Uredili

Željko Holjevac – Nives Mikelić Preradović – Gordan Akrap – Ivo Lučić

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Sadržaj

• Predgovor  ....(p.7)
• Prof. dr. sc. Miroslav Tuđman (1946. – 2021.)  ....(p.9)
• Bibliografija i znanstvena djelatnost prof. dr. sc. Miroslava Tuđmana  ....(p.15)
• Ivan ROGIĆ
  O jednoj pukotini u opusu Miroslava Tuđmana  ....(p.27)
• David VAANDRAGER, Willem LEEUWENKAMP, Giliam DE VALK
  A Horizon Scan Based on a Systems Analysis: to Anticipate Threats Against Organizations Involved in the Well-Functioning of Society  ....(p.47)
• Silvana MARIĆ TOKIĆ, Ivica SKOKO
  Uloga dezinformacije u kreiranju korpusa javnoga znanja  ....(p.73)
• Sanja KIŠIČEK
  Stvaranje i održavanje kolaborativne radne okoline  ....(p.89)
• Tomislava LAUC
  Informacijska znanost: od ishodišta prema korisničkom iskustvu  ....(p.103)
• Darko BABIĆ
  Organizacija znanja kao model upravljanja baštinom: baštinska pismenost  ....(p.113)
• Đani BUNJA
  Obilježja upravljanja informacijama u hrvatskom turizmu  ....(p.125)
• Željka MIKLOŠEVIĆ, Mihaela KULEJ
  Iskazi znanja u suvremenom muzeju i digitalna tehnologija  ....(p.137)
• Marija BOBAN
  Umjetna inteligencija i privatnost: izazovi za zaštitu podataka u informacijskom dobu  ....(p.155)
• Ana BARBARIĆ, Ivana HEBRANG GRGIĆ
  Publikacije hrvatskih iseljenika u Australiji i Novome Zelandu: od bibliografije do bibliometrije  ....(p.177)
• Dražen ŽIVIĆ, Ivana BENDRA
  Miroslav Tuđman i znanstveno-stručni skup „Vukovar ’91.”: konferencijska priopćenja i objavljeni radovi  ....(p.189)
• Władysław BUŁHAK
  The Eve of Moscow’s Eight Eyes, Shields and Swords Alliance. The summit of the security apparatuses of the Soviet bloc countries (7-12 March 1955) as an event constituting the communist intelligence community  ....(p.203)
• Davor MARIJAN
  Krizna stanja u teoriji i praksi obrambeno-zaštitnog sustava socijalističke Jugoslavije  ....(p.215)
• Josip MIHALJEVIĆ
  Gastarbajteri kao sigurnosno pitanje jugoslavenske komunističke vlasti 1970-ih.  ....(p.239)
• Stipe KLJAIĆ
  Atavizam prošlosti: rasprave o dalmatinskom autonomaštvu na marginama Hrvatskog proljeća  ....(p.265)
• Domagoj KNEŽEVIĆ
  Franjo Tuđman u Informacijama Službe državne sigurnosti Republičkog sekretarijata unutrašnjih poslova Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske u kontekstu političkih promjena sredinom 1980-ih  ....(p.279)
• Gordan AKRAP, Ivica MANDIĆ
  Military Intelligence Estimates and Strategic Decisions: the Case of Vukovar 1991 – 1995.   ....(p.301)
• Mijo BELJO
  Informativno-propagandno djelovanje muslimansko-bošnjačke strane tijekom rata u BiH: primjer Oslobođenja (1992. i 1993. godine)  ....(p.325)
• Ivo LUČIĆ
  Hrvatska izvještajna služba u obrani Republike Hrvatske  ....(p.345)
• Ugo VLAISAVLJEVIĆ
  Ratna strategija bosanskog suverena: prilog čitanju Tuđmanove Druge strane Rubikona  ....(p.367)
• Roman DOMOVIĆ
  Znanstvena metodologija nasuprot pseudodokazima u predmetu IT-04-74-T  ....(p.385)
• Saša MRDULJAŠ
  Pozicije Hrvatske u odnosu na mogućnost realizacije ideje „srpskog sveta”  ....(p.403)
• Sažetak  ....(p.423)
• Summary  ....(p.432)
• O autorima  ....(p.443)

Predgovor

Urednici

PROF. DR. SC. MIROSLAV TUĐMAN (1946. – 2021.)

Osnovni podatci

Odsjek za informacijske znanosti i Miroslav Tuđman

Znanstvena djelatnost Miroslava Tuđmana i katedra za organizaciju znanja

BIBLIOGRAFIJA I ZNANSTVENA DJELATNOST PROF. DR. SC. MIROSLAVA TUĐMANA

Željko HOLJEVAC
Nives MIKELIĆ PRERADOVIĆ

Gordan AKRAP

Ivo LUČIĆ

1. Magisterij i doktorat

2. Znanstveni radovi

2.3. Knjige (urednik)

2.4. Poglavlja u knjizi

2.5. Znanstveni radovi objavljeni u znanstvenim časopisima

2.6. Znanstveni radovi recenzirani, objavljeni u zborniku radova s međunarodnih znanstvenih skupova

13. Đilda Pečarić, Miroslav Tuđman: About the differences between communication networks and cognitive networks. Contribution to Research of Bibliometric methods in Information Science”, Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries / Katsirikou, Anthi (ur.)., Athens, Greece, 2011.

2.8. Ostala znanstvena djelatnost

3. Znanstveni projekti

3.2. Voditelj domaćih projekata

3.3. Aktivno sudjelovanje u realizaciji znanstvenih projekata

4. Urednik znanstvenog časopisa

O JEDNOJ PUKOTINI U OPUSU MIROSLAVA TUĐMANA

Obrisi pukotine

Kratki podsjetnik na „slijepa mjesta” informacijskih praksa 

Instrumentalizacija simbolnih djelatnosti u ovako skiciranu okviru samo je jednim od posebnih vidova tehničke standardizacije socijalne zbilje. Budući da se njome simbolnim tvorevinama oduzimlju mnogobrojna zamršena značenja (poslužimo se uputnicom M. Webera: ona se „odčaravaju”), njihova se simbolna kakvoća javlja u obzoru „plivajuće” tehničke raspoloživosti, gdje simbolne tvorevine mogu jednako valjano služiti svakoj „funkciji” koja se legitimira vezom s proizvodnjom proizvodnje (tehnikom). Posve je očito kako se u takvu obzoru mogu nametnuti, a i nameću se, raznolike „informacijske strategije” koje istom „funkcionalnošću” raspolažu istinama, poluistinama ili lažima.

(c) Informatizacija društva = imperativ modernizacije. U već spomenutoj knjizi Obavijest i znanje Tuđman sugerira kako je informatizacija (društva) „prijenos i upravljanje ljudskim znanjem” (str. 62.) iliti gospodarenje ljudskim znanjem, kako sugerira i definicija UNESCO-a. Tu su važni (i) pristupačnost znanju; (ii) način upravljanja znanjem; (c) uporaba informacija kao forme raspoloživa znanja. Dvije činjenice ovdje izazivlju komentar.

Sjena konteksta: društveni akteri i moć

Prigodna skica glavnih aktera/generatora informacijskog nereda

Četiri Tuđmanova uvida

Znanstvenik u braniteljskom zrcalu

Zaključak

• Tuđman, M. (1983). Struktura kulturne informacije. Zagreb: Zavod za kulturu Hrvatske.
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• Tuđman, M. (1990). Obavijest i znanje. Zagreb: Zavod za informacijske studije Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
• Tuđman, M. (1992). Uvod u informacijsku znanost (zajedno s D. Borasom i Z. Dovedenom). Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
• Tuđman, M. (2003). Informacijska znanost: znanost o obavijestima, pogrešnim obavijestima i protuobavijestima, u: Miroslav Tuđman (ur.), Modeli znanja i obrada prirodnog jezika. Zagreb: Zavod za informacijske studije, Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 13-37.
• Tuđman, M. (ur.) (2005.). Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini. Zagreb: Slovo M.
• Tuđman, M. (2005.). Proizvodnja pamćenja: između povijesnog zaborava i pristanka na političku manipulaciju, u: Tuđman, M. (ur.), Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini. Zagreb: Slovo M, 3-50.
• Tuđman, M. (2008.). Informacijsko ratište i informacijska znanost. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2013.). Programiranje istine. Rasprave o preraspodjelama društvenih zaliha znanja. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2017.). Druga strana Rubikona. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2019.). Haški krivolov. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.

A HORIZON SCAN BASED ON A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: TO ANTICIPATE THREATS AGAINST ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE WELL-FUNCTIONING OF SOCIETY

David VAANDRAGER
Willem LEEUWENKAMP

Giliam DE VALK

“The challenge of the unknown future is so much more exciting than the stories of the accomplished past.” (Simon Sinek)

Introduction 

Method

How do we conduct a horizon scan?

Figure 1: Horizon scan

Protecting society

The external environment

The internal environment

Figure 2: Organization's internal environment

Causal Loop Diagram as a method to conduct a system analysis 

Mapping structure with causal loop diagrams

How do we construct a causal loop model? System theory offers a framework on how to interpret the environment. To visualize the structure of causal relationships that make up the bigger picture of the internal and external environment we use a method; the causal loop diagram. The causal loop diagram consists of cause and effect relationships and is constructed as follows:

• Step 1 identification: first we need to be clear about the phenomenon of interest. 
• Step 2 adding causes: Once we have identified phenomenon "X" we want to know what caused the phenomenon. 
• Step 3 adding consequences: Next, we want to know what consequences phenomenon "X" produces. Consequences can be found a little easier if we hypothetically let the phenomenon “X” increase or decrease. 
• Step 4 identify feedback: Feedback effects, or feedback exists because the various elements are connected in conjunction. Specifically, when an element is connected to itself through a relationship with one or more other elements.  So not "X" affects Y, but X affects Y, Y affects A and A affects "X" again, or in other words a closed circle or 'loop'. A more concrete example of such a closed loop is when an institution makes policies to influence a particular phenomenon, the change in that phenomenon in turn provides input for new decisions. Schematically, we can construct a causal loop diagram as shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Constructing a causal loop (Vennix, 1996)

Figure 4: Anglers Feedback Loop

The causal loop models

Internal environment

• Capacity is a problem if threats unfold while security departments are undermanned
• Knowledge and skills of the civil servants: when it is hard to attract the right people to mitigate or understand the threat
• Structured knowledge networks: practitioners depend on each other, the services, social media and each other for their knowledge. The better practitioners are embedded in his or her network the easier it is to pick up the right signals. 
• Open culture versus a blame culture: A prerequisite for the free flow of information is an open culture. Employees must feel safe to communicate about certain safety-related issues. If not, people will not communicate, relevant information will not be shared, and signals do not get to the right place at the right time. 

Figure 5: Internal environment 

Globalization

Interstate competition

Economy

Subversion

Climate

Conclusion 

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ULOGA DEZINFORMACIJE U KREIRANJU KORPUSA JAVNOGA ZNANJA

Silvana MARIĆ TOKIĆ
Ivica SKOKO

Uvod

Informacija kao faktor moći

Medijska konstrukcija stvarnosti

Javno znanje u vremenskom i društvenom kontekstu 

Tko je dijelio Bosnu i Hercegovinu?

Zaključak 

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STVARANJE I ODRŽAVANJE KOLABORATIVNE RADNE OKOLINE

Kolaborativna radna okolina 

Izazovi u stvaranju kolaborativne radne okoline

Komunikacijski obrazac za kolegijalni dijalog

a. Pojašnjavanje

Pojašnjavanjem postavljamo pitanja jednostavnog i zatvorenog tipa putem kojih saznajemo više detalja potrebnih kako bismo bolje razumjeli sugovornika i shvatili što nam želi reći. Uputno je izbjegavati pitanje “Zašto?” jer ono izaziva obrambeni stav i stavlja sugovornika u poziciju obrane i objašnjavanja te ga može udaljiti od problema i onog što je uistinu važno. Pitanja pojašnjavanja pomažu sugovornicima da ostanu fokusirani na predmet razgovora i specifični u argumentaciji (v. karticu ispod za primjere takvih pitanja i moguće rečenične strukture). 

Nakon što smo ustanovili da smo sugovornika dobro shvatili i nakon što smo dobili dovoljno detalja da razumijemo izloženu situaciju, odnosno problem, možemo krenuti s postavljanjem pronicljivih pitanja. To su složenija pitanja otvorenog tipa. Svrha takvih pitanja je potaknuti sugovornika na ekspanzivnije razmišljanje o problemu, promjenu perspektive ili otvaranje novih horizonata. Takva pitanja često izazivaju “aha” trenutke u kojima sugovornik sam dolazi do spoznaje internalizacijom misaonih procesa. Pronicljiva pitanja pomiču defenzivnost prema dubljem promišljanju i osvrtu. Pitanja ovakvog tipa ne svaljuju krivnju ni na koga, ne insinuiraju, ne upućuju na optužbe niti osuđuju. Ako želimo da sugovornici predano sudjeluju u razgovoru, važno je da se osjećaju psihološki sigurno, kako tvrdi Knight . Drugim riječima, to znači da ih ne osuđujemo kakav god da odgovor daju. Važno je pripaziti da niti u ovom koraku ne ubacujemo svoje prijedloge i moguća rješenja jer bismo time sugovornika mogli ograničiti u samostalnom zaključivanju i dolaženju do zaključaka. Kada postavljamo pitanja, nastojmo “ponizno upitati”, kako to naglašava Shein . “Ponizan upit” je prema Sheinu vještina koja sugovornika izvodi na čistinu, na otvoreno, postavljajući pitanja na koja nužno ne znamo odgovor, vještina koja gradi odnose temeljeno na znatiželji i zanimanju za ljude (v. karticu ispod za primjere takvih pitanja i moguće rečenične strukture). 

Tek nakon što smo sugovornika dobro shvatili aktivnim slušanjem i parafraziranjem, i nakon što smo mu dali priliku da ekspanzivnije samostalno razmišlja postavljajući mu pronicljiva pitanja, “zaslužujemo” pružiti mu povratnu informaciju i iznijeti svoje prijedloge u svezi datog problema. Da smo to učinili ranije, sugovornika bismo ograničili u vlastitoj mogućnosti da dublje promišlja o problemu i da samostalno dođe do spoznaje. Bez obzira koliko je naše rezoniranje logično i koliko nam se vlastito rješenje ”zdravorazumski” nameće kao odgovor na problem, uputno je suzdržati se od preranog dijeljenja našeg zaključka, kako bismo ostavili prostor sugovorniku da sam dođe do svog zaključka, što je osnovni preduvjet za dugoročnu održivost spoznaje. Naime, čak i da sugovornik usvoji naše preuranjene sugestije kao odgovore na problem, riskiramo da ih nakon kratkog vremena odbaci i vrati se starim (naučenim) obrascima ponašanja koji su ga i doveli do problema. Stoga je internalizacija na putu do spoznaje vrlo važna! Pogledajte moguće rečenične strukture za pružanje povratne informacije na kartici ispod. 

Održavanje i kultura kolaborativne radne okoline

Tko su protagonisti?

Umjesto zaključka

• Aguilar, E. (2016). The Art of Coaching Teams. Building Resilient Communities That Transform Schools. Jossey-Bass.
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• Knight, J. (2016). Better Conversations. Coaching ourselves and each other to be more credible, caring and connected. Corwin.
• Kolaboracionist. Hrvatska enciklopedija, mrežno izdanje. Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža (2021). Pristupljeno 28. 5. 2022. Preuzeto s: http://www.enciklopedija.hr/Natuknica.aspx?ID=32331.
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• Schön, D.A. (1983). The reflective practitioner. New York: Basic books.
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• Wheatley, M. (2002). Willing to be Disturbed. Berrett-Koshler Publishers, Inc. San Francisco.

INFORMACIJSKA ZNANOST: OD ISHODIŠTA PREMA KORISNIČKOM ISKUSTVU

Tomislava LAUC

Ishodišta informacijske znanosti

Porijeklo informacijske znanosti: dokumentacija i pretraživanje informacija 

Informacijska tehnologija i posredovana komunikacija

Informacijska znanost i podatkovna znanost

Informacijska znanost / informacijske znanosti: prema korisničkom iskustvu

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ORGANIZACIJA ZNANJA KAO MODEL UPRAVLJANJA BAŠTINOM: BAŠTINSKA PISMENOST

Darko BABIĆ

Pismenost

Potreba kritičkog pristupa

• Afrić, V., Lasić-Lazić, J., Banek-Zorica, M. (2004). Znanje, učenje i upravljanje znanjem, u: Lasić-Lazić, J. (ur.). Odabrana poglavlja iz organizacije znanja. Zagreb: Zavod za informacijske studije, 33-61.
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OBILJEŽJA UPRAVLJANJA INFORMACIJAMA U HRVATSKOM TURIZMU 

Đani BUNJA

Pregled literature

Izvor: autorovo istraživanje

Upravljanje informacijama

Upravljanje informacijama u hrvatskom turizmu

Umjesto zaključka

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ISKAZI ZNANJA U SUVREMENOM MUZEJU I DIGITALNA TEHNOLOGIJA

Željka MIKLOŠEVIĆ
Mihaela KULEJ

Muzejski epistemološki obrasci 

Dijalog ili dijaloški muzej kao okosnica razvoja participativnosti 

Narativnost u adaptivnom muzeju

Čula i čuvstva kao temelj performativnog muzeja

Participacija i informacijsko-komunikacijska tehnologija 

Zaključak - prema otvorenom muzeju 

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• Russo, A.  – Watkins, J. – Kelly, L. – Chan, S. (2008). Participatory Communication with Social Media, Curator: The Museum Journal, 51 (1), 21-31. 
• Salgado, M. – Marttila, S. (2013). Discussions on Inclusive, Participative and Open Museums“, International Conference on Design and Digital Heritage -NODEM 2013 Conference Proceedings (Beyond Control – The Collaborative Museum and its Challenges). Stokholm, 41-48. 
• http://repo.nodem.org/uploads/Discussions%20on%20inclusive,%20participative%20and%20open%20museums.pdf (12.01.2022)
• Schorch, P. (2013). Contact Zones, Third Spaces, and the Act of Interpretation. Museum and Society, 11 (1), 68-81. 
• Schorch, P. – Hakiwai A. (2014). Mana Taonga and the public sphere: A dialogue between Indigenous practice and Western theory. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 17 (2), 191-205.
• Smith, L. (2021). Emotional Heritage. Visitor Engagement at Museums and Heritage Sites. London–New York, Routledge.
• Smith, L. – Waterton, E. (2012). Heritage, Communities and Archaeology. London et al: Bloomsbury.
• Steier, R. (2014). Posing the Question: Visitor Posing as Embodied Interpretation in an Art Museum. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 21 (2), 148–170.
• Stuedahl, D. – Skåtun, T. – Lefkaditou, A. – Messenbrink, T. (2019). Participation and dialogue Curatorial reflexivity in participatory processes, u: Galani, A. – Mason, R. –Arrigoni, G. (ur.), European Heritage, Dialogue and Digital Practices. London–New York: Routledge, 62-83.
• Tallon, L. –  Walker, K. (2008). Digital Technologies and the Museum Experience: Handheld Guides and Other Media. Lanham, MD: Altamira Press.
• Tuđman, M. (1990). Obavijest i znanje. Zagreb: Zavod za informacijske studije. 
• Vujić, Ž. (1999). Museum object and museum collecting as viewed by semiotics. Informatologia, 32 (3-4), 200-208.
• Watson, S. (ur.) (2007). Museums and their Communities. London–New York: Routledge.
• Weil, S. (1990). The Proper Business of the Museum: Ideas or Things“, u: Weil, S. (ur.), Rethinking the Museum and Other Mediations. Washington – London: Smithsonian Institutions Press, 43-56.
• Witcomb, A. (2015). Toward a pedagogy of feeling: understanding how museums create a space for cross-cultural encounters, u: Message, K. (ur.), Museum Theory (The international handbooks of museum studies). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 321-344. 
• Wray, T. –  Ingimundardottir, E. –  Stanciauskaite, G. –  Løvlie, A. S. (2018). Word by Word: A mobile game to encourage collaborative storytelling within the museum. MW18: MW 2018. 
• https://mw18.mwconf.org/paper/word-by-word-a-mobile-game-to-encourage-collaborative-storytelling-within-the-museum/  (13.08.2021.)

UMJETNA INTELIGENCIJA I PRIVATNOST: IZAZOVI ZA ZAŠTITU PODATAKA U INFORMACIJSKOM DOBU

Primjena umjetne inteligencije i zaštita podataka u informacijskom dobu

Uredba o umjetnoj inteligenciji u europskoj uniji – „artiifcial intelligence act“ (aia)

• Uredba o slobodnom protoku neosobnih podataka
• Akt o kibernetičkoj sigurnosti
• Direktiva o otvorenim podacima
• Opća uredba o zaštiti podataka.

Ograničen rizik

• do 30.000.000 EUR or ili 6 % globalnog godišnjeg prihoda koji je ostvaren u prethodnoj godini (ovisno što je veće) u odnosu na zabranjene sustava i upravljenje podacima.
• do 20.000.000 EUR ili 4 % globalnog godišnjeg prihoda koji je ostvaren u prethodnoj godini (ovisno što je veće) u odnosu na ostale neusklađenosti s uredbom.
• i 10.000.000 EUR ili 2 % globalnog godišnjeg prihoda koji je ostvaren u prethodnoj godini (ovisno što je veće), ako obveznik uredbe daje nepotpune i netočne informacije nadzornim tijelima. 

Primjena umjetne inteligencije u europskoj uniji i osiguravanje odgovarajućeg regulatornog okvira zaštite privatnosti

• Poglavlje I - Temelji pouzdanog AI-ja: postavlja temelje pouzdanog AI-ja postavljanjem njegovog pristupa utemeljenog na temeljnim pravima12. U njemu se identificiraju i opisuju etička načela kojih se treba pridržavati radi osiguranja etičke i robusne AI.
• Poglavlje II - Realizacija pouzdanog AI-a: prevodi ova etička načela u sedam ključnih zahtjeva koje bi AI-sustavi trebali primijeniti i ispuniti tijekom svog životnog ciklusa. Pored toga, nudi i tehničke i „netehničke“ metode koje se mogu koristiti za njihovu primjenu.
• Poglavlje III. - Procjena pouzdanog AI: donosi konkretan i neiscrpan popis procjene pouzdanog AI-ja za operacionalizaciju zahtjeva iz Poglavlja II, nudeći praktičarima AI praktične smjernice. Ova procjena mora biti prilagođena aplikaciji određenog sustava. 

Privatnost i zaštita podataka. 

Pristup podacima. 

Zaključak

• Abrams, M., Abrams, J., Cullen, P. (2019). Artificial intelligence, ethics, and enhanced data stewardship. IEEE Security & Privacy. Volume: 17, Issue: 2, March-April, 17-30.
• Benson, T., Grieve, G. (2016). Principles of Health Interoperability. London: Springer.
• Boban, M. (2019). E-zdravlje: zaštita osobnih podataka u novim uvjetima. 1. Kongres KOKOZ-a i 3. Hrvatski kongres medicinskog prava s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem. Rabac, Hrvatska, 41-72.
• Boban, M. (2019). Primjena robotike u medicini: tehnološki, pravni i etički izazovi. 28th Conference Medicine, Law & Society The Globalization Of Medicine In The 21st Century. Maribor, 89-107.
• Building a European data economy,  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/building-european-data-economy
• Carmon, Z., Wertenbroch, K. et al. (2018). Consumer Choice and Autonomy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Dana. Cust. Need. and Solut. 5, 28–37 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40547-017-0085-8).
• DIREKTIVA (EU) 2019/1024 EUROPSKOG PARLAMENTA I VIJEĆA, od 20. lipnja 2019. o otvorenim podacima i ponovnoj uporabi informacija javnog sektora, Službeni list Europske unije, L 172/56. Dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L1024 
• Europarlament, službene web stranice, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/hr/headlines/society/20200827STO85804/sto-je-umjetna-inteligencija-i-kako-se-upotrebljava
• European Commission, Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI -  High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, B-1049 Brussels, Document made public on 8 April 2019., Brussels, 2019.
• European legislation on open data and the re-use of public sector, information https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-legislation-reuse-public-sector-information
• Hattenbach, B., Glucoft, J. (2015). Patents in an era of infinite monkeys and artificial intelligence. Stanford Technology Law Review, 32, 32-51.
• Hedgecoe, A. (2004). The Politics of Personalised Medicine: Pharmacogenetics in the Clinic. Cambridge University Press.
• Izvješće Komisije „Spašavanje života: poboljšanje sigurnosti automobila u EU-u” (COM(2016) 0787 final 
• Javno savjetovanje o transformaciji zdravstvene zaštite i skrbi u okviru jedinstvenog digitalnog tržišta, provedeno između srpnja i listopada 2017. Dostupno na https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/public-consultation-transformation-health-and-care-digital-single-market_hr 
• Katyal, S. (2019). Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54.
• Kingston, J. (2017). Using artificial intelligence to support compliance with the general data protection regulation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (1), str. 1-15
• KOMUNIKACIJA KOMISIJE EUROPSKOM PARLAMENTU, EUROPSKOM VIJEĆU, VIJEĆU, EUROPSKOM GOSPODARSKOM I SOCIJALNOM ODBORU I ODBORU REGIJA Umjetna inteligencija za Europu COM/2018/237 final (dalje KOMUNIKACIJA KOMISIJE Umjetna inteligencija za Europu) str. 1. Dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/hr/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0237 
• Komunikacija komisije Europskom parlamentu, vijeću, Europskom gospodarskom i socijalnom odboru i Odboru regija o omogućivanju digitalne transformacije na jedinstvenom digitalnom tržištu u području zdravstva i skrbi: osnaživanje građana i stvaranje zdravijeg društva, Bruxelles, 25.4.2018., COM(2018) 233 final. Dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0233&from=EN 
• KOMUNIKACIJA KOMISIJE Umjetna inteligencija za Europu 
• Komunikaciji komisije o omogućivanju digitalne transformacije na jedinstvenom digitalnom tržištu u području zdravstva i skrbi: osnaživanje građana i stvaranje zdravijeg društva, COM(2018) 233 final
• Kuang, C. (2019). Insight of Artificial Intelligence Application in Healthcare. International Journal of Sciences, Janary 8(08), 50-55.
• Mitrou, L. (2018). Data Protection, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Services: Is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)'Artificial Intelligence-Proof'? SSRN´s eLibrary. Dostupno na https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3386914 
• Narayanan, A., Bennun, M. (1998). Law, Computer Science, and Artificial Intelligence. Intellect Books.
• Prijedlog UREDBE EUROPSKOG PARLAMENTA I VIJEĆA O UTVRĐIVANJU USKLAĐENIH PRAVILA O UMJETNOJ INTELIGENCIJI (AKT O UMJETNOJ INTELIGENCIJI) I IZMJENI ODREĐENIH ZAKONODAVNIH AKATA UNIJE COM/2021/206 final  (dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206)
• Pročišćena verzija Ugovora o Europskoj uniji i Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije Ugovor o Europskoj uniji (pročišćena verzija) Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije (pročišćena verzija) Protokoli Prilozi Ugovoru o funkcioniranju Europske unije Izjave priložene Završnom aktu Međuvladine konferencije na kojoj je donesen Ugovor iz Lisabona potpisan 13. prosinca 2007. OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388. Dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016ME%2FTXT   
• Program Copernicus dostupno na http://copernicus.eu/news/upcoming-copernicus-data-and-information-access-services-dias
• Radni dokument službi Komisije o odgovornosti uz ovu Komunikaciju (SWD (2018)137).
• Requirements of Trustworthy AI, https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines/1#Human%20agency
• Rupali, M., Amit, P. (2017). Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning”, International Advanced Research Journal in Science, Engineering and Technology National Conference on Innovative Applications and Research in Computer Science and Engineering (NCIARCSE-2017) AGTI’s Dr. Daulatrao Aher College Engineering, Vidyanagar Extension, Karad, Vol. 4, Special Issue 4, January IARJSET ISSN (Online) 2393-8021 IARJSET ISSN (Online), 2393-8021 (dostupno na https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1059.8084&rep=rep1&type=pdf) 
• Studeny, J., Coustasse, A. (2014). Personal health records: is rapid adoption hindering interoperability?“, Perspectives in Health Information. Dostupno na https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4142513/
• Uredba (EU) 2016/679 Europskog parlamenta i vijeća od 27. travnja 2016. o zaštiti pojedinaca u vezi s obradom osobnih podataka i o slobodnom kretanju takvih podataka te o stavljanju izvan snage Direktive 95/46/EZ (Opća uredba o zaštiti podataka – GDPR), Službeni list Europske unije, L 119/1 Dostupno na https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679
• Wallis, L., Paich, M. (2017). Integrating artifical intelligence with anylogic simulation“, 2017 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC), Las Vegas, NV, 4449-4449.
• Weber, M., Boban, M. (2016). Security challenges of the internet of things. 39th International Convention on Information and Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics, MIPRO; Opatija; Croatia, IEEE, 638-643 (doi:10.1109/mipro.2016.7522219).

PUBLIKACIJE HRVATSKIH ISELJENIKA U AUSTRALIJI I NOVOME ZELANDU: OD BIBLIOGRAFIJE DO BIBLIOMETRIJE

Ana BARBARIĆ
Ivana HEBRANG GRGIĆ

Metodološki aspekti izradbe bibliografija

Od bibliografije do bibliometrije

Umjesto zaključka

• Hebrang Grgić, I. (2022a). Hrvatske novine u Australiji početkom 1930-ih godina: načini provođenja i izbjegavanja cenzure. Vjesnik bibliotekara Hrvatske, 1 (65), 273-298 (doi:10.30754/vbh.65.1.940).
• Hebrang Grgić, I., Barbarić, A. (2019). Metodologija prikupljanja podataka i izrade retrospektivne bibliografije iseljeničkog tiska. Vjesnik bibliotekara Hrvatske, 1 (62), 29-48 (doi:10.30754/vbh.62.1.744).
• Hebrang Grgić, I. (2022b). Newspapers Published by Croats in New South Wales: From Print Environment to Social Networking Sites. Journal of the Australian Library and Information Association, 2 (71), 1-14 (doi:10.1080/24750158.2022.2046385).
• Hebrang Grgić, I., Barbarić, A. (2021). Ni s kućom ni bez kuće: nakladnička djelatnost Hrvata u Novome Zelandu. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak.
• HIT – Hrvatski iseljenički tisak. Dostupno na: https://hit.ffzg.unizg.hr/ (31. 5. 2022.)
• HIT – Hrvatski iseljenički tisak: publikacije hrvatskih iseljenika, publikacije o hrvatskim iseljenicima i druge vrste građe. Dostupno na: https://hit.repozitorij.ffzg.unizg.hr/ (1. 6. 2022.)
• ISBD: Međunarodni standardi bibliografski opis (2014.). Objedinjeno izd.  Zagreb: Hrvatsko knjižničarsko društvo.
• Logar, J. (1973.). Uvod u bibliografiju. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
• Projekt Hrvatski iseljenički tisak (HIT), Hrvatska znanstvena bibliografija – CROSBI. Dostupno na: https://www.bib.irb.hr/pretraga?operators=and|9320|text|project-id&report=1 (26. 5. 2022.)
• Zakon o knjižnicama i knjižničnoj djelatnosti, Narodne novine, 17/2019, 13. veljače 2019. Zakon o izmjenama Zakona o knjižnicama i knjižničnoj djelatnosti, Narodne novine, 98/2019, 4. listopada 2019. Dostupno na: https://www.zakon.hr/z/2275/Zakon-o-knji%C5%BEnicama-i-knji%C5%BEni%C4%8Dnoj-djelatnosti (24. 5. 2022.)

MIROSLAV TUĐMAN I ZNANSTVENO-STRUČNI SKUP „VUKOVAR '91.“: KONFERENCIJSKA PRIOPĆENJA I OBJAVLJENI RADOVI

Dražen ŽIVIĆ
Ivana BENDRA

Miroslav Tuđman i znanstveno-stručni skup „Vukovar '91.“

Hrvatska i bošnjačka politika u prvoj polovici 1990-ih – između suradnje i suprotstavljanja

Zaključni osvrt

• Mihaljević, V. (2021). Humanističke znanosti u kaleidoskopu Instituta Pilar, u: Živić, D. (ur.), Pilarov kaleidoskop hrvatskoga društva (u povodu obilježavanja 30. obljetnice Instituta Pilar). Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 35-42.
• Rogić, I. (2021). Jedan po jedan odlaze gospari… Pilar. Časopis za društvene i humanističke studije, godište XVI., broj 31 (1), 209-217.
• Tuđman, M. (2004). Umreženo znanje: između kolektivnog zaborava i povijesnog pamćenja. Odgovornost informacijske znanosti za prikupljanje i obradu podataka i dokaza o logorima i ljudskim pravima u Europi na pragu 21. stoljeća, u: Jurčević, J. – Živić, D. – Esih, B. (ur.), Vukovar '91: međunarodni odjeci i značaj. Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 159-181.
• Tuđman, M. (2012). Programiranje istine – Rasprava o preraspodjelama društvenih zaliha znanja. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2013a). Programirane hereze i hrvatski otpori – Pripovijest o nepoćudnim knjigama, o nepoželjnim ljudima, o prešućenim događajima i o ustrajnom otporu u doba detuđmanizacije i kriminalizacije Domovinskoga rata. Zagreb: UHIP.
• Tuđman M. (2013b). Bosna i Hercegovina u raljama zapadne demokracije. Korespondencija predsjednika Republike Hrvatske dr. Franje Tuđmana i dokumenti o Bosni i Hercegovini 1990. – 1995. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus.
• Tuđman, M. (2014). Strateški ciljevi bošnjačke politike 1993. – 1994., u: Živić, D. – Špoljar Vržina, S. – Cvikić, S. – Žebec Šilj, I. (ur.), Vukovar '91. – genocid i memoricidna baština Europske Unije. Zagreb – Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar i Ogranak Matice hrvatske Vukovar, 215-231.
• Tuđman, M. (2018). Razlozi i posljedice Izetbegovićeva odbijanja vojnog saveza s Hrvatskom, u: Živić, D. – Žanić, M. – Macut, P. (ur.), Hrvatsko društvo: 25 godina nakon Vukovara '91. Zagreb – Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar i Ogranak Matice hrvatske u Vukovaru, 205-244.
• Žanić, M. – Živić, D. (2014). Vukovar '91. u istraživanjima Instituta Pilar, u: Živić, D. – Špoljar Vržina, S. – Cvikić, S. – Žebec Šilj, I. (ur.), Vukovar '91. – genocid i memoricidna baština Europske unije. Zagreb – Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar i Ogranak Matice hrvatske Vukovar, 113-125.
• Živić, D. (2014). Hrvatski domovinski rat u zrcalu istraživanja Instituta Pilar, u: Živić, D. – Špoljar Vržina, S. – Cvikić, S. – Žebec Šilj, I. (ur.), Vukovar '91. – genocid i memoricidna baština Europske unije. Zagreb – Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar i Ogranak Matice hrvatske Vukovar, 99-111.
• Žebec Šilj, I. – Cvikić, S. (ur.) (2015). Vukovar '91.: domovinska i (europska) sigurnost. Kriza sigurnosti i politike manipuliranja suverenitetom. Knjiga sažetaka. Zagreb – Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.
• Živić, D. – Cvikić, S. (ur.) (2017). Javni diskursi i pozicije moći. 20. znanstveno-stručni skup Vukovar '91. – dvadeset i šesta godina poslije. Programska knjižica. Vukovar: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar – Područni centar Vukovar.
• Živić, D. (ur.) (2021). Pilarov kaleidoskop hrvatskoga društva (u povodu obilježavanja 30. obljetnice Instituta Pilar). Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.

THE EVE OF MOSCOW'S EIGHT EYES, SHIELDS AND SWORDS ALLIANCE

THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY APPARATUSES OF THE SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES (7-12 MARCH 1955) AS AN EVENT CONSTITUTING THE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Władysław BUŁHAK

Invitation to Moscow meeting 1955 

The course of the meeting

The course of the meeting

General Serov's guidelines - the cornerstone of the communist intelligence community

Conclusions

• AIPN 01174/5, Radio-counterintelligence. Coordination Group (Group "K"). Work plans, protocols, instructions, 1955-1958, k. 1-302, pdf.
• Aparat bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w latach 1954–1956. Taktyka, strategia, metody. (2011). Eds. Majchrzak, G., Paczkowski, A. Warszawa: IPN.
• Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw (AIPN) 1583/161, Protocol on the agreement concluded as a result of the talks held from 20 June to 22 June 1955 in Berlin between the State Security Committee of the People's Republic of Poland and the State Secretariat for Security of the GDR, k. 11-17 (thanks to Dr Witold Bagienski for a copy of the document and valuable bibliographical guidance); AIPN 01174/5, Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting of the Services of the RKW of the USSR and the European Countries of People's Democracy of 20 September 1955, k. 7-12, pdf.
• Bagieński, W. (2017). Wywiad cywilny Polski Ludowej w latach 1945-1961. Vol. 1. Warszawa: IPN.
• Bułhak, W. (2021). W poszukiwaniu porównawczej syntezy aparatu represji w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944–1954. Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej, nr 19 (in print).
• Cenckiewicz, S. (2009). Udział aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL w drugiej kampanii reemigracyjnej (1955–1957), in: Cenckiewicz, S. (ed.), Śladami bezpieki i partii. Studia – źródła – publicystyka. Łomianki: LTW 2009, 61–62.
• KGB and DS. Vrezki i zawisimosti. Dokumenti ot centraliziraniya archiv, 1950-1991 (2010). Ed. by Kiriakova, T., Angelova, N. Sofia.
• KGB Lexicon, The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook (2002). Edited by Mitrokhin, V. London & New York: Routledge.
• Larecki, J. H. (2017). Wielki Leksykon Tajnych Służb Świata. Warszawa:Rytm.
• Murphy, D., Bailey, G., Kondrashev, S. A. (2002). Pole bitwy Berlin. Moskwa: Terra, 342-343. 
• https://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/index.html (access 14 December 2021).
• Okváth, I. (2020). Sprawozdanie z tajnej narady, 687-713.
• Okváth, I. (2020). Sprawozdanie z tajnej narady szefów bezpieki państw socjalistycznych 7–12 marca 1955 r. Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989, nr 18, 688-689.
• Osgood, K. (2017). Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, in: Pach, C. J., Malden MA (eds.), A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower. Oxford-Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 370-387.
• Pawlikowicz, L. (2013). Aparat centralny 1. Zarządu Głównego KGB jako instrument realizacji globalnej strategii Kremla 1954-1991. Warszawa: Bellona/Rytm.
• Petrov, N. (2015). Nowy ład Stalina. Sowietyzacja Europy 1945–1953. Warszawa: Demart.
• Pucci, M. (2020). Security Empire. The Secret Police in Communist Eastern Europe. New Haven–London: Yale University Press.
• Stosunki sowiecko-polskie 1953-1964. Sprawy zagraniczne i kwestie bezpieczeństwa. Dokumenty. (2022). Eds. Bułhak, W., Sokulski, M., t. 2, Warszawa: IPN (in print).
• Tyszkiewicz,  J. (2015). Rozbijanie monolitu. Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Polski 1945-1988. Warszawa: PWN, 57-89.
• Wolf, M., Mc Elvoy, A. (1997). Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster. New York: Times books.

Appendix: 

• Related multilateral meeting finally took place in Prague on 20-24 September 1955, during which the group coordinating radio counter-espionage activities was established located in Warsaw; cooperation in this area was very intensive, see AIPN 01174/5, Radio-counterintelligence.
• Coordination Group (Group „K”). Work plans, protocols, instructions, 1955Đ1958, k. 1-302, pdf.

KRIZNA STANJA U TEORIJI I PRAKSI OBRAMBENO-ZAŠTITNOG SUSTAVA SOCIJALISTIČKE JUGOSLAVIJE *

Davor MARIJAN

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

• Hrvatski državni arhiv u Zagrebu 
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GASTARBAJTERI KAO SIGURNOSNO PITANJE JUGOSLAVENSKE KOMUNISTIČKE VLASTI 1970-ih  

Josip MIHALJEVIĆ

Gastarbajteri kao skupina

Gastarbajteri ulaze u fokus sigurnosnih službi (akcija „Odmor“)

Vojni aspekt fenomena gastarbajtera

Bojazan od utjecaja političke emigracije

Angažman sigurnosnih služba prema gastarbajterima

Sigurnosne mjere primjenjivane na gastarbajtere 

Marginalnost „neprijateljske“ aktivnosti gastarbajtera nakon 1972.

Od sigurnosne ugroze do korisnog „alata“ u borbi protiv političke emigracije

• Hrvatski državni arhiv, Zagreb (HR-HDA)
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• Hrvatski institut za povijest (HR-HIP)
• Audio zbirka „Gastarbajterska usmena povijest“ (AZGUP)

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ATAVIZAM PROŠLOSTI: RASPRAVE O DALMATINSKOM AUTONOMAŠTVU NA MARGINAMA HRVATSKOG PROLJEĆA 

Stipe KLJAIĆ

Povijesna pozadina autonomaštva prije druge polovine 20. stoljeća

Rasprave o autonomaštvu i unitarizmu u Hrvatskom proljeću

Zaključak

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FRANJO TUĐMAN U INFORMACIJAMA SLUŽBE DRŽAVNE SIGURNOSTI REPUBLIČKOG SEKRETARIJATA UNUTRAŠNJIH POSLOVA SOCIJALISTIČKE REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE U KONTEKSTU POLITIČKIH PROMJENA SREDINOM 1980-ih

Domagoj KNEŽEVIĆ

Franjo Tuđman u Informacijama SDS RSUP SRH Centar Zagreb (ožujak – prosinac 1985. godine)

Franjo Tuđman u Informacijama SDS RSUP SRH Centar Zagreb (siječanj- rujan 1986. godine)

Zaključak

• Hrvatski državni arhiv, Zagreb, Služba državne sigurnosti Republički sekretarijat za unutarnje poslove Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske, fond 1561.
• Slobodna Dalmacija, 12434 (41), 19. travnja 1985.
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• Akrap, G. (2010). Mač i štit u rukama partije – represivni sustav u funkciji oblikovanja korpusa javnog znanja. National security and the future, 4 (11), 165-239.
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• Lučić, I. (2013). Uzroci rata, Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus – Hrvatski institut za povijest.
• Marijan, D. (2017). Hrvatska 1989.-1992. Rađanje države. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest.
• Radelić, Z. (2006). Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji: 1945. - 1991.: od zajedništva do razlaza. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Školska knjiga.
• Sadkovich, J. J. (2010). Tuđman: prva politička biografija. Zagreb: Večernji posebni proizvodi.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS: THE CASE OF VUKOVAR 1991-1995

Gordan AKRAP
Ivica MANDIĆ

Introduction

The history of human life is marked by conflicts and wars of different intensities, duration, and area of action. The outcomes of wars are decided at level of strategy when two, or more, opposing strategies clash.  This was realized long ago by Sun Tzu, who wrote about achieving an overall victory in the war by defeating the opponent’s strategy and imposing your own will on the target audience: „The highest form of warfare is to attack the strategy itself” . One of the key capabilities that the conflicting parties must develop to effectively defend or to create the conditions for offensive actions, is their own intelligence community. This precondition for victory was clearly recognized again by Sun Tzu, devoting an entire chapter to it in his book “The Art of War” , emphasizing: “Spies are a key factor in warfare. Every movement of the army depends on them” .

By integrating intelligence capabilities into the real context of the general actions of the state to fulfil its own Grand strategy, we come to the concept of Strategic Intelligence. It includes all those activities, as well as results of the intelligence community activities that aim at: a) reaching information superiority; b) to be used as a crucial support for decision makers on strategic level; c) to win any conflict and war.

Thanks to the knowledge, abilities, and skills of Prof. Dr. Miroslav Tuđman, Croatian intelligence community successfully developed its strategic capabilities in information and knowledge management. With the aim of acquiring a state of information supremacy, both in the civil and in the military domain of imposed conflict and war, Croatian Homeland war for independence. Therefore, we dedicate this article to the memory of Prof.Dr Miroslav Tuđman.

SIGINT – role and place in low- and high intensity conflicts

One of the methods and means for data collection that are necessary in the decision – making process are the data collected by the technical means, or intercepting different types of signals, signal intelligence or SIGINT (as it is seen on picture 1). One must take care when using data collected by this activity, as well as other intelligence activities. In the case of data obtained by HUMINT, it is necessary to always check and evaluate the reliability and credibility of the source, the source’s availability of the obtained data (direct, or indirect), the integrity, accuracy, completeness and truthfulness of the obtained data.

For data and information obtained by SIGINT, it is also necessary to analyze a number of determinants in order to assess their usefulness. Namely, it is known, both from practical experience and from the works of relevant experts (Tuđman, 2000; Wiebes, 2015) that the data collected through SIGINT can be extremely valuable but also extremely manipulative in the sense that they can lead the recipient to inaccurate conclusions.  One should also consider the fact that the intercepted data may be intelligence by itself. In other words, autonomous intelligence product . SIGINT, especially nowadays, provides the recipient with huge quantities of raw intelligence. This imposes the need to use special software based on artificial intelligence (AI) so that the collected data can quickly be reviewed and that a rough estimate of the possible value for further intelligence analysis can be given. The development of modern information and communication technologies constantly imposes the need for newer solutions for the collection, processing, organization, distribution, and storage of this type of data. Very high costs are associated with this collection activity. 

Picture 1: Intelligence gathering methods 

On the other hand, the use of technological solutions and the intelligence gained through the operation of the SIGNIT system, depends on a number of questions that need to be answered: are the SIGINT targeted persons precisely those persons whom we expect them to be or are collected data incorrectly attributed to someone else; are the people that are under SIGINT measures aware of that and know that, are they trying in some way to plant disinformation at some point in order to persuade opponent analysts and decision makers to make decisions that benefit them? The use of technological solutions like this for obtaining (strategic) intelligence can become a significant political problem if it is discredited and/or publicly discovered. Namely, their use demands the highest level of competence and seriousness in the approach to the management and use of the collected data and information. At the same time adhering to the highest level of secrecy of data protection on this activity and the collected data is from vital importance. 

Croatian Homeland War

The Croatian Homeland War is an example of the conflict that we now call the hybrid war. From strong military – political – economic – financial – social – ethnic – religious pressures to stop democratic processes and the implementation of the first free multi – party election results to inciting internal upheavals by overthrowing the newly elected democratic government. 

After Non-kinetic operations failed, kinetic operations were launched with the aim of violent change of government, abolishing the newly established democratic government, which faced the need to transform the organization of society and the state, as well as the mentality, from a one-party totalitarian to a multi-party democratic system. Kinetic operations were accompanied by strong non-kinetic operations (information operations, media operations, psychological operations, among other things by placing numerous misinformation in the Croatian and international public media space). Therefore, for the Homeland War, we can say that the Croatian political leadership led it in four strategic dimensions, i.e. at the same time on four different chessboards (as shown on Picture 2): 

a) Kinetic,

b) Non-kinetic,

c) Diplomacy, and

d) Internal and National cohesion and unity 

Picture 2: Four dimensions of Croatia’s Homeland war 

Events and processes on one of the mentioned chessboards directly influenced the development of the situation and relations on other boards, which in turn led to a backlash towards the first board. Therefore, it was neither allowed nor possible to easily engage into solving the challenges that the leadership faced on one of the boards because it could easily happen that by gaining an advantage on one board, one would lose a decisive advantage on the other board, or more of them that could lead to the loss of war. Namely, a large number of different "players" with different strategies and interests participated either as active or as passive players on these boards, influencing the processes (public and non-public, military, political, information, security, cultural, economic, financial …). This led to different possible outcomes of low- and high-intensity conflicts in individual phases as well as in the outcome.

Strategy of the Republic of Croatia 

Strategic leadership is the process of using the influence of leaders to achieve a desirable and clearly understood vision, influencing organizational culture, allocating resources, guiding through policies and guidelines, and building consensus in a changing, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global environment marked by opportunities and threats. 

Strategic leadership requires that strategic leaders initiate processes that ensure that their organization:

• Monitors and scans the environment,
• Maintains awareness of social, international, technological, demographic, and economic trends, and
• Interprets scanned data to derive an organization's response.

On a holistic level, the interpretation of the observed and scanned environment should lead to the creation of a vision that is in line with the best estimate of the future environment. The vision of an organization is an idealized representation of what the organization should strive to become. The strategy should explicitly balance the ultimate desired states (goals), ways (concepts and methods) and means (resources) to provide organizational resources in a way that enables the success of the organization in current and future environments.

Croatia's strategy for victory during the conflict and war, defined by that time President Franjo Tuđman, was very clear, simple, and unambiguous :

a) The ultimate goal was not to achieve victory using kinetic means but to achieve the set of strategic goals through negotiation processes at the national and international level with the aim of stopping the conflict, preventing armed conflict, creating conditions for lasting peace and respect for human rights and freedom;

b) The military strategy was only one of several dimensions in the art of conflict and war;

c) Diplomatic action has to be always a priority way, method and solution for stopping tensions, conflicts and wars;

d) The use of kinetic force should be reduced only to those situations when diplomatic (public and grey) activity (so called non-kinetic) cannot reach a solution that meets the goal stated under point a).

The requirements that were defined, required the possession of usable, accurate, reliable, secure, timely, integral, and non-manipulated data and information of a strategic nature: strategic intelligence. This was one of the main tasks set for the Croatian intelligence community. In this war period, the Croatian intelligence community consisted of the following agencies that had the goal and task of gathering, and process intelligence: 

a) Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), Central Analytical Service, responsible for operational work abroad, for cooperation with foreign services/agencies, and coordinator of the work of the intelligence community within the territory of the Republic of Croatia (was part of the Office of National Security);

b) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, with the task of counter-intelligence protection in the Republic of Croatia (integral part of the Ministry of the Interior);

c) Security and Information Service in charge of counter-intelligence protection of the Armed Forces (within the Ministry of Defence) and

d) Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (ID-GSAF) responsible for collecting data on the opposing side using, primarily, technical measures.

The role of the Croatian intelligence service

The Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia has shown by its example how in times of conflict and war, from the beginning and very quickly, an effective structure (organizational and human) of the intelligence community can be built. This community has made a significant contribution to ending aggression and defending Croatia. It also made a key contribution in the second phase, in the preparations and implementation of non-kinetic and kinetic operations with the aim of liberating the occupied areas of Croatia by collecting and processing data of a strategic nature. Among other things, they enabled the rapid and efficient conduct of military-police operations with an extremely small number of casualties on both sides. In fact, the term Intelligence Battlefield Preparation was introduced after the analysis of Croatian military-police operations. It is an excellent example of the practical use of collected intelligence (at all levels of value) in the processes of planning, preparation and implementation of non-kinetic and kinetic actions of different ranges and intensities in all domains of action.

Reaching information supremacy

At the strategic level, Croatia has managed to achieve almost a complete control and management of the hostile system of communication and information in the occupied territory, as well as in parts of neighbouring countries along the occupied territories. This achieved a state of information superiority/supremacy. Since we knew the context of the conflict, as well as the different domains of knowledge that were necessary to make key decisions (Picture 3), we needed less intelligence to gain informational supremacy. One of the most important strategic intelligence assets was a case of SIGINT surveillance of Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia, communications. This intelligence, compared and verified with intelligence obtained from other sources (primarily HUMINT and IMINT) were one of the key activities with the help of which the Croatian state leadership, often to the surprise of the political scene in Croatia (both ruling and opposition) made certain strategic decisions. Namely, this activity was one of the most protected secrets in the Republic of Croatia. An extremely narrow number of members of the intelligence community and a very narrow circle of people around President Tuđman were acquainted with that. These intelligences were indeed of strategic importance in the decision-making process because President Milošević was unaware that the Croatian intelligence community had established the capacity to monitor his communications. And that it put those capacities into active and operational duty. 

Picture 3: Domains of knowledge for context understanding

How strategically important these intelligences were to us is shown by a brief analysis of the effects of Operation Storm (August 1995) with war operations in the similar area (but of much smaller territorial scope) during World War II (November-December 1944). Based on intelligence estimates , Operation Storm was planned and conducted to liberate the occupied area of about 10,400 km2 (for comparison, Kosovo covers 10,900 km2, Luxembourg covers 2,586 km2). Picture 4 shows how reliable and accurate Croatian intelligence analyses were and how successful they were in meeting the set goals and objectives: enable the rapid liberation of the occupied territory in the shortest possible time during a direct military conflict with the enemy and with the least number of direct and indirect casualties on both sides. 

Picture 4: Comparison of the effects of different military operations 

Croatian military intelligence estimates 

At the end of the summer of 1995, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia successfully planned and conducted several military-police operations that liberated a significant part of the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Final preparations for the liberation of the remaining occupied part of the territory followed: the Croatian Danube region. Morality, motivation, equipment, training of members of the armed forces was at the highest possible level. The level of national unity and public support given to the political leadership in connection with the launch of the armed liberation of the occupied Croatian Danube region was at a level that can only be desired by political authorities. On the other hand, Croatian military intelligence estimates showed that the morale, organization, readiness for armed defence of the aggressor, who was in a situation to defend the occupied territories, was at an extremely low level. The assessment of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces about the military operation to liberate the Croatian Danube region, showed that this operation could be successfully carried out and organized. Successful given its ultimate goal of liberating the last parts of the occupied territory. However, this assessment also indicated the following facts :

a) The number of direct and indirect human casualties on both sides would be in the thousands, which can be a serious security-demographic-development problem for a small population such Croats and Serbs are. 

b) Destructions caused by the action of kinetic means would be devastating. 

c) A direct armed conflict with Serbia would probably be inevitable given that the occupied territory is on the border with the Republic of Serbia and that Serbia is directly involved in logistical, military, financial, intelligence and any other support to the political and military leadership that is located in the occupied Croatian territory.

d) In the event of the launch of a Croatian military-police operation called "Chariots of Fire", there would most likely be a mass exodus of Serbs living in the area from Croatia and the migration to the territory of Serbia.

e) The political part of the assessment indicated the possibility that such activity of the Croatian Armed Forces could not be accepted as a means of re-integrating the occupied territory into the Croatian constitutional order within the some of the influential members of international community and there was a possibility of division in the international community stand regarding that case.

Given the mentioned military intelligence estimates, and the before mentioned strategy of President Tuđman from 1991, President Tuđman decided to: 

a) Continue with a negotiation process with the aim of achieving a political solution for the integration of the Croatian Danube region as a priority model of action.

b) The negotiation process should be conducted at several levels; it must also include the intelligence community, which can communicate problems and possible solutions more directly and concretely with the opposing side, away from the eyes of the curious audience.

c) At the same time, preparations should continue for the planning and possible launch of a military-police operation to liberate the occupied area with kinetic operation if political negotiations do not lead to the desired results.

d) In this context, when planning kinetic operations, appropriate responses must be anticipated and offered, to reduce the number of casualties and destruction on both sides to a minimum level.

e) The developed capabilities and possibilities of hybrid action (non-kinetic operations) of the Croatian intelligence community should be used with the aim of reducing the level of the enemy's defence capabilities and for conducting a fast and efficient military-police operation (3-5 days);

f) In that case, the representatives of the international community must be acquainted with the negotiation process in order to avoid divisions in the international community and misunderstanding of Croatian actions if there is a need to launch a kinetic operation.

Those decisions led to the fact that, although the intelligence community and the armed forces continued with detailed preparations and activities for a rapid and effective military operation, a political agreement was reached at Dayton peace negotiations on the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region. The negotiating goals were: full integration of the occupied territory into the Croatian constitutional and legal order, building and not destroying relations, protection of entire population, respect for victims, cooperation with the international community in stopping conflicts and building a foundation for a sustainable future. The determination to implement such a strategy of imposing peace through political negotiations and building a future society based on reconciliation and cooperation was expressed by President Tuđman himself when he came to Vukovar on June 8, 1997, during the process of the peaceful reintegration (1996-1998). On that occasion, at a gathering in the middle of the destroyed, until recently occupied city of Vukovar, one of the symbols of Croatian defence, heroism but also the suffering of the defenders, he said : 

“…. the Victor who does not know how to forgive, plants the seeds of discord and future evils. And the Croatian people do not want this”.

Aggressors’ military intelligence estimates in 1991 – strategic failure

How did the successful, and peaceful, reintegration of the occupied Croatian Danube region took place without a shots being fired, without any human casualties, without destruction, even though several thousand people were killed in the battle for that city in 1991, while almost the entire city was destroyed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and Serbian troops? 

We have already pointed out certain strategic decisions of the Croatian politics during the Homeland War and some military-intelligence assessments written in the Croatian intelligence community.  This example can clearly show the conflict of strategies, the changing role of the conflicting parties during the war and the importance of strategic military-political-security-economic analysis in the management of low and especially high intensity conflicts.

Offensive operation of the 1st Military District (MD) of the YPA on Eastern Slavonia

According to army general Veljko Kadijević (Minister of Defence of SFR Yugoslavia 1988 – 1992), in mid-March 1991 the most suitable option for the YPA was to “relying on political forces in the Federation and in the republics representing the people who want to live in Yugoslavia, with a peaceful separation from those who want to leave it, continue to provide such a policy.”  Translated into practical language, it meant the protection and defence of the Serbian people outside of Serbia and the gathering of the YPA within the borders of the future Yugoslavia. 

In accordance with the previous, the tasks of the YPA were determined :

• Defence of the Serbian people in Croatia and protection of their national interest.
• Withdrawal of the YPA garrison from Croatia.
• Full control of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the ultimate goal of defending the Serbian people and their national rights when it becomes relevant.
• Creation and defence of the new Yugoslav state of those Yugoslav people who want it, at this stage of the Serbian and Montenegrin people

In order for the YPA to carry out its tasks, the strategic leaders defined the basic elements of the manoeuvre (as it can be seen at Picture 5) :

1. Completely block Croatia from the air and from the sea; 

2. The main directions of the YPA forces attacks should be linked as directly as possible to the “liberation of the Serb areas” in Croatia and the YPA garrison in the depths of Croatian territory. 

3. To achieve those goals, divide Croatian territory on the routes Gradiška-Virovitica, Bihać-Karlovac-Zagreb, Knin-Zadar, Mostar-Split; 

4. With the strongest group of armoured mechanized forces, liberate eastern Slavonia, and then quickly continue with operations to the west, merge with forces that are coming from the area of Herceg Novi-Trebinje, block Dubrovnik from the mainland, break into the Neretva valley and thus act accordingly with forces advancing in the direction of Mostar-Split;

5. After reaching certain goals, secure and hold the border of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, withdraw the remaining parts of the YPA from Slovenia and then withdraw the YPA from Croatia;

6. It takes 10-15 days to mobilize, preparation of mobilized units and bring them to the planned directions of use, depending on the level of combat readiness of the unit and its distance from the direction of use.

Picture 5: Strategic offensive operation of YPA against Croatia 

However, at a meeting between Borislav Jović (Serbian member of the SFRY presidency), general Veljko Kadijević and Slobodan Milošević (president of Serbia) on June 27, 1991, Milošević insisted that the YPA defends Yugoslavia's future borders: “Why do we have to defend the Slovenian borders, that is temporary. We need to defend what will be permanent.” According to Jović, Kadijević accepted the request without discussion . Changing the strategic goals required a change in the strategy that has never been made. 

Irrespective of the previously mentioned, the plans of the largest groups of the YPA went with their own direction, regardless of the established or redefined political goals. Thus, the 1st Military District of the YPA defined some of its goals and associated tasks for the offensive military operations in Eastern Slavonia: 

“End with the mobilization, bring the units and vigorously attack the main forces in the interfluve of the Drava - Sava and the auxiliary (5th Corp) Okučani - Pakrac - Virovitica and Okučani - Kutina, with the task: with air and artillery support and cooperation with territorial defence units to surround and break the forces of the Republic of Croatia in Slavonia, unblock units and military facilities, break out on the line Našice - Slavonski Brod and be ready to continue the attack on Koprivnica and Okučani.

Perform the operation in two stages:

In the first stage, for 2-3 days, unblock the forces in the Vinkovci garrison, take control of the line Našice - Slavonski Brod and be ready for further actions.

In the second stage, lasting 4-5 days, break out on the line Suhopolje - Okučani and be ready to continue the attack towards Varaždin and Koprivnica. With part of the forces secure the border with Hungary and the left flank of the main forces. With the forces of the 1st and 5th Corp of the Air Force and Air defence shall perform air defence of the main forces from possible reconnaissance and action of aviation from the area of Hungary and Austria, and fire support of units. The focus of support should be on the forces of the 12th Corps and the 1st Infantry guard motorised division, and with part of the strength to support the 5th Corps. Larger populated places should be avoided, and their blockade and control of roads is performed by territorial defence units. Engage infantry formations within the Armoured mechanised units to secure the flanks, fighting/combat vehicles, and clear obstacles. The readiness of all units for movement at 22.00 hours on September 19, to perform the movement according to special orders. Beginning of the attack on September 21. Prepare other forces for the mobilization.” 

Analysis of ultimate desired states (goals), ways (concepts and methods) and means (resources)

The evaluation of the achievement of goals of the operation, which has a special value, was given by the YPA leadership: "Units of the 1st Military district entered the conflict with the armed paramilitary formations of Croatia unplanned and without a specific goal, which resulted in inadequate results during the conduct of combat operations.”  

YPA general Života Panić said:

“Osijek was abandoned because we entered it without an army, but then I was ordered to return. I listened, and then Kadijević asked for an explanation. Before I went to Kadijević's, I remember that [Blagoje] Adžić [that time chief of YPA HQ] said: “May God help you. You will be replaced”. I told him that there were plans and that I acted on them. At the moment when Vukovar fell, I received an order to take Osijek and Županja and go to Zagreb in two lines, along the Drava and Sava rivers. We could have done that in two years, and, well, why didn’t we, so to speak, regardless of the fact that the plan was approved, I think that there was an attitude because the Serbian leadership insisted on protecting only the areas where the Serbs lived. So, don’t go any further. That’s why we listened.  Not a single Croatian village in Slavonia, Baranja or western Slavonia was occupied. Only those in which the Serbs were in a majority.” 

The following conclusions speaks best about the functioning of the command-and-control system, or its disintegration in YPA: 

“Units of the 1st Military District were not sent to the border of their own area of responsibility in time. The dedicated organization of forces did not correspond to the mission. The independence of joint tactical level commands was insufficient. During the operation, none of the goals from the “Directive of the Commander of the 1st Military District no. 5-89 for operations in Slavonia, dated 19 September 1991” was achieved. The decision to conduct the operation was made in the inner circle of the "command of the 1st Military District". 

Changing the date of the attack (September 20, not September 21) took time for plan and prepare subordinates causing a problem with complete chaos on communications. The guideline on “how to bypass larger settlements and their blockade and control of roads by territorial defence” was completely opposite to the situation on the battlefield.  Armoured and mechanized formations proved inadequate to occupy the settlement. 

“During their ultimately successful attack on the city of Vukovar, eastern Slavonia, the Serbs concentrated two tank brigades and six mechanized brigades plus some paramilitary units, totalling 36,000 men, against some 2,000 Croatian defenders (…) The Croatian city of Vukovar fell to the Serbs only after 87 days (25 August–18 November 1991) of strong resistance.” 

A large number of reserves bridges whose combat performance tended to zero were engaged. The troops Often refused to carry out combat missions. The coordination of the activities of these units was archaic, which was due to the lack of radio communication devices. 

The troops were in long anticipation of being introduced into combat activities. Even when they were engaged into combat activities, the use of armoured and mechanized brigades and their firing operations was not synchronized. The tasks of the units were not precise as a result of the incomplete implementation of the operational planning process. 

The offensive operation was planned along the operational axis from east to west, bringing the operational depth of the defenders to 400 km. Forty artillery battalions or 60% of the capacity of the 1st Military District were engaged in the offensive operation, i.e. 973 artillery pieces and 17,647 persons. Only one battalion was used for direct shooting in the battle for Vukovar (ZIS 76mm M-42). The reconnaissance was incomplete and with many weaknesses, and most of the artillery targets were not observed. The action of the air force was not used by ground forces, and air defence cannons (40,559 grenades of 20-57 mm calibre) were used in anti-infantry combat. 

The YPA intelligence system was taken aback by the situation. No serious HUMINT intelligence operations were undertaken against the Croatian army at that time during the Battle for Vukovar on local level. The system was completely unequipped, and the exchange of information was centralized, leading to huge delays in intelligence distribution, which often made them almost unusable. There was no unified intelligence system at all at the level of the Yugoslavia. Electronic reconnaissance was at the level of improvisation. Radio goniometry did not exist. 

On the side of the aggressor, HUMINT was dealt with by a small number of agents with poor competencies and knowledge. Therefore, their intelligence judgments had nothing to do with the real picture:

“The assembly of the Croatian National Guard (CNG) composed of about 12,000-14,000 persons in brigades: Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci and probably Đakovo. The forces of the Ministry of the Interior of about 10,000-11,000 are grouped in 3 police departments (Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci) with about 12 police stations in municipal headquarters and police stations in local communities. The forces of HDZ [governing political party in Croatia after forts democratic elections], about 6.000-8.000 were organized into local communities. In western Slavonia, the main forces [Croatian], are in the region of Okučani - Pakrac around 2,000-2,500 and in the wider region of Novska around 2000.” 

In fact, during mid-August, there were 200 to 300 members of the CNG and about 400 to 500 members of the Ministry of Interior in the city of Vukovar. During September and October, the number of Vukovar defenders of all categories ranged from 2,000 to 2,300.  The actual data differ significantly from the estimates of the aggressor intelligence service. One of the reasons why this had happened and why they made so many mistakes in their assessments is the targeted distribution of disinformation in public and non-public space by Croatian institutions stating that Croatia has a much larger and well-equipped force ready for defence compared to the real situation on the ground. It was one of the influence operations whose goal was to deter the aggressor from attacking. To try to avoid kinetic conflict and for gaining to time to execute strategic goals.

During the offensive operation on the city of Vukovar and its wider area, the aggressor used 11 manoeuvre brigades whose occupancy was about 70-75%. The response to mobilization was about 50%. Occupancy of motorised units was between 50-70%. The air force did not have the ability to shoot point targets without entering the area of operation of short-range air defence means. The artillery management system was not developed. 

Due to all the above mentioned, the losses of the YPA were enormous. A total of 5,899 soldiers were "thrown out from the units", of which 833 were killed, 2,126 were seriously wounded and 2,937 were lightly wounded.

“Likewise, the Serbian attack on the Croatian city of Vukovar (eastern Slavonia) in October-November 1991 resulted in extremely high losses for the attacker-reportedly, several thousand dead and about 200 tanks destroyed, against some 2,000 Croatian defenders.” 

“Although the Serbs eventually seized the city, the striking power of the former Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) was broken, and the planned offensive to seize the rest of eastern Slavonia and advance to Croatia’s capital of Zagreb was abandoned.” 

Picture 6: Overview of aggressor losses during military operations in the wider area of the city of Vukovar and in the city itself  

Development of Croatian intelligence capabilities - emphasis on the military intelligence component

From the beginning of the process of taking over political power in Croatia in the mid-1990s, the new government, led by party Croatian democratic union (HDZ), has realized that it does not have the instruments of power that are otherwise available to the governing administration. A special problem was the fact that in the then secret services, human resources were deeply divided according to their personal political and national affiliation. Croatia has set out to create a new intelligence community modelled on modern Western countries and NATO member states with new employees with the help of reliable and capable members of the until recently existing intelligence. Priority mission for Croatian intelligence community was intelligence collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, IMINT….) and developing objective analytical capabilities and activities that were necessary to obtain and create intelligence in order to win the war: strategic intelligence.

The organizational and human capabilities of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (ObU) have been developed in several stages:

1. The Directorate for Intelligence Affairs was established as part of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces.

2. Intelligence departments were organised in each of the subordinated command levels and units.

3. Reconnaissance and behind-the-enemy-line units, together with EW/SIGINT units on the rang of brigades were established and put in function.

4. UAV abilities were developed and activate on the level of General staff and three battlefield areas together with IMINT abilities.

5. Strategic SIGINT abilities were developed with integrated previous EW abilities into a fully functional ability 

In addition to the above-mentioned capabilities, the analytical capabilities of ObU were also developed. They delivered the collected data and information in a form of various important intelligence reports to their users. 

It should be noted that with the establishment of HIS (Croatian Intelligence Service), a significant part of analytical reports that were intended and delivered to the state leadership was created in the HIS, as the central analytical service of the Croatian Intelligence Community. In this sense, a high level of intelligence professional cooperation has been achieved at the horizontal level among the employees of these services with the aim of quality, accurate, reliable and timely delivery of analytical work to users (President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Chief of General Staff, Director of the National Security Office).

The state leadership set clear guidelines and issues that the intelligence community needed to give answers. Some of them (generalized) are:

1. What are the strategic advantages of the aggressor in relation to Croatia (military, political, social, economic, security…)?

2. How to neutralize the military strategic advantages of the aggressor, with what forces, how to act and in what areas, what time is needed to carry out offensive actions and transition to the defence phase at the reached positions, how to prevent aggressors' counterattacks, conditions necessary for strategic surprise, how to prevent possible destructive retaliatory actions of aggressors against civilian targets;

3. How the defence system is organized at the political and implementation level, what are its capabilities, relations among leading figures, schedule, equipment, training, staffing and organization of units and their personnel.

4. Economic and financial ability to support the military actions of the aggressor.

5. Mutual connection and connection of different aggressor units in the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia as well as in the territory of B&H.

and a number of other issues necessary for decision-making at the strategic level.

ObU provided reliable and accurate answers to some of these questions, within its competence. Military intelligence estimates suggested that the aggressor that after 1992 become a defender of the occupied Croatian territory, was not able to significantly organize and mobilize military units with trained personal. They had problems with a low number of the military officers, and soldiers: Their moral was on a very low level, the economy was not able to cover the expenses of conducting defending/military activities and therefore even less were able to cover costs of organizing large-scale offensive activities. 

The conflict between Croatia's strategies on the one hand and the aggressors on the other, related to the aggressors' aggressive action in the Bihać area during 1994 and 1995. It showed differences in the developed capabilities of the conflicting intelligence communities. Croatia gave a key contribution to the defence of the Bihać area, while at the same time planning and carrying out offensive-defensive actions on the territory of B&H and the Republic of Croatia with the aim of defeating opponents. The intention of Serbs from the occupied territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to occupy the Bihać region was prevented. That put Croatia in a strategically better and very challenging situation in the process of planning and conducting military-police operations to liberate Croatian territory. The Croatian strategy defeated the enemy's strategy in that area as well, which created additional favourable moments for the approach to the liberation of the occupied Croatian Danube region.

Although the Croatian military intelligence estimates indicated, as already stated at the beginning, that the enemy had organized a better and more efficient defence in the area of the Croatian Danube region then in the “Krajina area”, there were still a number of weaknesses that were pointed out. These weaknesses were also the basis for planning a military-police operation different from what the enemy expected. Intensively supported with intelligence operations. Namely, the opposing side organized the defence along the existing line of separation with an emphasis on the area between occupied Vukovar on one side, and Vinkovci and Osijek on the other. However, the Croatian strategic idea was to bypass that defensive line from the north and to make a sudden, fast and strong penetration along the Danube River with strong support from other parts of the battlefield.

However, thanks to also the activities and results of the Croatian intelligence community, the liberating military-police operation “Chariots of Fire” did not took place and the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region was carried out. One of the reasons why the former occupiers of the area agreed to the agreement was the awareness that Croatia had developed its military-police capabilities at a much higher level than them (insurgent Serbs and Serbia), that Croatian intelligence was much better prepared for the war, its strategic assessments were much better, more reliable, more accurate, and more secure than theirs, and that Croatia had enough economic resources to wage war, unlike the rebel Serbs and Serbia.

Conclusion

During the first phase of the Homeland War, while Croatia was defending itself, the aggressors (YPA and Serbia) were in a strategic advantage that they neither knew nor managed to use. The strategic objectives of the YPA offensive on Eastern Slavonia were not clearly defined and it was changed during the operation. The military forces were not enough trained, equipped and motivated to conduct intensive military operations with deep penetrations in the Croatian territory. The doctrine was outdated and unenforceable. The manner in which the military forces were used favoured the defender.

The military leadership was incompetent:

• They did not understand the complexity and ambiguity of the then processes on the global and European political scene. Their knowledge of the external political, economic and cultural systems affecting the military was insufficient.
• There was no strong consensus between politics and the military.
• The YPA military leadership was entirely strategically incompetent. 
• Their military intelligence estimates were, at that times, inaccurate, insufficient, and time-consuming.
• Although the YPA counter-intelligence service had developed a network of its agents in Croatia as well, which is why they had a lot of quality and reliable data, the mutual integration of the system obviously had serious shortcomings.
• In this context, one must consider the operational capabilities of the federal (Yugoslav) and Serbian civilian intelligence agencies which failed to develop a sufficiently large, reliable and high-quality network of their agents and sources in the not-occupied territories of Croatia (it should be noted that the Croatian intelligence identified and arrested a large number of sources and agents of their services in the period 1991-1995 in the territory of Croatia and beyond). 
• In their analyses, they often overestimated the strength of the Croatian defence forces, which led to errors in the planning and operation of military operations.
• They conducted anti-Croatian psychological operations with the aim of further mobilizing their own population and military forces, which eventually returned to them in a negative form because they demoralized and disintegrated their defence capabilities. This fact was used very effectively by the Croatian intelligence community in order to weaken the ability and will of the opponents to defend themselves when planning and carrying out Croatia’s own offensive actions.

War cannot be won by the army alone, and Yugoslavia and Serbia were left with only armed force. Given the success of the leaders who led her, her enemy was superfluous. This was especially evident during 1994-1995. in the occupied territories of Croatia when there were serious and deep divisions between different political sides among the insurgent Serbs, and with military commanders. 

During this time, Croatia, starting almost from the beginning, on the foundations and following the example of Western democratic systems, built its intelligence community (human, organizational, technical, technological). The Croatian Intelligence Community has successfully worked on achieving the set of its strategic goals and tasks and providing strong, reliable, and secure intelligence supporting the state leadership for making key decisions on which the future of the Republic depended. One of these strategic supports was the ability to intercept and monitor the telephone communications of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević even before the escalation of the conflict into war on the territory of Croatia.

The Croatian intelligence community's assessments of the enemy forces, and capabilities were one of the important contributions to achieving the final political-military victory at the strategic level, that culminated in the peaceful reintegration of the occupied Croatian Danube region into the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia. The one that Sun Tzu emphasizes as the primary goal of every war has been achieved: to defeat the opponent's strategy and to win the war with minimal use of kinetic force.

Abbreviations:

• B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina
• CNG – Croatian national Guard (first official armed units; Croatian Army was later established based on the CNG)
• EW – Electronic warfare
• HUMINT – Human Intelligence
• IMINT – Imagery Intelligence
• MD – Military district (VO – vojna oblast)
• ObU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Obavještajna uprava Glavnog stožera oružanih snaga Hrvatske)
• SIGINT – Signal Intelligence
• UAV – Unmanned aerial vehicle
• YPA – Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA – Jugoslavenska narodna armija) 

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INFORMATIVNO-PROPAGANDNO DJELOVANJE MUSLIMANSKO-BOŠNJAČKE STRANE TIJEKOM RATA U BIH: PRIMJER OSLOBOĐENJA (1992. I 1993. GODINE)

Mijo BELJO

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• Oslobođenje, 15786 (49), Sarajevo, 1. lipnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15794 (49), Sarajevo, 9. lipnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15802 (49), Sarajevo, 17. lipnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15820 (49), Sarajevo, 5. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15821 (49), Sarajevo, 6. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15822 (49), Sarajevo, 7. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15823 (49), Sarajevo, 8. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15824 (49), Sarajevo, 9. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15825 (49), Sarajevo, 10. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15826 (49), Sarajevo, 11. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15831 (49), Sarajevo, 16. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15835 (49), Sarajevo, 20. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15839 (49), Sarajevo, 24. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15844 (49), Sarajevo, 29. srpnja 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15852 (49), Sarajevo, 6. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15854 (49), Sarajevo, 8. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15855 (49), Sarajevo, 9. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15856 (49), Sarajevo, 10. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15857 (49), Sarajevo, 11. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15858 (49), Sarajevo, 12. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15860 (49), Sarajevo, 14. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15864 (49), Sarajevo, 18. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15865 (49), Sarajevo, 19. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15876 (49), Sarajevo, 30. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15877 (49), Sarajevo, 31. kolovoza 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15882 (49), Sarajevo, 5. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15884 (49), Sarajevo, 7. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15884 (49), Sarajevo, 8. rujna 1992. (tiskarska greška, isti broj kao prethodni)
• Oslobođenje, 15886 (49), Sarajevo, 9. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15887 (49), Sarajevo, 10. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15888 (49), Sarajevo, 11. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15894 (49), Sarajevo, 17. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15897 (49), Sarajevo, 20. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15898 (49), Sarajevo, 21. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15899 (49), Sarajevo, 22. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15900 (49), Sarajevo, 23. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15905 (49), Sarajevo, 28. rujna 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15908 (49), Sarajevo, 1. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15916 (49), Sarajevo, 9. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15919 (49), Sarajevo, 12. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15925 (49), Sarajevo, 18. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15926 (49), Sarajevo, 19. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15916 (49), Sarajevo, 23. listopada 1992. (tiskarska greška broja)
• Oslobođenje, 15917 (49), Sarajevo, 24. listopada 1992. (tiskarska greška broja)
• Oslobođenje, 15918 (49), Sarajevo, 25. listopada 1992. (tiskarska greška broja)
• Oslobođenje, 15919 (49), Sarajevo, 26. listopada 1992. (tiskarska greška broja)
• Oslobođenje, 15934 (49), Sarajevo, 27. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15935 (49), Sarajevo, 28. listopada 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 15942 (49), Sarajevo, 4. studenoga 1992.
• Oslobođenje, 16002 (50), Sarajevo, 3. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16003 (50), Sarajevo, 4. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16005 (50), Sarajevo, 6. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16007 (50), Sarajevo, 8. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16008 (50), Sarajevo, 9. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16009 (50), Sarajevo, 10. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16011 (50), Sarajevo, 12. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16017 (50), Sarajevo, 18. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16018 (50), Sarajevo, 19. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16019 (50), Sarajevo, 20. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16023 (50), Sarajevo, 24. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16024 (50), Sarajevo, 25. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16026 (50), Sarajevo, 27. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16028 (50), Sarajevo, 29. siječnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16039 (50), Sarajevo, 9. veljače 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16055 (50), Sarajevo, 25. veljače 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16085 (50), Sarajevo, 27. ožujka 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16089 (50), Sarajevo, 31. ožujka 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16097 (50), Sarajevo, 8. travnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16106 (50), Sarajevo, 17. travnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16110 (50), Sarajevo, 21. travnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16113 (50), Sarajevo, 24. travnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16122 (50), Sarajevo, 3. svibnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16129 (50), Sarajevo, 10. svibnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16134 (50), Sarajevo, 15. svibnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16138 (50), Sarajevo, 19. svibnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16150 (50), Sarajevo, 31. svibnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16156 (50), Sarajevo, 6. lipnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16159 (50), Sarajevo, 9. lipnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16164 (50), Sarajevo, 14. lipnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16170 (50), Sarajevo, 20. lipnja 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16258 (50), Sarajevo, 15. rujna 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16259 (50), Sarajevo, 16. rujna 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16264 (50), Sarajevo, 21. rujna 1993.
• Oslobođenje, 16265 (50), Sarajevo, 21. rujna 1993.

HRVATSKA IZVJEŠTAJNA SLUŽBA U OBRANI REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE 

Ivo LUČIĆ 

Temelji hrvatske obavještajne zajednice 

Labrador i Opera 

Hrvatska izvještajna služba (HIS) 

HIS u Domovinskom ratu 

Borba protiv terorizma 

Politički sukobi i pokušaj politizacije HIS-a 

• BiH, F BiH, F MUP, Sarajevo, Prosudba terorističkih djela na prostoru F BiH, u periodu od 1. 1. 1997. do 20. 10. 1997. Sarajevo, listopad 1997.
• R BiH, F BiH, Ministarstvo socijalne politike, raseljenih osoba i izbjeglica, Adresar stranih humanitarnih organizacija, Sarajevo, 01. 6. 1996.
• Republika Hrvatska predsjednik, Odluka, broj: PA7-544/1-94., Zagreb, 29. prosinca 1994. 
• Republika Hrvatska Ured za nacionalnu sigurnost, Raspored djelatnika HIS-a na IZM-ove GS-a, Ur. broj: 716-2109-A-08/95-070, Zagreb. 3. kolovoza 1995., ministru obrane Gojku Šušku i načelniku GS HV generalu zbora Zvonimiru Červenku, u potpisu zamjenik predstojnika UNS-a Miroslav Tuđman.
• Republika Hrvatska, predsjednik, Odluka, broj 01-081-99-1329/1., Zagreb, 2. srpnja 1999.  
• Republika Hrvatska, predsjednik, Odluka, broj 01-144/1-92. Zagreb, 13, veljače 1992.
• Republika Hrvatska, predsjednik, Odluka, broj 081-98-933/1., Zagreb, 20. travnja 1998.  
• Republika Hrvatska, predsjednik, Odluka, broj: PA7-13/1-93. Zagreb, 26. ožujka 1993.   
• UNS, HIS, dopis ravnatelja predsjedniku Hrvatskog državnog sabora, privremeno na dužnosti predsjednika Republike Zlatku Tomčiću, 10. veljače 2000. 
• UNS, HIS, dopis ravnatelja predsjedniku Republike Hrvatske Stjepanu Mesiću, Zagreb, 7. veljače, 2000. 
• UNS, HIS, dopis ravnatelja predsjedniku Vlade Republike Hrvatske Ivici Račanu, 10. veljače 2000.
• Predsjednik Republike dr. Frano Tuđman, osobno, pismo Miroslava Tuđmana, Zagreb, 20. lipnja 1999.  

• Hrvatska Riječ (Sarajevo)  
• Jutarnji list (Zagreb) 
• Ljiljan (Sarajevo) 
• Narodne novine (Zagreb)  
• Oslobođenje (Sarajevo) 
• Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo)  
• Večernji list, (Zagreb) 

• Lučić, I. (2001). Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism, NSF, no 3.4. 
• Lučić, I. (2020). Predavanje Terorizam u BiH. Fakultet hrvatskih studija Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. 
• Radojčić, R. (2009). Izjava. NSF. Broj 10. Zagreb.    
• Rogić, I. (2021). Miroslav Tuđman 1946-2021. Jedan po jedan odlaze gospari… Pilar, broj 31, Zagreb.  
• Tuđman, M. (2001). HIS: 1993 – 1998. Prvih pet godina Hrvatske izvještajne službe. Nacionalna sigurnost i budućnost (Zbornik, Svezak 1.). Zagreb.  

• Akrap, G. (2013). Specijalni rat. 3. Zagreb: Despot infinitus. 
• Aralica, I. (2009). Život nastanjen sjenama. Zagreb: Znanje.  
• Karan, Lj. (2006). Bio sam oficir KOS-a. Beograd: Blic. 
• Manolić, J. (1995). Intervjui i javni nastupi 1989.-1995. Zagreb: MISL.
• Marijan, D. (2017). Hrvatska 1989.-1992. Rađanje države. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest.     
• Perković, J. – Gabriš, J. (1999). Rekonstrukcija Službe državne sigurnosti Republičkog sekretarijata za unutarnje poslove SR Hrvatske u vremenu od 1. siječnja 1980. do 30. svibnja 1990. Službena tajna povjerljivo. UNS Obavještajna akademija. Zagreb.  
• Tuđman, M. (2008). Informacijsko ratište i informacijska znanost. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada. 
• Tuđman, M. (2012). Programiranje istine. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada. 
• Ured za nacionalnu sigurnost i Obavještajna zajednica RH (2000). Povjerljivo. UNS i HIS, Zagreb. 
• Vasiljević, A. (2012). „Štit“ akcija vojne bezbednosti, Dnevničke beleške operativca. Beograd: IGAM.
• Žunec, O. – Domišljanović, D. (2000). Obavještajno-sigurnosne službe Republike Hrvatske: Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.  

RATNA STRATEGIJA BOSANSKOG SUVERENA: PRILOG ČITANJU TUĐMANOVE DRUGE STRANE RUBIKONA

Ugo VLAISAVLJEVIĆ

Znanstveno tumačenje ratne zbilje

Odgonetanje političke strategije kao prijateljski i neprijateljski čin

Odluke kao točka križanja strateških ciljeva i povijesnih događaja

Referendum o neovisnosti BiH kao ustoličenje suverena

Vjerski vođa na čelu urušenog komunističkog poretka

Pregovarač koji nipošto ne može učestvovati u pregovorima

Zaključak

• Balakrishnan, G., Anderson, B. (eds.) (1996). Mapping the Nation. London – New York: Verso.
• Barbarić, D. (2021). Struktura nedopuštene kohabitacije: Analiza decizionističkoga modela politike u Bosni i Hercegovini. Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, 18 (1), 113-133. 
• Bartov, O. (2000). Mirrors of Destruction. War, Genocide and Modern Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20-22. 
• Bartov, O. (2003). ’Fields of Glory': War, Genocide and the Glorification of Violence, u: Postone, M., Santner, E. (eds.), Catastrophe and Meaning. The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century. Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 123-125.
• Bibó, I. (2015). The Miseries of East European Small States, u: Dénes, I. Z. (ed.), The Art of Peacemaking: Political Essays by István Bibó. New Haven: Yale University Press, 130-181. 
• David, M. (1966). La souveraineté du people. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996). Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, u: Balakrishnan, G., Anderson, B. (eds.), Mapping the Nation. London – New York: Verso, 255-266.
• Hroch, M. (1996). From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation. The nation-building process in Europe, u: Gopal B. (ed.), Mapping the Nation. London: Verso, 3-20. 
• Hroch, M. (2009). Learning from small nations, New Left Review 58, July-August, 41-59. 
• Kohn, H. (1960). Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books.
• Kuzio, T. (2002). The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn's framework for understanding nationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1 (25), 20–39.
• Lefort, C. (1986). Permanence du théologico-politique, u: Essais sur le politique XIXe-XXe siècle. Paris: Seuil, 251-300.
• Lučić, I. (2013). Uzroci rata. Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus i Hrvatski institut za povijest, 359-365. 
• O’Donovan, O. (2003). The just war revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Foucault, M. (2003). Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Coll.ge de France 1975– 1976. Ed. by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. New York: Picador. 
• Özkırımlı, U. (2010). Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction. Second Edition. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
• Paltineanu, O. S. (2010). Miroslav Hroch’s model of small nation-formation and Begriffsgeschichte. Nationalities Papers, 6 (38), 813–827. 
• Rahner, K. (1979). Über eine theologische Grundinterpretation des II. Vatikanischen Konzils. Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, ¾ (101), 290-299.
• Rublovskis, R. - Šešelgyte, M. - Kaljurand R. (2013). Defence and Security for the Small: Perspective from the Baltic States. Centre for Small State Studies. Reykjavik: Institute of International Affairs.
• Schmitt, C. (2015). Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. Zehnte Auflage. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
• Smith, A. D. (1996). Nationalism and the Historians, u: Balakrishnan, G., Anderson, B. (eds.), Mapping the Nation. London – New York: Verso, 175-197.
• Smith, A. D. (1988). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 157-160.
• Tuđman, M. (2003). Prikazalište znanja. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2005). Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.-2025: rasprave o prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Zagreb: UHIP.
• Tuđman, M., Bilić, I. (2005). Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991. – 1995. Zagreb.
• Tuđman, M. (2017). Druga strana Rubikona. Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Vlaisavljević, U. (2020). Daytonska prekretnica: napokon ustavna demokracija u Bosni i Hercegovini ili - zašto deklaracije ZAVNOBiH-a nisu imale pravnu snagu. Motrišta 115 (rujan-listopad 2020), 110-123.
• Vlaisavljević, U. (2021). Antifašistički revizionizam i teorija temeljne interpretacije, u: Vlaisavljević, S. (ur.), Lustracija između fašizma i antifašizma. Mostar: Sveučilište u Mostaru, 91-121.
• Wiberg, H. (1987). The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences. Journal of Peace Research, 4 (24), 339-340. 

ZNANSTVENA METODOLOGIJA NASUPROT PSEUDODOKAZIMA U PREDMETU IT-04-74-T

Roman DOMOVIĆ

Diskusija - Ciril Ribičič

Zaključak

• Globus, br. 176, Zagreb, 22. travnja 1994.
• Večernji list, Zagreb, 17. travnja 1991.
• Večernji list, Zagreb, 24. travnja 1991.
• Večernji list, Zagreb, 9. lipnja 1991.
• Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, sudski spisi, predmet IT-04-74-T:
• - dokaz br. 1D02036, Ribičič, C. (2001). Geneza jedne zablude: Ustavnopravna analiza nastanka i djelovanja Hrvatske republike Herceg-Bosne. Zagreb-Idrija: Jesenski i Turk-Založba Bogataj.
• - dokaz br. 1D02910, Presidential transcript of  Meeting of Supreme State Council on 8 June 1991. / Zapisnik sa 7. sjednice Vrhovnog državnog vijeća Republike Hrvatske
• održane 8. lipnja 1991. godine.
• dokaz br. 3D00295.
• dokaz br. P09673, Manolić, J. (1995). Intervjui i javni nastupi 1989.-1995. Zagreb: Misl.
• - dokaz br. P10355, transkript svjedočenja Cirila Ribičiča od 16.2.2000.
• - Presuda - tom 4 od 6.
• - transkript svjedočenja Josipa Manolića od 3.7.2006.
• - transkript svjedočenja Josipa Manolića od 5.7.2006.

• Manolić, J. (1995). Intervjui i javni nastupi 1989.-1995. Zagreb: Misl.
• Manolić, J. (2015). Politika i domovina: Moja borba za suverenu i socijalnu Hrvatsku. Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga.
• Tuđman, F. (1999). Hrvatska riječ svijetu - Razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada-Hrvatski institut za povijest.
• Tuđman, M. (2017). Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića, Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
• Tuđman, M. (2006). Vrijeme krivokletnika. Zagreb: Detecta.

POZICIJE HRVATSKE U ODNOSU NA MOGUĆNOST REALIZACIJE IDEJE “SRPSKOG SVETA“ *

Saša MRDULJAŠ 

Aktiviranje ideje „srpskog sveta“ i pitanje Bosne i Hercegovine

„Srpski svet“ i Crna Gora

Zaključak

Karta br. 1: Srbija i Republika Srpska

Karta br. 4: Katoličko-pravoslavna linija razgraničenja od polovice 14. stoljeća

• Džaja, S. M. (1992). Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
• Ančić, M. (2005). Kasnosrednjovjekovni Stolac. Povijesni prilozi, 24 (29), 41-58. 
• Ančić, M. (2001). Na rubu zapada: tri stoljeća srednjovjekovne Bosne. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest / Dom i svijet.
• Andrijašević, Ž. (2004). Srpstvo u Crnoj Gori. Feljton u dnevnom listu Vijesti objavljivan od 20. rujna 2004; dostupno posredstvom portala Montenegrina; https://montenegrina.net/ (28-05-2022).
• Babić, V. (1998). Boka kotorska u časopisima preporodnog doba. Dani Hvarskog kazališta: Građa i rasprave o hrvatskoj književnosti i kazalištu,  24 (1), 433-442.
• Bieber, F. (2022). Zašto je predsjednik Srbije prijetnja za Europu. Pobjeda,  06. 01. 2022. (28-05-2022).
• Bilandžić, D. (1999). Hrvatska moderna povijest. Zagreb: Golden marketing.
• Crkvenčić-Bojić, J. (ur.) (1992). Popis stanovništva Hrvatske 1991. – narodnosni sastav stanovništva Hrvatske po naseljima. Zagreb: Republika Hrvatska – Republički zavod za statistiku.
• Crkvenčić-Bojić, J. (ur.) (1995). Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine – narodnosni sastav po naseljima. Zagreb: Republika Hrvatska – Državni zavod za statistiku.
• Četrdeset tisuća izbjeglica se popisuje (uglavnom Srba), koji su glasali na svim izborima i referendumu (17. mart 2011). Portal: Kampanja SPC i vaskolikog srpstva pred popis u Crnoj Gori 2011. godine, https://popis2011.wordpress. com/ (28-05-2022).
• Durmanović, S. (2021). Vučićevo 'istorijsko pomirenje' Srba i Bošnjaka – (ne)moguća misija. Nova srpska politička misao, 02.06.2021. http://www.nspm.rs/ (28-05-2022).
• Džankić, J. (20159. Biti Crnogorac/Crnogorka – rekonstrukcija značenja. Politička misao 52 (3), 130-158.
• Đurđev, B. (1984). Postanak i razvitak brdskih, crnogorskih i hercegovačkih plemena. Titograd: Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti.
• Frank, R. (2022). Komunicirajući mržnju prema Hrvatskoj i Hrvatima Vučić sije sjeme novog zla koje može proklijati brže nego se može i zamisliti. Glas Istre, 23.05.2022, (28-05-2022).
• Gashi, S., Novaković, I. (2017). Od tehničkih sporazuma do sveobuhvatne normalizacije: Odnosi između Beograda i Prištine. Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1-12.
• Glas Crnogorca, 29. siječanja 1884. Posredstvom: Jovanović, V. (2018). Crnogorstvo – od Njegoša do naših dana (I). Feljton na portalu Antena M, 25.04.2018., https://antenam.net  (28-05-2022).
• Jovanović Ajzenhamer, N. (2018). Autoritarni populizam: težak put do objašnjenja (Slučaj Srbije), u: Đorđević, B. (ur.), Konstituconalizam i ustavni dizajn u demokratskoj recesiji. Beograd: Udruženje za političke nauke Srbije / Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultet političkih nauka, 235-252. 
• Jovanović, S. (2016). Bilansi nezavisnosti. Matica 17 (67), 31-42.
• Jovanović, S. (2016). Pravoslavna crkva u Crnoj Gori. Matica 17 (68), 33-70.
• Kako je nastao Srpski sv(ij)et: Raičević, Bokan, Dobrosavljević i Raković na  nacionalnoj TV (VIDEO), IN4S, 06.05.2021, https://www.in4s.net/ (28-05-2022).
• Korać, D. (2007). Franjevci i njihovi samostani u Humu. Croatica Christiana periodica, 31 (60), 17-33.
• Krešić, M. (2016). Vjerske prilike u Humskoj zemlji (Stonu i Râtu) u srednjem vijeku. Hercegovina, br. 2, 65-94.
• Latković, G. (2020). Zašto je Vučić opsjednut Hrvatskom, a u svakom nastupu spominje Hrvate: 'To je stara balkanska metoda'. RTL, 14.7.2020. https://www.rtl.hr/  (28-05-2022).
• Marković,  L. (2021). Jesu li Srbi zarazili Bošnjake imperijalističkom ideologijom? Nedjelja – Portal Katoličkog tjednika, 14.07.2021; https://www.nedjelja.ba/ (28-05-2022).
• Marković, T. (2021). 'Srpski svet', kulturna ideja koja je izvršila kulturocid. Al Jazeera Balkans, 15.08.2021, balkans.aljazeera.net (28-05-2022).
• Matković, H. (1998). Povijest Jugoslavije. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić.
• Mitrović, K. (2017). Kraljevstvo od iskona: Barska (arhi)episkopija i Duklja, u: Mišić, S. (ur.), Srpska kraljevstva u srednjem veku. Kraljevo: Univerzitet u Beogradu etc., str. 47-83.
• Mrduljaš, S. (2019). Određenje Bosne i Hercegovine po Ustavu iz 1974. godine i ideja građanske Bosne i Hercegovine, u: Musić, I. (gl. ur.), Europski ustav za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Mostar: Sveučilište u Mostaru, 291-310.
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• Ukupni rezultati izbora za poslanike u Skupštinu Crne Gore, Podgorica: Državna izborna komisija – Crna Gora., 2020. Dostupno na: dik.co.me (28-05-2022).
• Vidović, D. (201). Pregled toponimije jugozapadnoga dijela Popova. Folia onomastica Croatica, br. 19, 283-340.

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Summary

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O autorima

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• Gordan AKRAP graduated at Zagreb Faculty of Electronics and Computing (1994). He received (2011) PhD at the University of Zagreb, in the field of Information and Communication sciences. Throughout his career in diplomatic and intelligence structures, during and after Croatia's Homeland war, he completed several professional courses, including Diplomatic Academy. His area of research is national and regional security, and intelligence. He published several books, and papers in journals and proceedings. He is editor-in-chief of National Security and the Future Journal, founder and president of Zagreb Security Forum and Hybrid Warfare Research Institute, lecturer at several universities in Croatia and abroad.
• Darko BABIĆ muzeolog (Zagreb, 1973.) izvanredni je profesor na Odsjeku za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti Filozofskog fakulteta SuZG. Radio je na Hrvatskoj radio-televiziji te kao višegodišnji organizator konferencije The Best in Heritage. Bio je predsjednik nacionalnog odbora Međunarodnog komiteta za muzeje (ICOM Hrvatska), te član Hrvatskog muzejskog vijeća (Ministarstvo kulture i medija RH). Redoviti je recenzent, i povremeni (ko)autor muzeoloških koncepcija uključujući nagrađeni stalni postav Muzeja nematerijalne baštine: Riznica Međimurja.
• Ana BARBARIĆ redovita je profesorica na Odsjeku za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu gdje od 1998. izvodi nastavu iz više kolegija na preddiplomskome, diplomskome i poslijediplomskome studiju. Od lipnja 2010. obnaša dužnost predstojnice Katedre za bibliotekarstvo na navedenome Odsjeku. Od rujna 2002. do rujna 2004. bila je stručna tajnica Hrvatskoga knjižničarskog društva (HKD). Od 2005. do 2013. bila je članica Stalnog odbora IFLA-ine (Međunarodni savez knjižničarskih društava i ustanova) Sekcije za katalogizaciju, a od 2009. do 2011. bila je stručna tajnica navedene sekcije. Od 2012. do 2016. bila je članica Upravnog vijeća Nacionalne i sveučilišne knjižnice u Zagrebu u ime Ministarstva kulture. Od 2013. predsjednica je Zakladnog odbora Zaklade Dr. Ljerka Markić Čučuković. Od ožujka 2017. članica je Hrvatskoga knjižničnog vijeća (Ministarstvo kulture i medija) kao predstavnica Rektorskog zbora Republike Hrvatske.
• Mijo BELJO, povjesničar, rođen je 1989. u Mostaru. Radio je kao nastavnik povijesti u Osnovnoj školi Alojzija Stepinca u Zagrebu. Od 2017. godine zaposlen je na Fakultetu hrvatskih studija Sveučilišta u Zagrebu i izabran je u znanstveno-nastavno zvanje docenta. Na matičnom fakultetu izvodi nastavu iz obveznih i izbornih kolegija moderne i suvremene hrvatske te svjetske povijesti s naglaskom na razdoblje Domovinskoga rata. 
• Ivana BENDRA (rođ. Augustinović) rođena je 1982. u Vukovaru. U Institutu društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar – Područni centar Vukovar zaposlena je od siječnja 2007. godine, trenutno na radnom mjestu znanstvene suradnice. U zvanje znanstvene suradnice iz Interdisciplinarnog područja znanosti, znanstvena polja sociologija i teologija izabrana je siječnju 2020. Sudjelovala je kao suradnica na 10ak znanstvenih/tržišnih projekata, odnosno kao voditeljica na jednom projektu. Sudjelovala je na više domaćih i međunarodnih znanstvenih skupova te je do sada objavila preko 20 znanstvenih radova te jednu koautorsku knjigu.
• Marija BOBAN izvanredna profesorica Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Splitu, rođena 1976. u Splitu, predstojnica je Zavoda za ekonomske, financijske i informacijske znanosti i statistiku i pročelnica Katedre za informacijske znanosti i statistiku Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu (gdje je zaposlena od 2000.g. do danas). Autorica je i koautorica 7 udžbenika, 132 znanstvena i stručna rada. Kao predavač sudjelovala je na 130 međunarodnih i domaćih znanstvenih i stručnih skupova kao pozvani predavač uz izlaganje i prezentaciju radova koji su objavljeni u zbornicama radova i relevantnim znanstvenim i stručnim časopisima. Dobitnica je niza nagrada i priznanja te se kroz svoj dugogodišnji znanstveni i stručni rad profilirala kao stručnjakinja za informacijsku sigurnost, zaštitu osobnih podataka, krizno komuniciranje, krizno upravljanje, umjetnu inteligenciju, blockchain tehnologije, e- Zdravstvo, e-Upravu i računalnu forenziku.
• Władysław BUŁHAK (born 1965), PhD in History (1998), Habilitation (assistant professorship) in Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, University of Warsaw (2020). Co-organized the "Need to Know" international conferences since 2011 (12 annual editions). A former member of the editorial board of "Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość" (bi-annually of IPN) (2007-2016). Deputy editor in Chief of "Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej" (annually of IPN) (2020-present). Member of Program and Scientific Committees of Zagreb Security Forum. Member of the International Intelligence History Association. Member of the Research network at the Center for Cold War Studies of the University of Southern Denmark. Published on Polish-Russian relations, intelligence and counter-intelligence of Polish underground (Home Army) during the German occupation of Poland, and Polish communist intelligence. His newest monograph, Wywiad PRL a Watykan, 1962-1972, IPN, Warsaw 2019 (840 pages), is dedicated to the Polish communist intelligence operations against the Holy See in the period from 1962 to 1978.
• Đani BUNJA rođen je 1971. u Zadru. Oženjen je i otac dvoje djece. Hrvatski je branitelj iz 1991. Radio je u Srednjoj školi Biograd, Zadarskoj županiji i na Sveučilištu u Zadru. Od 2001. zaposlen je na Sveučilištu u Zadru, a od 2015. do danas kao docent. Njegov znanstveni interes vezan je za istraživanje različitih aspekata fenomena turizma. Autor je jedne knjige i tri srednjoškolska udžbenika (od toga jedan u koautorstvu) te više znanstvenih i stručnih radova. Sudjelovao na više međunarodnih znanstvenih skupova u zemlji i inozemstvu.
• Roman DOMOVIĆ, doktor informacijskih znanosti, rođen je 1973. u Zagrebu. Radi kao profesor stručnog studija na informatičko-računarskom odjelu Tehničkog veleučilišta u Zagrebu, a ujedno je i dopredsjednik Instituta za istraživanje hibridnih sukoba. Autor je dviju knjiga te više znanstvenih i stručnih radova.
• Ivana HEBRANG GRGIĆ znanstvena je savjetnica i izvanredna profesorica na Odsjeku za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu. Predstojnica je Katedre za knjigu i nakladništvo te voditeljica institucijskog projekta Hrvatski iseljenički. Područja njenog interesa su nakladništvo, knjižnične zbirke i znanstvena komunikacija. Autorica je četiri znanstvene knjige te brojnih radova u časopisima i zbornicima radova. Dobitnica je domaćih i međunarodnih nagrada i priznanja.
• Sanja KIŠIČEK rođena je 1984. u Zadru. Docentica je u Centru za obrazovanje nastavnika Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu i znanstvena suradnica u području informacijskih i komunikacijskih znanosti. U izobrazbi nastavnika, u svom stručnom i znanstvenom radu, bavi se komunikacijskim vještinama, kreiranjem kulture kolaboracije i uspostavi kolegijalnog dijaloga u službi recipročnih mentorstava, multimedijskim instrukcijskim dizajnom te učenjem i poučavanjem s tehnologijom. 
• Stipe KLJAIĆ rođen je 1982. godine. Zaposlen je kao viši znanstveni suradnik na Hrvatskom institutu za povijest. Doktorat iz povijesnih znanosti postigao je 2015. godine na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu, dok je stipendist Hoover instituta sveučilišta u Stanfordu bio 2018. godine. Područja interesa su mu moderna hrvatska povijest s naglaskom na intelektualnu povijest i povijest ideja. Autor je dviju znanstvenih monografija i dvadesetak članaka. 
• Domagoj KNEŽEVIĆ, povjesničar, rođen je 1977. u Zagrebu. Radi kao znanstveni suradnik na Hrvatskom institutu za povijest. Tijekom 2020. imenovan je na dužnost savjetnika ministra vanjskih i europskih poslova. Autor je znanstvenih i stručnih radova, sudionik na tribinama te suradnik u snimanju dokumentarnih serijala.
• Mihaela KULEJ ravnateljica i viša kustosica Gradskog muzeja Virovitica, 1974., po struci je povjesničar umjetnosti i filozof, a trenutno je doktorandica na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu, Odsjek za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti - područje muzeologija. Autorica je mnogih stručnih tekstova te muzeološke koncepcije i novog stalnog postava Gradskog muzeja Virovitica, naziva Drveno doba, koji je više puta nagrađivan, a u studenom 2022. Gradski muzej Virovitica osvojio je nagradu za najbolji slavenski muzej koju dodjeljuje Forum of slavic cultures.
• Tomislava LAUC rođena je 1966. u Vukovaru. Redovita  je profesorica na Odsjeku za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, gdje je počela raditi 1992. kao suradnik na projektu  „Modeli znanja i komunikacijski obrasci“ voditelja prof. dr. sc. Miroslava Tuđmana. Autorica je ili suautorica više znanstvenih radova iz područja obrade prirodnog jezika i multimedijskog instrukcijskog dizajna.
• Willem LEEUWENKAMP works for SoSecure International as a security and intelligence advisor for public and private organizations. He advises those organizations in intelligence-driven word and methodologies for collecting, processing, and disseminating threat intelligence. Willem obtained his master’s degree in Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University during which he specialized in early warning of violent extremism. Before that, he studied political science and intelligence studies at the University of Amsterdam. 
• Ivica LUČIĆ, povjesničar, rođen je 1962. u Ljubuškom. Zaposlen je na Hrvatskom institutu za povijest u zvanju znanstvenog savjetnika. Izabran je u zvanje redovitog profesora na Sveučilištu u Zagrebu i Sveučilištu u Mostaru. Bavi se modernom i suvremenom poviješću. 
• Ivica MANDIĆ is a retired Captian of the Croatian Navy who served as the Head of the Center for Strategy and Defense Study of the Croatian armed forces. He is a graduate of the Naval Military Academy, Command and Staff School “Blago Zadro,” Croatia, and Führugsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, Germany. He is currently a PhD candidate in Croatian history at the University of Zagreb.
• Silvana MARIĆ TOKIĆ rođena je 1984. u Mostaru, Bosna i Hercegovina. Na Filozofskome fakultetu u Mostaru završava studij Novinarstva. Poslijediplomski studij „Jezici i kulture u kontaktu“ upisuje 2008. godine na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Mostaru. Kvalifikacijsku radnju brani 2012. godine pod mentorstvom prof. dr. Miroslava Tuđmana, a doktorsku disertaciju pod naslovom Mediji i informacijski rat u sarajevskim tjednicima u razdoblju od 1992. - 1995. brani 2014. godine pod istim mentorstvom. Zaposlena je kao docentica na Filozofskom fakultetu u Mostaru i kao vanjski suradnik na Fakultetu prirodoslovno-matematičkih i odgojnih znanosti Sveučilišta u Mostaru. Autorica je knjige Medijsko-informacijski rat. Članica je Hrvatskoga društva za znanost i umjetnost BiH.
• Davor MARIJAN, povjesničar, rođen je 1966. u Priluci. Zaposlen je u Hrvatskom institutu za povijest u Zagrebu. Bavi se problematikom suvremene hrvatske povijesti. Autor je nekoliko knjiga i većeg broja znanstvenih radova.
• Josip MIHALJEVIĆ, povjesničar, rođen je 1983. u Livnu. Primarno područje znanstvenoga interesa mu je hrvatska i jugoslavenska povijest druge polovice 20. stoljeća. Znanstveni je suradnik na Hrvatskom institutu za povijest, a kao vanjski suradnik predaje na Hrvatskom katoličkom sveučilištu u nastavnom zvanju docenta. Nagrađen je Državnom nagradom za znanost za znanstvene novake te nagradom Društva sveučilišnih nastavnika i drugih znanstvenika u Zagrebu.
• Željka MIKLOŠEVIĆ, muzeologinja, povjesničarka umjetnosti i anglistica, radila je kao kustosica u Muzeju Slavonije u Osijeku, a od 2009. godine zaposlena na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu na kojem je stekla status doktora znanosti. Trenutno u zvanju docentice na Odsjeku za informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti drži nastavu iz kolegija o komunikaciji i edukaciji u muzejima te teoriji baštine, što su istovremeno i teme koje su u središtu njezina znanstvenog interesa. 
• Saša MRDULJAŠ, rođen je 1971. u Splitu. Osnovnu i srednju školu završio u rodnom gradu. Diplomirao politologiju na Fakultetu političkih znanosti u Zagrebu. Na istom je fakultetu magistrirao (međunarodni odnosi) i doktorirao (vanjska i unutarnja politika). Od 2002. radi u Institutu društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar – Centar Split čiji je voditelj od 2010. U zvanju je znanstvenog savjetnika. Osnovni predmet znanstvenog interesa Saše Mrduljaša jest politička dimenzija hrvatsko-srpsko-bošnjačko-crnogorskih odnosa u prošlosti i sadašnjosti. 
• Ivan ROGIĆ umirovljenik, znanstvenik emeritus. Objavio više knjiga i znanstvenih članaka iz sociologije. Glavna područja znanstvenog interesa su urbana sociologija, sociologija kulture, sociologija razvitka. Živi u Zagrebu.
• Ivica SKOKO rođen je 1969. u Mostaru. Na Fakultetu filozofsko-humanističkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Mostaru, diplomirao novinarstvo. Na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Mostaru, 2011. god., završio poslijediplomski specijalistički studij Odnosa s javnošću i stekao zvanje magistar specijalist odnosa s javnošću. Na istom fakultetu 2013. godine upisuje poslijediplomski doktorski studij „Jezici i kulture u kontaktu“, smjer Informacijske i komunikacijske znanosti, te doktorira 2018. godine pod mentorstvom prof. dr. M. Tuđmana sa temom „Anketa kao sredstvo utjecaja javne diplomacije na javno znanje“. Od akademske 2014./15. na Fakultetu prirodoslovno-matematičkih i odgojnih znanosti sudjeluje u nastavi na kolegiju Informacijske strategije i poslovne informacije. U zvanju docenta na Fakultetu prirodoslovno-odgojnih i matematičkih znanosti je od 2018. godine. Autor je više znanstvenih i stručnih radova. Izlagao je na znanstvenim skupovima i konferencijama u zemlji i inozemstvu.
• David VAANDRAGER is a PHD-student at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (Defense February 24th 2023). He obtained master degrees in Human Geography at the University of Utrecht and Public Administration at the University of Rotterdam. His research centers on institutions and their ability to accommodate change stemming from their environment. He has done research for several regional and national public institutions including the Ministry of Defense and the National Security Authority. 
• Giliam de VALK published (in 2005) his PhD on the quality intelligence analyses have to meet. He is specialized in the methodology of security and intelligence analysis. He has worked at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Utrecht, and the Netherlands Defense Academy where he coordinated and lectured a minor on intelligence studies. At the moment he is an assistant professor at the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University. In 2021, De Valk was the first to receive The Tudjman Scientific Excellence Award. 
• Ugo VLAISAVLJEVIĆ, filozof, rođen je 1957. u Visokom. Radi na Filozofskom fakultetu Univerziteta u Sarajevu u zvanju redovitog profesora. Glavni je urednik filozofskog časopisa Dijalog (Sarajevo) i član uredništva međunarodnog časopisa Transeuropeennes (Paris). Sudionik je brojnih međunarodnih znanstvenih skupova, a više puta bio je gostujući profesor i korisnik stipendija na uglednim inozemnim sveučilištima.  
• Dražen ŽIVIĆ demograf i geograf, rođen u Vukovaru 1968. godine. Znanstveni je savjetnik u trajnom izboru u Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar. Bio je dugogodišnji voditelj Područnoga centra Instituta Pilar u Vukovaru (2006. – 2019.), a od 2019. godine pomoćnik je ravnatelja Instituta Pilar. Autor je i suautor nekoliko znanstvenih knjiga te brojnih znanstvenih radova u časopisima i zbornicima radova. Kao naslovni izvanredni profesor sudjelovao je u nastavi na Fakultetu Hrvatskih studija Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, na Hrvatskom katoličkom sveučilištu, na Katoličko-bogoslovnom fakultetu u Đakovu, na Diplomatskoj akademiji Ministarstva vanjskih i europskih poslova Republike Hrvatske te na Ratnoj školi „Ban Josip Jelačić“ Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“. Dobitnik je više priznanja i nagrada. 

• Na portalu Instituta u objavi Predstavljanje zbornika “Miroslav Tuđman i paradigma znanja”; Zagreb, 25. 5. 2023. objavljeno izvješće s fotografijama: https://www.pilar.hr/2023/05/predstavljanje-knjige-miroslav-tudman-i-paradigma-znanja-zagreb-25-5-2023/

• Pristupačni portal: https://www.pristupacno.pilar.hr/2023/05/predstavljanje-zbornika-miroslav-tudman-i-paradigma-znanja-zagreb-25-5-2023/

CIJENA: 21,24 EURA / 160 KUNA

Zlatko Rebernjak

Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o.

ISBN 978-953-8404-14-6

Zagreb, 2023.