Iako je jugoistočna Europa bila izvor i područje velikih europskih sukoba u dvadesetom stoljeću, rješavanje krize, kojeg su se poduhvatili EU, NATO i OSCE, uspjelo je samo privremeno ugasiti vatru i ukloniti izvore sukoba. Zbog toga bi međunarodna zajednica trebala primijeniti kratkoročan plan rješavanja krize i osmisliti dugoročne prijedloge za regiju. Pakt o stabilnosti zaista može postići stabilizaciju regije ako regionalne strane i njihovi dugoročni ciljevi budu inkorporirani u cjelovitu strategiju za cijelo područje. Regionalne vladine i nevladine organizacije mogle bi značajno doprinijeti stvaranju naprednih rješenja unutar sveobuhvatne strategije i na taj način doprinijeti uspjehu Pakta o stabilnosti kao glavnog nositelja strategije.

Autor u ovom radu nema namjeru dati cjelovit opis rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, između ostalog i zbog toga što današnja razina istraženosti to i ne omogućava. Put, koji vodi spoznaji ovog rata, jesu činjenice, a ne predrasude. One su pogotovo jaka značajka su muslimansko-bošnjačkih autora. Svode se na tvrdnju kojom se razbijačima Bosne i Hercegovine imenuju Srbi i Hrvati između kojih se stavlja znak jednakosti. Oslanjajući se na uglavnom neobjavljene i nenavođene dokumente svih triju konstitutivnih bosanskohercegovačkih naroda, dokumente koje dijelom i navodi, autor činjenično osporava neke od uobičajenih i općeprihvaćenih tvrdnji. Za neke tvrdnje nudi drugačije odgovore i skreće pozornost na kompleksnost rata u BiH, koji se uglavnom tumači crno-bijelo. Drži da se u razmatranju karaktera rata prelazi preko rata u Hrvatskoj i njihovog međusobnog odnosa. Težište je rada na 1992. i muslimansko-hrvatskim suprotnostima koje početkom 1993. prerastaju u otvoreni rat. Također, postavlja pitanje u kojoj je mjeri Međunarodna zajednica sudjelovala u ratu i putu u podjelu Bosne i Hercegovine.

U radu se prepoznaju i obrazlažu najznačajnije promjene u JNA i način na koje su one izvedene kako bi ona postala srpska imperijalna sila, a po značenju se ističe sljedeće: (1) preoblikovanje vojske tipa "ideološke jednakosti"; (2) obilježja i svrha preustroja koji su izvedeni prije nego što je javno obznanjena ideja o stvaranju "Velike Srbije"; (3) ratni planovi te uloga vojne strategije i njezino teorijsko, organizacijsko i pokusno utemeljenje; (4) primjena te strategije u agresiji na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu.

The Croatian nation is one of the oldest European nations. Croatia appeared as an independent state subject in Europe during the Frankish-Byzantine era, between the 9th and 12th centuries. Later, Croatia entered into a state entity with Hungary and Austria, retaining-though in limited form-its state and national individuality. The Hungarian emperors were also the rulers of the Croatian Kingdom (Slavonia and Dalmatia).

The late Croatian President, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, has left a variegated legacy in European and international affairs in the wake of his departure from the historical scene. The paper published in this issue of the journal was delivered in January of 1990, on the cusp of democratic changes in Croatia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia. During this uncertain period, Tudjman was the president of a broad movement and emerging political party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (independent political parties were only just beginning to be legalized in Croatia).

Ragusa (Dubrovnik), a city-state on the eastern Adriatic coast has organized one of the first intelligence organizations in history. Having no army Ragusa's indipendence depended heavily on accurate and timely intelligence gathered by its merchant, diplomats and scientists. Througout its history as a indipendent city-state (from 14th to 19th century) Ragusa maintained its neutral position and ballanced between Austria, Venice, Otoman Empire and other European powers having good diplomatic and trade relations with all of them. The author's own research of the Dubrovnik's archive show that good intelligence was critical for such a policy enabling Ragusa's diplomats quick adapting to the new situations and helping them "guessing right", and that is exactly what intelligence is.

The aggression of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army in 1992 caused the dissolution of the health care system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was unable to sustain itself without external assistance. In 1992 and early 1993, this assistance was provided almost exclusively by the Republic of Croatia, whereas the involvement of the international community began to materialize only from late 1993 onwards. Through the heroic efforts of local communities, Croatia and the international community secured the most basic level of health care for segments of the population in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina not occupied by Serbian forces. However, the preservation and improvement of that health care system since the end of the war has been almost completely dependent on the support of the international community. A country cannot secure its own future if it is not able to establish and maintain a basic social system, such as the health care system. Therefore, the international community's efforts to preserve the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina might fail unless a serious reevaluation of current approaches does not occur.

Croatia played a crucial role in the management and termination of the humanitarian crisis caused by the aggression of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 1992 and 1995, Croatia accepted three waves of refugees and cared for more than 500,000 refugees from B&H; it thus secured the basic precondition for the survival of B&H as a state. Croatia invested more than 1,000,000.000 U.S. dollars from its State budget just for the care of refugees from B&H. Even today about 130,000 Bosnian refugees are still accomodated in Croatia, for most are still unable to return to their homes. The European Community and the UN were unable to protect the lives of civilians or to prevent grave breaches of international humanitarian law. At the some time, the Croatian military operation "Storm" in 1995 saved the lives of thousands of civilians in the Bihać area. A careful analysis of the Croatian contribution to the achievement of the Dayton agreements and the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in B&H clearly reveals that the positive role of Croatia has been seriously underestimated and down-played by the international community.

The article discusses the Hungarian foreign policy in the last ten years. The author states the three main thrusts of the Hungarian foreign policy: the North-Atlantic and European orientation; the regional policy; and, third, supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states. These three directions are analyzed in each of the three Hungarian governments between the period 1990-2000. The author maintains that there was a continuity in matters of national interest, although small differences in the foreign policy could be observed between the three governments. The author points out the differences between the Antall and Horn governments in the policies towards regionalism. Finally, the author reviews Mr. Orbán's foreign policy, which stresses continuity in each of the three areas. The author also underlines the strategic partnership with Croatia, which thus far lacks content.

Author analyses (a) the causes leading to the Afghan Civil War 1979-1989 (the war is above all the result of global rivalries between the super-power states and conflicting political systems); (b) Politburo decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan (there is reason to believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union became "victims" of strategic misinformation, skillfully put into effect by American intelligence agencies); (c) the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (brought about an intensification of the internal Afghan conflict, and brought about an abrupt international reaction, especially from the US, the NATO countries, the countries of the Islamic world and China); (d) combat operations (the Soviet troops conducted mainly partial military operations in the DRA, with very limited forces and equipment); (e) the national reconciliation policy and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (A civil war should end through consensus within a given society. Such a consensus has not been achieved in Afghanistan to this day, and therefore the war continues); (f) the Civil War without Soviet troops (After Soviet troops departed, the scale of fighting between the Afghans themselves increased); and provides (g) summations and conclusions (The Afghan conflict facilitated the defeat of the USSR in a global military and strategic confrontation between the two super-powers, socio-political systems, and military blocs. One million men passed through Afghanistan. The dead numbered 14,626. About 50,000 men were wounded, 6,669 were disabled, and over 500,000 contracted various severe illnesses. In addition, 147 tanks, 1,312 armored vehicles, 233 artillery guns and mortars, 114 airplanes and 322 helicopters were lost).

The author in this study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because the current level of research does not enable this. The only way to understand this conflict is through facts, not prejudices. However, such prejudices are particularly acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors. They base their claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable in its destruction. Relying on mainly unpublished and uncited documents from the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually challenges basic and generally accepted claims. The author offers alternative responses to certain claims and draws attention to the complexity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been mainly viewed in terms of black or white. The author does, however, suggest that in considering the character of the war it is necessary to examine first the war in Croatia and the inter-relationship between the two. The main focus is on 1992 and the Muslim and Croat differences that developed into open conflict at the beginning of 1993. The role of the international community in the war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also discussed.

The most significant changes in the JNA and the way they were carried out so that it could become a Serbian imperial force are identified and explained. The following is emphasized for its significance: (1) reorganization of the "ideological equality" type military; (2) the characteristics and the purpose of the reorganization that had been put into effect before the idea of creating "Greater Serbia" was made public; (3) war plans and the role of military strategy and its theoretical, organizational and trial foundation; (4) the implementation of such strategy in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the aforementioned, the Serbian strategic idea is explained, i.e. "...that in a low intensity conflict, including the prevention and elimination of extraordinary events, and counterstrikes from distance, the enemy be decisively defeated and Yugoslavia protected," which makes up the operational plan for the employment of JNA. Regarding the implementation of the plan in the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the segment that is invisible, not always recognizable, in a word covert, but crucial for making own strategic decisions, is explained. The covert nature of the plan is always a good basis for debate, in which the exchange of ideas and views is a continuos process, and the result questionable. Therefore, it is essayed in this work to bring to light this other, less visible side.

The author considers the relationship of the United States toward the former Yugoslavia, based on declassified documents (1948-1991) of the American intelligence agency. The US showed no particular interest in Yugoslavia after 1945, considering it a reliable Soviet ally. When the conflict broke out between Stalin and Tito in 1948, it was believed that a Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia was probable and that there was a possibility of American military assistance to Yugoslavia. In the mid-50s, it was evaluated that in the event of an armed conflict between the western and eastern blocs, the Yugoslav army could be relied upon as a Western ally. During the 1960s, American analyses became more critical of Yugoslav foreign policy, which was in open contradiction to Western interests (non-aligned movement, relationship toward the Israeli-Arab war). During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, American policy proposes a "very cautious and well-calculated" position toward post-Tito Yugoslavia, with America avoiding any kind of leading role or hasty initiatives. Evaluations of the internal situation in Yugoslavia grow with the creation of a unified Yugoslavia (which is in American interests), to the total disintegration of the country (the most dangerous scenario being the eventual outbreak of armed conflict, which would be halted with the introduction of Soviet troops into the eastern parts of former Yugoslavia and western troops into Slovenia and Croatia). American analyses do not lose sight of the fact that the regime in Belgrade is repressive, especially in its relations with Croatia and Kosovo, but conclude that the "Belgrade policies, while not ideal, serve western interests."