 |
Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Terrorism
Ivo
Lučić
ABSTRACT
The author describes
the causes and roots of terrorism in Bosnia and Hercegovina,
all of which are deeply rooted in the former Yugoslav
system. Yugoslavia, often idealized in the West as a model
for today's multi-ethnic ideology, supported, trained,
and even gave refuge to terrorist groups around the world.
Yugoslavia earned approximately 700 million dollars a
year selling weapons to "non-aligned" countries.
In addition to its problematic activities in the area
of foreign affairs, the Yugoslav communist government
committed terrorist acts against its own citizens in the
diaspora who opposed Yugoslav policies. Between 1945-1990,
it organized the murder of 73 Croatian emigrants.
With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, five new states
emerged. One is Bosnia and Hercegovina. The author describes
the birth and development of terrorist groups in this
country, placing emphasis on today's most dangerous form,
Islamic terrorism, which is supported by the Muslim government
in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and thousands of "mujahedeen"
who arrived during the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina to
fight for Islam. Since the end of the war, Bosnia and
Hercegovina has been a undeclared protectorate.
The international community holds the most power, but
also carries the most responsibility for the situation
in this country. Many terrorism issues have not been resolved,
often because political problems are concealed in order
to maintain the image of an ideal multi-ethnic community
and create the impression that the creators of the Dayton
Agreement have succeeded. The author warns that such a
view toward terrorism is extremely dangerous, and that
political trials such as the Leutar case are unacceptable
in the democratic world.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was, until its independence and
international recognition in April 1992, one of the six
republics of the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRJ). Thus, in order to explain the phenomena of terrorism
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to first explain
the relationship between Yugoslavia and terrorism, considering
that this later strongly affected Bosnia's position toward
terrorism. Up until the disintegration of the Socialistic
Federative Republic, Yugoslavia had been repeatedly accused
of supporting international terrorism, and at the same
time of directly using terrorist methods on their citizens
in emigration. Yugoslavia responded to the accusations
with counter-accusations, charging that the (western)
countries accusing them utilized double standards towards
terrorism.1
In order to address the problem of "double standards",
the definition of terrorism being used at that time in
Yugoslavia needs to be considered. In the Yugoslav Military
Encyclopedia of 1975, there was no definition of the word
"terrorism". Terror is defined as "a violent
action (system of government) whose goal is frightening
or destroying the opponent, etc."2 In 1986 in Belgrade,
"The Security Lexicon" was published, in which
terrorism was defined as "planned and systematic
use of acts of violence to spread fear among people who
are a members of government institutions or organized
groups for the purpose of reaching certain political goals."3
In the Criminal Law of SFRJ, international terrorism is
addressed in section 155a, and: "whoever with the
intention of harming a foreign country, liberation movement,
or international organization performs the kidnapping
of some person or some other type of violence; creates
an explosion or fire, or performs a generally dangerous
act or uses generally dangerous means endangers a person's
life or property of value, will be punished...",
etc.4
The General Encyclopedia of the Lexicographic Institute
of 1982 makes a distinction between terror and terrorism
and presents both definitions. Terror is defined in the
same manner as in the Military Encyclopedia: "use
of violence whose goal is to frighten or destroy the opponent".
Terrorism is defined as "a way for individuals, political
groups, and organizations to fight against the existing
social-political orders and political systems based on
the use of organized violence...".5 The Yugoslav
Military Lexicon defines terror as "the use of violence
to frighten a political opponent and break his resistance…",
while terrorism is defined as "organized and sustained
use of violence with the intention to destroy by provoking
fear and personal insecurity among the citizenry the authority
of the state or to achieve certain political goals".6
There is a certain politicization in regard to these definitions,
especially if they are considered in their entirety. Nonetheless,
Yugoslav theory considers terror to be violence committed
by the state (violence from above), and terrorism to be
violence committed against the state (violence from below).
A problem arises with the definition of international
terrorism taken from SFRJ law, where the significant,
ambiguous construction "liberation movements"
appears. Here terrorism enters the political, ideological
sphere and there is no longer a consensus on its definition.
Those who for some are freedom fighters are for others
terrorists.
These definitions are not intended to explain the concept
of terrorism; they serve only to enlighten readers about
how the term was understood in former Yugoslavia. Terrorism
is difficult to define in final terms because political
changes also alter the definition of words, and nobody
refers to himself as a terrorist anymore. The concept
has been replaced by less objectionable designations:
fighters for freedom, justice, human rights and so forth.
It is important to provide some of the newer definitions
of terrorism so that they can be compared with what former
Yugoslavia considered terrorism and what is today considered
terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rest of the
world.
One of the better definitions of terrorism is that of
the American FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation): "an
illegal use of force and violence against persons or properties
in order to frighten or force the government, civil society,
or any other part of society to do something, their goal
being the promotion of their own political or social goals".7
The American State Department uses a definition of terrorism
found in Chapter 22 of the USA codex, section 2656: "Terrorism
is politically motivated violence with premeditation which
is performed against non-combatants by sub-national groups
or secret agents, usually with the intent to influence
public opinion".8 The Ministry of Defense of the
United States of America defines terrorism as: "an
illegal use or threat to use force or violence against
individuals or properties in order to frighten governments
or societies, frequently in order to reach political,
religious, or ideological goals".9 So it is clear
that different services of the same state institutions
define terrorism differently, depending on their area
of activity and authority.
As mentioned, Yugoslavia has been accused in the past
of supporting or participating in international terrorism:
condoning the presence of known terrorist "Carlos"
in Yugoslavia; the arrest but failure to extradite four
members of the Baader-Meinhof group; connections to the
Italian Red Brigades; and the failure to extradite (protection
of) the Palestinian, Abu Abbas. In 1978, Austria's "Die
Presse" accused the Yugoslav government of protecting
(hiding in their territorial waters) a Lebanese ship which
was transporting "Arrow" anti-aircraft missiles
produced by the Soviet Union for the "Red Brigades".10
The Yugoslav government responded to these accusations
with counter-accusations that western "reactionary
countries" supported and tolerated anti-Yugoslav
emigrant terrorist organizations. At the same time, Yugoslavia
was accused of using terrorist methods to eliminate its
emigrant citizens.11 As a defense against these ever-increasing
accusations,Yugoslav terrorism theorists proposed the
use of all resources at its disposal, as well as the nonaligned
movement and the international community as a whole, to
achieve a redefinition of liberation and revolutionary
movements and thus invalidate the indictments against
Yugoslavia.12
A short review of former Yugoslavia's relationship toward
liberation-terrorist movements can serve to illuminate
certain past events and issues.
By
command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of SFRJ, November 17th, 1995, the Educational Security
Center was formed in Pančevo, which included the School
of Security and School of Military Police, and later the
school for members of foreign armies from nonaligned,
friendly countries and liberation movements.13
The School of Security was renamed the Intelligence-Security
Education Center (OBŠC) in 1975.
As part of the same structure, the Inspectors School of
the Second Federal Administration for National Defense
(SSNO) was formed in Kovin in 1964, as well as the School
for Diversionary and Anti-diversionary Activities.
In the 1988/89 school year, 36 regular classes were offered
in the OBŠC (courses lasted thirty days for reserve and
three months for active officers) and three seminars (which
lasted from 5 to 10 days). The training of the second
generation of officers undergoing the year long program
in the intelligence-security courses KŠŠT KoV and final
schooling (4 years) of the Military Academy (VA) and military
high-school (SVŠ) KoV, special units course, was thus
achieved. 1339 auditers and military-school students finished,
and the average grades were very good.14
Between 1960 and 1986 Pančevo, over 800 foreign auditers
from 10 countries and 4 liberation movements were educated
in OBŠC.15 Members of liberation movements were also trained
in Yugoslav military schools to become helicopter pilots,
commanders of low and higher level units, and officers
in various special areas and services.16
Yugoslavia assisted in various ways almost all "liberation
and revolutionary movements", including: MPLA - Angola;
FRELIMO - Mozambique; PAIGC - Guinea Bissau; SWAPO - Namibia;
the Patriotic Front ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe; ANC in
South Africa; the Liberation Committee OAJ; the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO); the NR in Angola; Tanzania;
the National Unity Front of Chile;17 and others. Even
though this assistance to the liberation and revolutionary
movementswas was offered with no strings attached, it
still brought large material profits. As a result of its
policy of nonalignment and benevolence toward these movements,
exports of Yugoslav artillery and military equipment to
foreign (nonaligned) countries increased considerably.
In 1974 alone, there were more export agreements reached
than there had been during the past 20 years. 66 Yugoslav
companies received contracts worth approximately 713 million
dollars. The full capacity of the military industry was
engaged for years into the future.18
In
addition to military institutions, assistance and training
of the "liberation and revolutionary movements and
organizations" was also provided by institutions
which were a part of the Federal Secretariat of Internal
Affairs; specifically, the federal services of state security
and the Security Institute, which was formed by the Federal
Secretariat of Internal Affairs.19
These activities, or indications that they existed, gave
foreign countries on the other side of the ideological
curtain the ammunition they needed to accuse the Yugoslav
government of supporting terrorism. It was also accused
of using terrorist methods to eliminate its citizens in
emigration.
Partial investigations were undertaken in the Republic
of Croatia after it gained independence in 1991; they
revealed that the Yugoslav government, through its intelligence-security
services, had liquidated 73 Croatian emigrants, of which
five are still missing.20 In a book by Božo Vukušić, secretary
of the "The Commission to Certify Postwar Victims
of the Communist System Abroad", and the "Committee
to Certify War and Postwar Victims", it is written
that agents of the Yugoslav secret service killed 69 Croatian
emigrants throughout the world between 1946-1990, while
eight are listed as missing (their disappearance is assumed
to be connected to actions of the Yugoslav services).
Also, 24 unsuccessful assassinations are recorded, the
victims having survived after suffering various degrees
of injury or aftereffects. Three emigrants were kidnapped,
and four kidnap attempts failed, as the victims succeeding
in saving themselves.21
On the other hand, ?uro Rebić, a former employee of the
Federal Services of National Security who was for most
of his working career responsible for clerical matters
and internal communications,22 and later acted as a publicist
for the SDB, writes in his book Spies, diversionists,
terrorists about numerous terrorist attacks by emigrant
organizations against Yugoslav objects. Rebić claims:
"The extreme pro-fascist Yugoslav emigration performed
between 1946-1985 about 400 terrorist actions in the country
and abroad which resulted in the death of 102 and wounding
of 330 persons". Among other things, Rebić claims
that the "Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood"
alone (founded in 1961), performed 120 terrorist attacks
during the first year after its creation, in which 53
persons died and 118 were wounded.23
It is interesting to note that Rebić, true to Yugoslav
communist policies towards emigrants, and especially Croatian
emigrants, labels all the emigrant organizations fascist,
criminal, and terrorist, although the majority was not.
This was done in order to politically disqualify them.24
Rebić's text represents the official political stance
and thus serves as an accusation directed at the "western"
governments: "A complete symbiosis of reactionary-bourgeois
elements and the dregs of defeated fascism and its collaborators
has come into existence. Unanimous in their attitude towards
socialism, they differ only in the methods of struggle
they employ to destroy it, though in time these differences
are becoming fewer."25 It is indicative that in Rebić's
and similar books and articles, the deaths of Croatian
and other emigrants are rarely even mentioned, except
when attempts are made to disseminate disinformation,
arouse suspicion and provoke discord in emigrant circles,
or disguise Yugoslav secret service operations. In such
cases, it was claimed that the victims died as a result
of disagreements between various emigrant organizations.
The true state of affairs is illustrated clearly by a
trial that took place in 1981 in the western Germany city
of Saarbrucken, after which three Yugoslav secret police
agents were sentenced to a total of 35 years in prison
for planning and organizing the murder of at least one
Yugoslav (Croatian) emigrant.26 At that time, the German
weekly paper "Der Spiegel" quoted the prosecutor
in the trial: "While the government in Bonn is negotiating
with Yugoslav politicians about containing international
terrorism, Yugoslavia itself is violating the spirit of
these negotiations and committing acts of terrorism on
foreign territory intended to "liquidate" political
refugees from Yugoslavia living abroad". The "activities"
of the Yugoslav government were also harshly attacked
by the Canadian press (The Vancouver Sun) in 1979 and
in the Swedish "Parlament" on October 14th,
1980.
Two years earlier, the American publicist Jack Anderson
published sections from the secret report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, which alleged
that the Yugoslav secret service in the USA was "probably
committing murders". Senator McGovern requested a
thorough investigation, but everything was quickly hushed
up.27 Temporary political pragmatism had apparently taken
precedence over long term security.
Terrorism
as a declaration of war
Bosnia
and Herzegovina's struggle for independence began with
a literal bang. In the months prior to the outbreak of
war, explosive devices were planted, kidnappings occurred,
and the first human victims fell. The situation was worst
in Herzegovina; that is, in Mostar, as this was where
the largest concentration of Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was located. They, along with many Muslims, were unwilling
to accept Serbian domination, as it was clear to them
what was being planned for them in Yugoslavia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The situation worsened when the war escalated in the Republic
of Croatia, Serbian reservists marched on Herzegovina,
and the Serbian army attacked Dubrovnik.
Between January 1st 1991 and February 25th 1992, when
neither war nor peace reigned on the territory of Herzegovina,
72 explosions were recorded in areas which were under
the authority of the Center of Security Services, Mostar,
28 of which took place in the city of Mostar itself; within
the next month, six more explosions occurred in Mostar.28
In addition, there were also several kidnappings and murders.
The counterintelligence service of the Federal Secretariat
for National Defense (SSNO), which operated inside the
JNA (and was known as KOS) played a significant part in
the preparation of aggression on Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Almost all the leaders of the rebellions
in Croatia officially collaborated with this service,
which directed, armed, trained, and protected them from
the police forces. In the beginning, this protection was
represented as "dividing parties at war", work
for which they solicited tactical and often strategic
assistance. For the most part, the JNA simply protected
positions the Serbian paramilitary forces had overtaken.
These paramilitary units later became official units of
the joint Yugoslav, that is, Greater Serbian, armed forces.
In addition to equipping the paramilitary units, the counterintelligence
service also planned terrorist actions which were part
of a wider plan to politically compromise and block the
newly formed republic government.
The operative group "Opera", which was formed
in conjunction with the War Air Force Command and Anti-aircraft
Defense (RV and PVO) of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA)
is an example of this. Its role was to conduct propaganda-subversive
action, and it was comprised of members of special services
within the Central Committee of the Federal Communists
of Croatia (CK SKH). The group conducted a series of terrorist
actions, including: the rocket attacks on the Banski dvori
(the then Presidential palace) which were intended to
result in the murder of the Croatian president, and the
mining of the Jewish district and cemetery in order to
compromise the Republic of Croatia and discredit the government.
Members of this group were tried in Belgrade and Zagreb,
indicted for a variety of offenses. In addition to terrorist
actions, they devised and performed numerous psychological-propagandist
actions; for example, organizing a campaign against Herzegovinans
specifically, and Croatians in general throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina. They also were also the first to introduce
the thesis of a parallel chain of command in regard to
the the functioning of the government in the Republic
of Croatia, which was later used to bolster the claim
about a parallel chain of command existing in the Croatian
army, etc.29
At the same time, the intelligence-security services of
the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the assistance
of the majority of the Serbian personnel in MUP and other
institutions, conducted diverse, even terrorist, actions.
Following the example of the Jewish district bombings
in Zagreb, the Partisan cemetery in Mostar was mined.
This was only one of a series of explosions based upon
a plan to "create controlled panic"; that is,
controlled terror,30 in order to frighten the local population
and incite it into promoting a change of government by
means of protests and capitulation to the "Yugoslav
forces". As a response to the aggression, the Croatian
and Muslim sides formed defense groups and then units,
which initially lacked clear and firm organization. This
resulted in isolated acts by individuals or small groups
which could be characterized as terrorist, but these were
exceptions and should be viewed within the specific situation;
that is, the struggle for survival.
The European Union recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on
April 7th, 1992, and on the same day it was recognized
by the Republic of Croatia as well. From that day on,
the ex-JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces changed its
tactics and began to use military force instead of violence.
The limited attacks on Croatians and to some extent Muslims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina became an all out aggression
on Bosnia and Herzegovina.31
Terrorism
and war
When
it was fought in cities and villages, especially in the
beginning before the front lines were established, the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina produced a horrendous number
of civilian victims. Large territories were occupied by
force, around 70% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the territory was ethnically cleaned by means of terror
and violence. Protected objects and individuals were systematically
destroyed (civil population, cultural and religious objects)
in order to eradicate the identity of the enemy.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina's case, it is clear that the aggressor
(the ex-JNA, assisted by Bosnian and Herzegovinan Serbs
from the Serbian Democratic Party) executed these policies
of terror by utilizing military strategy, and, even more
tragic, alternated these policies with those of genocide
in attacks on protected zones.32
In response to the aggression, defense groups were organized
on the Croatian and Muslim sides, units which lacked a
strong organization and themselves resorted at first to
terror (mining, kidnapping, and so on). However, this
should be viewed as a specific situation in which a struggle
for sheer survival was being fought.
As an outcome of the Greater Serbian aggression on Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the occupation of a larger part of
the territory, the social and government structures collapsed
and the ethnic balance on the still free territory was
changed, which led to conflicts between the Croatians
and Muslims. During this conflict, which was characterized
by crime as well, the policies of terror were also used,
most frequently in the form of military strategy. Still,
it is important to note that there was an escalation of
terrorist actions after the war in the Croat-Muslim (Bosnian)
Federation, and that the perpetrators of those actions
were predominantly members of radical Islamic organizations
who had arrived during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
to assist the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order
to understand the ultimate goals of this assistance, it
is necessary to analyze the relations between the Islamic
world and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Political
Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina
At
the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, political
Islam became more active and organized in international
politics, in part as a result of the Islamic revolution
in Iran in 1979. At the end of 1969, an international,
independent political organization of Muslim countries,
the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIK), was constituted.
Even though this organization was primarily religious,
it was also an ideological, economic, and cultural organization
of Islamic countries, which supported the idea that Islam
was not merely a religion, but also represented a specific
view of the world and organization of society. The first
OIK conference on a ministry level was held March 23-25,1970,
in Jeddah. At the third ministerial level conference of
the OIK, February 29-March 4, 1972, also in Jeddah, the
by-laws of the OIK were adopted in the presence of representatives
from 30 countries, the operating principles affirmed and
the general secretary and three assistants appointed.
It was decided that their headquarters would be in Jeddah
until such time that Jerusalem was liberated; thereafter,
the headquarters would be relocated to Jerusalem.33
At the third conference of the OIK in Taef, January 25-28,
1981, in Saudi Arabia, there was an increased focus by
the OIK on Muslim minorities throughout the world; that
is, on countries which did not officially belong to the
Muslim community. Particular interest was shown in the
Muslim (Turkish) part of Cyprus, and a decision was made
to assist the Muslim community in Cyprus both morally
and materially. At the OIK conference in Niger in August,
1982, a resolution was adopted to research and examine
the positions of Muslims in countries which were not members
of the OIK. In that context, the position of Muslims in
Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, Kosovo) was
also addressed.
At an OIL consultation in Cairo (August, 1982) on the
tasks of "political Islam", Islam in Yugoslavia
was one of the topics and a comment was made that the
dissemination and activation of Islam in Yugoslavia would
facilitate closer contacts with the Muslim minority in
the Balkans and the dioceses in western European countries.34
On March 23rd, 1983, members of the national security
service of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina broke into Alija Izetbegović's
apartment with a search warrant. After a detailed search,
Izetbegović was brought to the service headquarters and
was placed in detention. A large group of people was arrested
along with him; Izetbegovic and four others were brought
to trial in the late 1940s and early 1950s for their membership
in an illegal group, "Young Muslims".
The indictment was based on Izetbegović's book The Islamic
Declaration which presents the principles of the Islamic
movement. Izetbegović was sentenced to 14 years, and the
others to a total of 90 years.
In his final statement, Izetbegović said: "I was
a Muslim and that is what I will remain. I considered
myself a fighter for Islam in the world and I will feel
this way for the rest of my life. Islam was for me a symbol
of everything beautiful and noble and represented a promise
or hope of a better future for the Muslim nations, for
a dignified and free life; in other words, everything
worth living for."35
Izetbegović was released from prison on November 25th,
1988, after a ruling by the Presidency of Yugoslavia.
A year later he began to organize a Muslim party, the
basis for which had been formulated in the Foča prison,
and introduced it at a press conference in Sarajevo on
March 27th, 1990. The party, "The Democratic Action
Party" (SDA) was defined as a party of Yugoslav citizens
with Muslim cultural-historical ties. For the party's
flag, the "Spanish Muslims" design was adopted:
a white flag with two light green horizontal stripes on
the edges and a half-moon of the same colour in the middle.
The Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina organized politically
around this flag.36
On the day that the first press conference of the newly
founded party was held, the National Security Service
of Bosnia and Herzegovina,37 the same service that had
arrested Alija Izetbegović seven years earlier, pointed
out in their internal newsletter the growing Palestinian
displeasure with the normalization of relations between
Yugoslavia and Israel, and warned that certain radical
Palestinian organizations might initiate terrorist actions
within SFRJ as a result. There was also a negative reaction
from the Arabic (Islam) countries on an economic level.
The service also called attention to an increase in Iranian
nationals in Yugoslavia and reported that the number had
grown to 606 in 1989. They also claimed that there were
promotors of militaristic Shiite fundamentalism among
them who had come into being as a result of contacts with
Afro-Asian (Islamic) nationals and like-minded Yugoslav
nationals.38
Four months later, in July, 1990, the service recorded
a strong reaction to the normalization of Yugoslav-Israeli
relations, which they propogate as a result of pressure
applied by the Serbian leadership. Arabic sources warned
that Yugoslavia, as chairman of the non-aligned movement,
must condition normalization of relations with a change
in Israeli policies towards the Arabic; that is, the Palestinian
world. Arabic sources were especially upset by the organization
of "Serbian Week" in Israel and the publicity
afforded this event in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Some Islamic
countries, such as Libya, Iraq, and Jordan, reacted in
terms of economical measures against Yugoslavia, and especially
Serbian companies. At the same time, an Iraqi diplomat
announced as a "precautionary" measure that
more attention and interest would henceforth be devoted
to the Muslim issue in Yugoslavia by Islamic international
organizations and countries, for they were aware of the
position of Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Service again warned of possible terrorist attacks
by radical Islamic groups.39
Earlier, in January, 1990, the National Security Service
of Bosnia and Herzegovina noted an attempt to form branches
of the "Muslim Brothers" organization in Tuzla,
in north-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mustafa Kemal,
a Palestinian from Gaza and a student of the Faculty of
Civil Engineering in Zagreb, came to Tuzla as a special
delegate of the leadership of the "Muslim Brothers"
of Eastern Europe. In addition to propaganda activities,
Kemal also introduced the possibility of military training
in 1990 for members of the organization, and proposed
that Mahmud Fudžami, a Jordan national and student at
the School of Electrical Engineering in Tuzla, attend.
A suggestion was also made to add several names to the
leadership of the Eastern Europe "Muslim Brothers":
Abdul Hakim Ismail, a student of the School of Dental
Medicine in Priština, and Halid Marei and Ali Taib, students
of the Medical Faculty of Zagreb. In the estimation of
the service's best information sources, Ali Taib who was
at that time in Sudan,40 was most likely to be elected
president of the organization.
Already in March,1982, the leader of the "Muslim
Brothers" in Egypt, Hasan Naser, son of Gamal Abdel
Naser, the ex-president of Egypt and one of the founders
of the non-aligned movement, arrived in former Yugoslavia
(through Zagreb to Belgrade). He brought with him the
"Ihvans", younger members of the "Muslim
Brothers", who applied to study at Yugoslav universities
but rarely completed their degrees. The Egyptian government
learned of Naser's arrival and made an inquiry to the
Yugoslav government, which denied the report; in other
words, concealed Naser's presence.41
At the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina
in November, 1990, the SDA won 86 of 240 parliamentary
mandates. Three of seven members of the presidency were
SDA candidates, and this explains how Alija Izetbegović
became President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and politically the most influential person in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.42 Democracy was soon thereafter replaced
by war, and with the first shots directed at Bosnia and
Herzegovina "assistance" also arrived. One such
form of "assistance" for Bosnia and Herzegovina
were the numerous "humanitarians", who soon
revealed themselves to be mujahedeen, fighters of Allah's
path, fighters for Islam.
Mujahedeen
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
"We
did not invite the mujehadeen; Croatians opened the door
to Bosnia and Herzegovina!" Alija Izetbegović stated
at his last press conference as the president of the Democratic
Action Party on October 12th, 2001. He said it was the
Croatians and not the Bosnians who should explain why
they allowed the Mujahedeen into Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Izetbegović conveniently forgot his open letter to the
President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, sent from Geneva
on January 28th, 1993, at a time when Croat-Muslim relations
were extremely volatile. The letter is a response to Tuđman's
letter of the previous day. Izetbegović first acquaints
Tuđman with various offenses committed by Croatians in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; for example, the arrest of two
directors of the Islamic humanitarian organization "Igasse"
in Busovača, Galib es Sufi and Abu Hasan Alija, and the
theft of their money and belongings valued at half a million
German marks. Izetbegović also complains about the general
extortion of humanitarian aid and refers to a statement
by the secretary of the Humanitarian Aid Association in
Zurich.43
The identity of the two directors and the justification
for their arrest and imprisonment in Busovača prison is
clear from a report by the HVO Military Police, which
states that on December 18th, 1992, they stopped a Mitsubishi
all-terrain vehicle at the control point, driven by Ali
Muhammad, born 1944, a citizen of Great Britain (passport
number 700192046) and Pakistan (passport number H407904).
In addition, Ali also had an identity card from the Bosnian-Herzegovinan
Army and a gun with a permit. His fellow-traveller Galib
Ali Elsofi, born 1966, a citizen of Sudan (passport number
R 12078) also had an identity card from the Bosnian-Herzegovinan
Army. His residence visa for study in Bosnia and Herzegovina
had expired and his presence in the country was therefore
illegal. After having been stopped, both became violent
and broke the official police vehicle's windshield.44
The names of the "humanitarians" were spelled
incorrectly in Izetbegović's letter, but it is obvious
that it was the same two individuals.
About twenty days earlier on November 28th, 1992, the
Defence department HZ HB had warned MORH in Zagreb about
the activities of the Kuwaiti humanitarian organization
"Igass" in connection with procurement of illegal
arms and military equipment in Croatia. Representatives
of the Islamic community, Salih efendija Eolaković, and
the head imam of the IZ committee, Prozor Elkaz efendija
Hidajet,45 were directly involved in these activities.
On November 9th 1992, the HVO Military Police discovered
nine nationals from Islamic countries during a Split-Kiseljak
bus control who were carrying military equipment and propaganda
materials praising Islam and inviting others to join the
holy war for Allah.46 Twenty packages of propaganda flyers
and instructions for waging special war were also found.47
"We invited the mujahedeen to Bosnia", said
Mustafa efendija Cerić, the Resiu-l-ulema of the Islamic
community in Bosnia and Herzegovina on OBN's contact show
"Telering" in February 1999. "We invited
them in from Algeria, Qatar, Afghanistan, and other Islamic
countries because we were endangered and needed help.
We should all be grateful to the mujahedeen", added
Cerić.48
It is a fact that the mujahedeen came through Croatia;
that is, through Zagreb, with the cooperation or at least
tolerance of the Croatian government. The SDA itself originated
in Zagreb, in the Islamic Cultural Center where a large
group of Muslims led by Salem Šabić and Šemsudin Tanković
regularly gathered. It was here the SDA platform, developed
by approximately fifteen like-minded people, came into
existence.49 On April 8th ,1993, the new Reisu-l-ulema
of the Islamic community of Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived
from Zagreb: Mustafa Cerić, the former imam of the Zagreb
mosque. Also coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina through
Zagreb was a transport of Iranian artillery and military
equipment, a fact about which Peter Galbraith, the American
ambassador to Croatia at that time, was called to testify
before the U.S. Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee.50
As a matter of fact, all the aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina
passed through Croatia. This is the route taken by the
mujahedeneen, who came under the auspices of several of
the 33 Islamic humanitarian organizations active in Croatia
at that time (1992-1995) and who later moved to Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where in 1996, 216 foreign humanitarian
organizations were registered.51
One with those with the closest ties to the Muslim government
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, to Alija Izetbegović,
was the "Third World Relief Agency" (TWRA).
Its founder and director is El Fatih Hassanein from Sudan,
a former medical student in Sarajevo. The co-founder is
Derviš ?ur?ević, one of those who stood trial with Izetbegovic
and the others in Sarajevo,1983. He later moved to Vienna
after he had served his sentence.52 The TWRA was active
in Vienna until the Austrian services uncovered illegal
activities and broke into their premises on September
5th ,1995.53 The TWRA provided many kinds of assistance
for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but especially
in supplying artillery and military equipment and transferring
mujahedeen to Bosnia and Herzegovina. During 1993, TWRA
money in Vienna was handled by its founder and director,
El Fatih Hassanein; one of the chairman of the SDA, Hasan
Eengić, who was later the Minister of Defense of the Bosnian
and Herzegovinan Federation; and one of the ideologues
and founders of the SDA and former President of the Parliament
of Islamic Communities of Croatia and Slovenia, Salim
Šabić. About 350 million American dollars passed through
this organization.54 After searching the premises, the
Austrian police determined that the TWRA was also connected
to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian imam sentenced
to life in prison in the United States for planning various
terrorist attacks against American targets.
There were connections to other Islamic militants as well.
Hassanein himself stated in an interview for an Islamic
magazine in 1994: "Bosnia must be Muslim in the end
because if that does not happen, the whole war makes no
sense and will have been waged in vain."55
Ties between Zagreb and the above-mentioned groups should
also be sought among Izetbegović's close friends from
the Croatian government of that time; that is, those he
mentioned by name in his "Memoirs".
Upon their arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic
volunteers formed the El Mujahid unit, which was part
of the third corpus of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
headquartered in Zenica. In August 1995, an interview
with the commander (Emir) of the El Mujahedeen unit, Abu
el Ma ali, appeared in the Croatian media. The journalist
estimated that the unit, which in the words of the commander
had come to Bosnia and Herzegovina to offer assistance
to the Muslims, had about 2000 members at that time. Abu
el Ma ali said he was certain that Islam would rule the
world and that he was dedicated to this cause. At that
time, Bosnian politician Haris Silajdžić expressed his
intention to summon volunteers from all over the world
to fight "Serbian fascism", and Abu el Ma ali
stated that their stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina had confirmed
such a need, and that many more would come were it not
for the interference of the Herzegovinan Croats.56 The
mujahedeen from the "El Mujahid" unit and other
units in Bosnia and Hercegovina represented a significant
military strength, and their presence was decisive in
the raising morale of the Bosnian-Muslim army. Support
from Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim government signified
to the sponsors of BH Islamization that the government
was "on the right path", and that their investment
and engagement was justified. On the other hand, Bosnia
and Herzegovina served as their refuge and provided them
with a training site for the handling of diverse weapons
and explosive devices. Their presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
also enabled Sefer Halilović, chief of staff of the Supreme
Command of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan Army at that time,
to vow in the Spanish newspaper "El Pais" (January
1993) that "no kind of negotiations, not even those
in Geneva, can destroy the idea of Bosnia as a united
and sovereign country. They can sign whatever they want
in Geneva! If those negotiations lead to a unitary Bosnia,
we will embrace them. If not, we will realize this kind
of state on the battlefield. If Europe doesn't change
its attitude, we will take action and bring terrorism
to its territory. Many European cities will be in flames."57
During
the war, a stream of terrorist attacks was committed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that is not the topic of this
study. In order to shed light upon the murders of Croatian
military commanders Ivica Stojak, Vlado Šantić, four soldiers
from Živko Totić's company, and Živko Totić's kidnapping,
more time and space is required, since this occurred during
the war with the Serbs, and in the period of the Muslim-Croat
alliance. It is therefore difficult to determine whether
these were actually war crimes or acts of terrorism.58
The signing of international agreements in November and
December 1995, which will here be referred to simply as
the "Dayton Agreements", put an end to the war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the issues of reconstruction,
damages, and healing the wounds of war still had to be
addressed. An incident in February 1996, however, showed
that the restoration of peace would be a difficult process.
Members of the international forces - IFOR - broke into
the former hiking lodge on the Pogorelica mountain near
Fojnica and discovered a secret training camp of the AID
(Muslim Intelligence-Security Services). The instructors
were Iranian intelligence officers, members of the MOIS,
three of which were arrested during the operation.
In
addition to the Iranians, eight Bosnia-Herzogovinian Muslim
AID members were arrested as well. Not only were they
being trained for intelligence but also for terrorism.59
This scandal resulted in the replacement of the director
of AID. Six weeks later, the chairman of the Presidency,
Alija Izetbegović, stated during an interview to a newspaper
with close ties to his party: "What happened in Pogorelica
near Fojnica was a very big mistake on our part."60
On September 28, 1996, in Sarajevo, the Assistant to the
Director of AID, Nedžad Ugljen, was on his way to visit
someone he had called beforehand to announce his arrival
when he was killed in front of his building.61 Shortly
before his death, Nedžad Ugljen had spoken with Izetbegović,
said he feared he would be killed, and identified to Izetbegović
the individuals who posed a threat to him.62
In 1997, terrorists acts were committed almost daily.
In the first ten months, 35 explosives attacks occurred,
and over 90% of the attack targets were Croats. Other
targets included 10 private residences, 8 Catholic churches,
5 apartment complexes, 3 infra-structure objects and 2
mosques. Two (Croats) were killed, and many others injured,
seven severely.63 By the end of the year, four more Croats
had been killed. During 1998, the number of terrorist
attacks rose to 132, and once again the majority of the
victims were Croats. Only in 25 cases were the perpetrators
caught.64 It was later discovered that the terrorists,
who had been accused of ttacks on Croatian emigrants and
who were being sought by the Muslim (Bosniac) police were
former members of El Mujahedeen forces then living in
a police-owned apartment.65 In addition to these attacks,
three other terrorist attacks show particularly clearly
the extent of the terrorism problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
One of the most important events in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
especially for its Catholics (Croats), was the announcement
of the arrival of Pope John Paul II to Sarajevo. On the
day of his visit, April 12, 1997, the Ministry of the
Interior's Anti-Terrorist Protection Department (KDZ)
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina discovered
during its third inspection of the area a large amount
of explosives ready to be activated by remote control
under a bridge on the Miljacka river, placed placed along
the route Pope John Paul II would be traveling that day.
The KDZ deactivated the explosive device and eliminated
the threat.66 At the same time, a Muslim citizen (Bosniac),
Husein Barjaktarević, noticed a large explosive device
in a sewer on the Kiseljak-Sarajevo road. He stopped an
SFOR vehicle, and the SFOR soldiers then removed the explosive.
It was determined that it was set to be activated by remote
control, but SFOR later announced it was an explosive
left over from the war, although they themselves had checked
the entire route the previous day to ensure against diversionary
activities and found nothing. The following day, April
13th, the police picked up Barjakterević in his cottage
near Kiseljak after which was then taken to the federal
police station in Sarajevo where he was questioned about
the circumstances surrounding his having found the explosive.
After the interrogation, which was attended by KDZ department
head, Mirza Jamaković, Barjaktarević (a Muslim) was given
a rosary and pictures of Catholic saints by the Muslim
police officers who had questioned him. They told him
that they were gifts from the Pope. Barjaktarević then
reported this to the Kiseljak police station, while at
the same time the family home in which he had previously
lived was set afire in the village ofTulice.67 The KDZ
department head of the Ministry of the Interior, Mirza
Jamaković, was arrested on September 25, 2001 for illegal
weapons trafficking from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo.
After five days imprisonment, he was transferred to the
prison hospital.68
On January 22, 1995 an accident occurred near Travnik
involving a Nissan. Three automatic rifles, two bombs,
two guns, and a large amount of ammunition and military
gear was found on the driver, a citizen of Saudi Arabia,
Ahmed Zuhair, son of Zeda. He was born on October 16,
1965, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and also carried a Saudi
passport, number A216281, and an official identity card,
number 0000914 issued by the Croatian Ministry of the
Interior, which he had received as a member of the humanitarian
organization "Charitable Community for Orphans".
He also had an official military declaration from the
BH army allowing him freedom of movement, which was certified
with a stamp from the chain of command of the reconnaissance
and diversion batallion of the seventh corps of the BH
army, and a travel order from the El Mujahedeen units.
Husnija Kubur, a Muslim Bosniac from Eajnić was also in
the vehicle with Zuhair.69 After the tape on Zuhair had
been broadcast on television, a fifty-year-old woman (FB)
from Vitez recognized him as being a member of the mujahedeen
unit which had attacked her village on September 18, 1993.
She specifically recognized Zuhair because he had tried
to kill her son (M.B. 14 years old), who was a minor,
with a knife. Zuhair sent a letter from prison to "his
brothers in the high Saudi Commission for Abu Yaqubo"
requesting that the letter then be forwarded to Basim
Al Atas. Zuhair stated that he was working for Walid Saati
in a humanitarian organization assisting orphans, and
was thus seeking their assistance. The addressees were
asked to obtain for Zuhair documents from the UNHCR to
show that his presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was for
humanitarian purposes.70 He was released in May 1997.
Four months later, on September 18,1997 at 11:40 p.m.,
a highly-destructive car bomb exploded near an apartment
complex in the western part of Mostar. Three people were
severely injured and forty others suffered minor injuries
from the explosion. Ninety-four apartments were damaged,
along with 96 automobiles, and 13 offices and garages.
Haris Silajdžić was among the first to comment on the
explosion, accusing Croats of being the perpetrators.
Several journalists with links to the intelligence underground
immediately accepted this theory and thus a whole campaign
was launched in support of it. Yet the perpetrators were
ultimately identified as Ahmed Zuhair, a.k.a. Handal,
and Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, a.k.a. Ubeid. They had been assisted
by Saleh Nedal, a.k.a. Jemen and Vlado Populovski, a.k.a.
Macedonian. in the planning of the explosion. A few days
later, Nedal warned Zuhair that the police were looking
for him and that he should go into hiding.71 Ahmed Zuhair
and Ali Ahmed Hamad had initially come to Mostar on September
11, 1997, in order to research the situation and confirm
where they would plant the car bomb several days later.72
The same day their co-conspirator, Saleh Nedal, was issued
a passport, no. BA584607, by the Ministry of the Interior
of BH in the district of Sarajevo, and he registered his
address as 8 Džamijska, Sarajevo.
A year later, on September 8, 1998, deputy district attorneys
Dr. Paolo Giogavnoli and Dr. Maria Vittoria De Simone
of Bologna, Italy, issued an international warrant for
a group of criminals responsible for a series of crimes
in Italy, among them terrorist acts. The eighth individual
on the list was Saleh Nedal. Italy requested his extradition
and on April 13, 1999, the district court in Travnik arrested
him based on Interpol's request of December 14, 1998.
The Investigating Croatian Judge, Mirjana Grubešić73 and
the County District Attorney in Travnik, Croat prosecutor
Marinko Jurčević, asked the County Court in Travnik to
comply with the Italian request to extradite Nedal.74
The county court in Travnik presided over by Judge Senad
Begović ( a Muslim Bosniac) ruled on July 12, 1999, against
the extradition of Nedal to Italy.75
The same judge then signed a decree which terminated Nedal's
imprisonment and released him.76 The Supreme Court of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina affirmed the
decree, which was signed by Judge Nazif Sulman ( a Muslim
Bosniac) on August 19, 1999.77 After being warned by Saleh
Nedal, Ahmed Zuhair fled and thus avoided standing trial
before the County Court in Zenica which began on September
18,1998, the anniversary of the explosion. The accused
Ubeid had admitted committing the crime during the police
investigation and made the same admission before an investigating
judge, only to deny it all during trial and state that
the police had coerced him by promising a quick trial
followed by his release.78 The accused was not charged
with terrorism, but rather, as the court in Zenica classified
it, constructing a car bomb, "a criminal act endangering
the general safety of people and property", and as
a result, all the accused received lighter sentences.
The longest sentence, eight years in prison, was given
to Ali Ahmed, since Zuhair's ten-year-sentence would never
be served.79
The legal explanation used by the defense attorney, Almin
Dautbegovic, was interesting. He claimed that in a terrorist
indictment based on (BH) regulations, it is necessary
to prove that the perpetrator had hostile motives towards
BH during the perpetration of the crime. In other words,
that there existed a subjective desire on the perpetrator's
part to commit this crime so as to harm or destroy the
country, BH. Based upon this, it would be very difficult
for a prosecutor to prove that individuals who had come
to BH in order to fight for its survival had committed
these heinous crimes in order to harm the country.80 The
judge accepted this definition of terrorism. It is also
interesting to note that, according to Article 168 of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Penal Code,81
international terrorism is defined as: "Intentionally
harming a foreign country, liberation movement, or international
organization…."82 It would also be interesting to
explore what the legislation meant by the term "liberation
movement". Therefore, according to the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina's laws, the car bomb plot in
Mostar was not a terrorist act, because Zuhair "only
wanted to take revenge on the Croats", while those
responsible for the murder of Anwar el Sha'abana (Abd
Al Rahman, international terrorist who was a member of
at least one international humanitarian organization,
although he had originally come in order defend BH in
the war) could conceivably be prosecuted for terrorism.
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Deputy Minister
of the Interior, Jozo Leutar, reacted many times to the
burlesque of trials and investigations, once in a letter
to the International Police Force ( IPTF) in November
1997, in which he pointed out the presence of Abu Hamze
and Karai Kamil Bin Alia in central Bosnia, in spite of
a warrant having been issued for their arrest. Many others
who had warrants against them were also walking around
freely in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.83
On March 16, 1999, shortly before 8:00 a.m., a bomb which
had been planted beneath Deputy Minister of the Interior
Jozo Leutar's official automobile, which had been parked
in Alipasian Street in downtown Sarajevo near the American
embassy, exploded. The bomb was activated while the car
was in motion. Leutar suffered severe physical injuries,
while his driver, Željko Aosić, and the passenger, Ivo
Rezo, sustained lesser physical injuries.
A month later, on April 16, 1999, Mounir Hanouf, Muhamed
Abu Gazali, and Murat Bas, a.k.a. the " Igman Group"
were arrested. Objects were found on them connecting them
to the terrorist attacks. During a police search of Abu
Gazali's apartment on July 12, 1999, police found a another
series of objects directly linked to the terrorist attacks.
Muhamed Abu Gazali had come to Bosnia and Herzegovina
one day before the attack on Leutar, on March 15, 1999.
Problems immediately arose at the beginning of the investigation.
First, the investigating judge tried to remove Croatian
police officers from the investigation, and evidence on
the Igman Group gathered during the investigation was
hidden from the Croatian police officers. Alija Izetbegović
commented publicly about the Leutar assassination, stating:"
This was either done by our (Muslim Bosniac) fools or
by Croatian extremists." He also added that the assassins
of Kennedy, Palme, and Alda Mora had never been identified,
implying that this case would also never be solved. The
media complicated matters further, fueling speculation.
Anyone who got in the way of the influential politicians
was charged with something. Politics was apparently controlling
the investigation.
Soon thereafter, U.N. Mission Chief in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Jacques Klein, compromised himself by stating that he
had certain evidence and that the guilty parties would
soon be brought to justice. The tragedy was then used
for pre-election campaign purposes and a wave of indictments
was issued. After a superficial and disgraceful investigation,
Klein seemed to have lost much of his self-confidence.
In an interview on November 23, 2000, he said he had only
reported things which had been told to him by the Federal
Ministry of the Interior.84
On April 6, 2000, the Investigating Judge, Idriz Kamenica,
issued a indictment against six Croat suspects believed
to be implicated in Jozo Leutar's murder, Deputy Minister
of the Interior and HDZ (Croatian Democration Union) president
in the county of Sarajevo. According to the prosecution
theory, the suspects had committed the crime in order
to cause the collapse of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, thereby qualifying them as terrorists.85
The charges in the indictment are comparable to the propaganda
that was issued from the Serbian side after the Markale
market massacre in Sarajevo. They claimed at the time
that the Muslims had themselves committed the massacre
in order to shift blame to the Serbs. The entire indictment
was based on a statement made by a "protected witness",
who was said to be a vicious criminal and a former mental
patient. The trial is still continuing.
On November 21, 2001, during the 27th session, the defense
stated that Leutar had been killed by the same individuals
who had set the bombs during the Pope's visit and killed
Croats in Travnik.86
Terrorist
attacks on the USA
The
tragic events which occurred on September 11, 2001, in
the USA made a serious impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Feelings were divided, and statements given unanimously
condemned the attacks, though the attacks themselves were
analyzed in different ways. In any case, anyone who believed
he had political or social influence issued a statement.
The SFOR units in Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the most
sensitive position, as they were forced to carefully assess
their situation and determine whether or not they were
at war. The first week after the attacks on the US, a
veritable political chaos prevailed. Some claimed that
Western civilization was endangered by militant Islam,
and accused the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of
supporting terrorism; others defended Islam, claiming
that terrorism is in contradiction to Islam, for terrorism
has no religion, and quoting various passages from the
Ku'ran which prohibit the commission of evil acts. Others
pointed out that the true terrorists were Karadžić and
others like him. The politicians wanted simply to be on
the politically correct side in order to reap political
and personal gains.
Izetbegović then distanced himself from the mujahedeen,
stating that they had not invited "them", and
thereafter, SFOR commander General Sylvester said (October
12, 2001) that the mujahedeens posed no threat to Bosnia
and Herzegovina.87 Just a week after his statement, the
American and British embassies and consulates closed down.
A week after that, five foreigners ( mujahedeen) were
arrested in BH. The Head Secretary of NATO, George Robertson,
confirmed that at least one of those arrested had links
to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda.88 The Deputy Minister of
the Interior of the Federation of BH, Tomislav Limov,
released information that the Federal police had 17 suspects
linked to international terrorism under observation, and
also confirmed that between 1996 to the present day (30.10.2001),
approximately 1000 individuals from Arabic countries had
received Bosnian citizenship. He emphasizsed that problems
do exist in Bosnia, and that rumors about Bosnia being
a safe haven for terrorists were not, in fact, groundless.89
The new American ambassador Bond said on November 10,
2001, that it was not Bosnia as a whole that posed a terrorist
threat, but only certain individuals.90 The International
Crisis Group (ICG) then reported only two days later that
Bosnia and Herzegovina posed the only true threat of terrorism
in south-eastern Europe.91
Ivo Komšić, vice-president of SDP (Social Democratic Party),
the most powerful party in the governing coalition, said
they were informed by other party members of the executive
branch of government at a meeting of the party heads (November
3, 2001) that the battle against terrorism in Bosnia was
only in its initial stages. Komšić also added that he
had not known that Bosnia had been ranked among high-risk
countries.92
After successful operations in Afghanistan, the press
released information that a Bosnian passport and a notebook
in Bosnian with instructions on how to make explosive
devices had been found in a house in Kabul which had been
used by members of the Al Qaeda,93 This information was
confirmed shortly thereafter; however, not only one but
two passports were found, belonging to individuals, according
to the Prime Minister of the Federation of BH Alija Behmen,
whose citizenship had been revoked just a few days earlier.94
The federal Ministry of the Interior then revoked the
citizenship of 94 others who had come from Islamic countries
and had obtained citizenship illegally.95 Investigating
the illegal issuance of citizenship is difficult, as those
who enabled it still occupy high positions in the government
and are thus protected. The following case provides an
illustration: two police officers, Samir Rizvo and Mirsad
Žutić Beganović were proven to have participated in the
illegal issuance of BH citizenship to mujahedeen, yet
were promoted by the new federal government of BH. It
is especially indicative that Mirsad Žutić Beganović was
promoted to Secretary to the Minister in the Ministry
of the Interior, thus putting him in the position of invalidating
the citizenship decisions he himself had previously made.
What is even more interesting is the decision of French
general Vincent Courderoy, International Police Commissioner
of the UN (IPTF), to revoke on November 15, 2001, the
work permits of two police officers who had attempted
to murder Fikret Abdić, a former member of the Presidency
of BH, a former vice-president of the SDA ( Democratic
Action Party) in BH, and the former president of the autonomous
region of western Bosnia.
Abdić, who had once been Izetbegović's most influential
colleague, later became his most bitter adversary. Bihać
police officers, Derviš Demirović and Hajrudin Halilagić
had attempted to kill Abdić, who was in Rijeka in the
Republic of Croatia at that time. The Croatian police
arrested them with weapons and explosives and they were
charged with endangering the safety of citizens in the
Republic of Croatia by an act of terrorism and sentenced
to prison sentences of 18 months, which translates to
12 months in the Croatian judicial system.
After having served their sentences, they returned to
their jobs in the Bihać police department.96 This was
more than sufficient grounds for Abdić's party, the Democratic
People's Union of BH, to assert that the SDA was the organizer
of state terrorism. They also pointed out that the unsuccessful
assassination attempt was masterminded by Ejub Ikić, Chief
of AID ( the Bosnian Intelligence Agency) of BH and Sakib
Mahmuljin, the former commander of the third corps in
the BH army in which the El Mujahedeen force was incorporated.
The DNZ also announced that information had emerged in
Rijeka that two additional members of the terrorist group
were currently employed as professional soldiers in the
fifth corps of the BH army.
Three days prior to publication of the French general's
decision on the dismissal of the two police officers in
the media, the Sarajevo daily "Dnevni avaz"
almost shamefacedly carried a report from the Italian
newspaper "Corriere de la Sera" from November
11, 2001. Its article concerned the Bosnian government's
extradition to Egypt of Hasan Masud El Sharif Saad, who
was suspected of being implicated in the car bomb planted
in front of the Rijeka police station (Republic of Croatia)
in October 1995. According to American and European investigators,
Hasan Masud El Sharif Saad was one of Bin Laden's key
people in Europe. Based on an Interpol warrant, Hasan
Masud El Sharif Saad had been arrested with two other
countrymen and extradited to Egypt.97 One might have thought
at that point that the threat of terrorism in BH had been
repelled. Especially after a meeting of the heads of BH
with SFOR commander general Sylvester, during which it
was stated that there was no outright threat of terrorism,
at least not to SFOR troops.98 Yet only two days later,
the Director of the Federal Border Agency, Tomo Mihalj,
claimed to have information that a certain number of Al
Qaeda members had set out to central Europe through Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia to Bosnia and Herzegovina after being defeated
in Afghanistan.99
It is clearly difficult to fight international terrorism,
especially without a effective security system. It is
no surprise that after SFOR forces arrested a man in Kiseljak(central
Bosnia) in a spectacular operation with special forces
on November 30, 2001- under suspicion of trafficking in
radioactive material from which atomic bombs could be
constructed - they released him from prison three days
later. While searching the house, they succeeded in confiscating
ground paprika, among other things, but no bombs.100 These
and similar actions show that members of the International
Forces continue to be duped by local criminals and their
fabrications, partially due to their desire to prove themselves
and also due to fear.
How then can we define the Bosnian-Herzegovinan Muslim
position toward terrorism? After a war which they neither
initiated nor provoked, can we still designate them Europe's
"special" Muslims? " "Bosnian-style
Muslims", as Alija Izetbegović said in a statement
in the Institute for War and Peace Reporting's (WPR) last
edition?101 " Radicalism is alien to the Bosnian
spirit, and fundamentalist elements comprise only a small
minority", Izetbegović pointed out.102
Only a day after the statement had been released to the
BH media, Alija Izetbegović left on December 3, 2001,
by special charter flight to Dubai, the capital of the
United Arab Emirates. The plane had been specially sent
for him so that he could receive an award for " Islam
Personality of the Year". Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa Cerić
and the president of the SDA, Sulejman Tihić, travelled
with him.103
Izetbegović described his relationship with the Albanians
in his memoirs, several of which were with him in prison
in Foče. he wrote that they were quiet, secretive, and
much too serious. On one occasion, one of the Albanian
inmates, the leader of their group, requested to speak
to Izetbegović about their movement, to which Izetbegović
replied: "Albanians are Muslims and that is the main
reason we support your fight for freedom."104 Izetbegović
went on to say that Albanians had caused a lot of problems,
a view with which the leader of their delegation disagreed.
In his opinion, religion had played a negative role in
the history of the Albanian people and had benefitted
only the occupiers. Thus, religion was unnecessary for
their fight for freedom. He further asserted that only
Marxism and Leninism had brought progress to their people.
Izetbegović disagreed with him on this, and said that
they if that were the case, then they were the only nation
on earth that was able to survive without religion and
that he believed the majority of Albanians would disagree
with this statement. At that point, the two " delegations",
with their two political views, temporarily parted ways.105
That they had at least maintained some contact was evident
by the arrest of the KDZ department of the Ministry of
the Interior ( Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) Mirza
Jamaković for illegally exporting weapons to Kosovo. This
could have been regarded as simple smuggling, that is,
a criminal offence, up until December 21, 2001, until
the arrest of Bosniac Muslim general Hamid Bahto of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bahto had also served
as Assistant to the Minister of Defense for Intelligence
Affairs in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.106
What part did the Intelligence component of the Federal
army under Bosnian Muslim control play? Who or what stood
behind it? This can be explained by the example of a certain
judicial inquiry.
On invitation of the Israeli Minister of Defense, B. Ben
Elizer, the Defense Minister of the Federation, Mijo Anić,
traveled to Israel on December 10, 2001. The Federal Ministry
of Defense announced that Anić would be travelling with
the Deputy Assistant of Defense for the military industry,
Pero Džepina, and several directors of central Bosnian
companies which manufactured weapons and military gear.107
This trip provoked heated reaction from Bosniac politicians
and the general population. Alija Izetbegović, the honorary
president of the strongest Bosniac party, the SDA, posed
the following question at a press conference led by its
vice-president: "Is Anić selling weapons bought for
us ( Bosnia-Herzegovinian Muslims) by Islamic nations
to Israel?"108
Only a few days after this scandal, Defense Minister Mijo
Anić found himself in the limelight again, due to a statement
by Cerić's on Studio 99's television show "Interview
of the Day", December 19, 2001. Cerić complained
bitterly about the fact that on November 25, 2001, during
the celebration of Bosnia and Herzegovinan's Independence
Day celebration in the Military Federation Centre in Sarajevo,
pork was being served even though Muslims had begun Bajram
fasting.109
The tumultuous events of 2001 exhausted Izetbegović, and
by the end of December his state of health was very grave.
So at the invitation of the Saudi king Fahd, who sent
a plane for him, Izetbegović was transported to Rijadh
to receive any necessary medical attention. Eight days
later Izetbegović returned to Sarajevo.110
Authorities of the Federation reported on Friday, January
18, 2002, that in the early hours of the morning they
had surrendered six individuals of Algerian citizenship
to the government of the USA. These individuals had been
in custody since October 2001 under suspicion of having
links to individuals and organizations in the international
terrorist network.111 This extradition caused an uproar
among the Bosniac Muslim public, but this time the response
was well-organized, with demonstrators and the media present.
They also had political support and strong legal and human
rights arguments. Everything perfectly arranged. After
this, the term "Islamic groups" came into regular
use. Many public figures reacted to this with shock, and
it ultimately caused the collapse of the Helsinki Committee,
whose president Sr?an Dizdarević showed support for the
Algerians and thus lost non-Muslim members Todorović and
Kukić.112 Yet, even more important than these verbal disputes
were the events that occurred on the Sarajevo streets
on Friday, January 18, 2002. In a night of conflict between
demonstrators and police, the Islamic groups in Bosnia
demonstrated their clout, organizational skills, and will.113
These events inspired Zija Dizdarević of Sarajevo's "Oslobođenje"
to write the following: " Bosnia and Herzegovina
is confronted with a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. This
new Islamic youth movement is an idealogical and political
reality, but it remains to be seen whether it will be
an important factor in th future of Bosnia and Herzegovina."114
Once again, Izetbegović's statement of December 2001:
" Radicalism is foreign to the Bosnian spirit, and
elements of fundamentalism are only part of a small minority."
Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not come about
spontaneously; it did not arise from the Bosnian milieu
and it definitely is not part of Bosnian and Herzegovinan
mentality. It was imported into Bosnia and Herzegovina,
brought in during the Yugoslavia's existence, and its
presence continues even after the collapse of Yugoslavia.
Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not attributable
to any individual or group, but it part of the system
and therefore a political problem. These were the policies
of non-aligned Yugoslavia and later the project of Islamization
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The consequence of some of
these policies has been, in fact, terrorism. James Rubin,
the former State Department spokesperson, told Croatian
politicians that they could bear witness to what the Americans
had done for Muslims in Europe ( Bosnia and Herzegovina),
because it was a known fact that the American administration
at that time was considered pro-Muslim, though it seems
the Arabs have forgotten this.115
Not only have the Arabs forgetten, but so too the Bosnian-Herzegovinian
Muslims (Bosniacs). Everyone has forgotten but the Croats,
who were forced into a federation with the Muslims and
thus had to resolve the problem Europe could not - the
spread of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Islam is the
joining of religion with the state, as Dr. Abdullah Omer
Nasif, Secretary General of the World Islamic League Senior
Council wrote in the official journal of the Islamic Community
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.116
The fact that many Europeans fear Islam is understandable,
especially after the events of September 11, 2001. This
explains, for example, the denial of visas by France,
Holland, and Switzerland to Imams designated by the Islamic
community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize religious
activities among the Bosnian diaspora population during
the month of Ramadan.117
This fear was also referred to by the former Vice-Chancellor
of Austria, Erhard Busek, coordinator of the American
Initiative for south-eastern Europe (SECI) in an interview
on March 8, 2001.118 A major part of European political
policy toward the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was governed
by that same fear. "Why hasn't Bosnia and Herzegovina
become a Muslim state yet?" asks Enver Eaušević in
the Islamic Community weekly Rijaset of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
"Because", he says, "there is a shortage
of power and will needed to transform lethargy and general
hopelessness into action. To intensify the struggle for
a return to the basic values of Islam and to those individuals
who will preserve them for our children."119
The will is increasing, as well as the power supplied
by the Islamic centres which are appearing throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina and which are completely different
from mosques, even though they are located in their backyards.
|
|
 |
|
|
New York,
September 11, 2001.
|
|