The first five years of the Croatian Intelligence Service: 1993-1998

Notes toward an understanding of the position, role, tasks and activities of the Croatian Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Community
during the first years of the inception and formation of the Republic of Croatia

Miroslav Tuğman

 

NOTES

1 Today we could present Bacon's divisions in another way: cultural bias, personal bias, media bias (prejudice of public opinion), group bias (prejudice based upon interest).

2 I was the director of HIS and the deputy director of UNS from 1993 to May 1998. I resigned at my own reqeust. I was however appointed president of the Educational Council of the Intelligence Academy in October, 1998.

3 This report was written on the basis of reports and summaries prepared for lectures at the Intelligence Academy. Some formulations are taken from the brochure "UNS and the Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia", an internal publication of UNS from January 2000.

4 Law on the National Security Office (NN 37/95).

5 The following acted as directors of the National Security office between 1993-1998:

· Hrvoje ©ariniæ (3.4.1993 - 12.10.1994)
· Krunoslav Olujiæ (12.10.1994 - 18.5.1995)
· Miroslav Tuğman - served as acting director (14.6.1995 - 1.2.1996)
· Luka Bebiæ (1.2.1996 - 15.12.1996)
· Ivan Jarnjak (16.12.1996 - January 2000)

6 Law on Domestic Policy (NN 29/91, 19/92, 33/92, 76/94)

7 Law on Defense (NN74/93)

8 Per the Proposed Work Plan for 2000, the main tasks should include:

· Croatian national interests and regional stability
· protection of sovereignty and integrity
· international terrorism and organized crime

· counter-intelligence protection of classified data in the state government bodies

· protection of economic interests

It is obvious from this that during the years, changes have taken place regarding the main foci of the Intelligence Community, according to political and security developments.

9 The weekly magazine "Globus" (No. 468) published an article entitled "Nine intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies are active in the Republic of Croatia", to which the Secretariat of UNS responded in a statement of December 8, 1999.

10 VONS - Defense and National Security Council, which is appointed per the Constitution by the President of the Republic of Croatia

11 The work of the intelligence and security services of the Republic of Croatia is regulated by a series of laws. The most important are:

· Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (NN 8/98)
· Law on the system of state administration (NN 75/93)
· Law on state officials and deputies and on salaries of legal officials (NN 74/94, 86/94, 7/95)
· Law on the National Security Office (NN 37/95)
· Law on Domestic Policy (NN29/91, 73/91, 19/92, 33/92, 76/94)
· Law on foreign policy (NN 48/96)
· Law on Defense (NN 74/93)

· Law on changes and additions to the Law on Defense (NN 57/96)

· Law on service in the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia (NN 23/95, 33/95)

· Law on financial police (NN 89/92, 16/93)

· Law on changes and additions to the Law on financial police (NN 94/93)

· Law on additions to the Law on financial police (NN 28/94)

· Law on customs agency of the Republic of Croatia (NN 53/91, 57/91)

· Law on changes and additions to the Law on customs agency (NN 106/93)

· Law on protection of classified data (NN 108/96)
· Law on negotiating and implementing international agreements (NN28/96)
· Law on investigatory commissions (NN 24/96)

12 SONS meets on an average of twice a month.

13 Or, according to other criteria: two intelligence services (HIS, VOS) and two counterintelligence services (SZUP, SIS).

14 Director of HIS has the status of state minister as he presides over the members of KOOZ, who are assistant ministers.

15 Since the very beginning we were open for cooperation. In his guidelines, Croatian president Franjo Tuğman always determined the type, direction and scope of cooperation. As a rule we received instructions for openness and directness in the passing of real goals and intentions of the official Croatian policy.

16 It is not true that the UNS is a legal successor of the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Order headed by Josip Manolic, as was reported in the media.

17 President of the Republic Franjo Tuğman visited the HIS on 10 October 1996. On that occasion I informed the President of the personnel structure in the HIS: eighty percent of men, i.e. fifty percent of all employees, took part in the Homeland War. HIS employees do not have military ranks, but there was also one general, two brigadiers, five colonels etc. with personal ranks obtained in the War.

18 I advocated this thesis in my paper "A view from Croatia. Peace and Stability in the Balkans and in Southeast Europe. Realities and Contradictions," Wilton Park Conference: Peace and Stability in the Balkans and in Southeast Europe, 27-31 October 1997.

19 See Tuğman, M. "Croatia as a Factor for Peace and Stability in Europe", in. M. Sopta (ed.) Croatia as a Stabilizing Factor for Peace in Europe, Croatian Center of Strategic Studies, Zagreb, 1998.

20 So were both the former Czechoslovakia - the CSSR - and the USSR. The downfall of these multi-national countries has a common point of departure: the need of the so-called small nations to achieve their independence and sovereignty.

21 Cutileiro, Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans had advocated a provincial, a cantonal partition model for BH, and/or envisioned BH as a union, consisting of three republics.

22 See Admiral Davorin Domazet (2000). How aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was prepared or the transformation of the JNA into Serbian imperial force. National Security and the Future, 1(1)107-152.

23 25 September 1991. Upon Yugoslavia's proposition, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 713 on complete embargo on the import of arms in Yugoslavia. The JNA's attack on Vukovar had begun a month earlier, on August 25, 1991. A week after the Resolution had been adopted, on October 1, 1991, the Montenegrin-Serbian aggression aimed at the Dubrovnik region began along the entire border between Montenegro and Croatia. On October 7, 1991, JNA airplanes bombed president Tuğman's office Banski dvori, during his meeting with Stipe Mesic and Ante Markovic.

24 Badinter Commission, an arbitration commission of the Peace Conference for Former Yugoslavia, decided on July 4, 1992 that the "SFRY does not exist any more" and that the SRY could not be considered its "only successor."

25 On December 11, 1991 the Security Council was presented with C. Vance's plan for the UN peace operation in former Yugoslavia. The Security Council approved urgent deployment of 14000 blue helmets in Croatia on March 6, 1992.

26 Germany recognized Croatia on December 23, 1991, and EC countries did the same on January 15, 1992.

27 At the referendum on Bosnia's independence on February 29, 1992, 64.31 percent of citizens, mostly Muslims and Croats, chose an independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina.

28 Croatia recognized Bosnia on April 7, 1992.

29 The Split Agreement on Military Cooperation, i.e. "Declaration on the Implementation of the Washington Agreement, joint defense from the Serbian aggression and achievement of political solution", was signed in Split by Croatian president Franjo Tuğman, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic and president of the Federation Kresimir Zubak on July 22, 1995.

30 Military operation "Storm" during which 26.5 percent of occupied Croatian territory was liberated, began on August 4 and ended on August 8, 1995.

31 The massacre in Srebrenica happened on July 7, 1995. and the fall of Zepa was on July 25, 1995.

32 During peace negotiations in Dayton, representatives of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia initialed a General Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina on November 21, 1995.

33 Croats and Bosniacs signed the Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Special Relations with the Republic of Croatia in Washington on March 18, 1994; in 1995 in Dayton all three peoples signed the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, comprised of the BH Federation and the Republika Srpska.

34 President Clinton's directive: Executive order 13107, "Implementation of Human Rights Treaties," December 10, 1998

35 Sapere aude is the motto of the HIS, and is written into the agency's emblem. The sense of this Latin saying is 'dare to be wise' (Horatius), 'have strength to use your own reason' (Kant); its literal meaning is 'acquire wisdom through listening', and its essential meaning is 'be smart'.

36 In October 1999 in Mostar (BH) SFOR conducted operation WESTAR. They penetrated into the National Security Service headquarters, aiming to prove HIS's illegal operations in the Federation. The HIS immediately issued a release requesting an apology and a statement from the US Administration. I received letters from directors of the CIA and the NSA, supporting and confirming our statements. US Ambassador in Zagreb William Montgomery on several occasions stated for the media that Croatia had contributed significantly to the security of international troops. SFOR never submitted any evidence of illegal actions of the HIS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the US government and the State Department failed to employ fair treatment of SFOR and the Croatian government thereby preventing unnecessary media manipulations.

37 Today HIS cooperates with twice as many foreign agencies than former Yugoslavia did until 1990.

38 This is one of the few speeches that I wrote beforehand and therefore it is presented here in its original form, and not from memory.