

New European Values and Small Nations

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Introduction: European Security Strategy

ESS - *The European Security Strategy* (ESS)¹ has been approved by the European Council in December 2003, by document titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World. *European Security Strategy*". Upon defining the European security and defence politics (ESOP) in 1998 with the main goal to strengthen outside activities of EU through creating its own possibilities for outside activities through development of autonomous civil and military capacities, for international prevention of confrontations and for crisis management. ESS is a document which the Europe uses for the first time to create its mutual security strategy, and represents the very first official and systematic display of security-strategic concept of EU.

Document starts with the conclusion that "Europe has never been so successful, so secure or so free", and ends with the conclusion; "The World is filled with new hazards and possibilities".

ESS includes the global challenges and five possible threats to the European security: terrorism, arms proliferation for mass destruction, regional conflicts, weak states, i.e. "failed states" and organized crime. The ESS especially brings out the efficient multilateralism and international law that considers it could offer appropriate legal framework for usage of force in international relations.

It introduces new terms of "preventive engagement" (which includes activities of diplomacy, economic measures, development cooperation and humanitarian aid), and "efficient multilateralism"².

The ESS document also makes a conclusion that threats in modern world are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable". It also claims that "In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near. The new threats are dynamic ... The first line of defence shall often be abroad", outside the borders of EU and therefore "conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early."

Therefore the EU took over the "task to promote ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean". The importance of such politics illustrates well the example of the Balkans. Because "the credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there". However, the "solution of the Arab/Israeli confrontation is also strategic priority for the Europe"³.

Moreover, the Europe considers the entire Mediterranean area as the area of "serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona process".

In accordance to the security and defence politics (ESOP) the EU outside its borders performs operations for peace preservation, crisis management, as well as operations of peace establishment. Up till now four operations have been carried out and 11 are in course.⁴.

(Un)learned lessons or asymmetric threats

We must agree on conclusion that European Union - with 25 Member States, 450 million inhabitants that form one fourth of the world gross national income - is the world player which "should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and building a better world" . The fact the 25 Member States assign 160 billions of Euros for defence politics is a good indicator, as well as the guarantee, that EU has the strength to resolve all threats that could endanger its "physical" security: from armed terrorist actions to military and economy threats.

However, in the era of globalization the world actors, as well as small or large countries, communities or corporations, are disposed to the attacks and threats of some other sort: their values are attacked, cultures, identity, ways of thinking and living. Those attacks are harder and harder to defend from. Sometimes, it is much easier to defend from the physical attacks and threats. Since, when dominant values are displayed to the attack of the "soft force", than those attacks can not be defended by hard force.

The good examples of what we are trying to say are events that happened in Europe at the end of the 20th Century. This is the fact

that is not mentioned in the strategic documents and it is important for the strategic evaluation. At the end of the 1980s and beginning at the 1990s the communist system and Warsaw Pact disintegrated. One of the strongest two military alliances disintegrated, where the military assets have not even been used. Why did the communist system and Warsaw pact disintegrated?

Although everybody coveted, and those that had to live under such system and those that competed and confronted with it, even today, there are no reasonable analyses. The majority would probably agree that this disintegration came unexpectedly and as the consequence of decanted values it was build on.

What is the conclusion? The largest danger for European security is the danger that we can hardly outlive, are threats that threaten values on which the Europe rests, or it strives for. Europe can successfully defend from the outside attacks, with more or less damage, but how can it defend from its own mistakes, arrogance and exclusivity that destroy its credibility and reputation?

"We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention"⁷. We rightfully have to question what are the goals, i.e. on which values it is allowed to impose, especially, **preventive** solutions by military threats, economy sanctions and other different types of political and diplomatic pressure?

It already became a general placement of the European culture that violence, especially violence against life, as well as against peace, is unacceptable as behaviour of the individual and as much as states. However, the measures of pressure, even those military interventions and operations that are accepted by the UN Security Council or NATO, i.e. EU, are "acceptable". More precisely, in accordance to the regulations of the international law and conventions there are no sanctions against implementation of military, especially not a "soft" force and coercion (political, economy, etc.), to the countries and international organisations towards disciplinary actions of the certain countries and regimes.

Basically, as much as those actions are justified, sometimes they are, as shown by the example of Iraq, very questionable in regard its long-term impacts and consequences which are very often followed by undesired social and political consequences that leave deep wounds and trauma.

Therefore, the question of European "strategic culture" is of great importance. Could European strategy be based on the values of the globalism? Namely, detailed analysis of the strategic documents would show that globalism values (free market, technology, information, "free flow of people, goods and capital") are the values that dominate in such documents. But, as long as those values could be of the vital interest for the large states and international corporations are not always the priority of the small

nations. The advantages, as well as threats as a consequence of the global changes, are not equal for small and large countries, for fewer or numerous nations. This stands for not only the world outside the EU, but for small and large Member States of EU, and for countries that wish to join to EU.

EU should count on the fact that there is an asymmetry of threats in national security of certain countries, where the Member Countries of EU are also faced with asymmetric threats of their security by the globalism even when they are placed under the European umbrella.

The arrogance of large ones and the national interest asymmetry of the small ones

In *European Security Strategy* (ESS) Balkans was mentioned seven times in the following context: "The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent"⁸, "Balkans criminal network"⁹, "... to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC"¹⁰, "... Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy ..." ¹¹, " Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows"¹², etc.

Those lump sum evaluations "of Balkan" as a problem that is hard to resolve, and as a threat of the European security, were undertaken from the documents that preceded the adoption of the European Security Strategy.

In strategic documentation through alleged analysis of the cause of the war and wars on the Balkans the arrogance is also present. So the authors of the "Report of the International Commission on the Balkans" saw the main causes of the confrontations and wars in the area of former Yugoslavia in "return of the ancient hatred", in "return of the suppressed nations", that is in confrontation of the "grown wild" nationalisms:

*"But, the main causes of this war are in the fact that sparkles of the aggressive nationalism were fired by those political leaders of the Yugoslavian Federation that, in their desire to obtain their nationalistic goals invoked "ancient hatred" and the ones that intentionally initiated their propaganda machinery in order to justify something that can not be justified: the usage of the violence for purpose of taking over the territory, deportation of "other" nations and resuming the authoritarian government constitution"*¹³.

Beginning with the belief that the "prevailing mentality on the Balkans is one continuous peace threat, the terrifying example of intolerance and shame for the Europe"¹⁴ the International Commission for Balkans came to conclusion that in the area of

the former Yugoslavia, which they continually call Balkans, and where by their opinion, live "Balkans nations", "a Third Balkans War" took place. In order to place this "European shame" under the control, the Tindemans Commission formed their report in 57 recommendations which are "intended for the west governments and non-government organisations in region"¹⁵.

First thirty recommendations are related to certain countries "at the Balkans", where the recommendations from 31 to 57 articulate the measure and procedures for obtaining the "creation of the Southern Balkans Confederation".

Such starting point of the *International Commission for Balkans* referring to the causes and the reasons of disintegration of Yugoslavia, from the historical and political point of view is misleading. From the social point of view it is humiliating and insulting for the nations that fought for national freedom and their country to set themselves free from communist and from Yugoslav unitary regime, which is also unsupported from the position of theory and facts which is proved enough by the simple fact: at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s resulted with 15 new countries in Europe. This process is continued even after year 2000 when Montenegro became independent and sovereign country.

This kind of status is expected for the Kosovo as well. Are all of these states the result of the "aggressive nationalism, "ancient hatred" or an act of the "propaganda machinery"?

Today's confrontations between Walloons and Flemings in Belgium broke out to the surface in the very heart of the European Union. Is this the matter of the "aggressive nationalism" and "ancient hatred" as well? Hardly.

It is more likely that it is the matter of the repudiation of the rights of small nations to freedom and independency, as from the hegemonistic actors in multinational communities, as much as the international actors - "keepers" of the actual international order.

Maybe some "Balkans states" have stumbled, they probably still have not established democratic standards as developed European countries, but new states in the area of former Yugoslavia are established as a result of the national democratic movements and are free of Yugoslav unitary order as well as communist system without any help, and once beside help of some European countries.

Therefore, the underestimation of the national independency and freedom of the new states undermines the credibility of the European actors with small nations that are proud on their democratic achievements in given circumstances.

The events in Europe at the end of the 20th Century only confirmed the historical and political fact, which is the consequence of the disintegration of the communist system and democratization

of the international order:

a) The world is in the process of versatile international and regional integrations, yet in the same time, more and more nationally individualized; multinational countries are disintegrated and (small) nations gain their sovereignty in their own state and in membership of international organizations; fundamental ideals in strategy of democratic movements are national freedom, independence, sovereign state and international recognition;

b) Multinational states constituted as unitary community, i.e. on hegemony of one nation, can survive only through force and they are not democratic, because every constitutive nation can not achieve their national freedom and interest.

Due to the different reasons, the confirmation of these attitudes does not have its place in the strategic documents. Misunderstanding of these crucial events that occurred at the end of the 20th Century, the processes that resulted in establishment of 15 new states in Europe, could illustrate, what it appears to be misunderstanding in "terminology" which carries even possible deeper misconceptions.

Namely, Croatia, in its political, historical and at least geographic sense has never been the part of the Balkans nor West Balkans. It became as such just in year 2000 by means of the political engineering of EU when the summit of "the largest conference of statesman in history of Croatia on West Balkans¹⁷" was held in Zagreb.

One strategic document that preceded the *summit* in Zagreb, precisely explains why EU uses the term Balkans: "The usage of the term "South-Eastern Europe" instead of the term "Western Balkans" implied to the acknowledgement of the fact that this region is already part of the Europe and that its problems are problems of the Europe, and that any sustainable solution must be European solution that would include dependency on Union and its enlargement"¹⁸.

For EU, Western Balkans could represent a "technical term" which, as explained, implies to the fact that "this region" is not a part of the Europe and that Balkans problems are not European problems. For such concept, the bureaucracy of EU obtained ruling elite in Croatia and maybe with more or less success, the elites in other countries of "Western Balkans". However, it is the fact that Croatian citizens and Croatian nation shall not agree on such judgement of values because they have historically and politically, as well as geographically¹⁹ always considered Croatia as part of the Middle-European or Mediterranean country.

Therefore, we have the right to ask the question: is it justified and politically wise to impose such solutions which implication of values could be the cause of new misunderstandings in the future? Croatia can, but does not have to be accepted to EU. I believe

that it will be, because Croatia belongs there. As for the Croatian national and cultural identity it is not very good to be pushed where she does not want to be²⁰; similarly it is not desirable for the credibility of EU to impose wrong solutions or the solutions made in a hurry to the one (still) not willing to accept the its membership.

The violence of the global

The EU outside its borders is planning and implementing operations for peace preservation, crisis management and operations of peace establishment. Such strategy is based on the modern comprehension and logic of the "great strategy", for which the goal of the international politics is not war but establishment of the good peace. Today's goal of the European politics is to avoid war at any price. McNamara is even more specific: "Today, there are no such thing as military strategy, there is only crisis management".

It is necessary to be reminded to the "scientific basis" which is the foundation for operations for crisis management. According to the Riemann model "the settling of the confrontation": the actors should be imposed by outside conditions that "disable/to come to/the sustainable development where everybody wins ... There is no requirement of justice or solution for the cause of the confrontation, but tends to affect the actors offering them certain benefits for withdrawal from the confrontation".²¹

Global strategists and crisis managers do not "seek justice or solution for the cause of the confrontation", they request from the actor to withdraw from its values and interests.

One of the main arms that are used for the crisis management is a "soft" force. The public diplomacy means the usage of the "soft power", i.e. media, non-government organisations, exchange of experts, etc. with the goal: to force the others to behave in the way that suits us (and otherwise they would not behave in this way).²²

The effects of the public diplomacy in European dimensions are not a secret. It is publicly spoken about government changes in certain transition states per "Slovakian model", "Bulgarian model", "Croatian model", etc..

The usage of the media by the public diplomacy is not a secret as well; information wars are led with the goal for obtaining the dominance of own information, i.e. how to force the opponent to change his decisions on his own damage²³. The postulate for such actions is hidden in the thesis: "the picture is more important than the truth" and "the future is more important than the past".

International Haag Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is also one of the "instruments for imposition of the peace" and not for the establishment of justice. (This is the reason why the verdicts followed the logic of political verdicts and rewards in order to disci-

pline "Balkans countries and nations". From the justice point of view ICTY is an international failure. If it was wanted to achieve justice and punish the crimes, the punishment should be left to the national courts where the ICTY could have been the higher corrective instance).

There is a range of examples that could confirm only the processes that occur: universal values - freedom, human dignity, truth, justice, culture - which were the basis for the international order after World War II. and their definition in the UN charter from 1948, are "getting old".

Globalisation is the new world process that is not the question of choice but it is inevitable. This process is imposing new values: market, technology, information, tourism.

At the same time globalists have given up primary human rights: freedom, truth, justice, man dignity. Instead, they offer "new human rights": free flow of money, goods and services.

Recently deceased French philosopher Jean Baudrillard was right when he claimed that there is no analogy between terms "global" and "universal". The human rights, freedom, culture and democracy are universal values. Opposite to that, the technology, market, tourism and information are global values. Our societies and cultures vanish in the global, because we lost our own singularity and given up on our own values.

Security strategies of the large forces, such as EU, shall successfully defend from all outside and "physical" threats. The problem is whether they will find the "balance" between the universal and global values?

Through the ESS and public diplomacy, small nations and their interest sphere in EU are imposed by advantages and benefits brought by "global" values.

Those advantages can not be denied and sometimes they are hard to refuse. But it is the question of the price that they must pay. Is the price to give up on the universal values?

New states on the European ground did not have the chance to build firm mechanisms of the national security and therefore the impact of the global values to their national and cultural identity could be much more destructive than those of countries with long tradition of security culture.

What can we do? The globalisation is inevitable. Similarly as the industrialisation two Centuries ago. Because no one considered the negative effects of the industrialisation, the world in the last 50 years had to deal with rectifying of ecological disasters and damages "produced" by uncontrolled desire for wealth and growth. Some of the industrialisation consequences are impossible to rectify.

Shall we be able to avoid negative globalisation consequences in due time? The globalisation values are irreversible. Universal

values are not. We must accept the world that is permanently integrating, but nationally individualizing as well. Therefore there must be a balance between global and universal values. Globalisation is a world networking upon variety of foundations, but the nodes around which and for which the world integrates are universal values. Today, this balance does not exist: universal values are suppressed to strategic plans of great ones.

By its origination the National Associations of the War Veterans are predetermined to be the bearers of the universal values: freedom, independency, man dignity, homeland, and respect for the victim that was paid for those values. This is the reason those associations take care of traditions and symbols of the national and cultural identity of their nations.

Countries with the long tradition of veterans should use their experience to offer help to the new Europe states, to the transition countries also, so that the organisations of the war veterans could obtain crucial place not just among NGO but as the part of every state politics.

If we wish to build Europe on the variety of differences, different national identities and cultures, it can not be built without participation of the organisations of war veterans. Similarly, strategies and politics that international actors shall bring without acceptance and participation of the "failed" countries, to which they shall apply the means of "soft" and "hard" force, will have only short-term success, as well as long-term negative consequences.

In order to avoid negative consequences of the strategic plans we should move step further. Today, long-term goals of development and strategic plans are privilege of large and developed ones. Small countries and undeveloped countries do not have adequate infrastructure for strategic opinion and planning. If it is true that today's world is networking on different foundations, than it would be reasonable to create a network of strategic centres in those countries that have mutual interests and needs for mutual connecting. If this is about European countries and interests than it does not matter if all of those countries are on this or other side of the Schengen border.

Notes

- 1 Brussels: European Council, 12 December 2003
- 2 European Security and defense politics. (URL: www.mvpei.hr/ei/-11.11.2007)
- 3 "Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has

- long supported - is now widely accepted", European Security and defense politics. (URL: www.mvpei.hr/ei/ -11.11.2007)
- 4 ESOP Operations include fulfilment of the "Petersberg tasks", i.e. operations of peace preservation, crisis management, but also the operations of peace establishment. Till now there are 4 successful operations: military operation "Concordia" in Macedonia (March - December 2003), military operation "Artemis" in Congo (June - September 2003, significant since it is the first military operation without NATO participation and carried out outside European area), civil jural mission "Eujust Themis" in Georgia (July 2004 - July 2005) and police mission "Proxima" in Macedonia (December 2003 - December 2005).

Further, there are 11 operations in course: military operation "EUFOR-Althea" in Bosnia and Herzegovina (started in December 2004), police mission "EUPM" also in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since January 2003), police mission "EUPOL Kinshasa" (started in April 2005), civil jural mission "Eujust Lex" in Iraq (operational since July 2005), mission "EUSEC" for security sector reform support in DR Congo (since June 2005), mission "EUFOR DR Congo" (approved by the EU Council in March 2006 upon UN request, with a goal for EU support to UN mission MONUC in DR Congo during the time of the election process), civil-military operation "AMIS II" in Darfur, Sudan (since July 2005), Monitor mission "AMM" in Aceh, Indonesia (since September 2005), police mission "EUPOL COPPS" on Palestine territory (since January 2006), border mission "EU BAM Rafah" at the Rafah border crossing of Palestine territory (operational since November 2005), police advisory team "EUPAT" in Macedonia (since December 2005., operation is continued to "Proxima" completed in December 2005), and EU mission for control of the borders of Moldova and Ukraine (started in November 2005). (URL:www.mvpei.hr/ei/. 11.11.2007)

- 5 Page 2.
- 6 Document was created in 2003, and the information is most probably related to year 2003.
- 7 Page 12.
- 8 Page 2.
- 9 Page 6.
10. Page 7.
11. Page 7.
12. Page 14.
13. "Unfinished peace". Report of the International Commission on the Balkans". Leo Tindemans, President. Zagreb: Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights; Sarajevo: Law Center FOD BiH, 1997, page XVI.

14. **Unfinished peace**:..., page X.
15. **Unfinished peace**:..., page 12.
16. The thesis were taken from the study M. Tuđman: "Memory production: between historical oblivion and consent to political manipulation", in M. Tuđman. The truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina. Zagreb: Letter M, 2005, pages 3-50.
17. HINA (Croatian News Agency), Base EVA, 24.11.2000.: Zagreb summit, 24th November 2000. gathered heads of the states or governments of all Member States of EU and five states of Southern-East Europe - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania, accomplished the projection on the regional cooperation in the way Tindeman International Commission wrote in 1996. Namely, five "Balkans states" through signing the final summit document obliged to regional cooperation and in return they gained the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as mutual obligatory contract for eventual acceptance to the EU.
18. See: BALKANS STATES AND NEW EUROPEAN RESPONSIBILITIES. Strategic concept presented at the special meeting of "Club of three and Balkans countries". Brussels, 29-30 June 2000. Dr. Win van Meurs, C.A.P, 19.06.01.
19. The fact that "Western Balkans" is political and not a geographical term is already pointed out by the fact that there is no Eastern, Southern or North Balkans; i.e. it is not quite clear where is the entire Balkans area to which belongs the Western Balkans as well.
20. It is important to emphasize that Balkans here is not considered as the undesired term due to possible and negative meaning that could be attributed. Here, we had in mind much more elementary fact, which is the right for the small nations to choose their surrounding and their partners upon their own interests and priorities, and not to be imposed by long-term solutions. This does not mean that Croatia does not want to accept the standards and conditions that are the precondition of the membership in EU. The question is does Croatia (as other "Balkans states") have to accept solutions that are brought by others and imposed under pressures and threats. Basically small countries ask themselves with the right whether the European order will function for them upon the principles of imposing the vital decisions in other matters as well?
21. The experience of managing the crisis International Community gained in the "area of former Yugoslavia", that is in the area of today's "Western Balkans". This is one of the first experiences where has been reached term and theory on "crisis management".
22. The terms are sometimes changed but the content is the same. Therefore the term propaganda due to its usage on

East became unpopular on the West. American started to use terms "system of values", information politic and recent "public diplomacy".

23. "...in its essence, is about ideas and epistemology -- big words meaning that information warfare is about the way humans think and, more importantly, the way humans make decisions." (Stein, 1995, p. 32)