitutional order
in the Republic of Croatia". At the beginning of
April, the 9th corpus of the JNA received orders to act
"in cooperation" with the 8th naval sector and
the 5th military district for the purpose of "preventing
the passing of units of the Interior Ministry through
routes in the greater area of Zadar, Biograd, Šibenik,
Split, and Sinj which lead to Knin, Benkovac, and Obrovac".
The directions of the 5th military district were to "defend
controlled areas and control routes which lead through
the Lika hills to the areas of Graeac, Obrovac, and Knin".40
Having in mind that the units of the 5th district created
a "buffer zone" in the Plitvice area, the entire
Knin and Lika regions having majority Serb populations
were given a "guard", which prevented any actions
by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Croatia, and
allowed for the further development and organisation of
the illegal rebel Serb government.
After this, the JNA became actively engaged. At the beginning
of April 1991, during a meeting of the Secretariat for
the People's Defence, it was decided to move some units
westward. Part of the elite 63rd airborne brigade was
sent from Niš to Zagreb. From the 51st mechanised brigade
in Paneevo, the 1st armoured battalion was transferred
to Petrinja in Banovina and incorporated into the 622nd
motorized brigade.41 The second mechanised battalion of
the 36th mechanised brigade from Subotica and the 1st
mechanised battalion of the 453rd mechanised brigade from
Sremska Mitrovica were transferred to eastern Slavonia
and Vinkovci and placed under the command of the 17th
corpus.42 The armoured and mechanised components of the
10th motorized brigade from Mostar were transferred to
the Kupres highlands in May.43 By acting in this timely
manner, they managed to withdraw from areas with Croat
majorities towards areas that were more ethnically accommodating;
they moved to northern Dalmatia in September and were
incorporated into the 9th corpus. The activities of the
JNA in eastern Slavonia were accelerated in June with
the engagement of the Naval River Surveillance flotilla,
whose units were used to supervise bridges and crossings
on the Danube River from Bezdan to Ilok, and to serve
as artillery support to infantry in the region.44
In May 1991 activities dramatically increased. In Borovo
Selo, twelve Croat policemen were slaughtered at the hands
of the paramilitary eetniks. This incident proved to be
the beginning of the armed uprising in the Vukovar municipality.45
The rebellion spread around Vinkovci and Osijek, and the
villages of Mirkovci and Tenja were incorporated into
the JNA "buffer zone" and became eetnik strongholds.
In reaction to the increased tension in the country, the
Headquarters of the Supreme Command ordered on May 6th
"increased JNA combat readiness and mobilisation
of relevant units so that the JNA, in the event that federal
and republic bodies could not secure peace, can do so
effectively and according to its constitutionally defined
role and responsibility".46 This was the excuse used
for the mobilisation of reserves, which occurred until
the end of the year. The manner in which it was carried
out within the units of the 1st military district illustrated
the reasoning behind the command. In the areas of the
17th corpus and other units in Slavonia and Baranja, all
military complexes were tightly secured, and in the event
of an attack, the command of the corpus ordered "actions
aimed at institutions which organise these attacks, i.e.,
municipalities, police stations, political party headquarters,
military headquarters, training locations for paramilitary
units, and so on. Engage for these activities AMU (armoured-mechanised
units), and artillery and AAU (anti aircraft units), and
as necessary request the use of the air force, in which
case you must give the relevant institution a time-limited
ultimatum after which you may begin intensive action".
The order was issued only to "specially selected
senior officers".47 The same measures were undertaken
in the units of the 5th military district and the 5th
corpus of the air force and anti-aircraft defence.48
The short-lived war in Slovenia began on the morning June
27th, 1991, when the JNA was sent in to take control of
the border with Slovenia and place federal police and
customs officers on the border.49 The conflict, which
ended quickly and without intense fighting, led to the
withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia. For Croatia, this
meant that the technical capabilities of the JNA were
moving from Slovenia into the neighbouring area of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia.50 During the conflict in Slovenia, armoured
and mechanised units of the 1st military district were
positioned along the "so-called administrative borders"
of Croatia and Serbia. Their operations were clearly a
demonstration of strength meant to underline to the Croatian
armed forces the imbalance in amounts and types of weapons
between the two sides. An additional threat was the securing
of the bridges over the Danube, which was the last of
the natural links between Croatia and Serbia. The Commander
of the 12th corpus, Major-General Mladen Bratia, announced
that at the beginning of July they had received "several
threats from extremists that they will destroy bridges
in order to prevent our efforts to stop the ethnic conflict.
That is why we are controlling both sides of all bridges
located between Vojvodina and Croatia".51 The securing
of these bridges was a clear signal that Serb tanks were
no longer separated from Croatia by the Danube, which
was a large natural barrier.52 The Army's journal The
People's Army explicitly stated that its goal was "to
prevent the war which is destroying our brotherhood, protect
the borders of Yugoslavia, and participate in the battle
against paramilitary formations increasingly present in
the region". Stationed on the border around Šid were
the 1st proletarian brigade from Belgrade and the 453rd
mechanised brigade from Sremska Mitrovica.53 The 36th
mechanised brigade from Subotica took control of Baranja
and the bridge between Bezdana and Batina, while the 51st
mechanised brigade from Paneevo controlled the bridge
and region around Bogojevo.54 Units of the 12th corpus
controlled the bridge on the Danube between Ilok and Baeka
Palanka.55 The 12th proletarian56 mechanised brigade in
Osijek had part of its troops holding the military garrison,
while the other part was securing incoming and outgoing
city roads since "this is the reasoning behind the
exercise".57
Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Adžia,
heavily favoured the use of armoured and mechanised units58
which he demonstrated at the beginning of August 1991
in his visit to the 1st proletarian mechanised brigade
near Sremska Mitrovica and the 329 armoured brigade in
Banja Luka; both visits were covered widely by the military
press.59 In favouring the use of armoured and mechanised
units it was clear that the JNA had distanced itself from
the officially proclaimed strategy of armed combat.60
Though initially playing a tactical role, the armoured
and mechanised units now assumed an operative and strategic
role, which meant that the JNA was adopting a manner of
organised combat identical to that of a potential aggressor
from the east or west; this scenario had been developed
for years during command and military exercises.61 The
reasoning behind such action is quite simple: the military
elite completely ignored the human factor and approached
the "problem" exclusively from a technical standpoint.
The armoured combat vehicles displayed the great technical
superiority of the JNA over the Croatian armed forces.
Preparations for war were also felt with changes in the
chain of command. During the conflict in Slovenia significant
personnel changes were made in the 5th military district.
Slovene Lieutenant General Konrad Kolšek was replaced
by Lieutenant General Života Avramovia, who had been commander
of the 3rd military district. Base commander Colonel Ljubomir
Bajia took command of the 5th corpus of the air force
and anti-aircraft defence.62 This was a clear signal to
and expression of distrust for non-Serb personnel. Thus
personnel transferred to the northwest front had ethnic
links to the group that dominated the officer corps. The
ethnic structure of the JNA officer corps in Slovenia
and Croatia at that time, according to the Command of
the 5th military district, favored the Serbs, who comprised
57%; 12% were Croats, 6% Slovenes, 5% Montenegrins, 4%
Yugoslavs, and 16% other nationalities.63
The war in Slovenia provided an excuse to mobilise part
of the units of the 5th Banja Luka corpus, the 12th Novi
Sad corpus, and the 2nd corpus in Montenegro. In the 52nd
corpus in Kosovo, combat units were strengthened to 100%
capacity.64 On the 3rd of August, the ministry of the
people's defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina announced that since the beginning of August
some commanders of the JNA combat units were mobilising
soldiers, thereby ignoring procedure and the commands
of bodies of higher authority, particularly in Han Pijesak.65
Since the mobilisation was not going according to the
JNA's plan, it was decided that the September class of
recruits would have their stay extended by twenty days.66
The delay in the confrontation with Croatia had a negative
effect on the combat readiness of the JNA, since they
were unable to arm their reserves forever.
The war had began without any official declaration.67
Villages inhabited by Serbs, such as Tenja near Osijek,
Mirkovci near Vinkovci, and Borovo Selo near Vukovar became
support positions for the rebel Serbs, eetniks, and the
JNA in the war. In July, eetnik groups and rebel Serb
units with heavy weaponry began moving into Croatian territory
and ethnically cleansing all non-Serbs. Despite the power
imbalance, every attempt of Croat forces to overpower
the rebels and their confederates brought in from Serbia,
as was the case in Mirkovci and Tenja on the 5-7th of
July 1991, was prevented by the armoured and mechanised
units of the federal army. The JNA openly took the side
of the eetniks, defined in certain places the zones it
would place under its protection, as in Mirkovci, and
consequently attempted to expand into key objects under
Croatian control.68
On July 11th , the rebel Serbs mobilised their headquarters
and units,69 and then under the protection of armoured
and mechanised units of the federal army assembled their
paramilitary structure. Its organisation began immediately
after the Knin incidents in August 1990. The process was
slow and relatively ineffective due to conflicts among
the rebel leaders. The climax occurred in mid-1991 in
Knin, when several paramilitary armies were formed. Along
with police and the Territorial Defence inherited from
before, or, more accurately, appropriated from the legal
components of the Republic of Croatia, other small units
were formed, ranging from the special units of Captain
Dragan to various partisan armed units whose manpower
came mainly from Serbia.70 The police was under the command
of interior minister Mile Martia, and the territorial
defence of Serb Krajina (SAO Krajina) Premier Mile Babia,
who was also minister of defence. The combat readiness
of these units was limited, though with their heavy weaponry
they were superior to the Croatian army and police until
the end of September 1991. These groups were not capable
of executing complicated tasks, and their total collapse
and military defeat by Croatian units was prevented due
to assistance from the federal army and its "buffer
zones". In late July, regional headquarters were
organised in Kordun and Banovina.71 At a government meeting
of the SAO Krajina on August 1st, 1991, it was decided
that the armed forces be composed of the territorial defence
under the command of the premier of SAO Krajina. In August,
the Ministry of Defence issued a decision regarding the
organisation of the defence system, in which the headquarters
of the territorial defence of Krajina would oversee the
municipal headquarters of TD Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac,
Graeac, Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, and the zone headquarters
of the TD of Kordun and Banija. The interior minister
Mile Martia was named deputy commander of the TD and member
of the headquarters of the TD for police units.72 The
organisation of operative zones of the TD SAO Krajina
was conducted on August 20th, 1991. The 1st operative
zone was located in northern Dalmatia, the 2nd in Kordun
and the 3rd in Banovina.73
The organisation of the Serb rebel armed forces was implemented
parallel to attacks aimed at cleansing the terrain of
Croatians. After eastern Slavonia, the second critical
zone opened up at the end of July in Banovina, when the
TD of the rebel Serbs from Dvor na Uni, organised as the
1st Dvor order, participated in a "battle to completely
emancipate the municipality".74 The Croatian villages
of Zamlaea and Struga were seized, while the mechanised
unit of the 329th armoured brigade stood nearby awaiting
completion of the offensive.75 Farther north, the armoured
battalion of the 51st mechanised brigade attacked the
police station in Glina, doing its part in the ethnic
cleansing of Croats in Banovina.76 The larger part of
the 51st mechanised brigade in eastern Slavonia activated
itself as well. After the attack of Serb paramilitary
units on the police station in Dalj on August 1st, the
brigade sided openly with additional air support with
the eetniks in battle, which resulted was the deaths of
several dozen, and the expulsion of hundreds Croats from
Dalj, Aljmaš, and Erdut. The majority of the brigade then
continued westward towards the village of Serb-inhabited
Bijelo Brdo where they hunkered down.77 After "cleansing"
Erdut, Dalj, and Aljmaš they proceed to consolidate the
communications sectors of the 12th and 17th corpuses "in
order to survey paramilitary formations" - as they
referred to Croatian units, as well as to wage "similar
joint endeavours".78 By the end of August the 36th
mechanised brigade had occupied Baranja, reinforced by
eetniks and the remaining Serb paramilitary groups79,
while the armoured and mechanised units of the 17th corpus
were preparing for an offensive targeting bridges on the
Drava and Sava rivers to prevent a Croatian counter-attack.80
On August 13th in western Slavonia, the local Serbs proclaimed
the Autonomous Serb District (SAO) of western Slavonia
and annexed it to the SAO Krajina. On August 16th, their
paramilitary units in Okueani attacked units of the Croatian
police and the National Guard Corps. In light of this
attack, the government of the Republic of Croatia urgently
requested a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency.81 On August
16th, combat units of the 265th mechanised brigade were
sent to the crisis areas.82 Croatian policemen in Okueani
were also attacked by part of the 329th armoured brigade,
which had been brought in from Bosnia and Herzegovina.83
The leadership of the Republic of Croatia accused the
army of open aggression but the military court rejected
the charge as unfounded, stating that "it is absolutely
logical that the forces of the 1st military district and
units of the Banja Luka corpus were summoned to prevent
an inter-ethnic confrontation in its zone of responsibility".84
The situation in Croatia and the significance of the sites
of confrontation were so obvious that a journalist from
the Sarajevo daily Oslobo?enje asked the Command of the
Joint Chiefs if the confrontation line in Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag
in Croatia, which "is already in some places being
described as the boundary of a rump Yugoslavia, Serboslavia,
or greater Serbia, represents what will ultimately become
part of a new country".85
The units of the JNA in Croatia and Slovenia were placed
in a difficult situation when Croatian and Slovene recruits
for obligatory military service stopped reporting. Macedonia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also reluctant to send recruits
after the release of the June 1990 generation of recruits.
The obligatory military service system in western Yugoslavia
completely disintegrated and the JNA was left without
soldiers after having been forced to release them after
one year of obligatory service. The released soldiers
in some areas could not be replaced, and consequently
the JNA lacked sufficient forces to maintain the "buffer
zones" and support staff in their bases. The JNA's
role in northwest Dalmatia in the operative zone of the
9th Knin corpus and eastern Slavonia and Baranja became
obvious. After a three day session of the Croatian parliament,
a decision was brought on August 3rd, requesting the JNA
to withdraw to its garrisons without delay and within
an certain proscribed period to totally withdraw from
the territory of the Republic of Croatia.86 Since the
JNA completely ignored the parliamentary decision and
continued its aggression, Croatian forces began applying
pressure on the garrisons at the beginning of September.
The order of the president of the Presidency of SFRY,
Stipe Mesia, (September 11th) for the units of the JNA
to withdraw to its garrisons within 48 hours was dismissed
as illegal by the military leadership. The military brass
also dismissed notions that rebel Serb units designated
territorial defence were acting "under the command
and in concert with the JNA".87 A few days later
the Commander of JNA Military Headquarters General Adžia
repeated the same fabrications in an interview to BBC.
88
The blockade of the garrisons forced the JNA to expedite
its plans due to the potential threat that the Croatians
could obtain heavy weaponry and modern equipment. This
was illustrated in the threat made by the Command Headquarters
to the Croatian political and military leadership that
"every attack and captured complex of the JNA will
result in the destruction of one complex of vital interest
to the Republic of Croatia" and that for "every
attacked and seized garrison one vital complex in the
city where the garrison is located will be destroyed".
This was also a "warning to civilians to withdraw
from those locations"89 before the federal army initiates
its next phase of attacks in Croatia: a strategic offensive
operation. The operation was followed by a decision of
the incomplete Presidency of the SFRY which introduced
"work conditions during threat of war" and assumed
"certain rights of the parliament of the SFRY, which
could not be convened". According to this decision
"the Presidency of the SFRY makes decisions based
on a majority vote of the members of the Presidency of
SFRY present". Dr. Branko Kostia, vice president
of the Presidency, practically usurped the position of
president after this decision and announced: "the
Presidency of the SFRY will not use military force to
impose its will upon any of the peoples in Yugoslavia".90
Precisely at this moment, the majority of JNA resources
was imposing the will of the political and military elite
of the largest ethnic group in SFRY (the Serbs), onto
the second largest (the Croats).
The operation began at the end of September, and its goal
was to "defeat the Croatian army if circumstances
permit, achieve full co-operation with Serb units in Serb
Krajina, and allow for the complete withdrawal of remaining
JNA units in Slovenia".91 The operational plan foresaw
fifteen to eighteen armoured, mechanised and infantry
brigades, in addition to the previously engaged units
of the JNA. According to General Veljko Kadijevia "the
basic reasoning behind the offensives is - a complete
blockade of Croatia from air and sea; and organising attack
routes of the main forces of the JNA to link liberated
Serb regions in Croatia with JNA garrisons deep inside
Croatian territory. With this in mind, Croatia was to
be divided along the routes Gradiška-Virovitica; Bihaa-Karlovac-Zagreb;
Knin-Zadar; Mostar-Split. The strongest armoured and mechanised
divisions were to liberate eastern Slavonia, quickly continue
westward, merge with units in western Slavonia, and go
on to Zagreb and Varaždin; that is, toward the Slovene
border. At the same time, they were to landlock Dubrovnik
with strong units from the direction of Herceg Novi-Trebinje,
and then continue into the Neretva valley and combine
forces with the units on the Mostar-Split route. When
they reached the relevant objects, they would then secure
and maintain the borders of Serb Krajina in Croatia, withdraw
the remaining JNA troops from Slovenia, and subsequently
withdraw the JNA from Croatia; 10-15 days would be necessary
for the mobilisation, preparation for mobilisation, or
remobilisation of units, and for their arrival at the
operational routes, depending on the combat readiness
of the units and their distance from these routes".92
In the first days of the operation, the Federal Secretary
of Defence General Kadijevia announced that "at this
moment the Army desires only to maintain control in the
crisis areas, protect the Serb civilians from harassment
and destruction, and free members of the JNA and their
families", the prerequisite being "the defeat
of the Ustaša forces".93
Croatia was to be divided up, and forced to acquiesce
and accept all Serb demands. However, a poor showing of
reserves in the 1st and 3rd military districts placed
a strain on these exalted plans.94 The federal army tried
to alleviate the problem by accepting volunteers, for
which a special directive was drafted. According to it,
the volunteers were given the same status and rights as
military personnel and soldiers carrying out their obligatory
military service. Each volunteer was required to sign
a statement in which he/she pledged to uphold "existing
federal laws and other acts and orders which regulate
affairs, life, and work in the Yugoslav People's army".95
By this, the JNA had tacitly accepted waging war alongside
various partisan Serb paramilitary units. Their shared
aspiration, a Great Serbia, eliminated ideological or
political differences that might previously have existed.
During the aggression against Croatia, the rebel Croatian
Serbs increased their personnel significantly On the 20th
of September, a large number of commissioned and non-commissioned
officers was sent to the headquarters of the TD SAO Krajina
and the operative zones "Banija-Kordun" and
"Lika" to command the Serb paramilitary forces.96
This confirmed the JNA's official legalisation of the
so-called territorial defence of SAO Krajina, which became
its partner in combat. At the end of September, the paramilitary
forces finally organised themselves. The region of northern
Dalmatia and Lika was divided into two zones, zone 1 for
Dalmatia, under the command of headquarters of the TD
SAO Krajina, and Lika for the 2nd zone. The regions of
Kordun and Banovina were merged into the 3rd operative
zone.97 The other armed component used for combat offensives,
the police, was placed under the command of the territorial
defence on the 9th of October.98
The JNA units concentrated their offensive operations
on eastern Slavonia. Armoured and mechanised brigade groups
in eastern Slavonia and Srijem, composed of the 12th corpus
and 1st proletarian mechanised brigade corps and backed
by the 24th and 37th corpus, had been operatively developed
and engaged for weeks already in combat offensives prior
to the commencement of the operation. The 12th corpus
had participated in combat offensives around Vukovar from
the 25th of August. After taking control of Baranja, the
corpus directed the majority of its units towards Vukovar
while the support units were attacking Osijek. At the
beginning of September, the military media openly reported
that the JNA air force is "contributing greatly to
the liberation of Vukovar where a critical battle is being
fought" in order to assist the Serb rebels.99 The
battle for Vukovar, which lasted much longer than expected,
proved for the units of the 1st military district to be
their most difficult assignment. Vukovar was becoming
less a military problem than a blatant example of JNA
aggression in support of the Serb cause. Logically, the
city should simply have been blockaded by smaller units
and bypassed; this, however, was obviously not the plan.
In its westward advance towards central Croatia, the federal
army wanted to leave behind it a "clean slate".
On the 31st of October and the 1st of November, General
Adžia, the commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
SFRY armed forces, visited the units of the 1st military
district to lift their waning morale.100 Vukovar was finally
captured on the 18th of November, 1991, by the forces
of Operative group "North", under the command
of Major General Andrija Bioreevia, Operative group "South"
under the command of Colonel Mile Mrkšia, and air support
from the 1st airborne corpus, commanded by Colonel Branislav
Petrovia. The operation itself was executed under General
Života Pania, commander of the 1st military district.101
The capture of the city was described by journalists in
the following manner: "The liberators, units of the
JNA, TD, and volunteers, went house by house, whereby
they were considerate of the lives of the citizens, displayed
their combat skills in inhabited areas, and affirmed their
humanity and bravery"102; also, "Vukovar is
not a captured city. It is a city which has been liberated
from the darkest neo-fascist and Ustaša ideology. Thus
there is no place for doubt as to whether the destruction
could have been avoided. The neo-fascism was so aggressive
and deep-rooted that all available force and methods were
required to destroy it. There was no other option."103
Participating in the battle for Vukovar were the 1st proletarian
mechanised division corps, the 12th, 36th, 51st, and 453
mechanised brigades, motorized brigade corps, the 80th
motorized brigade, the 211th and 252nd armoured brigade,
the 20th partisan brigade, the 16th mixed artillery brigade,
the 63rd airborne brigade, units of the TD from Sremska
Mitrovica, Kragujevac, and volunteers from Belgrade, Novi
Sad, Ruma, In?ija, Sombor, Smederevo, and Smederevska
Palanka. Local Serb rebel groups from Negoslavac and Vukovar
also participated.104
The elite unit of the federal army, the 1st proletarian
mechanised division corps backed by the 252nd armoured
brigade from Kraljevo, attacked positions south and southeast
of the units of the 12th corpus. The aggression on Slavonia
began when its 3rd proletarian mechanised brigade corps
attacked Vinkovci from the direction of Ilaea-Orolik-Eakovci
at the end of September. Its commander subsequently boasted
that "in only three days we liberated all the villages
between Šid and Mirkovci".105 The division corps
arrived in the greater area of Vinkovci by the beginning
of October. In October, along with the 252nd armoured
brigade and volunteer units "Šumadija" and "Lepenica",
they captured the villages of Dželetovac, Bapska, and
Šarengrad.106 In an interview for the military journal,
The People's Army, division commander General Dragoljub
Aran?elovia bragged that his unit "has cleansed and
is holding firmly the area between the Danube and Bosut,
and local government is being organised in the area".107
This display of honesty clearly illustrated the core and
substance of the JNA's assignment - the ethnic cleansing
of Croatian territory of Croats and other non-Serbian
ethnic groups and the installation of Serbian rule. The
prime example of the workings of the 1st proletarian mechanised
division corps is Ilok, which they ethnically cleansed;
this was confirmed in the "agreement" made on
October 14th, 1991, in Šid.108
In addition to attacking Vukovar and Vinkovci, Serb forces
also attacked Osijek after having seized Baranja at the
beginning of September. The 12th proletarian mechanised
brigade from the villages of Stara Tenja, Silaš, and Trpinja,
carried out combat offensives and shelling of Croatian
villages and Klisa, reinforced by parts of the 51st mechanised
and 544th motorized brigades.109
The 5th corpus launched combat offensives in western Slavonia
throughout September. Contrary to how the large scale
operation had been envisioned, the JNA was only temporarily
engaged, which was a result of the rebellion of the Serb
population, which had assumed massive proportions.110
At the beginning of September, the JNA seized Okueani
and directed its offensives towards Novska and Pakrac.
Leading the offensive was the 329th armoured brigade,
reinforced periodically from the beginning of September
by units of the 5th corpus, and at mid-month by parts
of the 16th proletarian motorized brigade, the 5th partisan,
the 2nd partisan and the 343rd motorized brigade, subsequent
to being reinforced by reserves from Bosanska Krajina.111
Since the mobilised forces of the 5th corpus were insufficient,
they were periodically reinforced by units brought in
from Serbia - the 46th partisan brigade from Eaeak, a
battalion of the 84th motorized brigade from Bitolja,
and a division of multiple rocket launchers of the 150th
mixed artillery brigade from Vranj.112 Though the local
Serb turnout was massive, these forces failed to break
through to Bjelovar and Varaždin to join forces with the
32nd corpus in Varaždin, Bjelovar, and Virovitica, which
would have consolidated a Serb victory in Slavonia. After
the surrender of the 32nd corpus, the forces of the 5th
corpus concentrated their activities in the direction
of Novska-Kutina-Zagreb, intending to reinforce its areas
around Jasenovac and Hrvatska Kostajnica. Along the secondary
direction of Lipik-Pakrac-Daruvar, the local forces of
the HQ TD SAO Western Slavonia executed combat offensives
backed by the 5th corpus. Their instructions were to control
the area until the arrival of the 12th corpus and 1st
proletarian mechanised division corps from the east. Towards
the end of October, both groups were stopped, and at the
beginning of November they were forced to retreat towards
Okueani and the Sava River, which botched the signing
of a cease-fire.113
In central Croatia the command of the 5th military district
planned to carry out its offensive by concentrating several
operative groups in numerous directions: the 1st operative
group, composed of parts of the 10th corpus, the territorial
defence of the rebel Serbs,114 and reinforcements from
Serbia, had been assigned to reach the Kupa river along
the Petrinja-Karlovac line and allow for the withdrawal
of the surrounded forces in the Karlovac and Zagreb garrisons;
the supplementary tactical group from the 5th Banja Luka
corpus was assigned to "cleanse" the areas from
Plitvice through Slunj to Karlovac; the majority of the
10th corpus with part of the units from the 5th military
district -excluding for the forces of the 1st operative
group - were to withdraw through Velika Gorica towards
Petrinja, and then towards Dvor na Uni and Bosanski Novi;
the 13th corps in Rijeka and Delnice were to organise
an offensive in the general direction of Rijeka-Delnice-Vrbovsko-Slunj-Plitvice,
along with defending the garrisons; parts of the 32nd
corpus in Bjelovar and Koprivnica were to break through
towards Bjelovar-Grubišino Polje-Daruvar and join the
forces of the 5th corpus, which were operating from deep
inside the territory; the offensives of the 1st operative
group and the withdrawal of forces from the 10th, 13th,
and 32nd corps and the individual units of the 5th military
district were supported by heavy artillery and the air
force, which were assigned to attack vital complexes in
Zagreb.115 The orders of the 5th military district made
clear the intent to withdraw forces from areas ethnically
unfavourable towards areas with Serb majorities, and to
cut into the border zone through offensives of areas where
Serbs comprised the majority. This was apparent in the
case of Kordun, whose ethnic borders the JNA intended
to seize while purging the Croat inhabitants behind the
scenes.
The intricate plans of the 5th military district failed
due to the surrender of the 32nd corpus and the blockade
of most of the 10th and 13th corps, and the poor showing
of reserves from Serbia and Bosanska Krajina. An attempt
by the 1st operative group to break through to Zagreb
via Turopolje and extract the surrounded forces of the
10th corpus was botched. The group managed to reach the
Krupa River and the outskirts of Karlovac, which was no
great feat considering the favourable ethnic composition
of that area. Attempts to break through to Sisak, Mošaenica,
Komarevo, and Slunj proved unsuccessful, leaving the demarcation
line inactive in December.116 In the central and southeast
zone of the 5th military district, altercations continued
to the end of the year. In light of the fact that the
13th corpus from Rijeka and the majority of units in Istria
and Gorski Kotar were surrounded and isolated from the
remainder of the corpus, combat offensives were undertaken
in southern Lika by the 9th corpus, while the rest of
Lika and Kordun were handed over to the 3rd operative
group under the direct command of the 5th military district.
By mid-November in this area, the JNA seized Slunj with
the assistance of local Serb units and drove out Croat
inhabitants, thus creating a compact ethnic zone with
a Serb majority.117
The 9th corpus, reinforced by local Serb forces, led combat
offensives in northern Dalmatia. The corpus completed
its operations quickly, due to the superior positioning
of most of its forces. It was one of the few operative
groups that did not have major problems with troop reinforcements,
some coming from its own area, and others from Montenegro,
while the majority, several thousand reserves, came from
Serbia, mainly Šumadija.118 They were also reinforced
with armoured and motorized units from the 1st and 3rd
military districts. The "cleansing" of Kijevo
and Kruševo at the beginning of September allowed for
an advance on the Adriatic cities. Beginning in October,
the 9th corpus, along with the 8th naval sector, the 1st
corpus of the air force, and paramilitary and volunteer
units, "cleansed" the hinterlands of Šibenik
and Zadar in aggressive offensives.119
The navy of the armed forces of SFRY also assisted (September
17th, 1991) by barricading Adriatic ports and supplying
artillery support to units of the naval sector and infantry
troops in their attacks on Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Šibenik,
and Ploee.120 In southern Croatia, two operative groups
of the federal army collaborated with the navy. Activities
in the direction Mostar-Split were assigned to the 37th
Užice corpus from Serbia. On September 20th, parts of
the corpus began seizing the area of eastern and central
Herzegovina.121 However, due to a poor turnout of reserves
the assignment ended up being the securing of the airport
in Mostar and terrifying the non-Serb inhabitants of the
area. Forces of the 2nd Podgorica corpus and 9th naval
sector Boka were active east of the 37th corpus. Their
activities in the direction of Dubrovnik were co-ordinated
by two operative groups for southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia.122
The offensive on Dubrovnik began on the 1st of October.
The village of Ravno in eastern Herzegovina suffered relentless
Serb aggression; it was burned to the ground and its inhabitants
driven out.123 By the 5th of October Prevlaka was "cleansed";
pressure on Dubrovnik followed and it was surrounded and
cut off from the rest of Croatia. According to the commander
of the 2nd operative group, General Eokia, the republic
of Montenegro provided him with police forces in order
to "secure liberated territory", which along
with federal army reserves provided assistance.124 His
successor, Lieutenant General Pavle Strugar, made a public
offer to move the inhabitants of Dubrovnik out of the
city at the end of October.125 When the offer was rejected,
the surrounded city was attacked with mortar fire, most
intensively at the beginning of December, 1991.126
The magnificent operation planned by the command of the
JNA was less successful than expected. Infantry units
of the JNA were stopped in December, while the aerial
assassination attempt on the President of the Republic
of Croatia on the 7th of October 1991 was also unsuccessful.127
After part of the JNA's assignments were completed, a
stalemate evolved which in the long run worked against
Serb interests. Their combat forces were approaching their
goals but did not have the strength to continue and finish
the job. Another, smaller component of the force that
was to participate in the first group was undersized and
surrounded by Croatian cities. Once the 32nd corpus had
surrendered, the possibility existed that the Croatian
army would seize their weaponry and commence a strategic
counter-offensive. The Croatian problem was that some
of their necessary forces were engaged in the garrison
blockade. Successful offensives by Croatian forces in
November and December 1991 illustrated that a continuation
of the battle would be detrimental to the Serbs. Subsequently,
the JNA had to be satisfied with limited success, hoping
that the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations arriving
in the war zone would safeguard their territorial acquisitions.
Under pressure from the international community, a compromise
was reached with the signing of an agreement on the 22nd
of October 1991, under which the remaining forces of the
5th military district of the JNA were to evacuate Croatia
and leave the confiscated weapons of the territorial defence
to the Croats.128 The evacuation was completed on the
30th of December 1991.129 After the signing of an unconditional
cease-fire agreement in Sarajevo (2nd of January 1992)
by representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the
Yugoslav People's Army, the hostility was noticeably reduced.
United Nations peacekeeping forces began arriving and
positioning themselves at the demarcation lines.130 At
the end of 1991, on the 30th of December, the JNA was
reorganised and the 5th military district eliminated.
The 2nd military district was established and located
in Sarajevo. Incorporated into its structure were the
10th corpus from the former 5th military district, the
4th, 5th and 17th corps from the 1st military district,
and the 9th corpus from the former naval district. Incorporated
into the structure of the 10th corpus were three operative
groups - the 6th in Lika, the 7th in Banovina, and the
8th in Kordun, which came about with the reorganisation
of the 1st and 3rd operative groups. Armed forces of the
JNA from eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro oriented towards
southern Croatia became part of the 4th military district.131
The first few months of 1992 marked the beginning of a
brief period during which the JNA had two main tasks.
It had to withdraw from the territory of the Republic
of Croatia and it had to expend gret efforts to preserve
its territorial acquisitions from the war with Croatian
armed forces. This entailed reorganisation of the rebel
Serb armed forces from a Territorial Defence structure
into an army, and forming border units and a police brigade.132
At the end of February 1992, based on orders of the Commander
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff AF SFRY dated February 27th,
military reorganisation began in the areas the JNA had
temporarily seized from the Republic of Croatia. Headquarters
of the territorial defence of the Serb Republic of Krajina
and six zone stations of the TD with accompanying brigades
were formed.133 In mid-March the Joint Chiefs of Staff
AF SFRY dispatched to the Republic HQ of the Territorial
Defence of Krajina "Instructions for the operation
of HQ and units of territorial defence in preparing for
demobilisation and remobilisation", in which basic
information for demobilisation and mobilisation activities
were given "for the period upon withdrawal of JNA
forces from Krajina".134 In accordance with the orders
of the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed
Forces SFRY (March 24th, 1992) several organisational
changes were made in the territorial defence of the Serb
republic of Krajina. At the main headquarters level, a
background base was formed in Knin, and in the zone headquarters
heavy artillery divisions, mixed anti-armour divisions,
light artillery units of the anti-aircraft defence, and
background bases were formed.135
Along with the organisation of local Serb paramilitary
units, a directorate for special police forces under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence was also organised.
The directorate had jurisdiction over police brigades
formed according to the same orders in Knin, Korenica,
Vojnia, Petrinja, Okueani, Vukovar, Beli Manastir, and
Benkovac.136 Commissioned officers ranking from captain
to colonel were sent on April 22nd to the territorial
defence of the Serb republic of Krajina (SRK). Headquarters
commander of the territorial defence SRK issued them assignments
and placement orders. This experienced command structure
composed of active officers was to create the conditions
for a effective engagement by the forces of the rebel
Serbs.137 By the end of April the JNA managed to do what
the Serb rebel leaders had not succeeding in doing since
August 1990. Three separated areas or autonomous Serbian
districts, as they were dubbed by their creators, were
combined into a united Serb republic of Krajina, the first
of the two Serb republics outside Serbia proper.
Handing the zones of responsibility over to UNPROFOR began
in mid-May 1992, after which only armed police units remained
in the region of so-called Krajina. The armed forces were
demobilised and transformed into local headquarters.138
This marked the end of "official" JNA engagement
in Croatia and the withdrawal of its units and citizens
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the occupied
regions of the Republic of Croatia. The JNA ordered the
army to withdraw all material and technical resources
and personnel from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
by May 19th, 1992; this order was also binding for Croatia.
The 592nd motorized brigade was to withdraw from Glina
to Vranje, the 46th partisan brigade from Okueani to Eaeak,
the 51st mechanised brigade from Topusko to Novi Sad,
a battalion of the 84th motorized brigade from Okueani
to Zajeear, the 1st battalion 592nd motorized brigade
from Knin to Vranje, the artillery division of the 102nd
mixed anti-armour artillery brigade from Plitvice to Negotin,
and a multi-missile rocket launcher division of the 150th
mixed artillery brigade from Okueani to Vranje. Units
that were unable to transfer their equipment surrendered
it to a unit assigned by the 2nd military district command.139
In accordance with the Serb position that it had a right
to neighbouring land going back several decades, the war
waged against Croatia was first and foremost a territorial
war directed entirely against the Croat nation. The destruction
of the Croat village of Ravno in eastern Herzegovina confirmed
that the war was aimed at Croats, regardless of their
citizenship. The ultimate goal of the war can be summed
up in three words: ethnically cleansed territory. The
use of all available means was permitted to achieve this
goal.
The first phase of the direct conflict lasted from the
middle of August, 1990 until the beginning of March, 1991.
During this period, the JNA forces added oil to the flames
of rebellion, which were blazing in expectation of the
second phase. General Kadijevia defined the role of the
JNA as the protection of Serbs in Croatia "from attacks
by Croatian armed forces, and to allow them to consolidate
military organisation for the purpose of defence; at the
same time prepare the JNA for a war with Croatia once
it attacks the JNA".140 General Kadijevia was distorting
the truth. It was not a case of Serbs being attacked but,
rather, an armed rebellion of their militant elements
against the legitimate government of the Republic of Croatia;
the JNA's intervention "tightened" the area
onto which they desired to expand in the spring of 1991,
to the detriment of ethnically mixed regions.
The second phase lasted from the beginning of March until
the beginning of July 1991. During this period, the Serb
terrorists attempted to expand their illegal republic
to areas in which they did not have favourable status,
although their numbers were "sufficient enough"
to lay claim to yet another "ancient" plot of
Serb land. Units of the JNA from this moment on became
an overt guardian and then participant in the same mission.
Next were Pakrac, Plitvice, and Slavonia. There was a
limited number of victims in these initial, low-level
confrontations. The federal army benefited from the experiences
of the 52nd corpus in Kosovo. Specifically, they demonstrated
their force by the continual movement of armoured and
mechanised units and low flying fighter planes, which
was in clear contrast to the poorly armed Croatian light
infantry units. The tactical leaders were the armoured
and mechanised brigades located in Croatian territory
(4th armoured, 12th and 265th mechanised brigades) as
well as units from other areas: Banja Luka (329th armoured
brigade), Paneevo (51st mechanised brigade), Subotica
(36th mechanised brigade), and Sremska Mitrovica (453rd
mechanised brigade). General Kadijevia justified these
tactics candidly: "In order to execute the given
instructions, units of the JNA in and around Croatia must
be reinforced. They must have two types of formations.
A large number of armoured and mechanised units from platoon
to battalion strength should be positioned near the conflict
areas so that they can intervene quickly. An adequate
number of armoured and mechanised units, brigade size
or larger, should be positioned at suitable checkpoints
in and around Croatia so that they may be engaged in enhanced
operations".141 As was the case in the first phase
of the JNA's activities, General Kadijevia distorted the
truth in the second phase as well. Preparations for the
use of armoured and mechanised units began one year earlier,
based on an order of May 15, 1990, with the reclassification
and reorganisation of units in and around Croatia into
"A" type, and establishment of the 10th corpus
in Zagreb.142 It is crucial that this order was given
one day after the order to confiscate the weapons of the
territorial defence. The ethnic cleansing, carried out
by local Serbs, began during this phase. Units of the
territorial defence, as they referred to themselves, carried
out their assignments with threats and physical intimidation,
followed by a more effective formula: massacring all those
who were deemed "unsuitable". Blatant genocide
proved to be the most effective means for Serbs to reach
their goal of ethnically cleansing the areas of Croat
and other non-Serb populations. The formula was suitable
for the army as well, which presented itself as a neutral
factor whose basic assignment was to create "buffer
zones". The army was omnipresent when the success
of the terrorists (Dvor na Uni) needed bolstering, and
when the advances of regular Croat forces, should they
prove detrimental for the rebel Serbs (Pakrac, Plitvice)
had to be stopped.
The beginning of July marked the start of the JNA's third
phase of aggression against Croatia: segmented and ever-
increasing engagement in support of the rebel and volunteer
Serb units, and participation in their activities to such
an extent that in September, the JNA had become the main
strategist. The eetniks and other paramilitary units were
discarded as it became clear that they could not make
progress against the Croatian forces. This was especially
clear in eastern Slavonia, where the JNA seized the borders
of the Republic of Croatia with armoured and mechanised
units. This was a offensive intended to intimidate Croatia
as well as an important operative procedure that resulted
in control by the JNA of bridges on the Danube, which
was a great advantage in the further waging of war. From
these "administrative borders" the JNA moved
forward step-by-step, assisting the local Serb units and
various Serb partisan expansionist units. In this manner,
Baranja and several Croatian villages in eastern Slavonia
west of the Danube (Dalj, Aljmaš and Erdut) were seized.
In other parts of Croatia the "peacekeeping"
role of the JNA was becoming intolerable, forcing the
Croatian leadership to blockade JNA units wherever possible.
In cities with a Croat majority, roads were blocked, which
was significant for the armoured and mechanised units.
The arrival of new recruits from Croatia and Slovenia
had come to a complete halt, and there was also a significant
reduction from other parts of Yugoslavia. The unsuccessful
mobilisation of reserves at that time was another factor
working to the JNA's disadvantage.
From the end of September and beginning of October, an
offensive began whose objective was to withdraw units
from the hinterlands and areas that were not envisioned
for a greater Serbia, and to penetrate the artificial
borders. The poor showing of reserves condemned the plan
to failure and forced the implementation of a new plan.
The explanation given to the public by the defence minister
of Serbia, Lieutenant General Tomislav Simovia, conflicted
with the activities underway: "combat activities…allowing
for the evacuation of personnel, material, and technical
equipment from the surrounded garrisons in Croatia, and
foremost, preventing the genocide of Serb inhabitants
living in that republic by paramilitary units".143
The smokescreen, "preventing an ethnic conflict",
was exposed, and the JNA's position became clear. The
pretext of fighting to free barricaded garrisons in Dubrovnik
and Vukovar was nonsense, since, as Lord Carrington stated,
there were in these cities "no barricaded garrisons
or Serb inhabitants who must be protected".144 From
an operative standpoint, the offensives on these cities
were incomprehensible. Such an offensive is a very complex
and sensitive operation, and battles for cities are generally
avoided; cities are bypassed and blocked by smaller units.
This is particularly true if the attacker's main strength
lies in armoured and mechanised units, whose manoeuvrability
is drastically reduced in city battles. The armoured and
mechanised divisions of the 12th corpus and 1st proletarian
mechanised division corps lacked sufficient infantry to
escort their tanks. Logically, Vukovar should have been
bypassed and blocked by small forces. However, this was
not the case. Dubrovnik is even stranger. It would have
been logical for the forces of the 2nd Podgorica corpus
and the 37th Užice corpus to be dispatched through western
Herzegovina towards Split. This was again not the case;
the city was attacked. As with Vukovar, there is no military
explanation. The reasoning behind the attacks on these
cities must apparently be sought elsewhere; perhaps in
the mentality that had for centuries advocated the right
to neighbouring lands. In 1991, the balance of power was
so favourable for the Serbs that it would be senseless
to draw a comparison. Several thousand tanks confronted
a few combat vehicles of the Croatian police and hand-fashioned
armoured vehicles. This balance of power promised the
fulfilment of the centuries- long dream of a great Serbia.
In September 1991, when all this steel machinery fired
up, its navigators did not intend to leave "uncleansed
territory" behind. The objective was to ethnically
cleanse everything and everyone that was non-Serb, and
to eradicate any memory of these people. This was the
logic behind the attacks on cities and use of genocide
to reach the main goal. This was also the JNA's reason
for waging war on Dubrovnik and Vukovar.145
CONCLUSION
After
the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia entered the crisis-ridden eighties.
They were marked by the Kosovo crises in 1981 and 1989,
the long standing economic crises, and the rise of great
Serbian nationalism directed against the federal state
as conceived and confirmed in the 1974 Constitution -
a phenomenon which triggered a reaction from the non-Serb
peoples. The active participation of the JNA made it clear
that the Serb expansionism had also engulfed this institution,
which had a Serb majority and had for years promoted itself
as the last defender of Tito's legacy. At the end of the
eighties, the reorganisation of the armed forces of SFRY
was complete according to the "Unity" plan,
which called for extreme decentralisation. The organisational
changes weakened the territorial defence, which contained
elements of a republic army, and strengthened the other
component, the Yugoslav people's army. The military elite
thus openly sided with Serbia and Montenegro, which unlike
the other republics promoted the centralisation of Yugoslavia.
The only foundation for such reorganisation would have
been a serious threat from outside, which was an absurd
assumption at the end of the Cold War.
After the triumph of democracy in Croatia, the JNA disarmed
the Croatian territorial defence prior to the change in
leadership. Simultaneously, it reorganised its forces
in the greater Zagreb area and began forming the 10th
corpus, whose assignment was to pacify the city using
methods from the Kosovo battles in the eighties. Armoured
and mechanised units positioned in and around Croatia
reinforced the peacetime structure of the army, which
was particularly important in regions where Croats were
in the majority. Dependence on troops was thus reduced,
since these types of units, with their firepower and mobility,
were envisioned as the leading force during the conflict
in Croatia.
After the rebellion of the Serb minority in Croatia in
August 1990, the JNA immediately took their side. Until
July 1991 it operated through the "buffer zone"
institution, allegedly separating the "conflicting"
parties; in reality its assignment was to prevent the
legally elected Croatian institutions from upholding constitutionally
defined order throughout the country. From July 1991 the
federal army supported the rebels by use of force against
the Croatian armed units. At the end of September, a massive
strategic offensive was launched against Croatia in order
to divide the country, force surrender, and seize areas
which were part of the Serbian expansionist program. After
unsuccessful operations, the JNA satisfied itself with
areas predominantly inhabited by Serbs, and at the beginning
of 1992 it proceeded to organise the rebel Serb army prior
to withdrawal from the area.
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New York,
September 11, 2001.
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