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Conference on "Intelligence and the
Threat from International Terrorism"

Zagreb, Croatia, November 30 - December 01, 2001
Participants

Section I

The politics of the sociology of terrorism.
The use of intelligence and counter-intelligence by terrorist organizations

Tuđman:

Last year we discussed Intelligence at the beginning of the 21st Century. This year, we will be focussing on the events of September 11, and the consequences they will have for national and international security policy. This morning we will begin with a general framework of the issue. The floor is open.

Boyadjiev:

I would like to start with a short slide presentation. I recently spent a month in the States, and left New York late in the evening on September 10 with the last Lufthansa flight, just hours before the airport was closed. By chance I was taking pictures of the Twin Towers on September 10 from the other side of the Hudson river just before leaving around 5.00 pm. I was in the air when the tragedy occurred. I felt guilty to some extent that we, the professionals, had allowed such a thing to happen. I'm sure we'll discuss this later. I collected some unique slides from the Internet and would like to start our meeting with a visualization of the tragic events that have provided the incentive for meetings such as this all over the world (slides are shown).
Since September 11, the world has changed radically and it is not necessary to explain why. What can we now expect? International terrorism is on the move. Many assumptions are no longer valid. Many elements of national security doctrine seem obsolete now and need to be changed. We can expect an increase in left-wing, right-wing, religious, antiglobalist, minority, nationalistic, and other forms of radicalism, and new types of attacks. Before starting the discussion I would like to show you something else. It's called the "Handbook for the Dedicated Terrorist" and it is based on the way of thinking and ideology of the Basque terrorist organization, ETA, presented by one of its leaders, Ricardo Garcia. I took some points from it to provide an overview of their philosophy and operations. What do they consider their main weapons and means to perform terrorist acts and reach their goals? What do the terrorists believe in?
The first weapon, according to Ricardo Garcia, is motive, and he lists several rules: 1) Do not kill without motive; 2) your reasons for acting must be shared by others; 3) Be an honorable David against the Goliaths; 4) All rationales are valid; 5) Seek the support of reliable people; 6) Keep attacking until victory is achieved.
The second weapon is efficiency, and the rules are: 7) Perform the violence with the precision of brain surgery (the tragedy on September 11 was performed in this manner); 8) A dead dog doesn't bite; 9) fast, confident and cheerful; 10) Be mercurial and militant; 11) Prepare "the picture", the background; 12) Keep that "patriotic flame" or religious flame burning; 13) The people's cause always is a good cause; pretend to be fighting for a real cause; 14) Kill with your brain; 15) God is accepted for he punishes and forgives; 16) Throw the stone and hide the hand. 17) Plan the terrorism like seeds. 18) Cleverness and caution (it's foolish to put your head in the lion's mouth); 19) Discretion; and 21) When you hunt deer, don't settle for a hare.
The third weapon of the terrorists, according to Ricardo Garcia, is the moral weapon: 22) Who defines the morals?; 23) Let the circumstances be your shield; 24) Cover yourself in the cloak of "progress"; 25) The violence will never appear necessary unless it is committed; 26) A drop of oil leaves a bigger stain than a bucket of water; 27) In the name of peace; 28) To harvest you must also sow; 29) Little streams make great rivers; and last 30) Do not forget that the hangman can also be hanged.

Dedijer:

What is your source?

Boyadjiev:

These are quotations from the Philosophy of Ricardo Garcia, the chief ideologist of the Basque terrorist organization ETA.

Dedijer:

Who published it?

Boyadjiev:

Somebody found it in Spanish and translated it into Bulgarian, and I got it from him.

Kerr:

The only comment I'd have is that it seems to me ETA has violated all the fundamental principles you just laid out. They violated their own guidelines, because if you look where ETA is right now, it's lost any popular support. It has very little popular support.

Boyadjiev:

This was not written recently, but years ago.

Kerr:

They didn't follow their own creed very well.

Smith:

You're right that they did break all their rules. However, I think that the terrorists probably thought they were following their rules. We must remember that most people, but particularly fanatics, are able to convince themselves that what they are doing is right and consistent with their own rules. They set up rules and they believe they're following them.

Boyadjiev:

Since we will be talking about the politics and sociology of terrorism, I thought it would be interesting to share this.

Tuđman:

There is probably an explanation for that. Do you know what year it was published?

Boyadjiev:

I do not know exactly; probably about 10 years ago.

Tuđman:

That is exactly what I would like to discuss. The impact of terrorism on international security policy. Why is September 11 so significant? Because this is probably the first time terrorism became a global activity. Terrorists are attacking strategic targets using methods and techniques offered by the global market. That is why the character and nature of terrorist activities are changing; globalization is being utilized. Terrorism has become an international activity, because it is financed in one country, training takes place in another, and in a third, the operation is performed. So it is not just national anymore; international borders have been crossed. So now we have to find new answers for old problems, but in a completely new global context.
From that point of view, we can also evaluate international security policy, and contemporary security problems and international conflicts. The case of southeast Europe and the former Yugoslavia, for example. Even today, there is no clear understanding of the sources of the conflict. Why did it happen and what was the background? Without this understanding, there can be no proper diagnosis of the situation. The international community could not reach agreement on its objectives or on ways to resolve the crisis. How to manage the crisis does not mean how to resolve the crisis. The system of international security is not designed to resolve the problem. The same problem applies to military management. The military, in my experience during the last ten years, was advocating political solutions. But the most we can say is that some countries are supporting terrorism in one way or another and that terrorist activities today are adapting themselves to the global environment and using its resources. We see that terrorists do not care anymore about the consequences. The focus now is not on threatening somebody, but protecting ourselves and our interests. Another threat which has developed as the result of global terrorist activities is that today the lines are blurred between national, public, external, and internal security. That is important because services are divided along that principle. If we change this, the internal and external division among the services is in question. The intervention by NATO was rationalized according to Article 5, which talks not about attacks from another state or country, but about protection of NATO itself. Another point is that no country can fight terrorism alone. That means we need to interpret partnership in another way. I believe that the basic principle of international, bilateral, and multilateral relations today is the application of pressure. I don't believe that pressure should be a guiding principle because pressure, by definition, is legalized force applied by entity against another. Obviously there are overlapping and conflicting national interests, but how do we resolve this? Today the world order can be described somewhere between a multiple and monopolar system, because America is the biggest country wielding the greatest influence on the world order. The problem is that individual human rights are being transformed into universal human rights, and imposed upon all the other countries of the world. Many of these individual human rights are not suited to Europe, and other countries do not accept these definitions. If the approach is that certain principles or definitions are superior to all others and should be imposed on everyone else, then we have a problem. That leads to negative consequences. If we are talking about national security, intelligence, and threats of international terrorism, we have to think within a global framework. The world is at a turning point, but what kind of new world order can we expect? What do we want? The bipolar world disappeared during the 1990s. For decades now, the Security Council has represented only those countries who wield the most power and influence. Without a consensus between all the countries, our task will be impossible.

Dedijer:

On September 12, I wrote down three pages of notes, and posed three questions. What is terrorism? What causes it? How can we fight it? And I'm going to apply these three questions to the September 11 terrorist attack. It may just be an illusion but it seems to me there have never been so many people living in freedom in the world as there are today, so many people who have been freed from their chains. Terrorism comes from those who have not been freed. The little group says "I'm going to speak on behalf of my community. I want them to be free. I don't have tanks and I don't have planes. I don't have any weapons except terror. I'm going to use that." The interesting thing is that suddenly we have Putin and Russia joining the war against terrorism. I read in Le Monde a long article about two significant minorities in China who have announced a terrorist attack against the Chinese government. They want freedom from China, just as Chechnya wants freedom from Russia. And the ETA from Spain. The Irish have been fighting the English for 180 years. The United States' struggle for freedom began with a terrorist act and a bunch of people going to Boston and refusing to pay the British. We have to consider what causes terrorism and who are the people it engages.

Tuđman:

There is a problem with such an explanation. In the September 11 events, there was no political objective, and nobody knows who exactly is behind it. The group behind it is not asking for anyone to be freed and anything like that. They are just making threats. I think we can expect to see more terrorist activity using the resources of a globalized world to threaten vital world centers, and committed by a group of people who are simply dissatisfied with something; for example, how wealth is distributed in their country.

Kerr:

It seems to me that the terrorists involved in September 11 were fundamentally different, at least in terms of motivation, than terrorists in Ireland and other countries. I think you're right, Miro; I think that for the most part terrorism has had specific objectives: changes in government, independence, liberation, or ethnic separation. In some ways I think one can look at September 11 more historically as anarchism aimed at destruction. Like the anarchists of the late 1800's and the early 1900's, those involved in the September 11 event were not trying to change the government to something else. They were trying to destroy government. They were trying to destroy a global order they felt was for a variety of reasons evil, but their goal was not to overthrow the government. They were trying to cause instability and panic.

Lange:

I would like to comment. We have to distinguish between classical terrorism and new terrorism. Classical terrorism aims at destabilizing a specific system by attacking its representatives. In many ways, classical terrorism has tried to go for hard targets. Of course there is always collateral damage, but this is not the intention. Now we are seeing something completely new. Concerning September 1l , there is no visible system which was destabilized by this action. I think at this stage we know much less than we believe we know. Of course, we know the people involved had a link to Islam. But I doubt that the people sitting on the planes were the ones who planned the operation. I also do not believe that Mr. Bin Laden was coordinating each phase from faraway Afghanistan. There is more behind it. Just for the sake of terminology, I think we should distinguish between classical terrorism and new terrorism, even though we do not really know yet what new terrorism is. But the ETA, IRA, and Red Brigades were something else.

Tuđman:

In a globalized world, it's difficult to identify the leader or organizer of the action. Everybody uses Internet, but who's in control of the Internet. Who are the users? It is difficult to locate and identify them. That is one of the main problems with the new terrorism.

Lange:

Just one additional remark. I feel it is important to differentiate between soft and hard targets when it comes to fighting new terrorism. In the case of classical terrorism, you knew vaguely what the targets would be; now you don't know. This has consequences for the struggle against new terrorism. We will have to make radical changes in organization and personnel. This is a precondition for success. Changes will have to be more radical than we think.

Lučić:

Classical terrorism has the aim of waging war against a certain state or authority. New age terrorism, meaning Islamic terrorism, is attempting to halt the process of globalisation. That is the crucial difference between the two.
Dedijer: Conflicts among civilizations cannot motivate twenty people to sacrifice their lives, sit in a plane, and hit targets. This idea of somebody overthrowing western civilization is nonsense. You can't overthrow a civilization. But this is a concrete case of a terrorist act with a political background.

Ćosić:

After September 11, I gave an interview to a Croatian newspaper here in Zagreb. The objective was to discuss and identify some unexpected technical and technological changes in the world of terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century. In the interview, I introduced terms like smart terrorists, well-educated terrorists, high-tech terrorism, etc. I was surprised later when I saw that the terrorism we witnessed on September 11 was committed by well trained, well-educated and extremely well- organized terrorist cells. The complexity and quality of their training, recruiting methods, coordination and synchronization, low profile preparation, communication and action, autonomy in target selections, and team leadership were amazing. What contributed most to their success was the fact that they were unknown for a long period to the majority of intelligence organizations. The training technology they had at their disposal was really high-tech in comparison with classical terrorism training methods; for example, flight simulators to practice various flight missions without any government surveillance and so on. So they had the infrastructure necessary to generate the skills they needed to successfully execute the terrorism missions, including financial support, civilian communication, infrastructure, and Internet. We know know we were mistaken about the infrastructure the terrorists have at their disposal. The main threat now, in the age of information, is the abuse of modern technologies for purposes of terrorism.

Ferš:

I would like to return to three questions we posed earlier. What is terrorism, what caused it, and how do terrorists operate? We agree that the world has changed during the last year, but that terrorism is nothing new. When I prepared my remarks for this conference I tried to formulate a concrete definition for terrorism. I must admit that I failed. In the past we had a different definition, but as the world changed, the definition changed. We knew how to define it in 1933 in the League of Nations. Crime and terrorism were at that time synonymous. Then later, in 1983, the United States US Code, Section 2625 L (d) came up with a different definition. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation has yet another definition. But I think that after September 11, the European Commission and the Security Council have devised a good definition for international terrorism as a new phenomenon, and have separated this type of international terrorism from other extreme acts of the past. I think there is a difference between so-called national terrorism and extremism. What we have now is not terrorism, but extremism. Why has this type of international terrorism appeared now? Some say the people who aren't free or don't feel free are the ones who commit this terrorism. Maybe this is accurate; they are imprisoned in their minds. Yesterday we spoke about this, and I think we came up with a good explanation. Most of the world is uneducated, but many have money. Without money there can be no terrorism. Everything is an expense. But what is important is that they are unable to participate in world politics. They are segregated in one part of the world and have no opportunity to create policy.

Wolf:

I fully agree with the way Stevan and the last speaker from Slovenia, Mr. Ferš, analyzed the problem. No question, the well-organized, terrible terrorist attacks of September 11th opened a new page in the history of terrorism and raised new questions about how to combat it. But I don't agree that it's a totally new situation in terms of terrorism, and I think we should discuss a revamped strategy for the intelligence services which addresses the new aspects of international terrorism. There have been numerous examples of terrorism in the 20th century, but since the 1970s, it has become a central focus for intelligence services in the East and West, who have the task of reconnaissance, infiltration and, if possible, paralyzing the opponent. If a division were made between classic terrorism and a totally new terrorism, it would be difficult to formulate a strategy. In the past, there was a big difference in the approaches used by the socialist and Western countries. What did they consider terrorism? Their views were different. In socialist countries, top priority was given to hijack attempts by people trying to flee those countries. But there were also terrorist occupations of embassies and attacks against people or objects. From the point of view of western countries, particularly the United States, every national movement in Africa or PLO was regarded as a terrorist organization, Yassir Arafat was the head of terrorism, and so on. There were national aspects; for example, the IRA or ETA, but there were also international aspects, and communication existed between the different terrorist entities. Now of course we have to consider the Muslims, Bin Laden, and his kind of organization, but if we limit our attention to them, I think it will be difficult to find a real strategy.
The first reactions of the American people, the American administration, and the American president after the terrible attacks in New York and Washington are understandable. But after the declaration of war and the implementation of military measures, reactions have changed. Of course it is a political question, and the politicians must decide if it is possible to combat international terrorism with war and consider the consequences. President Bush's declared war aims were very vague, and lacked a clear definition of goals and a strategy for the intelligence services.
We will discuss today and tomorrow methods and problems of cooperation, but the aims must be declared clearly. Now there is confusion among the politicians as to whether Iraq is a war aim or not, whether Iraq is involved in the terrorist activities, and in Bin Laden's terrorist organization or other organizations of this kind. This is a difficult question which requires an answer, and the services must inform the politicians so that they have a clear picture. Only if the aims are clearly defined can a strategy be formulated by the services to combat international terorrism. We need at least an abstract division in order to analyze the new problems and utilize the existing information. Who decides where the centers of international terrorism are? What countries support international terrorism? Should only one government have the power to declare which countries are terrorist? This is a difficult problem. The main goal is to find a strategy that provides a clear analysis of the situation. But international terrorism cannot be defeated over a short time period by war. We will be confronted with international terrorism the rest of our lives.

Kerr:

I tend to agree with this question of definition. First of all the definition of terrorism depends where you sit. From an American perspective, I can tell you September 11 is quite different. This is the first major attack inside the United States. People around this table have had that experience, but it is new to the US. The attacks on the US embassies in Africa, the barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole involved US personnel overseas. That is seen as an acceptable risk when you send your military forces and civilian representatives abroad. But when it happens in the United States it changes everything for us. Calling it a war is a way to mobilize the country to a full effort. Unfortunately, the term war is not a good one because you win or lose wars. We're not going to lose this war, I'll tell you. I'm not sure how you win it precisely, but we're not going to lose it. But from an American perspective it would be a mistake for you not to think of it as a war. It is seen that way and that means that when the president says you're either with us or you're for them, he means it and so do the American people.

Dedijer:

This is the first attack on the United States since 1814, when the great-grandfather of a friend of mine, Scott Gerald Cockburn, burned down the White House. Since then, the United States had not been attacked until September 11th. We understand the psychological reaction. There are two reactions. One is from the gut. I am going to kill him! That's one reaction. The other is a policy reaction, a US change of policy, and I will discuss this later.

Boyadjiev:

I want to react to what Dick Kerr said. Emotionally speaking, yes, it is a war. It is a war for the American people. Politically speaking and internationally speaking, it's a reaction against terrorism. It has its political and economic component, and there is cooperation between police and intelligence services, with war as the military reaction. I put war in last place as a reaction against terrorism. We still do not have a uniformly accepted definition of terrorism. I believe a double standard regarding terrorism still exists and that's not only when we talk about the past, but also the present. One of the things that we have to agree upon during the first, political stage of cooperation is to accept a common definition for international terrorism. I know it's difficult, but without one, it will be impossible to fight the common enemy, terrorism, as a joint entity. And several more things. Drago Ferš mentioned that terrorism needs money. Here I want to suggest another topic for discussion. Terrorism not only needs money, terrorism makes money, a lot of dirty money. I'll give an example and I dare anyone to say that I am wrong. For the month before September 11, banking analyses in the States showed that options to buy shares in United Airlines, American Airlines, and some insurance companies ranged somewhere about 240 - 270 per day. On the September 10, there were 2800 options to buy shares of those companies during the upcoming week. For me, that is an indication that not only Bin Laden but many other parties knew that the shares of the airline and insurance companies would fall. So terrorism for me has a financial side: making money. A large part of it will finance further terrorism, but another part of it makes dirty profits, and it ought to be punished.

Međimorec:

Every one of us fully supports the United States in the war against terrorism; there is no doubt that we all oppose terrorism. But if I may say - there are two different perceptions of terrorism: that of the USA and that of many other countries which are willing to fight terrorism, but also want to investigate the sources of its growth and expansion. Are the roots in the economic gap between the rich and poor, cultural and religious differences, poverty, or political inconsistencies? Different civilizations? When we try to identify the sources and nature of terrorism, we are, metaphorically speaking, passing through a murky forest where we'll be confronted by all sorts of hobgoblins. There are many obstacles to reaching a clear understanding of the terrorism phenomena. In the Croatian media, terrorism has been analyzed from a philosophical, sociological, religious, and historical point of view - it has been given a political perspective. Huntington and Fukuyama are often quoted. We are eager to understand the causes of terrorism. There was some of it during the national liberation processes of nations during the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Terrorism, disguised as humanitarian aid and aid to resist communism and Serbian hegemony, appeared in Croatia in 1992 at the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the disintegration of Yugoslavia progressed, it moved to Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and even to southern Serbia. Terrorism has shown another face - that of the national liberation movements both in Kosovo and Macedonia. Terrorists, with foreign financial aid, have misused and compromised a just cause: Albanian national liberation from the harsh rule of Serbia. Should we call all Albanians terrorists if the majority of the Albanian population opposes terrorism and its methods? It is not simple and clear. Terrorism can have a "legal face" as well. It can present itself in a humanitarian and social role, using cultural and religious methods of operation. Though many terrorist methods are already known, it is distinguish villains from true humanitarian or social workers. We must take all these elements into consideration when analyzing and trying to understand terrorism. It can be the driving force behind actions of enslaved, impoverished, humiliated, and desperate people. Terrorism can be committed in the name of ideas like Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations", and can collect or even steal money for revolutionary purposes. It can also be backed by extreme political ideas. We should talk about all these disguises terrorism utilizes because this will help us uncover its true nature. And it is not a simple task.

Smith:

There are different kinds of terrorist outbreaks. In this case I think the Bin Laden terrorist attacks are in some ways similar to the outbreaks of violence in the Middle Ages in Europe and Asia, wherein peasants rebelled in a most destructive way but lacked a program; they were just rebelling against a situation they considered intolerable. They attacked whatever power structure existed because that power structure was not treating them well or because it was the only thing to attack. Inevitably the rebellion was crushed and the movement died. There are some similarites between the medieval revolts and the Bin Laden attacks [both are fighting against things they don't understand] but there are also great differences. And the Bin Laden problem will not disappear quickly. It is a major problem; it will go on for a long time and our children will probably also have to deal with it. Whether we like it or not, it is a kind of clash between civilizations. But by a combination of firmness, often involving military force, [and good international cooperation] and understanding of cultural differences, we will prevail. As always in such cases it is important to understand the motivation of the terrorists so that the appropriate strategy can be devised.
I would like to make another point. Bush's declaration of war was both necessary politically [to mobilize America first and then the world] and morally correct. Americans were terribly mad; if Bush had not acted as he did the country's morale would have been destroyed. The question of Iraq is a separate question but Iraq is certainly part of the terrorist problem. In all likelihood, Iraq was responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center. Saddam's Iraq is known to support and train terrorists and to have used them extensively for their own purposes. Saddam tried to blow up Bush's father in 1992 when Bush visited Kuwait. Saddam is unquestionably a user and supporter of terrorism and is also directing an extensive program to develop weapons of mass destruction. I think that we would be irresponsible if we allow Saddam to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and support terrorism. If we did, the result would be an attack even more destructive than that on the World Trade Center. We knew that Bin Laden was planning something, we knew he was a terrorist leader, we knew he had a worldwide link and a worldwide organization. Unfortunately it took this massive attack to mobilize the Americans to do something about it. I think once mobilized there will be a movement led by America to destroy terrorist capabilities around the world, including that of terrorist states. Iraq is a brutal dictatorship. If we don't do something about them, they may well attack the United States suddenly and without warning, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, only much worse. To summarize, as the leader of the United States, Bush was absolutely right to react the way he did. In marked contrast to the way his predecessor handled Bin Laden attacks, Bush has been thoughtful, effective and relentless. He devised a strategy and then acted. He did not merely shoot missiles the next day and then ignore the problem.

Tuđman:

The focus should be to keep the nation together and create political support for actions aimed at protecting national interests and values. But will the same principles be used to evaluate how other nations react in a similar situation? That is international security policy's main problem. Today every government in the world is reacting against terrorism on a political or professional level. But I would like to stress once again a need for vision in international security policy. And that vision can be developed and accepted only if all principles are equally valid for everyone.

Smith:

Those terms are very hard to come by.

Tuđman:

Of course.

Kerr:

But I would disagree with you in a sense. I think you underestimate the implications of September 11 for larger US policy, even beyond terrorism. What that brought to the front is that we waited until we were attacked and then responded. I think you will find the United States is going to be much more proactive in dealing with future threats, whether they are nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The US is not going to wait until it is attacked to respond. It is going to be very aggressive and identify direct threats beyond terrorism in the area of weapons of mass destruction and so on. In information warfare against the United States we are also going to be more aggressive. So if you think we're going to be passive in the future about actions like this, I think you're mistaken.

Tuđman:

My comment was more an observation on some prior events, not on that one. But if the United States is going to act alone, then September 11 will be interpreted as a threat against only the United States. In that case, we would have one type of international security system. If a system of international security is organized to protect most or all other countries, then the system will be different. That is the dilemma we are faced with.

Kerr:

I think we will act alone; we would prefer to act in concert but if not, we will act alone. I think it is of sufficient urgency and importance. We would prefer the former, but we will do the latter.

Dedijer:

This morning President Bush stated that Iraq is almost an enemy.

Kerr:

It's not almost, it is.

Dedijer:

Tony Blair said "no, let's finish Afghanistan first. Let's forget Iraq." Chirac just shrugged his shoulders. So if the United States wants to go alone, what can we do about it.

Lučić:

Blair said that yesterday, but he changed his mind today. There is a problem in defining terrorism. Different agencies have different definitions. United States DOD, State Department, and FBI all have different definitions because they stand on different ground. Here we also have different views, because we are looking at the problem from different points of view: the European, the small countries, and the US.
I can give you an interesting example - a car bomb explosion in Mostar, BiH in 1997 that went off and destroyed 94 apartments, 96 cars, 13 businesses, shops and stores, wounded 3 people seriously and approximately 40 lightly. Police conducted an investigation and arrested a Saudi, Ahmad Zuhair. Zuhair went to trial but the court didn't even consider charging him with terrorism, because in Bosnia and Herzegovina you can only be charged with terrorism if you deemed to be working against Bosnia and Herzegovina interests. Zuhair was a Mujahedeen in the 3rd Corps of Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; he came to BiH to fight for BiH; therefore it was ruled he could not be considered its enemy! That was the position Zuhair's attorney argued and the Court accepted it. Zuhair was found guilty not of terrorism but of disturbing public order and possessing illegal substances. Bosnia and Herzegovina's law still states that it is a crime to act against a foreign state, international organization, or liberation movement! This article is the same as in ex-Yugoslavia, which cooperated closely with a number of so-called, liberation movements.
This is a completely different point of view than that of the US or Europe.

Kerr:

I believe international law considers terrorism to be indiscriminate attacks on civilians without a military objective. Attacks on military or government facilities during a war are not considered terrorism.

Kerr:

Over the past eight years, there have been several major terrorist attacks on US facilities. In Africa, the Embassies, the Saudi barracks, and the USS Cole.The US approach to those problems has been fundamentally legalistic. It has chosen to pursue the terrorist using the FBI and legal means to bring terrorists to the courts. It did at one point send some missiles into Afghanistan in a token response, but its real response has been in the courts. As a result of the court action, there has been an extraordinary amount of information published in the press, particularly during the trial of the people in New York following the first bombing of the New York Trade Center. Nearly all the information on how we identify the terrorists, how they were tracked, how they were followed through cell phones, computers, and money transfers was revealed. They were tracked after the fact, of course, but we talked about how law enforcement began to study the techniques they use to get into the United States. How they got through immigration, how they used their passports, how they moved money, how they communicated, how they planned; all of this was laid out in great detail in the courts. It was also done in later investigations, so whoever wants a blueprint on how we track and found the terrorists has a great one here. Even the dumbest of us could figure out how to avoid intelligence surveillance, and these terrorists are not dumb. I don't think they are geniuses, but they are smart, worldly, and clever enough to understand how to use our collection techniques against us, how to avoid being tracked, and how to avoid being caught. We not only told them how to get into the country undetected, we also told them what things we could not do well and things that we wished we would have done. In typical American fashion we gave them all the information they needed to avoid us. They also understood better then we the disconnect between foreign and domestic intelligence. It was easy to operate in the United States, to build an infrastructure, and to operate relatively free without detection from the authorities. The Iranians had quite a comprehensive infrastructure in the 1980s throughout the United States. Nearly every nationality is represented; there are close ties between major populations of foreign born groups, so almost every country has a infrastructure in which they can operate. Before 1990, people didn't understand how easy it was to operate in the United States. Foreigners believed we were far better at domestic surveillance monitoring than we were. We looked better than we really were. You could do a lot of things below our level of surveillance in the United States. I think they realized after the bombings in Africa, Saudi Arabia, and USS Cole that it was a very porous society. It was easy to get in and out, and our system for passports and immigration was fairly shoddy.The various organizations like the Nationalization Service and Customs do not communicate with each other. Foreign intelligence, despite its shortcomings, and certainly major shortcomings prior to 11 September 11 , had information that the US was targeted and that there was a real potential for attack inside the country. Fundamentally, civilian organizations lack the culture of intelligence organizations; they don't know how to organize analysis, they don't know how to disseminate information to each other or pass information across organizational lines and cooperate on operational activities. They have a long way to go, and I think it's problematic just how effective it's going to be. Not only because of the level of difficulty, but because those who feel strongly about social rights, human rights, and legal freedom in the United States are going to be very concerned about an internal police force. The United States citizens have always opposed a national police connecting everybody. They like it the way it is now with just cities, counties, and states acting independently. Most of these organizations lack experience in information processing.

Boyadjiev:

After your brilliant introduction, Dick, I would say that we had read each other's minds if I believed in extra-sensory perception. But we are thinking on the same wave length, because I wanted to summarize everything you said into a few sentences myself.
One thing that was clearly demonstrated on September 11 was the fact that the terrorists took full advantage of all the achievements of democracy - mobile phones, credit cards, technologies, and information. They did not need a special intelligence structure to get the information you mentioned. They took it from newspapers, Internet and so on. The terrorists have at their disposal all or most of the information they need to plan acts which result in such devastation. You raised another question I was going to raise as a discussion topic: the boundary between rights on one side and regulations and limitations on the other. Since we are living in a new and changed world, a new balance between liberties and human rights, and regulations and limitations must be achieved. We cannot afford to make available information that can be used for evil purposes. It's a matter of discussion, but I am afraid that's one of the big problems humanity, civilization, and democracy are going to face. I recall something that Mark Twain wrote many years ago: "The American people have many rights, plus the wisdom not to use all of them". It's probably time now to figure out how to best use these rights and liberties. The way this issue is addressed in the United States will influence the entire civilized world. It will produce a lot of negative reaction but we must find a balance.
My contribution to the discussion we are going to start now is based on a specific case in which I was heavily involved in late 1990- early 1991 prior to the Desert Storm operation in Iraq. At that time, I was Executive Secretary (deputy minister) in the Ministry of the Interior. Bulgarian Intelligence got a signal that an international terrorist group was preparing a rocket attack on a certain foreign embassy in Sofia. The international terrorist group had been operating outside of Bulgaria and in Sofia, and consisted of a Japanese member of the Japanese Red Army, a Philippine from a Philippine terrorist organization, a Palestinian Arab, and money coming from Colombia, South America. It was an entirely new pattern of terrorism with an indication of international backing from Saddam Hussein. After picking up that signal, our service exchanged it with partner services. The result was true international cooperation between representatives of several foreign services. The terrorist operation did not transpire that time, but it illustrated several things. First of all, it demonstrated a new form of terrorist internationalism. A wide variety of different groups, with different aims, combined to perform an operation against the United States on Bulgarian soil. Financing was coming from new, unexpected sources. Many of the mechanisms of the planned operation were not discovered, but it still showed that international terrorism was on the move. I do not make a parallel here between this and what happened on September 11th. But one of the conclusions I would like to draw is that we cannot oppose international terrorism if we do not internationalize our efforts to fight it. New forms of cooperation are needed. For many years I characterized what was needed by using a variation of the old-new "slogan": "Spies of the world, unite!" I say this because I disagree with the opposing view: "If you're not with us,we'll do it alone." One entity cannot fight everything and everybody around the world. We need to cooperate. So it is better to look for new ways to cooperate.
I will go back to the operation I was talking about to cover one more aspect. How did the terrorists get their information? It turned out that they didn't need a lot of intelligence and counterintelligence. They just needed a corrupt customs officer at the border to import the weapons, bring the rocket and launchers, and prepare the operation. It was not that difficult to engage a co-conspirator in Bulgaria to rent an apartment with a direct line of vision to the Embassy. Sophisticated intelligence or connections in the Bulgarian or Foreign Intelligence services were not needed. The terrorist organization once again took full advantage of the liberties within democratic societies. Using public information, they can predict repercussions, learn how to avoid them, and operate on another plane.
I suspect at one point that someone played a bad joke on the CIA. Director George Tenet once said that the CIA's classic mission is to separate fact from fiction. I suspect there was some information coming through the information channels which was probably considered too far-fetched and, instead of continuing through the channels, was blocked somewhere in the middle.

Kerr:

I think there was generalized information about the threat. It was not specific information. It is quite clear that all the pieces were not put together as well as they should have been, both by foreign intelligence and certainly by the FBI and the people inside. I don't think it was a question of it not going forward, I think it was a question of less than complete analysis and more fragmentary information. In hindsight, a lot of things were seen that made sense. Hindsight's a marvelous thing. Sometimes things that seemed disconnected before look different and fit together perfectly after the fact. So it looks a lot better in hindsight than it did at first. I think your description is a very complete one in terms of the nature of the terrorist ability to use our information against us. Then it kind of goes back to the point that was made earlier on technology. You don't want to think of them as masterminds, because they were using technology that was available to everybody. They just used it rather cleverly.

Dedijer:

I have a question of Mssrs. Kerr and Smith. What was the reaction of your intelligence colleagues on September 11th? How did they react? Were they surprised? A little more difficult question is: how is the United States intelligence community going to change? Now, what you said about internal security sounds like something President Truman said when establishing the CIA. It's easy for the Communist countries. They can control everything, stop everything, say anything, provide no information, and so on. Now is that the way you want to go? What was your reaction to the event and how is the community going to change, in your personal opinion?

Smith:

My reaction was anger because I thought we had not done a good job collecting intelligence, and I think the answer is, we don't have to reorganize, what we have to do is get better. We have to stop doing some of things that we were doing, like social things and making sure that everyone gets promoted, all sexes and all races and that sort of stuff. What we have to do is return to being very good human intelligence officers. We have to make a greater effort to get sources because what you need in intelligence service is sources and I don't think have enough sources. That's what we have to do.

Kerr:

I was going to answer his question. I would agree, but would say my first reaction was that it was a disaster because intelligence did not accomplish its fundamental mission. I also believe that law enforcement, policy people, and many others bear responsibility. But intelligence is the first line of defense and it failed to do what it is supposed to do. The reason it was less effective is scale. The size of the CIA and the cost of operations against terrorism were small scale. The intelligence effort by analysts and overseas operations conducted against terrorism is far less than the cost of a single US carrier. Put into the context of US Defense activity and US defense spending, intelligence is cheap. If you're going to do the kinds of things that Doug is talking about, you need to put much more effort into it, you need more expertise and human intelligence, and you need more sophisticated counterintelligence and analysis. We've been unwilling meet the costs.

Ćosić:

How can we improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community? I am definitely not an expert, but in papers I wrote a couple of years ago about integrated strategic approaches to regional conflict management, I presented ideas that could be useful as early warning tools in the war against terrorism. New analytical tools and methods can help predict potential terrorist attacks. The problems are complex so a new creative use of the methods and tools is needed. The scientific community and decision makers have to be more involved. And better education and training is the best preparation for preventing and eliminating terrorism. Integration and coordination of information, analytical processing of information, and decision-making must be improved as well. This means closer cooperation between agents in charge of collecting information and analysts responsible for processing of information with decision makers. The design and development of systems with built-in data could also be effective in the war against terrorism. And finally, decision makers are often political appointees who have different views, personal interests, and preferences, but cooperation between these key players is necessary to improve the quality of the intelligence community.

Tuđman:

I would like to comment on two things. The first concerns the reaction of the American government. We can understand the reaction by the use of two criteria. There is still a need to make a distinction between defense and security. Defense is something that is primarily the obligation of the country itself. Each country does everything possible to defend itself, but security is a question of partnership and cooperation. So there are two different levels, and how to balance and combine those two approaches is dependent on the skills of the politicians. The second thing is, I believe that terrorist groups do need intelligence and counterintelligence. If we agree that terrorist activities have changed and are now oriented toward strategic targets, then they need intelligence, need to know how to recognize the target, and approach and destroy it. So it is reasonable to expect they will develop certain types of intelligence. For example, a possible target for a large number of dissatisfied people could be international or national data banks (governmental, military, financial, scientific, cultural, etc.). What then? There would not necessarily be physical destruction and killing of people, but data banks and such would be destroyed. It's also reasonable to expect that terrorist groups will develop counterintelligence, because certain security measures must be undertaken now by a number of countries; for example, controlling the Internet. And we learned that even the September 11 terrorists were using the Internet. That means protection of communications, but also counterintelligence protection.

Boyadjiev:

Before giving the floor to our colleague, Markus Wolf, I would like to make a short comment. I agree with Miro. What I meant was that thus far terrorists have obtained much of the information needed to achieve their purposes "for free". In the future, we're going to face more and more terrorist intelligence and counterintelligence. If they are really Enemy Number One now, everybody will be trying to get agents into their circles. So they will develop more counterintelligence. With limitations on the dissemination of information, they will need more intelligence. I'll mention just one of the hypotheses advanced in the newspapers. It was claimed that for September 11, the terrorists obtained information from a Japanese construction company about where and how to hit the twin towers in New York to cause the greatest damage and the collapse of the structures.

Tuđman:

There was a movie on the bombing of the twin towers made in the 1990s. They said only an airplane of that size and type could damage the towers.

Boyadjiev:

So once again they didn't need intelligence to get answers they needed for their plan.

Wolf:

Only one short comment on communications. The flawlessness of the acts of September 11 showed that there had to be a lot of communication. I don't know what type; I only know what has been published. But it is a fact that the enormous surveillance possibilities of the United States, including the NSA, did not prevent these events. I was thinking about it and remembered the rules of conspiracy we were taught during the struggle of every revolutionary organization. But those rules are archaic now. In a conspirative organization, every man knows only what he needs to know, and knows not more than two other persons involved. Of course we talked about the use of modern methods of communication by terrorists, and they certainly use them; but in the organization of Bin Laden and another similar organizations, the old rules of conspiracy play a major role, and if Bin Laden or someone like him was devising a plan from his cave in Afghanistan or somewhere else, he would not use mobile phones or other gadgets. He would be aware of the abilities of the NSA and similar agencies. Perhaps he would send a courier on horseback. I think to prevent these terror attacks, human intelligence is needed most of all. You can only protect yourself and discover the plans if you have an agent inside this conspiracy.

Kerr:

I think you're right. It goes back to this question of separation of intelligence, foreign intelligence from domestic intelligence. NSA cannot collect communications against US citizens in the United States. It is a foreign intelligence collection organization, so it has serious limitations. I think it is unlikely that the United States is going to be able to control information. The information is out there in so much detail and volume that there is no way to limit it. The only point I'll make to Professor Ćosić is that technology to assist the analysts in interpreting information is valuable. In the September 11 attacks the terrorists were quite effective in denying us information and staying below our threshold.

Boyadjiev:

You are saying that you can't limit information. But the world organized to find means to limit pedophile information on the Internet. Why not to find a way to limit information about how to construct, let's say, binary weapons. I know a website on the Internet where one can find a terrorist handbook much better than the Afghan "Encyclopedia" on terrorism. You can find a lot of "recipes" for biological weapons, chemical weapons, buying and selling weapons, and so on. That's not limitation of the freedom of information. That is limitation of the abilities of terrorist groups in the world to find recipes on the Internet to enable them to kill Americans or Europeans or somebody else.

Ćosić:

Yes, there is clearly a lot of information out there. The problem is very simple. We didn't recognize the information. We have to have techniques capable of extracting knowledge from this information, because if you have billions of pieces of information, there is no result without proper processing. It can only cause confusion. But analytical experts will be able to extract the information and prepare suggestions for the decision makers.

Lange:

We must not be under the illusion that we can eradicate all this sort of information from the Internet because then you have to burn your books, and prohibit people from studying certain things, and where does it all end? On the intelligence-counterintelligence end, I would be interested in your opinion on whether the September 11 was a group operating autonomously. Was it guided by another organization, is there another movement behind it? If there is a State involved, then we would use one type of intelligence-counterintelligence, and for a professional group, we would use another. We also can't rule out the commercial aspect. Commercial terrorism might develop further. But was it just a group on its own looking for an organization, which got together and did the action? I don't believe that, quite frankly. I would be very much interested in your opinion because what sort of intelligence- counterintelligence we will have in the future depends on it.

Kerr:

There are grievances against the US. In the case of September 11 , it may have been a grievance against the developed world and globalization, and the United States is the foremost representative of that group. So it is a logical target if you have that set of grievances. It seems to me that it grew from the period following the Afghan war with people who were trained in Afghanistan primarily to fight against the Russians following the invasion in 1979, people who came to the assistance of the Afghans and made connections which continued when they returned to their home countires. But I think it goes back to Markus's point that these are small groups operating semi- independently, but with connections to the center. They committed an independent action, but were part of a greater plan. When you dissect it, it isn't that sophisticated a plan, it didn't involve that many people, it didn't cost that much money, but it required a single objective and coordination of a lot of different people. When you look at the actual things that had to be done and the number of people involved, if there were more than 150 people involved, I would be surprised. If there were more than a couple of million dollars involved, I would be surprised.

Tuđman:

There was an analysis in the New York Times, according to which the schooling and training of those pilots cost no more than 200-300,000 dollars.

Kerr:

No, but you need other money; you have to rent places, you have to rent cars, you have to live, you have to pay people to help you. And there's also infrastructure. It is not millions and millions of dollars.

Lange:

I'm just trying to figure out how the recruitment was done. How did the group constitute itself? How was the coordination organized?
And the guys from Hamburg. There's one thing that still raises some questions. What about this strange visit by Atta to Prague and their alleged meeting? Maybe it was nothing.

Kerr:

I haven't had direct experience in this event, but I have considerable experience in figuring out who was involved in the bombing of the Pan Am aircraft. I followed the analysis of how we tracked that problem and it's a very complex set of connections. Not unlike the connections in the Bin Laden group. When we first started, our first reaction was that we were led down a path initially to the wrong group of people. It wasn't that they were innocent people, because they were also planning attacks against aircraft, it's just that they didn't plan the attack against this aircraft. So as we followed these people, we eventually came to a dead end. We then got on the track of the Libyans, primarily thanks to an agent. But a connection between those cells is not unlikely. These are people who knew each other or who had family connections or political connections. It resembled a network that you would draw from friends and acquaintances around the world. I think the Bin Laden network is very much like that.

Smith:

A great many contacts and connections were made in Afghanistan during and after the war. These people had known each other, and had assembled to fight the infidel, in this case the Russians, and after that war some of them stayed there. The war gave them a chance to establish connections, people from the Islamic Jihad, Egyptian terrorist groups, and so on. Terrorist groups and Islamic terrorist groups came and got to know each other, and then we were surprised to discover that the Islamic Jihad had branches in about 30 countries around the world. We discovered this in the mid 1990s. It was all the result of the friendships, acquaintances, and connections they made as a result of the Afghanistan fighting. This is the result. Bin Laden went there, raised money, got interested in fighting, and then turned very anti-American during the Gulf War when we moved troops into Saudi Arabia. His first aim was to overthrow his own government because the Saudi government had permitted US troops to be stationed on sacred Saudi soil. It's relatively easy for Bin Laden and other terrorist leaders to recruit among the Muslims who had fought in Afghanistan, and that's what they did. The result was that a large terrorist network was established. It would simplify things if it develops that Iraq was involved in the attack on the World Trade Center, but I'm not sure it is. The meeting that the terrorist Atta had in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence officer doesn't necessarily mean that Iraq was involved in the attack. Atta might have been trying to get some support from Iraq; or maybe he was an Iraqi agent. It is conceivable that the Iraqis would like to know what Bin Laden was doing. My own guess is that there was no state sponsor.

Lange:

Then you would say you can explain the workings of this group just by analyzing the group, and that you don't need to find any missing link, be it a state or commercial group, which recruited people who did not know what they were really being recruited for.

Smith:

We don't know much about it. We know enough that we can be confident it is what we are saying it is. It's a group of people that is very anti-Western, anti-Christian, [anti-infidel] and their hatred was transferred from the Russian side to the American. That's why they attacked.

Dedijer:

I want to say one thing. The Americans made a survey in Israel as to how many Israelis support an independent Palestine. It was 60%. 19% voted for war against Palestine. Now I suggest that an American firm go to the Palestinians and ask how many of them would give their lives to ensure Palestine's existence. I'll think you'll find 10,000 among the millions of Palestinians who would be willing. That is how these 19 - 20% were recruited. They are willing to give their lives. I think it is important to change that mentality.

Ferš:

I never heard that Bin Laden took responsibility for anything that happened on September 11 or before.

Kerr:

I don't think he has.

Smith:

He came very close, I think, a couple of weeks ago.

Ferš:

He never said it was his organization, or that he was responsible. He spoke only generally. We are against, we fight against… and so on.

Kerr:

That's unique; no one took credit for the Pan Am bombing, either. Yet generally people understood what the reason for it was, even if nobody claimed credit for it.

Ferš:

Yes, but what is this new phenomenon? Before we had terrorist organizations who said "OK we are responsible for this and we are fighting for this and that." Here we don't know what the target is or the object of the attack.

Kerr:

Do you think there is any doubt, though, in the minds of the Arab and Islamic world about the source? Do you think there is any doubt as to what the object was, regardless of who did it? It seems to me that goes without saying. We may want evidence, but it seems to me the general population knows why it was done and believes they know who did it.

Ferš:

Yes. But, for instance before when a terrorist group hijacked a plane or something, they wanted to have some leader released from prison or something like that. Or else announced what they were fighting for. But now they just act without announcing anything or raising any issues.

Kerr:

But doesn't that go back again to what we were talking about at the beginning?

Ferš:

I think it is important to have clear intelligence information about how and what they are planning.

Tuđman:

It is not always clear who is behind certain activities. I am not talking about terrorist activities in the States because I don't know anything about that. This afternoon I will give some examples of terrorist activities in my country and who was accused publicly of them. They were terrorist operations organized in support of Serbian information warfare against the Croatian government. And it took time to collect clear evidence against the terrorists and people who instigated the information warfare. That is why obtaining intelligence about terrorists and their objectives is very important.

Lange:

I would like to link up here and ask the American colleagues: Is there really hard evidence that the embassy bombings were executed by Al-Qaeda? Why not keep an eye on other organizations? I could think of two dozen organizations who would like to have done the September 11 action, could have done it, and maybe have done it. Why Al-Qaeda?

Smith:

We were able to identify some of the operatives and we know that they are Al-Qaeda.

Lange:

But you know there are overlapping loyalties. The same person can serve in 3 - 4 different organizations.

Kerr:

I think you're asking an important question. First of all, I don't know enough about the details of the investigations to be specific about it, but you do have to distinguish between intelligence and the knowledge needed to actually prosecute in a court of law. There is a distinction between those two kinds of knowledge. But I think everyone is reasonably confident that it was involved. Could you prove that in a court of law? Actually, there was a formal case presented by the Attorney General in the case of the Embassy, so at least from that perspective they believe they had a case that would stand up in a court of law.

Lange:

You are more of an expert than I. We have to be skeptical of so-called intelligence. I'll just mention one case, the so-called chemical weapons factory in Sudan, the attempt to make it look like more than it was. There are many such cases, as you well know. But there was no direct need for Bin Laden to be involved from Afghanistan in the operation. As you said, it was not that complicated or expensive.

Kerr:

I would be very cautious about saying what you just said. There are many cases. Even the pharmaceutical plan had an evidentiary base, however flimsy. There was information that people made judgments on that led the policy makers to conclude there was a connection. How good that was is debatable, but you act on information that is not firm for a variety of reasons, some of them very good.