Case Studies
Southeaster Europe (SEE) – Intelligence and Security Services Battlefield?
(Svezak 17, br. 3, 2016.)n
During the last few centuries, SEE was the scene of conflict between many international factors and imperial policies led by various national, political, ethnic, and economic and security interests. These conflicts were, very often, in a function of gaining the dominance in other geographical areas. For the purposes of this study, we divided conflicts in two main groups according to the priority interests of the actors involved...
Article by: Miroslav Tuđman, Gordan Akrap, Published: 05 pro 2016 10:13:00
Assessing Terrorist Threats For Energy Infrastructure By Combining Historical Data And Expert Judgments
(Zagreb Security Forum 2016)
(Volume 17, Number 1-2, 2016.)
Energy systems are relatively attractive targets for terrorist attacks and should be adequately protected. The quantitative risk analysis (QRA), with the threat assessment as one of its standard components, is considered to be a promising methodological framework for optimizing such protection.
This paper presents the results of the research which consisted of two parts. In the first part the statistical analysis of the terrorist attacks towards energy systems was performed. The input data were derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Within the analysis relative contributions of the attacks on energy systems to the total number of attacks were determined. Also, it was examined how those contributions are influenced by various factors related to the characteristics of the target, terrorist group and the environment in which the group operates.
Article by: Davor Šinka, Slavko Krajcar, Tomislav Bajs, Published: 09 lis 2016 10:48:00
Protection Of Oil Pipeline Facilities - Practical Experiences From Croatia
(Zagreb Security Forum 2016)
(Volume 17, Number 1-2, 2016.
The paper presents implemented physical security systems on an Oil Pipeline Terminal in Croatia, concept of operations and standardized procedures for an effective critical infrastructure protection solution.
Article by: Damir Kovač, Velimir Ostoić, Published: 09 lis 2016 10:43:00
Securing CASTOR Transports And Nuclear Energy Material: The Case Of Germany
(Zagreb Security Forum 2016)
(Volume 17, Number 1-2, 2016.)
The year 2022 will probably mark the end of the German nuclear age. Nevertheless the question of how to secure the transport of nuclear energy material will remain relevant for an indefinite period of time: neither does the Federal Republic of Germany have final repository nor is it building one. The transport of nuclear material includes a high number of risk factors, e.g. terror threats and the risk of natural disasters. The article analyses the specific case of the German nuclear policy by looking at the past and current situation and by taking future developments into account.
Article by: Anna Abelmann, Published: 09 lis 2016 10:24:00
Critical Infrastructures Protection In The City Region Of Zagreb
(Zagreb Security Forum 2016)
(Volume 17, Number 1-2, 2016.)
This paper presents the review of the issue of critical infrastructure in the City of Zagreb and the role of the Emergency Management Office in the above themes. There will be described operations and analysis at the level of the Office in the segment of civil protection reaffirmation, ie. the training of its members, which should be a significant support to operational forces in the event of an accident or disaster during an earthquake, being the biggest threat to the City of Zagreb.
Article by: Pavle Kalinić, Boris Guberina, Published: 09 lis 2016 10:18:00
Energy-Critical Infrastructure Protection: “The Case Of Greece”
(Zagreb Security Forum 2016)
(Volume 17, Number 1-2, 2016.)
Certain Critical Infrastructure assets, including systems and networks, were considered vital for the normal operation of all public services, in every well organized community. In order to be controlled in an efficient way, Critical Infrastructure assets are modular separated in various Sectors
Article by: Ioannis E. Anastasakis, Published: 09 lis 2016 08:25:00
48 Absurd Meetings Between Tuđman and Milošević
(Svezak 16, br.2-3, 2015.)
The testimony of Stjepan Mesić is the subject matter of this analysis. In it, we will not deal with indictments against the Croats in The Hague, we will not analyse political circumstances or activities of the Hague Tribunal or the Prosecutor as well as testimonies given by other witnesses or documents produced in the Court. Instead, we will focus on what Stjepan Mesić told investigators...
Article by: Miroslav Tuđman, Published: 26 tra 2016 10:53:00
Metodologija provođenja informacijskih operacija
(Svezak 16, br.2-3, 2015.)
U današnjem svijetu odvija se nemilosrdna borba za prevlast na tržištu i geopolitičkoj sceni, a prava informacija dobivena u pravo vrijeme i iskorištena na pravi način može donijeti prednost ili čak konačnu pobjedu. Informacija je u današnjem svijetu postala kritičan faktor za opstanak poslovnih organizacija, oružanih snaga pa i čitavih država.
Article by: Roman Domović, Published: 26 tra 2016 10:36:00
The principles and determinants of Dr. Franjo Tuđman's national strategy
(Svezak 16, br. 1, 2015.)
"The European Community, which would, in the form of a union of European states, use the combined forces of European countries to prevent the further deterioration of the position of individual European nations could be the most suitable framework for actualizing the idea of co-existence in today's world". In 1968, Tuđman the historian wrote that the program of European integration into a “union of European states” (in today's terminology, the EU) was impossible to achieve or even imagine without Germany, more precisely a reunified Germany. Thus, he predicted that a reunified Germany was not only necessary, but vital. In other words, there could be no European integration without a reunified Germany, just as there could be no reunified Germany without a European integration strategy.
Article by: Miroslav Tuđman, Published: 02 tra 2015 10:04:00
Tehnike informacijskih operacija: Globusove karte o podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine
(Svezak 14, br. 1, 2013.)
Širenjem mita o podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine u Karađorđevu, pojavio se prostor da osobe koje su radile na ovim člancima i kartama realiziraju svoju težnju da javnosti nametnu svoj svjetonazor u kojem je podjela Bosne i Hercegovine u Karađorđevu stvarni događaj. To se vidi već u prvom članku u kojem se argumentira ništavnom argumentacijom, a pogotovo prikrivanjem autorstva karata u ostalim člancima i popratnim dijelovima teksta kojima se sugerira da su karte autentični materijal s pregovaračkih stolova hrvatskih i srpskih timova. Suradnik Globusa Slaven Letica potvrdio je da prvi članak nije djelo tima eksperata nego njegov rad. Bivši glavni urednik Globusa Denis Kuljiš opisao je kako su se opremali članci i pridodavale im se karte. Na temelju prikazane analize svega toga, može se zaključiti da je manipulacija autorstvom karata svjesno provedena informacijska operacija kojom se čitatelje treba uvjeriti da je podjela Bosne i Hercegovine u Karađorđevu stvaran događaj. Budući da je to je prva opširna i sustavna informacijska operacija na temu podjele Bosne i Hercegovine, može se reći da je ona zametak svih budućih informacijskih operacija na tu temu.
Article by: Roman Domović, Published: 18 tra 2013 08:46:00
Prikaz rada apoteke Glavnog sanitetskog stožera hrvatske za vrijeme Domovinskog rata
(Svezak 13, br. 4, 2012.)
Bolnice s lijekovima, kirurškim i sanitetskim materijalom te opremom bile su, dijelom pod kontrolom JNA. Jedna o ozbiljnijih posljedica agresije i gospodarskog osiromašenja Republike Hrvatske bila je i nestašica lijekova. Civilne ustanove nisu, u tom trenutku, bile spremne preuzeti selekcioniranje i distribuciju lijekova, sanitetskog i kirurškog materijala. U tu svrhu Ministarstvo zdravstva, Medicinski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu te druge ustanove, upućuju apele hrvatskoj dijaspori, dok liječnici i pojedine organizacije svojem članstvu u dijaspori upućuju precizne zahtjeve za pomoć u najnužnijem sanitetskom materijalu, lijekovima i opremi.
Article by: mag.pharm. Silvija Missoni i Lidija Lasić (Bilić Pešić), dr.med., Published: 28 pro 2012 05:20:00
Politika izdavaštva poštanskih maraka Republike Hrvatske
(Svezak 13, br. 3, 2012.)
Svojim grafičkim i likovnim rješenjima, hrvatske poštanske marke prenosile su i još uvijek prenose, informacije i poruke koje tako ostaju pohranjene i zabilježene u malom i specifičnom formatu kao svjedočanstva jednog doba, događaja, ljudi i njihovih međusobnih odnosa. Hrvatske poštanske marke na taj način postaju neizbježna činjenica i sastavnica svakidašnje ljudske komunikacije koja nepobitno utječe na oblikovanje javnog znanja u vremenu izdavanja, ali i kasnijeg korištenja za buduće naraštaje.
Article by: mr.sc. Andrej Sardelić, Published: 10 lis 2012 10:37:00
Mač i štit u rukama partije – Represivni sustav u funkciji oblikovanja korpusa javnoga znanja
(Svezak 11, br. 4, 2010.)
Primjena nasilnih metoda prema protivnicima jednopartijskog totalitarnog sustava vuče porijeklo još iz vremena sovjetske Čeke koja je jugoslavenskim komunistima poslužila kao uzor organiziranja i djelovanja vlastitog represivnog sustava. Osobe koje su tražile demokratizaciju društva i države, stvaranje i razvoj demokratskog sustava, bile su izložene snažnoj represiji, pa čak i likvidacijama, živjeli u inozemstvu ili u Jugoslaviji.
Article by: Dr. sc. Gordan Akrap, Published: 17 pro 2010 11:27:00
Vojne strategije i asimetrično ratovanje
(Svezak 11, br. 4, 2010.)
Premda asimetrično ratovanje nije nova pojava, nakon završetka Hladnog rata značajno je intenziviran ovaj oblik ratovanja. Bit asimetričnog ratovanja je i danas nepromijenjena - nastojanje slabije strane da postigne pobjedu nad nadmoćnijim protivnikom korištenjem nekonvencionalnih načina djelovanja. Vođenje asimetričnog rata prisiljava vojne organizacije država Zapada da pronađu metode kojima mogu adekvatno odgovoriti ovoj ugrozi.
Article by: Slavko Barić, Published: 17 pro 2010 10:00:00
Inverzija istine - metoda ostvarivanja dominacije u javnom informacijskom prostoru
(Svezak 11, br. 2-3, 2010.)
Razni elementi društva pokušavaju ostvariti svoju dominaciju u javnom informacijskom prostoru pomoću tehnika informacijskog ratovanja, odnosno tehnikama manipuliranja informacijama. Jedna od njih je inverzija istine. U medijskom obilježavanju dvadesete godišnjice pada Vukovara mogu se vidjeti elementi informacijskog rata te preko njih dokazati njegovo postojanje u hrvatskom informacijskom prostoru.
Article by: Roman Domović, Published: 16 lip 2010 01:14:00
Činjenice o „Optužnici“ koju je pročitao Siniša Glavašević
(Svezak 11, br. 2-3, 2010.)
Ponukani novinarskim prilogom o padu Vukovara koji je objavljen 20.11.2011. u središnjem Dnevniku HRT-a, te mnogobrojnim komentarima u drugim medijima, smatramo potrebnim ukazati upravo na činjenicu da je taj novinarski prilog bio u funkciji nametanja percepcije potpunom distorzijom istine. To ćemo dokazati na jednoj od tema koje se dotaknuo taj prilog: o Optužnici koju je u radijski eter pročitao Siniša Glavašević.
Article by: Marko Lončar, Published: 16 lip 2010 12:30:00
Brijunski transkript, 31. srpnja 1995.
(Svezak 11, br. 1, 2010.)
Zapisnik sa sastanka predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana sa vojnim dužnosnicima, održanog dana 31. srpnja 1995. godine na Brijunima
Article by: Redakcija, Published: 23 ožu 2010 10:56:00
Ima li i Bosna i Hercegovina priliku izgraditi zajednički sustav vrijednosti?
(Svezak 11, br. 1, 2010.)
Svaka država da bi opstala mora se temeljiti na osjećaju pripadnosti njezinih građana i naroda toj državi, na konsenzusu oko bitnog sustava vrijednosti i načina ostvarivanja zajedničkih interesa. Zbog toga je za budućnost Bosne i Hercegovine bitno je li moguća izgradnja zajedničkog identiteta i sustava vrijednosti koje prihvaća većina građana i pripadnici svih njezinih konstitutivnih naroda. Istraživanje o mišljenju građana BiH o ostvarivanju ljudskih prava, demokracije i slobode koje je u srpnju 2010. provela agencija PULS ruši stereotipe o BiH kao podijeljenom društvu.
Article by: Damirka Mihaljević, Published: 23 ožu 2010 10:17:00
Analiza „Brijunskoga transkripta” ili Brijuni 31. srpnja 1995. – 10 sati i 50 minuta
(Svezak 11, br. 1, 2010.)
Politika i strategija hrvatskoga predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, u stvaranju hrvatske države i u njezinoj obrani, kako se to vidjelo iz perspektive Beograda „bila je konzistentno oblikovana, priopćena bez sustezanja, ostvarivana korak po korak, bez radikalnih promjena i lomova”. I njegov sastanak s generalima 31. srpnja 1995. u 10 sati i 50 minuta na Brijunima počinje upravo tako, jasno i bez suvišnih riječi.
Article by: admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo, Published: 23 ožu 2010 10:05:00
Informacijske operacije i mediji ili kako osigurati informacijsku superiornost
(Svezak 10, br. 3-4, 2009.)
Najrazvijenije zemlje definiraju nacionalne informacijske strategije kako bi osigurale „dominaciju punog spektra“. Operacije utjecaja, javna diplomacija i strateško komuniciranje imaju ključnu ulogu u oblikovanju stranih javnosti. Suvremeni priručnici kojima se definira vođenje i upravljanje informacijskim operacijama, medijskim i psihološkim operacijama rađeni su na temelju iskustava i operacija koje su vođene od strane članica međunarodnih snaga i u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Article by: Miroslav Tuđman, Published: 15 pro 2009 10:29:00
Covername: Dali
(Svezak 10, br. 3-4, 2009.)
The author was recruited by the German Foreign Intelligence Service, BND, to work as a secret service member under the cover of his journalistic work. He gave some insight into the character of the BND´s Middle East operations in the 1980s and early 1990s, into some of the practical day-to-day activities of secret service work and wrote about some of his missions in the Middle East.
Article by: Wilhelm Dietl, Published: 15 pro 2009 10:20:00
Prvi međunarodni pokušaj unitarizacije Bosne i Hercegovine: Vance-Owenov plan (2.siječnja 1993)
Prvi međunarodni model unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH, čije je prihvaćanje predstavljalo jedan od preduvjeta priznanju njene neovisnosti bio je Cutileirov plan (18. ožujka 1992). Po njemu je BiH imala biti (kon)federativnom tvorevinom triju, primarno na etničkom principu zasnovanih teritorijalno-samoupravnih jedinica. No tijekom ljeta iste godine došlo je do korijenite promjene međunarodnog odnosa prema pitanju unutrašnjeg uređenja. Rezultat te promjene očitovao se i u pojavi novog, Vance-Owenovog plana (2. siječnja 1993.) po kojem je BiH imala biti unitarnom decentraliziranom državom.
Article by: Saša Mrduljaš, Published: 16 lip 2009 09:58:00
Informacijske strategije i oblikovanje javnog znanja
(Svezak 10, br. 2, 2009.)
Planiranje i provođenje informacijskih operacija nastalih kao posljedica informacijskih strategija, s ciljem oblikovanja javnog znanja kod ciljane publike nisu novost niti posebno obilježje informacijskog doba. Naime, informacija se kao borbeno sredstvo koristi od samih početaka ljudskih sukoba, odnosno u procesima nametanja vlastite volje protivničkoj strani. U informacijskom dobu, informacija postaje primarno sredstvo u procesima nametanja vlastite volje ciljanim publikama, dok se oružane snage koriste izuzetno rijetko.
Article by: Gordan Akrap, Published: 16 lip 2009 09:53:00
Upravljanje vojnim znanjem
(Svezak 10, br. 2, 2009.)
Rat ima dva aspekta: teoriju i praksu pri čemu se prvo sastoji od traženja i klasifikacije znanja o ratu dok drugo predstavlja primjenu znanja na aktualnoj ratnoj situaciji. Umijeće ratovanja, ratna vještina ili znanje ratovanja su sinonimi samo su rabljani u različitim društvenim epohama razvoja ljudske civilizacije, a temeljna razlika je u brzini protoka i količini informacija kojima vojskovođe upravljaju odnosno upravljanje znanjima kojima njihove vojske raspolažu.
Article by: Vilko Klasan, Published: 16 lip 2009 09:49:00
Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata
(SVEZAK 9, br. 4, 2008.)
Studija nastala na osnovi dviju izjava pod prisegom poručnika britanskog topništva Bernarda O'Sullivana o svom sudjelovanju u izručenju 900 Hrvata koji su se u svibnju 1945. predali britanskoj vojsci, a ona ih je izručila vojnicima jugoslavenske armije. Predaja tih 900 hrvatskih ratnih zarobljenika 24. svibnja 1945. bila je jedna od najvećih tragedija Drugog svjetskog rata i nikada se nije smjela dogoditi.
Article by: Dr. sc. Miroslav Međimorec, Published: 23 pro 2008 09:30:00
Hrvati u BiH 1991.-1995.: Nacionalni sukobi i uloga međunarodne zajednice u mirovnim procesima
(Svezak 9, br. 3, 2008.)
Reaching the final peace agreement under international support did not stop the Croatian struggle for equality and national viability. A part of Bosnia's political elite and some international circles of influence are trying to form a unitary Bosnian nation. Besides the weakness of the establishment which would have to unite different entities into a united political community, there is also a lack of one essential factor – the willingness of all ethnical communities to bocome one unitary nation.
Article by: mr. sc. Gordana Iličić, Published: 17 ruj 2008 09:17:00
Komunistički progoni katoličke crkve u Bosni i Hercegovini 1945.-1990.
(Svezak 9, br. 3, 2008.)
The communist government of Bosnia and Herzegovina considered the Catholic Church a serious problem. At the beginning of the communist governance, the Church was considered a direct and dangerous enemy, later even a serious opponent. The communists used various repression methods against the Church at different points in time: murdering priests, destroying and confiscating Church property, as well as various methods of secret police control and disabling activities of the Church.
Article by: dr. sc. Ivica Lučić, Published: 17 ruj 2008 09:12:00
Svezak 5, br. 1-4, 2004.
Miroslav Međimorec: MEDAČKI DŽEP - II DIO: Prijepori
Article by: Redakcija, Published: 23 stu 2004 07:37:00
Svezak 4, br. 1-4, 2003.
Miroslav Međimorec: MEDAČKI DŽEP - I DIO: Nepostojeća bitka
Article by: Redakcija, Published: 15 srp 2003 07:25:00
The Medak Pocket - Akcija Medački džep
(Volume 3, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2002.)
There are many questions that should be asked and answered. Some answers we’ll get immediately, and for some we have to wait. Part of the documents became public; the Croatian Ministry of Defense declassified those concerning the Medak Pocket. Some of the documents are yet to be acquired – for instance the Medak Pocket military operation analysis done by American military attaché Colonel Richard Herrick. That analysis, according to General Bobetko, spoke of an “exemplary military operation”. From what General Bobetko quoted as a part of a conversation that took place in his office, Colonel Herrick proved to be impartial in his analysis. “Our embassy has been worried by incorrect statements and we’re interested in the results of the inquiry. We’re not going to protect anybody; we are only interested in the truth.”
Article by: Miroslav Međimorec, Published: 15 lis 2002 06:25:00
From Security and Intelligence Service to Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency
(Volume 3, Number 1-2, Spring-Summer 2002.)
On April 6, 1941, without a prior declaration of war, the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces invaded Yugoslavia and defeated the Yugoslav Army in twelve days. On April 17, 1941, Yugoslav General Radoje Jankovie and the former Foreign Minister, Cincar Markovia, signed an act of unconditional surrender which took force at noon the following day, April 18. The epilogue: Yugoslavia vanished in a matter of days: the Germans, Italians, Bulgarian and Hungarians had virtually dismembered it.
Article by: Drago Ferš, Published: 03 svi 2002 05:45:00
The Yugoslav National Army Role in the Aggression Against the Republic of Croatia from 1990 to 1992.
(Volume 2, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2001.)
The essay analyses the role of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in the war waged against Croatia from 1990 to 1992. The author draws attention to the fact that from the end of the 1980's, the JNA was an active party to the Serbian expansionist aspirations that gripped Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The Army's role is chronicled from the point of Croatia's democratisation in 1990 to its retreat in the spring of 1992, after having only partially executed the tasks that Serbian expansionist policy had delegated
Article by: Davor Marijan, Published: 16 lis 2001 05:14:00
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism
(Volume 2, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2001.)
In addition to its problematic activities in the area of foreign affairs, the Yugoslav communist government committed terrorist acts against its own citizens in the diaspora who opposed Yugoslav policies. Between 1945-1990, it organized the murder of 73 Croatian emigrants. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, five new states emerged. One is Bosnia and Hercegovina. The author describes the birth and development of terrorist groups in this country, placing emphasis on today's most dangerous form, Islamic terrorism, which is supported by the Muslim government in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and thousands of "mujahedeen" who arrived during the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina to fight for Islam. Since the end of the war, Bosnia and Hercegovina has been a undeclared protectorate.
Article by: Ivo Lučić, Published: 16 lis 2001 05:12:00
The Macedonian Crisis - Terrorism, National Movement, or Struggle for Self - determination?
(Volume 2, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2001.)
Macedonia epitomizes the unresolved national issue which the majority Macedonian and the minority Albanian people of the former Yugoslav republic faced after the disintegration of their common state. The Macedonian state occupies a geostrategical spot and is important to maintain the balance in the region. The Macedonian majority shares the border with Albanians, who at the end of the 20th century have not attained their national goals. After the Serbian retreat from the Kosovo province, Kosovo Albanians, together with those in South Serbia and western Macedonia, demanded their historical and national rights.
Article by: Miroslav Međimorec, Published: 16 lis 2001 05:10:00
Uloga sustava zdravstvene zaštite u zaštiti budućnosti naroda za vrijeme rata: slučaj Bosne i Hercegovine
(Zbornik, Svezak 1, 2001.)
Agresija posrbljene jugoslavenske vojske uzrokovala je 1992. raspad bosanskohercegovačkog sustava zdravstvene zaštite. On se nije mogao održati bez pomoći izvana. Ta je pomoć 1992. i početkom 1993. bila gotovo isključivo hrvatska, dok je uključivanje međunarodne zajednice počelo tek krajem 1993. Herojskim naporima lokalnih zajednica Hrvatska je zajedno s međunarodnom zajednicom osigurala najosnovniju razinu zdravstvene njege za stanovništvo iz dijelova Bosne i Hercegovine pod srpskom okupacijom. Ipak, očuvanje i poboljšanje tog sustava zdravstvene zaštite do kraja je rata gotovo potpuno ovisio o pomoći međunarodne zajednice. Zemlja ne može osigurati svoju vlastitu budućnost ako nije u stanju organizirati i održavati osnovni socijalni sustav kao što je sustav zdravstvene zaštite. Zbog toga, ako se sadašnja rješenja ozbiljno ne razmotre, mogu propasti i međunarodni napori za očuvanjem nezavisne države Bosne i Hercegovine.
Article by: Marko Radoš, Miloš Judaš i Ivan Bagarić, Published: 31 sij 2001 04:33:00
Hrvatska uloga u rješavanju humanitarne krize u Bosni i Hercegovini
(Zbornik, Svezak 1, 2001.)
Hrvatska je igrala ključnu ulogu u upravljanju i okončanju humanitarne krize uzrokovane agresijom jugoslavenske vojske i srpskih paravojnih snaga u Bosni i Hercegovini. Između 1992. i 1995. Hrvatska je prihvatila tri vala izbjeglica i brinula se za više od 500.000 izbjeglica iz BiH; time je stvorila osnovne preduvjete za preživljavanje BiH kao države. Hrvatska je iz državnog proračuna za brigu o izbjeglicama izdvojila više od 1.000.000.000 američkih dolara. Čak je i danas oko 130.000 bosanskih izbjeglica smješteno u Hrvatskoj, a većina se njih još uvijek ne može vratiti svojim domovima. Europska zajednica i UN nisu mogli ni zaštititi živote civila niti spriječiti teška kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. S druge strane, hrvatska vojna operacija "Oluja", 1995. spasila je živote tisuća civila na bihaćkom području. Temeljita analiza hrvatskog doprinosa Daytonskom sporazumu i rješavanje humanitarne krize u BiH jasno otkrivaju da je međunarodna zajednica pozitivnu ulogu Hrvatske ozbiljno potcijenila i umanjila.
Article by: Ivica Kostović, Neven Henigsberg i Miloš Judaš, Published: 31 sij 2001 04:08:00
Kriza u jugoistočnoj Europi (1990.-1999.): Jesmo li išta naučili?
(Zbornik, Svezak 1, 2001.)
Iako je jugoistočna Europa bila izvor i područje velikih europskih sukoba u dvadesetom stoljeću, rješavanje krize, kojeg su se poduhvatili EU, NATO i OSCE, uspjelo je samo privremeno ugasiti vatru i ukloniti izvore sukoba. Zbog toga bi međunarodna zajednica trebala primijeniti kratkoročan plan rješavanja krize i osmisliti dugoročne prijedloge za regiju. Pakt o stabilnosti zaista može postići stabilizaciju regije ako regionalne strane i njihovi dugoročni ciljevi budu inkorporirani u cjelovitu strategiju za cijelo područje. Regionalne vladine i nevladine organizacije mogle bi značajno doprinijeti stvaranju naprednih rješenja unutar sveobuhvatne strategije i na taj način doprinijeti uspjehu Pakta o stabilnosti kao glavnog nositelja strategije.
Article by: Krešimir Ćosić, Srećko Domljanović, Published: 31 sij 2001 04:01:00
Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini ili nepodnošljiva lakoća "povjesničarenja"
(Zbornik, Svezak 1, 2001.)
Autor u ovom radu nema namjeru dati cjelovit opis rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, između ostalog i zbog toga što današnja razina istraženosti to i ne omogućava. Put, koji vodi spoznaji ovog rata, jesu činjenice, a ne predrasude. One su pogotovo jaka značajka su muslimansko-bošnjačkih autora. Svode se na tvrdnju kojom se razbijačima Bosne i Hercegovine imenuju Srbi i Hrvati između kojih se stavlja znak jednakosti. Oslanjajući se na uglavnom neobjavljene i nenavođene dokumente svih triju konstitutivnih bosanskohercegovačkih naroda, dokumente koje dijelom i navodi, autor činjenično osporava neke od uobičajenih i općeprihvaćenih tvrdnji. Za neke tvrdnje nudi drugačije odgovore i skreće pozornost na kompleksnost rata u BiH, koji se uglavnom tumači crno-bijelo. Drži da se u razmatranju karaktera rata prelazi preko rata u Hrvatskoj i njihovog međusobnog odnosa. Težište je rada na 1992. i muslimansko-hrvatskim suprotnostima koje početkom 1993. prerastaju u otvoreni rat. Također, postavlja pitanje u kojoj je mjeri Međunarodna zajednica sudjelovala u ratu i putu u podjelu Bosne i Hercegovine.
Article by: Davor Marijan, Published: 31 sij 2001 03:58:00
Kako je pripremana agresija na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu ili preoblikovanje JNA u srpsku imperijalnu silu
(Zbornik, Svezak 1, 2001.)
U radu se prepoznaju i obrazlažu najznačajnije promjene u JNA i način na koje su one izvedene kako bi ona postala srpska imperijalna sila, a po značenju se ističe sljedeće: (1) preoblikovanje vojske tipa "ideološke jednakosti"; (2) obilježja i svrha preustroja koji su izvedeni prije nego što je javno obznanjena ideja o stvaranju "Velike Srbije"; (3) ratni planovi te uloga vojne strategije i njezino teorijsko, organizacijsko i pokusno utemeljenje; (4) primjena te strategije u agresiji na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu.
Article by: admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo, Published: 31 sij 2001 03:53:00
On Historical Necessity and Contradictions between Sovereignty and Integration of European Nations
(Volume 1, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2000.)
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest European nations. Croatia appeared as an independent state subject in Europe during the Frankish-Byzantine era, between the 9th and 12th centuries. Later, Croatia entered into a state entity with Hungary and Austria, retaining-though in limited form-its state and national individuality. The Hungarian emperors were also the rulers of the Croatian Kingdom (Slavonia and Dalmatia).
Article by: dr. Franjo Tuđman, Published: 30 ruj 2000 03:07:00
Towards Croatian Integration into Europe
(Volume 1, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2000.)
The late Croatian President, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, has left a variegated legacy in European and international affairs in the wake of his departure from the historical scene. The paper published in this issue of the journal was delivered in January of 1990, on the cusp of democratic changes in Croatia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia. During this uncertain period, Tudjman was the president of a broad movement and emerging political party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (independent political parties were only just beginning to be legalized in Croatia).
Article by: Marijan Gubić, Published: 30 ruj 2000 03:05:00
Ragusa Intelligence & Security (RIS) - A Model for the 21st Century!?
(Volume 1, Number 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2000.)
Ragusa (Dubrovnik), a city-state on the eastern Adriatic coast has organized one of the first intelligence organizations in history. Having no army Ragusa's indipendence depended heavily on accurate and timely intelligence gathered by its merchant, diplomats and scientists. Througout its history as a indipendent city-state (from 14th to 19th century) Ragusa maintained its neutral position and ballanced between Austria, Venice, Otoman Empire and other European powers having good diplomatic and trade relations with all of them. The author's own research of the Dubrovnik's archive show that good intelligence was critical for such a policy enabling Ragusa's diplomats quick adapting to the new situations and helping them "guessing right", and that is exactly what intelligence is.
Article by: Stevan Dedijer, Published: 30 ruj 2000 03:02:00
The Role of the Health Care System in Protecting the Future of the Nation During the War: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Volume 1, Number 2, Summer 2000.)
The aggression of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army in 1992 caused the dissolution of the health care system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was unable to sustain itself without external assistance. In 1992 and early 1993, this assistance was provided almost exclusively by the Republic of Croatia, whereas the involvement of the international community began to materialize only from late 1993 onwards. Through the heroic efforts of local communities, Croatia and the international community secured the most basic level of health care for segments of the population in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina not occupied by Serbian forces. However, the preservation and improvement of that health care system since the end of the war has been almost completely dependent on the support of the international community. A country cannot secure its own future if it is not able to establish and maintain a basic social system, such as the health care system. Therefore, the international community's efforts to preserve the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina might fail unless a serious reevaluation of current approaches does not occur.
Article by: Marko Radoš, Miloš Judaš, and Ivan Bagarić, Published: 19 srp 2000 01:41:00
The Role of Croatia in the Management of the Humanitarian Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Volume 1, Number 2, Summer 2000.)
Croatia played a crucial role in the management and termination of the humanitarian crisis caused by the aggression of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 1992 and 1995, Croatia accepted three waves of refugees and cared for more than 500,000 refugees from B&H; it thus secured the basic precondition for the survival of B&H as a state. Croatia invested more than 1,000,000.000 U.S. dollars from its State budget just for the care of refugees from B&H. Even today about 130,000 Bosnian refugees are still accomodated in Croatia, for most are still unable to return to their homes. The European Community and the UN were unable to protect the lives of civilians or to prevent grave breaches of international humanitarian law. At the some time, the Croatian military operation "Storm" in 1995 saved the lives of thousands of civilians in the Bihać area. A careful analysis of the Croatian contribution to the achievement of the Dayton agreements and the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in B&H clearly reveals that the positive role of Croatia has been seriously underestimated and down-played by the international community.
Article by: Ivica Kostović, Neven Henigsberg and Miloš Judaš, Published: 19 srp 2000 01:38:00
Development of the Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Last Ten Years
(Volume 1, Number 2, Summer 2000.)
The article discusses the Hungarian foreign policy in the last ten years. The author states the three main thrusts of the Hungarian foreign policy: the North-Atlantic and European orientation; the regional policy; and, third, supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states. These three directions are analyzed in each of the three Hungarian governments between the period 1990-2000. The author maintains that there was a continuity in matters of national interest, although small differences in the foreign policy could be observed between the three governments. The author points out the differences between the Antall and Horn governments in the policies towards regionalism. Finally, the author reviews Mr. Orbán's foreign policy, which stresses continuity in each of the three areas. The author also underlines the strategic partnership with Croatia, which thus far lacks content.
Article by: Dr. Imre Varga, Published: 19 srp 2000 01:26:00
The Civil War in Afghanistan
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
Author analyses (a) the causes leading to the Afghan Civil War 1979-1989 (the war is above all the result of global rivalries between the super-power states and conflicting political systems); (b) Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan (there is reason to believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation, skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies); (c) the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (brought about an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict, and brought about an abrupt international reaction, especially from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the Islamic world and China); (d) combat operations (the Soviet troops conducted mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very limited forces and equipment); (e) the national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (A civil war should end through consensus within a given society. Such a consensus has not been achieved in Afghanistan to this day, and therefore the war continues); (f) the Civil War without Soviet troops (After Soviet troops departed, the scale of fighting between the Afghans themselves increased); and provides (g) summations and conclusions (The Afghan conflict facilitated the defeat of the USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation between the two super-powers, socio-political systems, and military blocs. One million men passed through Afghanistan. The dead numbered 14,626. About 50,000 men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, and over 500,000 contracted various severe illnesses. In addition, 147 tanks, 1,312 armored vehicles, 233 artillery guns and mortars, 114 airplanes and 322 helicopters were lost).
Article by: Redakcija, Published: 18 tra 2000 06:19:00
The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Or the Unacceptable Lightness of "Historicism"
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The author in this study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because the current level of research does not enable this. The only way to understand this conflict is through facts, not prejudices. However, such prejudices are particularly acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors. They base their claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable in its destruction. Relying on mainly unpublished and uncited documents from the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually challenges basic and generally accepted claims. The author offers alternative responses to certain claims and draws attention to the complexity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been mainly viewed in terms of black or white. The author does, however, suggest that in considering the character of the war it is necessary to examine first the war in Croatia and the inter-relationship between the two. The main focus is on 1992 and the Muslim and Croat differences that developed into open conflict at the beginning of 1993. The role of the international community in the war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also discussed.
Article by: Davor Marijan, Published: 18 tra 2000 06:16:00
How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA into a Serbian Imperial Force
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The most significant changes in the JNA and the way they were carried out so that it could become a Serbian imperial force are identified and explained. The following is emphasized for its significance: (1) reorganization of the "ideological equality" type military; (2) the characteristics and the purpose of the reorganization that had been put into effect before the idea of creating "Greater Serbia" was made public; (3) war plans and the role of military strategy and its theoretical, organizational and trial foundation; (4) the implementation of such strategy in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the aforementioned, the Serbian strategic idea is explained, i.e. "...that in a low intensity conflict, including the prevention and elimination of extraordinary events, and counterstrikes from distance, the enemy be decisively defeated and Yugoslavia protected," which makes up the operational plan for the employment of JNA. Regarding the implementation of the plan in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the segment that is invisible, not always recognizable, in a word covert, but crucial for making own strategic decisions, is explained. The covert nature of the plan is always a good basis for debate, in which the exchange of ideas and views is a continuos process, and the result questionable. Therefore, it is essayed in this work to bring to light this other, less visible side.
Article by: Admiral Davor Domazet - Lošo, Published: 18 tra 2000 06:13:00
US Intelligence Community Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991)
(Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000.)
The author considers the relationship of the United States toward the former Yugoslavia, based on declassified documents (1948-1991) of the American intelligence agency. The US showed no particular interest in Yugoslavia after 1945, considering it a reliable Soviet ally. When the conflict broke out between Stalin and Tito in 1948, it was believed that a Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia was probable and that there was a possibility of American military assistance to Yugoslavia. In the mid-50s, it was evaluated that in the event of an armed conflict between the western and eastern blocs, the Yugoslav army could be relied upon as a Western ally. During the 1960s, American analyses became more critical of Yugoslav foreign policy, which was in open contradiction to Western interests (non-aligned movement, relationship toward the Israeli-Arab war). During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, American policy proposes a "very cautious and well-calculated" position toward post-Tito Yugoslavia, with America avoiding any kind of leading role or hasty initiatives. Evaluations of the internal situation in Yugoslavia grow with the creation of a unified Yugoslavia (which is in American interests), to the total disintegration of the country (the most dangerous scenario being the eventual outbreak of armed conflict, which would be halted with the introduction of Soviet troops into the eastern parts of former Yugoslavia and western troops into Slovenia and Croatia). American analyses do not lose sight of the fact that the regime in Belgrade is repressive, especially in its relations with Croatia and Kosovo, but conclude that the "Belgrade policies, while not ideal, serve western interests."
Article by: Dr Jordan Baev, Published: 18 tra 2000 06:11:00

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