DOI: https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

Review paper

Received: March 10, 2022

Accepted: September 5, 2022

This study aims to highlight the significant role played by the escalating security policies in obstructing development efforts in the African continent, despite the tremendous financial support of international donor institutions with the aim of advancing development in the continent; the process of imparting security to the internal scene in these countries remained for decades diverting all those allocated budgets towards the sectors of militarisation, armament and security, by using a discourse that carries within its core all forms of existential threat, such as promoting the threat of international terrorism, which allows these countries to use exceptional methods in dealing with such dangers, while ensuring the international approval of the donors involved in these policies by virtue of the advantages they benefit from that are related to the other side of the hidden agenda of the process of securitisation of development, which provides them with a guarantee of the continuation of their economic interests.

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Introduction

In order to ensure the success of this new security approach, all parties, whether major Western countries, donors, or African governments, used the discourse of securitization. This discourse implies the existence of an existential threat that affects the physical or moral survival of a security reference, an individual, a group, or a state. Alternatively, identity and the process of securitizing an issue aim to legitimize politicians to international institutions and conclude exceptional arrangements to secure the threatened entity from various dangers. The main objective of the securitization process in Africa was to give legitimacy to the armaments and militarisation projects launched by the various successive governments in the region, which pivotally affected the path of faltering development for many years.

Methodology

We will try to theoretically address many of the problems associated with the process of taking over the international development aid and changing its course towards the military and security sectors, depending on the theory of securitization for several considerations, foremost of which is the theory's superior ability to analyze and explain the mechanisms of the process of securitizing development on the continent. This theory's basic premise is based on an attempt to negate the objective condition of security and consider it a result of a set of practices and discourses.  It leads us theoretically to the mechanisms that transform the question from a political viewpoint to a security problem. The latter is used by promoting the existence of an existential danger that targets the fundamental policy of the state and society, including the establishment of work to prepare public opinion to tolerate violations that the securitization process may cause. These are the violations that international donors and African governments are trying to conceal under the state of exception, which has grown in popularity in the aftermath of 2001, emphasizing the possibility of addressing a variety of concerns beyond the scope of its standard policy. 

Securitization of development: a cognitive entry

Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, stated in 2004: 'We know that poverty and insecurity lead to weak states that can serve as safe havens for terrorists and other criminals... Al-Qaeda had already been active before September 11, 2001. They have and continue to have bases in Africa; they hide in regions that are difficult for weak governments to manage, and from there, they plot their next strikes, which might take place anywhere in the world, including Africa.' 

Source: (Rhetoric and Reality: US-Africa Relations since 9/11, 2008)

All countries classified in the reports of the U.S. State Department as strategic allies in the war on terrorism, except for Eritrea, witnessed an increasing amount of aid. However, the largest share of this development aid after 2001 was obtained by Sudan, whose funding increased by 94.4 percent, a country classified in three successive reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on global terrorism as one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism. Undoubtedly, the increase in funding reflects U.S. security concerns within Sudan. 

'If we consider the unprecedented challenges and the size of the budget presented, the Fund should be more focused and direct its supportive efforts towards specific actions capable of addressing migration.’ 

The follow-up to the aid programs provided by the Fund to the African countries benefiting from these programs leads us to emphasize the security importance of this aid, away from all the declared developmental reasons. Most African countries are mainly considered source countries for illegal immigration and are a growing concern for decision-makers and the European political class.

The war on terrorism: The best pretext to justify securitization

Throughout the fifth and sixth sessions of the Sixth Committee meeting of the 74^th session of the United Nations, this prompted the delegates of some African countries to invite the attendees to help them financially in the fight against terrorist groups. Many African governments have waged their war on terrorism. At the same time, the delegate of Burkina Faso stressed the seriousness of the security situation in West Africa; he called on bilateral and multilateral partners to provide more support. In contrast, the delegate of Cameroon said: 'The danger and threat cannot be addressed by a country alone; rather, there should be concerted efforts by many parties.' 

On this basis, Western countries and donors are working to support these African governments to eliminate these organizations through several projects supervised directly or within the framework of aid provided by international institutions. (See Table No. 2)

Table. 2. U.N. Projects to strengthen counterterrorism

Source: (United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund, 2020)

As for the United States of America, in its strategy to combat terrorism, it relied on a soft fight against terrorism, an idea inspired by the Soft Power Theory of Joseph Nye.  On this basis, after11 September 2001, the American administration launched several support projects in Africa in order to besiege terrorism and dry up its sources, the most important of which can be highlighted in the:

The United States of America put forward the African Sahel Initiative with West African countries (Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger) in November 2002, after which the State Department allocated financial aid worth 7,75 mil US$ aimed at strengthening the military capabilities of these countries, through training operations, in addition to the participation of Units of the U.S. Special Forces and the Navy that are in joint operations with the local armed forces. 

The partnership is a multi-faceted, multi-year U.S. strategy between the United States of America and many African countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia). The partnership aims to build resilient institutions capable of preventing counterterrorism in comprehensive and long-term ways by working to enable partner countries to provide effective and accountable security and judicial services that allow for strengthening citizens' cooperation with and trust in law enforcement agencies, in addition to developing institutions concerned with combating terrorism such as border security, prison security, and reintegration efforts. 

The hidden agenda of securitizing development in Africa

For African governments, the state of emergency is the perfect tool to undermine democracy under the (pretext) of constitutional legitimacy. It is a good argument for why more power is needed. Why do power holders care about human rights, legislative restrictions, or other institutions while the country is under threat or attack? Thus, states of emergency can help dismantle democracy and undermine the resistance to its demise. The opposition can easily be described as unpatriotic for its defiance of the government when the state is endangered and requires unity. 

An authoritarian tendency grows when official institutions are disrupted and all powers are concentrated in the president's hands, especially in the absence of rules, regulations, exceptions, and emergency states. In many countries, constitutions stipulate the necessity of resorting to emergency measures in exceptional cases without legislation or legalization accompanying them or even without temporal control of the situation. This made it exceed thirty years in some African countries. All African countries have suffered authoritarian rule under the pretext of emergency laws in exceptional circumstances endangering the state and its institutions, whether during internal ethnic conflicts that have remained a feature of African state-building or during the global war on terrorism by the USA after11 September 2001.

The search for the exceptional case and hiding behind emergency laws express the reality of democracy and ill democracy in the continent. It represents a good argument for staying in power without developing legitimacy. Despite their failure to achieve development, most governments are still hiding behind security legitimacy and their war on terrorism and organized crime, which entitles them to their people and international public opinion to dispose of their budgets and the loans they obtain to serve their interests.

The hidden agenda is not limited to achieving the interests of local governments in Africa only and many of the donors' economic interests who contribute to the securitization process to ensure their interests in the continent. The military spending of African countries comes at the top of the hidden agenda of the donors, as the process of securitization requires more flows of arms that the major countries are working to provide to these countries.

Military spending in Africa in 2017 amounted to about 42,6bilUS$, while the total spending from 2008 to 2018 amounted to 409,3bilUS$.  An ascending graph confirms the increasing governmental trend in the continent towards armament and attention to the military aspects and modernizing the armies despite the global economic crisis and its various repercussions on most African economies, which approved many austerity measures to confront them. (See Figure No. 01) 

The graph in Figure 01 indicates an increasing escalation of military spending on the African continent from 2008 (to)2017, with a modest recession that did not last long until it rose again, quickly surpassing the effects of the economic crisis. However, this rapid recovery raises many questions about the sources of financing these huge deals in light of the lack of liquidity associated with the decline in oil prices. In the same context, the list of the largest arms suppliers in Africa between 2013-2017 recorded the United States of America, Russia, France, Germany, China, the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, Italy, and the Netherlands.  Most of these countries are among Africa's leading suppliers of loans and aid; hence, the securitization process is more evident in this element of the donors' covert objective.

Source: Prepared by researchers based on Arms, Disarmament, and International Security reports issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (YEARBOOK 2018 and 2019)

This agenda mainly aims to achieve a set of strategic goals for the donors in the short and long terms, as the increase in military expenses in the African countries receiving aid reflects an extensive Western program that works to recover aid funds on the one hand and secure oil supplies on the continent through the use of local armies in guarding significant companies operating in the continent.

The role of securitization discourse in controlling public opinion

After September 11, 2001, the security discourse contributed to securitization in Africa that exceeded all perceptions. The discourse's strength over the development discourse is its dual effect on the global and local levels. The United States of America and Western countries have adopted macro securitization, while African countries have been working to rotate the securitization discourse locally. The main features of the discourse of macro securitization have been formed through several critical variables, which can be summarized: First, the rise of the language of dualities; Good/Evil, Civilisation/Barbarism, which in turn gave rise to a new structural division of the world based on; Us/them, explicitly manifested in George Bush Jr's famous speech: "You are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Second, the excessive use of historical parallels through repeated allusions to the Cold War and World War(s), and third, the constant invocation of militarism and exclusion, which made the idea of the war on terrorism, bear a solid and integrated project.  

Following the dominance of the macro securitization discourse on the international stage, most countries, led by African countries, entered the international war on terrorism and rearranged their priorities in response to the new agenda, with security taking precedence over other projects such as the development democratic trajectories.

This new security discourse is based mainly on exaggerating the threat of terrorist groups through the official speeches of officials or through the various local media, which have occupied the topics of bombings and terrorist operations, the activity of the security forces and the army in combating them, at the forefront of the headlines within them. It creates an abnormal general atmosphere within their societies characterized by fear and insecurity. It pushes them to be more cautious and live in the shadow of mistrust among citizens.

Shifting from speech to militarisation

Numerous international studies and reports indicate the significant increase in the size of the budgets of armies, and the growth of arms supply operations in Africa during the past two decades, despite successive economic crises that prompted many African countries to adopt austerity policies that did not seem to include the military sectors that maintained their budgets.

Reinforcement of authoritarianism

Since the early 1990s, democracy and good governance have been central tenets of development discourse and politics, with donors proclaiming the importance of freedom, rights, and accountability for development and prosperity; however, the democratization process seems to have stalled in many African countries. While foreign aid flows freely to some of the continent's most authoritarian and repressive countries, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda have attracted significant donor support. 

In Rwanda, for example, the post-genocide era was characterized by a divided society led by a government that came to power through rebel forces, prompting civil war leader Paul Kagame to initiate a transition to civilian rule. The constitution and later the parliament were agreed upon, beginning with the first cell-level elections (the village sub-committee) in 1999 and provincial-level elections in 2001. However, what happened after that, the dismissal of the prime minister, the banning of the single significant opposition party in the country, the closure of political space, the maintenance of the status of fear, the disappearance of critical voices, the increased muzzling of the press, and the attack on civil society organizations, clearly indicate the faltering path of democratization in the country. Increasingly totalitarian, the course of elections intended to decorate the political facade was preserved. After assuming the presidency of Rwanda by acclamation in 2000 as the victorious leader in the war and then being elected in 2003, 2010, and 2017, Kagame amended the constitution in 2015 to allow him to remain in the presidency for three more periods ending in 2034.

On the other hand, Knox Chitiyo, Head of the Africa Programme at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), noted: ‘Britain has a lot of financial investments, symbolic and emotional connections in Rwanda, and the irony of this relationship is that Britain needs Rwanda more than the latter.’ 

Due to the high growth rates in recent years, the flourishing Rwandan economy makes the country's investment environment a magnet for significant countries trying to take advantage of these opportunities.

Since the 2005 national elections, the Ethiopian government has enacted restrictive laws and regulations governing the press and civil society organizations, as well as authoritarian measures to combat terrorist threats, such as restricting civil and political rights, which prompted many academics in the context of analyzing the Ethiopian political system to launch many descriptions such as guardianship, the new electoral authoritarianism, and the totalitarian one-party state.

In order to explain this paradox, some observers stressed the ability of the Ethiopian government to manipulate the international development discourse and firmly confront international donors to direct the Official Development Aid (ODA) to meet its political priorities. In contrast, others pointed to donor naivety or ignorance of domestic political dynamics and actual decision-making processes. At the same time, a third trend believes that Western geopolitical priorities in the global war on terrorism outweigh the promotion of human rights and democracy, giving the Ethiopian government a solid card to play in ensuring the continuation of development aid. Other causes are listed, such as the work of the International Assistance Agency, which has selected Ethiopia as an example of the efficiency of its work. The third proposition related to the global war on terrorism is consistent with the declared reasons for the securitization of development in Africa; it pushes us to support this interpretation, especially in light of the practical outcomes of the securitization process at the level of the country's political situation in its aspect related to the dimensions of democracy, human rights, and citizenship.

However, what happened after that confirms the exact opposite. Uganda was isolated in the non-party system after the president banned political parties from the activity and imposed candidacy in elections based on personal merit. According to the National Resistance Movement, this measure aims to prevent sectarianism, which motivated the president to mention it when he asserted that this system suits Africa better than any other form of Western democracy, claiming that political parties are due to the nature of rural areas. Ugandan society will inevitably turn to play on the strings of ethnicity, region, language, and religion rather than national interests. This remained the case until 2005 when political parties and associations were allowed to operate again.

It adopts more militarisation in dealing with political activists, human rights defenders, and all dissenting voices in the country. The Committee to Protect Journalists recorded a more than tenfold increase in attacks on journalists in Uganda between 2008 and 2011. The security forces were responsible for more than 90 percent of these attacks. Not to mention the shooting of protesters by the security services in several protest stations, such as April 2007, September 2009, and April 2011, the Ugandan regime also responded to what is believed to be strong opposition by arbitrarily closing independent newspapers and radio stations. 

In this context, many researchers believe that this continued militarisation of the Ugandan political system would not have occurred without international assistance, especially from Western donors who remained silent about various violations of Museveni's regime. Even more than that, these are due to their direct contribution to strengthening its ability. Since the mid-1990s, donor officials in Washington, London, and Brussels have increasingly promoted the Ugandan regime in neighboring countries and at regional and international levels as a vital counterterrorism provider. Furthermore, peacekeeping solutions have facilitated the military intervention of Ugandan forces in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. 

The Ugandan regime has benefited from significant shifts in the international and regional context since 1986 in order to gradually secure its relations with donors and increase the amount of international support directed towards its military and security forces, as donors have committed to help build and strengthen a military system in Uganda by agreeing to gradual securitization for their relationship with Museveni's government. In doing so, they contributed to creating an increasingly authoritarian state.  

Consolidation and dependency

Social anthropologists see dependency theory as one of the most pessimistic theories in social studies. At the macro level, this structural theory stems from a central premise that it is impossible to understand the processes and problems in Africa without looking at the broader socio-historical context of the expansion in Western Europe (industrial and commercial capitalism) and the colonialism of these places by Western economies. According to Walter Rodney, colonialism was not just a system of exploitation. However, its primary objective was to return the profits made in Africa to the so-called homeland, which means, from the perspective of dependency, a process of frequent relocation of the surplus values created by African labor using African resources. On this basis, the development of Europe can be seen as part of the same dialectical processes which led to Africa's backwardness. In other words, Europe's domination of Africa impeded the continent's economic development for five consecutive centuries, during which Europe benefited from its confrontation with Africa.  

In the same context, this socio-historical viewpoint supports many economic studies, such as development studies, that have been examined from various perspectives in Africa. Most of them unanimously support the common thesis of underdevelopment, which is an essential principle in the discussion of dependency, especially given the invocation of many concepts and the main variables along the way.  

Deepening the state of underdevelopment

As a result, the continent is experiencing an underdevelopment crisis due to increasing securitization policies and the marginalization of development favoring security. This is only one of the many manifestations of these policies that Western countries and donors bear in the first place, without overlooking the negative role played by the ruling political elites. 

Conclusion

• The strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in many countries of the continent, where the exceptional situation imposed by the securitization process affected the path of democratic transition that began at the end of the eighties. The state of emergency in connection with the fight against international terrorism has expanded across the continent, and regimes have used it to target opponents and all voices asking for reform and change. 
• Consolidating dependency by linking African economies to development aid and external loans directly contributed to the exacerbation of the indebtedness situation that most of the continent's countries mortgaged to donors, whether states or international institutions, which was then called neo-colonialism in Africa.
• Deepening the state of underdevelopment through increased attention to the security sectors and neglect of development.

Citate:

APA 6th Edition

Derradji, H. i Madouni, A. (2022). The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences. National security and the future, 23 (3), 49-82. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

MLA 8th Edition

Derradji, Hichem i Ali Madouni. "The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences." National security and the future, vol. 23, br. 3, 2022, str. 49-82. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3 Citirano DD.MM.YYYY.

Chicago 17th Edition

Derradji, Hichem i Ali Madouni. "The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences." National security and the future 23, br. 3 (2022): 49-82. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

Harvard

Derradji, H., i Madouni, A. (2022). 'The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences', National security and the future, 23(3), str. 49-82. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

Vancouver

Derradji H, Madouni A. The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences. National security and the future [Internet]. 2022 [pristupljeno DD.MM.YYYY.];23(3):49-82. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

IEEE

H. Derradji i A. Madouni, "The securitisation of development in Africa: causes, mechanism, and consequences", National security and the future, vol.23, br. 3, str. 49-82, 2022. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.3.3

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