Među ukupnim prijetnjama nacionalnoj sigurnosti jedan dio čini i kriminalitet određene vrste i sadržaja. S druge strane postoji i širok spektar nekriminalnih prijetnji nacionalnoj sigurnosti poput vojnih, vanjskopolitičkih, ekonomskih, prirodnih (potresi, poplave i sl.) i tehničkih/tehnoloških (havarije i sl.), zdravstvenih (epidemije) te prijetnji koje proizlaze iz unutarnjih strukturnih slabosti ili ranjivosti pojedinih institucija (obrana, sigurnosni sustav) ili vrijednosti (npr. politička stabilnost, socijalna kohezija, gospodarstvo, ekologija i dr.

Svijet je u tranziciji jer se promijenila priroda međunarodnih odnosa, odnosno promijenili su se instrumenti nacionalne moći. Većina je teoretika međunarodnih odnosa suglasna da su danas ključni instrumenti nacionalne moći javna diplomacija i informacija, a tek su na trećem i četvrtom mjestu ekonomija i vojska. Drugim riječima: u industrijsko doba zemlje koje su imale dominaciju na moru i u zraku vladale su svijetom; u informacijsko doba zemlje koje budu dominirale informacijskim prostorom imat će hegemoniju u svijetu. Zato nacionalne informacijske strategije imaju zadaću osigurati dominaciju punog spektra vlastitih informacija u stranim javnostima.

Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not make findings sufficient, on their face, to enter convictions against Mr. Markač on the basis of either aiding and abetting or superior responsibility. In the absence of such findings, and considering the circumstances of this case, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius dissenting, declines to assess the Trial Chamber’s remaining findings and evidence on the record. Doing so would require the Appeals Chamber to engage in excessive fact finding and weighing of the evidence. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius and Judge Pocar dissenting, recalls that the existence of a JCE and unlawful artillery attacks underpin all of the material findings of the Trial Judgement. In this context, any attempt to derive inferences required for convictions under alternate modes of liability would risk substantially compromising Mr. Markač’s fair trial rights.

Promene zadataka i ciljeva Oružanih snaga SFRJ za vreme sukoba u Hrvatskoj - u ovom delu se govori o promenama unutar Vrhovne komande na početku sukoba u Hrvatskoj i o tome kako je to uticalo na zadatke JNA u toku sukoba u Hrvatskoj. Naredženja i uputstva onoga što je preostalo kao Vrhovna komanda i štab Vrhovne komande ukazuju na to da je JNA, bar de facto, sve manje bila “vojska SFRJ" i da je, barem u Hrvatskoj, postepeno prerastala u pretežno srpsku vojsku, koja je služila srpskim ciljevima. Uloga JNA izmenila se, i umesto posredovanja izmedžu sukobljenih strana, postala je stvaranje srpskih područja u onim delovima Hrvatske koje je srpsko/srbijansko rukovodstvo smatralo srpskim i uspostavljanja kontrole nad njima. Tako je ustavni zadatak “zaštite teritorijalnog integriteta” sveden na učvršćivanje srpske/srbijanske kontrole nad tim područjima.

Gospodarska špijunaža egzistirala je još od najstarijih civilizacija, doduše u vrlo pojednostavljenim oblicima. Poznat je primjer iz državnog ustroja starog Egipta gdje su pojedini svećenici koji su odlazili u strane zemlje sustavno obučavani za zadaće prikupljanja podataka o njihovoj gospodarskoj snazi. Također, oko 1200 godina prije Krista, a tijekom izraelskog pohoda na Palestinu, Jošua je uputio dvojicu svojih uhoda da „tajno izvide da li je zemlja plodna“. Ovakvih, relativno pojednostavljenih primjera gospodarske špijunaže te primjera koji su obuhvaćali sustavniji pristup navedenoj problematici tijekom povijesti bilo je bezbroj.

Definirajući sustave ranog upozoravanja, Shaker i Richardson povlače analogiju s državnim strukturama navodeći da se radi o "onim izvještajnim aktivnostima namijenjenim detektiranju i izvješćivanju vremenski osjetljivih izvještajnih informacija o inozemnim događajima koji mogu uključivati opasnost za Sjedinjene Države ili za vojne, političke, gospodarske interese ili državljane Sjedinjenih Država u inozemstvu.

This article examines the institutional challenges that Greek security policy is facing and offers some suggestions regarding the mechanisms that are needed for a more effective security and crisis management policy. The inefficiency of Greek security policy derives among other things from the fact that the existing institutional structures are inadequate and poorly organized. The prospect of introducing a new institutional body, the National Security Council, will also be examined in order to demonstrate that such an institution although helpful should not be treated as a panacea.

Established governments recognize that life under the constant threat of terrorism jeopardizes their nation's stability, prosperity, and overall well being. They have all publicly condemned terrorism as criminal and immoral. For instance, on the heels of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001 even the Chinese government announced that it "opposes and condemns all forms of terrorism and is against using terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives.” Such statements prove that nations, regardless of whether their pronouncements against terrorism are genuine, at least recognize terrorism as a serious security threat to other nations. More recently, in 2005 the European Union had released a similar declaration stating, "Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances."

There are things and situations that assert the definition "anything you say is true". But is the Balkan theme among them? One is about to say not, having in mind the approach and the arguments, negative for their most, when "Europe", "the World", "America", "the Others" or "the Great Powers" are interpreting the "Balkan problems". But the answer would be rather yes, since closer scrutiny reveals the mosaic-like variety of lands, economies, policies and standpoints...

Radical changes in the international situation re-ignited previous conflicts. Ethnic and religious issues, suppressed during the bi-polar era, created an immediate threat for national and international security. The structure of the global information society increased the current risks to the security of information. Progress in state-of-the-art technologies created new opportunities for penetration, manipulation, and destruction of data, in addition to disrupting and compromising the records and activities of institutions, organizations, and companies. The threats are related to criminal activities and also to criminal organizations, fundamentalists, even anarchists.

Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro (that is, their politicians, businessmen, scientists, and artists) try to explain the issues in historical terms, but such explanations are greeted with scorn or lack of understanding. European politicians attempt to ignore our history, eradicate our differences, and destroy our memory. We, on the other hand, believe history freed from ideology explains the past and liberates the future.

For Russia, the Balkan states rate a high regional priority. From a geopolitical view, the region's problems are an unremitting threat to European and, by extension, world stability. Many of the regions' animosities are ages old and obdurate. To these are added new problems, mainly recent and internal, such as a plethora of refugees that have a dangerous, destabilizing effect on the area.

After more than a decade, most of the problems facing the states of the former Yugoslavia still have not been resolved. What has changed over the past ten years is that the locus of the crisis has shifted from the northeast - Slovenia and Croatia - to the southwest - Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo and Montenegro), and Macedonia. Even Albania has been in a state of almost chronic instability since 1997. And in this latter group, the political, constitutional, and state questions which were open at the beginning of the 1990s are far from resolved.

The politics of the sociology of terrorism. The use of intelligence and counter-intelligence by terrorist organizations / Old means for new tasks: Humint and Covert Operations / Merging police intelligence and national intelligence / Legal, ethical and media aspects of "Intelligence Wars". / Problems and prospects concerning international intelligence cooperation and joint action in counter-terrorism. / Lessons from the EUROPOL-cooperation

The war against corruption which has become "a chronic disease of the community" must become a top priority with the ruling government.   In order to ensure that the war against corruption is swift and effective, it is necessary to build and expand state institutions which can successfully lead to "the independence of the judiciary from politics, respect for political freedom, a free media and political opposition." 

In order to ensure future stability and security in Southeast Europe as a prerequisite to European integration, there should be a clear division of roles among the international factors in the region. The USA should lend "leadership and engagement," while the UN should deal with "mandates rather than operations."  

The Dayton formula - one state, two entities and three constitutive nations, a compromise solution reached under pressure, especially from the Americans, 'does not provide a guarantee of peace, stability or the survival of the Bosnian state." The contradictions inherent in the accord are self-evident. While the international community actively supports a strong sovereign state, it has through the accord divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities with significant powers, Republika Srpska and the Federation. Rather than implementing Dayton as intended and correcting fundamental mistakes, the international community is quietly revising Dayton.

In spite of that, some crucial foreign policy questions were raised during the 2000 campaign by the candidate Bush, in particular those concerning the policy towards China and Russia, the National Missile Defense, and the US acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol regarding the protection of the environment.

The vigorous participation of the international community has brought about the Dayton Accord, the Royamont Initiative, the EU's Regional Approach, the SECI, the Stability Pact, and - finally - the fall of Milošević. The change in the international climate and the presence of military forces in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR or NATO) essentially nullifies the threat of future conflict. One condition, of course, is that the international community commit to a long-term presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

In the past year, the situation in Southeastern Europe (SEE) has and FRY deserved strong support by the West. The prospects are better than before, though many problems and instabilities still exist. The challenge has now shifted from preventing mass bloodshed and conflicts to consolidating the present geopolitical situation by means of socio-political reform and economic development.

People living in Southeast Europe voice strong (and in many cases perhaps justified) criticisms of the nature and consequences of external engagement in the affairs of the region. Nevertheless, the same people continue to seek assistance of different kinds from these external actors who show no sign (at present) that they will refuse to consider such requests.

Crisis management forms the cornerstone of international security. The bulk of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already turned from collective defense to this activity. Members of the EU (in the framework of the "Petersberg Tasks") and NATO (or PfP) must participate in crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and peace-making/peace-enforcement operations..

NATO's challenges now include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of Gulf oil supplies, and instability along NATO's southern and eastern flanks. These challenges do not represent a direct threat to NATO territory; for NATO's future is no longer in territorial defense but in crisis management. However, NATO is still capable of mobilizing the forces needed to defend against threats in central Europe, but maybe not as capable of supporting forces trained for crisis management or peace keeping operations.'

Bosna i Hercegovina je Daytonskim sporazumom podijeljena na Federaciju BiH i Republiku Srpsku. U Federaciji BiH postoje dvije službe (jedna je od njih hrvatska SNS, a druga bošnjačka AID). U Republici Srpskoj postoji Služba državne sigurnosti. Usprkos rastu kriminala i terorizma, između tih triju službi ne postoji suradnja. Autor zaključuje da je nužno što hitnije donijeti zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnim službama u Federaciji (prijedlog kojega postoji), te uspostaviti bolju suradnju sa službom Republike Srpske. Cilj bi, kao što je slučaj sa svim sličnim službama, trebao biti trajni mir i stabilnost u regiji.

Nakon prvih demokratskih i višestranačkih izbora održanih 1990. u osamostaljenoj je Hrvatskoj započeo proces izgradnje državnih institucija. Članak opisuje razvoj sustava nacionalne sigurnosti: povijest Hrvatske izvještajne službe i obavještajne zajednice, njihovo podrijetlo, strukturu, zadaće i aktivnosti. Detaljno je prikazano i ocijenjeno prvih pet godina (1993.-1998.) sustava nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske. HIS je osnovan 1993. kao središnja služba Ureda za nacionalnu sigurnost (UNS-a). Glavni su ciljevi bili oslobađanje hrvatskih okupiranih područja i rješavanje regionalne krize. HIS je surađivao i sa stranim obavještajnim službama razmjenjujući obavještajne procjene regionalne krize i pružajući podršku međunarodnim trupama (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR, SFOR, itd.). Autor naglašava zakonske i etičke kriterije na kojima su utemeljeni HIS i obavještajna zajednica.

National Intelligence services largely failed to foresee the great changes in Europe in the ´80s and ´90s, at least in the sense that they conveyed them to partners and/or convinced their governments to act upon them. In some cases, as in the matter of the Baltic states' independence struggle, the KGB was accurate in its warnings, but failed to convince the leadership to act upon this Intelligence.

The process of national liberation of Croatia, Slovenia, and then Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina began with the first free and multi-party elections in 1990. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a bloody and difficult process, as the Milosevic regime was not prepared to surrender Serbian hegemony within the multi-national Yugoslavia. This process resulted in many related wars waged by Milosevic: the seven-day-war in Slovenia, the four-year-war in Croatia, a somewhat shorter one in Bosnia Herzegovina, and finally the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Former Yugoslavia, that is, Southeast Europe, became the strategic center of the European periphery (as General Wesley Clark recently stated)

At first glance, the problem appears simple: intelligence collects and analyses all data related to a certain political issue, prepares a report, and submits it to the policy maker (PM). The PM makes a decision which is implied or recommended in the report, acting under the assumption that the intelligence collectors and analysts are first-class professionals devoid of selfish or political motives, and that the PM is a reputable statesman whose only concern is the safeguarding of national interests.

The security threats of a bipolar world with two military alliances poised against one another appear to have abated with the demise of one of the super-powers. Our gain is that the danger of world extermination through super-power nuclear warfare has been averted. Our loss is the relative clarity that this bipolarity implied. Now, instead, we are confronted with transnational threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. These threats were always there. But, they have taken on new potency precisely because of the demise of bipolarity and the concomitant emergence of new states, some of which are still quite fragile. Now the threats are more numerous, less visible, more underground and - in an age of fast transportation and communication - much more immediate.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the CIA finds itself fighting for its institutional life. It stands accused by former top intelligence chiefs of having failed the mission for which it was founded: to provide political leaders with accurate assessments of the political, economic, and military state of the Soviet Union. Writing later about this "enormous failure", Turner made an extraordinary assertion in a 1991 Foreign Affairs article: "I have never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing, systemic economic decay

In Macedonia, intelligence gathering dates back more than 100 years. However, the modern structure and system was for almost half a century, was directed by Yugoslavia during the last fifty years. The Macedonian Intelligence Agency was officially established in 1995. Its status and function were defined by law, but there were obstructions and attempts at revision; that is, the restoration of the previous model. This caused a three-year delay in the transformation and establishment of modern Macedonian modern. Conditions have gradually changed since 1998, and the Intelligence Agency has begun to operate as a separate state institution for foreign intelligence. Preparing a case study of the development of intelligence in a post-communist state faces the challenge of representing conditions comprehensively and objectively. This challenge cannot be met fully, for the time period under analysis is still in transition, the data incomplete and fluid. Hence, the time of the adjustment of the secret services to the conditions and circumstances will differ.

The author chronicles the history of the security-intelligence system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He deals with the beginnings of the services' activities, the laws and regulations passed during the past 55 years, and the key political processes and events which influenced the development of the security-intelligence system and society as a whole. He also discusses the conditions and background under which the socialist security system collapsed at the onset of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and explains how the new service emerged. The author analyzes the affairs which damaged the reputation of the service, and how the fear and mistrust created by the failure to resolve them led to the final legal regulation governing the activities of the service. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided by the Dayton Agreements into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Two discrete services exist in the Federation (one the Croatian SNS and the other the Bosniac AID). Republika Srpska's entity is the Service of State Security. There is no cooperation between these three services, although criminality and terrorism are on the rise. The author's conclusion is that the law which has been formulated on intelligence-security services in the Federation must be immediately adopted, and better cooperation must be established with Republika Srpska. As is the case with all similar services, the goal should be lasting stability and peace in the region.

After the first democratic, multiparty elections held in 1990, the process of building state institutions commenced within the framework of newly-sovereign Croatia. This article describes the development of the national security system: the history of the Croatian Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Community, and their origin, structure, tasks and activities. The first five years (1993-1998) of the national security system of the Republic of Croatia are presented in detail and evaluated. HIS was formed in 1993 as a central agency of the National Security Office (UNS). The main objectives were the liberation of Croatia's occupied territories and dealing with the regional crisis. HIS was also oriented toward co-operation and partnership with foreign intelligence agencies regarding intelligence assessments of the regional crisis and support of the international troops (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR, SFOR, etc). The author stresses the legal and ethical criteria upon which HIS and Croatian intelligence community were established.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the changes in the tasks and roles of the Hungarian Military Intelligence Office (MIO). The introductory paragraphs give a short view of the historical roots of Intelligence, then go on to cite milestones of MIO history, and end with an outline of the organization of the MIO, stressing its strong link to Intelligence gathering and decision making. The major parts of the article explain first, how the MIO has adapted and responded to the challenges facing modern-era Intelligence agencies; and, second, its proposed restructuring, the result of Hungary's NATO accession. The concluding portion contains a summary of the MIO's goals.

The author discusses the fate of the Foreign Intelligence Department of the GDR, which he headed for over thirty years, and of its colleagues and agents since the reunification of Germany ten years ago. There was no transformation of this service after the implosion of socialism; instead, it was liquidated, and criminal prosecutions followed which continue to this day. The author describes how this is connected to the West German leadership goal of the "de-legitimization" of the GDR. The operations of the western services are described, as well as the actions of their collaborators, who agree to make available, for a price, their knowledge of sources, files, data and other evidence in order for criminal prosecutions to be launched; i.e. the "Rosewood" operation of the CIA, and the decoding of the data carrier "SIRA" and its significance are discussed. The author holds the view that the criminal prosecution of the colleagues and agents of his service violates the internationally recognized legal concept of "equality before the law". Of the approximately 150,000 political indictments initiated since the reunification, 7,099 were for espionage. The article also addresses other subjects, such as the inhumanely high prison sentences in the United States. The author feels that, after ten years, a political gesture should be made which would remove the last vestiges of the Cold War.

Although a formally non-aligned country with strong economic and security links to the Western powers, Sweden nevertheless developed an expansive national intelligence system during the Cold War. After the tumultuous shift of European security policy between 1989-91, Sweden realized immediate benefits in the area of national security; it went from the exposed position of a front-line state in the Baltic to an embedded position behind a new Cordon Sanitaire to the east. As other small European countries, Sweden in the 1990s was thus faced with the task of aligning its national intelligence system with new international premises and a broadened, but largely unknown, future security agenda. The attempts to reform its system offer insights into the process involved in changing intelligence agendas and institutions, and into the problems facing national intelligence policy caused by globalization and European integration.

The nations of the world increasingly are conducting business collectively, through international organizations. Intelligence services, traditionally focused on serving the needs of single nations, are being called upon to work within a larger international framework and to cooperate with counterpart services in pursuit of shared objectives. Decisions about sharing intelligence information present special difficulties and dilemmas when they must involve international organizations. This article traces the evolution of intelligence sharing policies - largely from a US perspective - and offers some proposed guidelines for making more effective use of intelligence in a multilateral context.

The author concludes that the world will most probably remain rife with conflict even in the twenty first century and that the traditional role of intelligence will not only continue but will increase in importance. He characterizes the international situation as being "more of the same historically"; that is, the existence of several different centers of power and mutual conflicts based solely on national interests. In order to protect and promote one's national interests, sovereign states will, on one hand, require its own military forces, and, on the other, its own intelligence service. In the future, the goals and priorities of intelligence services will be subservient to the interests of state policies, and the collection and analysis of information obtained by "special means" in support of national foreign policy will apply universally to all world intelligence services. The most important changes will take place in the technical aspects of intelligence. However, in spite of fears expressed about an "Orwellian" solution, which could in the future be at the disposal of intelligence services as a result of technological advances, the author believes human sources, humint, will remain the main intelligence tool. As far as "rules of the game" are concerned, they will also remain the same, though sporadic attempts will be made to devise some internationally acceptable framework for intelligence activities.

The issues, the activities and the relations preceding the formal international negotiations have increasingly become an area of a special theoretical interest. The prenegotiation or the prenegotiation phase is part of the broader issue of the dynamic interactive process of international negotiations. The Southeast European region or the Balkans, in particular its people and political leaders, could utilize much of the conceptual experience of prenegotiating in coping with the multitude of major and minor real and potential conflicts and other issues. Prenegotiations provide an opportunity to approach and be involved in managing significant issues, including conflicts, without taking the risk of formal commitments, as well as facilitating the very negotiations in areas as determining the participants, the agenda, etc. A basic benefit from prenegotiations by all parties is the possibility to understand better the specific mechanism of shaping the partner's and the own party's commitment to negotiate. Switching from the traditional bargaining model of negotiations to the problem-solving model in the Balkans, utilizing to the most the third-party capacity and the seminar and workshop experience of dealing with particular issues in an informal way are special accents in the prenegotiation potential applied to Southeast European issues.

The newly established situation in Kosovo, after the conclusion of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, has not resolved the open issues but, instead, introduced new questions in regard to internal, regional and European positions of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, questions which will in the long term be a burden on the security situation in the explosive "Balkan powder keg". The first priority in Kosovo is a speedy and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which will present a serious test for the international community. Results here will affect success in various moves for reconciliation in a variety of conflicts. On the Kosovo political scene, the main struggle in Albanian political bodies will be between representatives of former UCK-Tachists, which are characterized as extremists, and the moderate forces of the DSK, led by Ibrahim Rugova. In peacetime conditions, the moderate forces are slowly and effectively making political gains, and are more familiar with international community positions on multiethnic and multireligious entities as opposed to autonomy. In the area of security, serious threats might emerge from the former commanders in the paramilitary UCK formations, who are dissatisfied with their positions in the newly established transition government and civil administration.

The US undertook the Kosovo campaign without an appropriate coordinated military plan, for political reasons. The proper basis for Kosovo intervention was a valid strategic concern. Europe needs the US to operate out-of-area: only the US has the aircraft carriers, the lift capacity, the cruise missiles, the overhead reconnaissance capability, and other indispensable components of an out-of-area campaign. These are sensible criteria, which could help frame all debates about NATO intervention. Blair's address on April 22, 1999, offered a proposed doctrine for NATO intervention in non-member countries. It had five parts, and might be described as a NATO Powell Doctrine. "Are national interests involved?" Here, Kosovo qualifies fully as to the underlying reality. The Balkans remain a powder keg. The Vance-Owen Plan of cantonising Bosnia made sense, and should not have been dismissed by Secretary Christopher. The Russians have been essential to a solution. Wherever the Russian troops had been in control, the Albanian refugees would not have gone back, meaning a potentially unstable Macedonia. But with the NATO occupying force in place, NATO could dictate the terms of Russian participation.

Although Southeast Europe has been a source and scene of wider European conflicts in the twentieth century, crisis management by the EU, NATO, OSCE, succeeded only temporarily in extinguishing the fire and removing the sources of conflict. Therefore, the international community should apply short-term crisis management and devise long-term proposals for the region. The Stability Pact may indeed achieve a stabilization of the region if regional players are included and their long-term goals are incorporated into the integral strategy for the region. Both regional governmental and non-governmental think tanks could significantly contribute to the creation of progressive solutions within the comprehensive strategy for the region and thus to the success of the Stability Pact as the main vehicle of the strategy.